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Given that there has been no single view of the causes of global environmental degradation in the 
face of Third World developmentalism and widespread poverty, this thesis explores the potentials of 
Muslim groups to advance relocalisation, or returning to smaller scale, more self-reliant 
communities with simpler ways of living and with self-local governance. In particular, the research 
investigates the role of an Islamic symbolic universe in the adherents decisions to act, including how 
this affects interactions with the nation-state and modern sciences within the Indonesian context. In 
advancing this argument, I rely on social constructivism as it was developed by Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann, in conjunction with a Symbolic Interactionism premise, to develop a theoretical 
framework appropriate to Muslim communities and their voluntaristic actions. With a qualitative 
research method, the research focuses on four Indonesian Muslim groups: Muhammadiyah, 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Hidayatullah, An-Nadzir and the learning communities they established. Data 
sources include interviews with leaders, observations, participatory observations, documents, and 
texts. The outcome shows that capitalising on an Islamic symbolic universe to transition Muslim 
communities by endogenous relocalisation is possible and doable. Of the four Muslim organisations 
studied, all had potential for support of relocalisation in different ways, with Hidayatullah and An-
Nadzir providing the closest example of green intentional communities which can be transformed 
into models of endogenous relocalisation by Muslim groups. The transformed models can be 
duplicated and their culture can be propagated, to convert Muslim society at large to live up to the 
Islamic ecological values for survival and sustainability. The thesis puts forward knowledge 
transmission by Murabbi as a way to make sustainability education relevant to Muslim 
societies, based on the understanding that one needs more than intellectual ability 
to comprehend knowledge, but rather time is needed to personalize it by living it. The thesis 
highlights epistemological pluralism as posing a serious challenge to the whole-earth-one-world-
family vision of the environmentalists. With that challenge in the background, it aims to offer a 
more realistic vision where at least one sector of humanity can possibly advance environmental 
movement on a global scale under its own sacred canopy, that is, a global network of relocalisation 
by local Muslim communities. Thereby, the thesis advocates decentralism as opposed to centralism, 
and Dar al-Islam Environmental governance for the Ummah within night-watchman states.
Keywords: Peak Oil and Climate Change; Pragmatic; Endogenous; Relocalisation; Sociology 
of Knowledge; Symbolic Universe.
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In 570 A.D. Abraha, the ruler of Yemen, decided to destroy Kaba in Mecca. He marched at the head of a huge 
army. He camped outside Mecca, and then sent a few of his people to capture the camels of the Meccans. Of 
the camels captured, around 200 belonged to Abdul Muttalib, the chief of the Quraish, a grandfather of 
Prophet Muhammad. An officer from Abraha came to the Meccans, saying that they did not wish to hurt them 
but had come to demolish the Holy Kaba with his elephants. Abdul Muttalib said that they too did not want to 
fight Abraha. As for the Holy Kaba, it was the house of Allah and Allah would do whatever He pleased. Abdul 
Muttalib then went with some of his sons to see Abraha. Abraha welcomed him with respect. He expected 
Abdul Muttalib to ask him not to destroy the Holy Kaba but instead Abdul Muttalib ask for the return of his 
camels. Abraha was surprised that Abdul Muttalib was talking about camels when the Holy Kaba itself was 
going to be destroyed. In response to Abrahas remarks, Abdul Muttalib gave a famous reply, saying: I am the 
owner of the camels. The House too has a Master who looks after it. On hearing this, Abraha shook his head 
and proudly replied: There is none powerful enough to stop me. 
(Historical context (asbab al-nuzul) of Surah al-Fil (The Elephant) of the Quran (Q:105). 
Muslims understand the Ka'ba was built by prophet Ibrahim (Abraham), so it had been considered a holy 
shrine for the believers even before the birth of Islam)
The story of Abraha and Abdul Muttalib inspired me to consider relocalisation1 as a pragmatic 
position in the face of climate change and the dilemma of oil2. The enhanced greenhouse effect and 
dilemma of oil are arguably the most life-threatening environmental problems and the most 
difficult political issues in the 21st century. The problem is double pronged: firstly, the economic-
growth paradigm and consumption level of the consumer-capitalist societies; and secondly, poverty 
and the development project in the Third World (or developing countries). Both imply exploitation of 
natural resources. The ineffectiveness of the present form of environmental movements and global 
environmental governance is widely acknowledged (Speth, 2002; Park, 2008; Stern, 2006). They have 
been neither able to challenge the dominant political-economic and cultural paradigms which 
caused this problem in the first place, nor to persuade the majority of the population to act whether 
it is in the North or the poorer South. It is against this background that this research seeks to delve 
into socio-ecological problems without eliding the interlinked and dilemmatic situations of Third 
World poverty-development on the one hand, and natural resource exploitation-environmental 
degradation on the other. The research focused on Indonesia as a case study and attempted 
pragmatically to find an alternative environmental movement that could address both political-
  
1
The creation of smaller scale, less-unsustainable communities that are largely self-reliant, with self-local 
governance.
2
Whether oil has peaked already as some believe, or whether there are still abundant oil reserves as others 
argue. In case of the former, we are in the brink of scarcity; in case of the latter, we have so much oil that we 
are cooking the planet with it given that environmental degradation, in mathematical language, is a function 
of (i) economic growth, in which energy is needed; and of (ii) human consumption, in which population, human 
needs, and lifestyle are factors.
2
economic-cultural challenges, and the desirability and practicability of an environmental movement 
supported by a wider reach of the Indonesian population.
My chemical-engineering background and five years experience in the Indonesian 
petrochemical industry during the 1990s have exposed me to the extent of industrial pollution 
through soil, water, and air. Witnessing the steep increase of pesticide and agrichemical uses, I was 
beginning to get alarmed by food safety issues for my own family and developed an interest in 
organic agriculture. As soon as I got a closer look at farming life in Java, numerous problems came to 
the surface. There were a lot more immediate problems occurring in the rural communities other 
than that of agrichemical-addiction. They were extreme poverty, an asymmetrical agricultural 
trading system, land grabbing, land conversion, urbanization and ecosystem destruction, economic 
policies that were not favouring the agricultural sector, and loss of confidence and cultural 
coherence in the villages, which led the young people to leave for the cities. I had always been given 
the resource curse conundrum or paradox of plenty as an answer to how poverty and famine 
could exist in places like Indonesia. This refers to the paradox that countries and regions with an 
abundance of natural resources tend to have worse development outcomes than countries with 
fewer natural resources; perceived by me as a modern myth used to deflect all questions about 
global injustice. 
Beginning in 1999, I was determined to fully dedicate myself to activism and set up, however 
small, a social-entrepreneurial organisation to sustain a not-for-profit undertaking. This was named 
Amani3. During its operation there are varied international bodies that Amani has been non-
financially acquainted with: World Wildlife Fund Indonesia (WWF); Centre for the Promotion of 
Imports from Developing Countries (CBI) and Programma Uitzending Managers (PUM) Netherlands; 
and Institut Européen d'Administration des Affaires (INSEAD) in France (note that Amani has been 
self-funded completely). From CBI and PUM Amani accessed expertise; INSEAD used Amani as a case 
study of social entrepreneurship for their MBA students  one student came for fieldwork and a 
large group of students paid Amani a visit in their study excursion in Asia; a couple of times WWF 
used Amani farms as the venue of their occasions. Activities for Amani include promoting 
sustainable agriculture among the rural communities; ecologically-sound life ways among the urban 
  
3
This is a catchy word for Indonesians as aman in Bahasa means safe (to signify food safety), and Amani could 
be an abbreviation for ayo membantu petani, meaning, lets help the peasant. In Arabic Amani means 
aspirations, wishes, in Swahili, peace.
3
population; and promoting fair-trade4 as an alternative system of distribution through the anti-
capitalist cooperative where customers purchase directly from farmers. 
While Amani had to struggle with the onslaught of various problems faced by the villagers in 
their local rural ecosystem, it also had to face the reality that elite Jakarta urban dwellers - the very 
people who supposedly make the policies to remedy the rural-urban migration situation and 
excessive urbanization, were acutely sustainability-insensitive. With the support of a friend who 
owned a large area of land, the Cijeruk ecovillage was set up in Sukabumi, West Java. That was 
meant to transform the existing village into an ecological village, which Amani could make into a
centre of its movement. Ironically, Amani has never been able to make it an ecovillage in the real 
sense of the term due precisely to the exogenous nature of the attempt as it was initiated by an 
outsider to the village rather than initiated by the village members. For that reason, I was curious to 
find an endogenous alternative to carry out the movement, initiated by the local communities 
themselves. Meanwhile, as a student of Islam, I was aware of Islamic activism designed to confront 
the very challenges that both environmental and social actions have been struggling with, thus I
decided to examine the potential of Muslim groups to create an endogenous movement for 
ecologically sound communities. 
My background and the assumptions I have brought to the research were almost entirely 
different from those of majority students sent overseas by their governments to strive for national 
interests - they believe in an industrial development paradigm. An environmental activist is aware of 
discussions in scientific ecology about the global footprint which suggest that human beings have 
moved into ecological overshoot, eating into the earths natural capital and undermining the earths 
ability to regenerate. Individuals no longer live off its naturally and sustainably replenished bounty as 
in the past. Moreover, most measures of human well-being show that quality of life in the industrial 
world peaked in the mid-1970s (Kunstler, 2005; Dawson, 2006) and has been going downhill ever 
since, even while GDP has continued to climb (Dawson, 2006:11-12). At the same time, the input of 
energy from cheap fossil fuels which has facilitated us to produce more and more, including more 
foods and material goods, can no longer be depended on. Meanwhile, as a social activist I was also 
aware that community integrity has been crushed by economic policies favouring mass production 
and industrialization. As a student of Islam, I was well-versed in Islamic values that are congruous 
with social and environmental sustainability. Relations with international environmental NGOs as 




The most celebriticized movement that strikes sympathetic chords of the top-income urban lifestylers.
4
Suffice to say that I also experienced the desperation that other environmental and poverty-
reduction NGOs encountered in the Third World regarding intractable linkages between inequality, 
poverty and environmental problems. It is on that basis that I see the need to fashion different 
strategies of transition in the light of the impending challenges of environmental crisis on the one 
hand, and the end of oil5 on the other -- in order to guarantee the survival of the vast majority of 
Indonesian people. It has been argued that Climate Changes effects are more threatening to the 
poor in the Third World (Jackson, 2002; Trainer, 2002; Steel, 2003:156-191; Sunderlin et al, 2005; 
Chang et al, 2003; Dallas, 2008). But at the same time, Kunstlers (2005) Long Emergency 
prediction6 suggests that the threats of peak oil are probably more lenient to the poor  especially 
those who are not directly impacted by climate change, for they have less to lose. Indeed, Kunstler 
(2005:3) predicts that the developed world will begin to suffer long before the oil and gas actually 
run out. The issues of peak oil and climate change are inextricably linked and have profound 
implications. However, there are those who believe that peak oil is a more immediate and powerful 
lever than climate change in getting people to mend their fossil-fuel-dependent ways, and that 
therefore peak oil should be given headline treatment (Buchan, 2012). There is also a hypothesis 
that peak oil will keep climate change in check (Scientific American, 2013). Given the goal of all 
science is understanding and prediction (Steuer, 2003), it is of no exaggeration to take the plausible 
forecast and scenarios of the peak oil literature into consideration and put this thesis in that light.  
Forecasts are always fallible, but some scenarios of future events are more likely than others. Peak 
oil literature (Heinberg, 2005; Kunstler, 2005) analyzes the heavy dependence of modern-day life on 
petroleum and predicts an extremely turbulent interval between the end of cheap oil and whatever 
energy replacement comes next. They forecast that the government is likely to be increasingly 
ineffectual and irrelevant in an energy-starved world. Kunstler (2005) believes that even in the face 
of epochal discontinuity there is a lot that can be done to assure the refashioning of daily life around 
authentic local communities based on balanced local economies, purposeful activity and a culture of 
ideas that are consistent with reality. I concur with him and argue that the strategies of responding 
to the twin challenges of peak oil and climate change must be genuinely rooted in their societies and 
based upon creativity from within. In further correspondence with Kunstlers prediction (2005:235-
  
5
Oil (petroleum), natural gas, coal, oil shale, tar sand, coal bed methane (CBM) are all fossil fuel. It takes from 3 
to 6 millions of years to naturally form fossil fuel from the decomposition of dead organisms. That is why they 
are generally considered non-renewable. With our modern-industrial-affluent-consumption lifestyle, we 
consume fossil fuel in a way that is depleting the available resources much faster than the new ones being 
made. Global oil production is now approaching or has already passed an all-time peak and can potentially end 
our industrial civilization. The end of oil can also happen to all other fossil fuel. 
6
The period when the price and supply of fossil fuels suffer oscillations and disruptions.
5
307), I argue that these models cannot be inspired anymore by Left or Right ideologies or other 
materialistic worldviews, for none of them would be appropriate in a world running into scarcity. 
It is worth mentioning that my belief in peak oil theory is not without a basis. My chemical-
engineering education background provides a full understanding of the relations between petroleum 
and everything characterized as modern life. Oil has been used not only as the main source of 
energy linked to modern day amenities, but is also the raw material of almost every item needed 
everyday. Agricultural food production too depends on oil7 (see Pfeiffer, 2006). The marvels of 20th
century science and technology were only possible with access to abundant supplies of cheap fossil 
fuel. In addition, I encountered peak oil reality first hand when I worked in a petrochemical project 
in Arun, Aceh from 1994-1998. The project was to build a natural-gas condensate fractionation unit 
in Phase-1, followed by Phase-2 to construct production facilities for a wide range of aromatic8
petrochemical derivatives from Naphtha produced in the Phase-1 unit. The project was designed by 
ignoring the signs of a depleting Arun condensate reserve  the so-called cornucopians confidence 
that oil or natural gas exists in endless abundance in the earths deep interior. As a result, the Phase-
1 fractionation unit was finally built and operated for a short while but then had to be shut down 
completely as feedstock was unavailable, and Phase-2 never started due to a lack of feedstock of the 
right specification being secured from around the world. I gained further familiarity with peak oil 
issues from my husband who has been in the oil and gas services business throughout his career. 
Appendix 2 shows some data of Indonesias most current fossil fuels issues, reflecting the shortfall of 
their production and that none of these non-renewable resources are available for an unlimited 
future. An advocate of relocalisation, Ted Trainer (2009:1), is aware of this universal situation. He 
said: All probably recoverable resources of coal, oil, gas, tar sand and shale oil, and uranium (via 
burner reactors) would have been exhausted by 2045. In Kunstlers (2005:5) sarcasm: It is possible 
that the fossil fuel efflorescence was a one-shot deal for the human race.                 
My multidisciplinary background sent me naturally towards a systems-thinking paradigm. 
Systems-thinking is a new way of seeing the world in terms of relationship, connectedness and 
context9 on the premise that everything is connected to everything else (Capra 1999). The 
proponents argue that at the heart of the crises facing the world today is the inability of people to 
identify the interconnected nature of the crises (Strachan, 2009). Sachs (2008:14) commented that 
  
7
For agrichemicals (fertilizers, pesticides)
8
Benzene, Toluene, Xylene 
9
It has been drawn from different areas of study including cybernetics, ecology and complexity theory, and has 
developed a substantial body of knowledge
6
The problems just refuse to arrive in the neat categories of academic departments. Therefore, the 
crises call for interconnected and interdisciplinary solutions. Further, the approach of systems-
thinking is fundamentally different from that of a traditional form of analysis that relies on 
reductionism10. Whereas traditional analysis breaks a phenomenon down into its constituent parts, a 
systems thinking approach treats inter-related phenomena as a system. It studies the relationship 
between the pieces and the system as a whole.  It has been propounded to develop the learners 
ability to recognize and analyze the interconnections within and between systems. Accordingly, 
concerning sustainability, systems thinking calls for holism. It underlies the environmentalists 
vision of a whole earth one world family. My research grappled with the question is a whole-
earth-one-world-family-vision possible?; given that reality itself is socially constructed, and holism 
is therefore impossible for reasons of multiple symbolic universes under which social construction 
of realities occurred (Berger and Luckmann, 1991[1966]). Moreover, there is ineluctable historical, 
social, and cultural context of knowledge to be considered, given the long and tumultuous colonial 
and post-colonial history of Indonesia.
In my Masters study of Islamic Mysticism, we were introduced to sociology of religion
briefly, only to give an idea of the contrast with mysticism. The combination led me to an 
understanding of traditional religions as having two elements. One is truths that are of a 
transcendent order in their origin, that came from the Divine, through the illumination of the 
Buddha, the descent of the Avatars of Hinduism, the prophetic reception in the monotheistic 
religions, and so forth. The other is the continuity of tradition, which always implies transmission, 
continuity and application of the principles of Divine Origin over the centuries within the particular 
civilization that the original revelation creates. Hence, there are traditional art, traditional dress, 
traditional music, traditional architecture, traditional science and so forth. In this way of looking, 
Islam as al-din (Arabic, means: religion or creed, a faith or belief, a path or a way), or in Indonesian terms 
dinul Islam, appears as both truth that is of a transcendent order in its origin (Indonesian, wahyu) 
that came from God, as well as a tradition and culture (Indonesian, tradisi and budaya). In this 
particular discussion, the different notions between religion in the Western sense of the term 
(agama, in Indonesian) and the Islamic concept of al-din al-Islam, are worth mentioning. The term 
religion from the Latin religare has the root meaning to tie or to bind.  It is what binds humans
to God. On the other hand, the Arabic term of religion, al-din, carries a lexical meaning of 
obedience, reward and subjugation  which are closely associated with tradition. In this sense, al-
din means at once religion and tradition in its most universal sense. The limited meaning that the 
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In fact, the word analysis actually comes from the root meaning to break into constituent parts.
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term religion has gained in European language has caused certain authors in religious philosophy to 
limit this term only to the Western religions, especially in their exoteric expressions, distinguishing 
them from Hinduism, Taosim, and the like which they call tradition rather than religion (Nasr, 
1989:65-86).
Later on, in the literature review for my doctoral research, I read The Revival of Political 
Hesychasm in Contemporary Orthodox Thought by David Payne (2011) - not an environmental topic 
obviously, but the book gave me insights into what I had speculated on concerning the 
connectedness between social constructivism and environmental studies. Political Hesychasm is 
about a Neo-orthodox movement - a resurgence of public religion and a politicization of the Greek 
Orthodox church. Payne argues that the Neo-orthodox movement does not seek a religious 
nationalism as has been the predominant understanding, but rather seeks to ignite a universal 
religious movement, rooted in this particular understanding of the Greek identity, which actually 
transcends nationality. In light of the book, I saw a correspondence between the Neo-orthodox 
movement and Transnational Islam, and began to see Nationalism, Local Islam, and 
Global/Transnational Islam as competing factions in Indonesia. Upon completion of my review, I was 
sure that it was Berger and Luckmanns social constructivism that I wanted to use as a theoretical 
framework that can explain at once, (1) the continuity of Islamic tradition, (2) the pseudo-religious
character of secular nationalism in Indonesia, (3) and also to explain why the research problems 
under study, namely, sustainability-insensitive behaviors of developmentalists, exist among policy-
makers in Indonesia. The link that connects the three lies in the explanation of how cultures affect 
human consciousness and behaviour. I found two explanations, one from an anthropological 
perspective, and the other from Sociology of Knowledge. 
From the review of environmental literature, I found anthropologists commenting on the 
tremendous importance of cosmologies in culture-driven consciousness and behaviour for 
developing sustainable practices around the world. The second explanation lies at the central 
question of the Sociology of Knowledge. Sociology of Knowledge is concerned with social knowledge 
and how it is shared with others in a society and how it is available to the common-sense of the 
ordinary member of society. In The Social Construction of Reality, Berger and Luckmann 
(1991[1966]) draw a complex step-by-step process of what people in a collectivity conceive as 
reality, and hence, of knowledge that guides their conduct in everyday life. The social construction 
of realities occurred under a symbolic universe. Right here I identified a possible correlation 
between nationalism, developmentalism and sustainability-insensitive behaviors. In Third World 
societies, we need to recognize nationalism as a project of identity and as a pseudo-religion (Ernst, 
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1994) that remains powerful. Like religion, nationalism equally dictates the way societies are 
organized according to their culturally-defined beliefs, as well as practices and relations with the 
material world in which developmentalism ideology is predominant. At the same token, as I was 
pragmatically looking for an alternative model of environmental movement that potentially has 
more chance to be heeded by a wider reach of the population, I saw the significance of Islam as a 
symbolic universe for the Muslims consciousness and behaviour. Given that symbolic universe is 
developed through histories of particular human collectives interactions with the others (see Berger 
and Luckmann, 1991[1966]), it has a sociological dimension (political included) that arises from these 
interactions, besides the epistemic and paradigmatic characters. Moreover, symbolic universe has a 
capacity to confer identity and it has legitimation and allegiance characters. The religious symbolic 
universe has cosmic characters that transcend differences of race, class, gender and nationality. I 
decided, finally, that symbolic universe is the focal point of my thesis.
Subsequently, I had to consider what the other possible symbolic universes mean to the 
Indonesian Muslims. With the aforesaid definition in mind, I identified two of the most essential
ones. They are Nationalism (including ethno-nationalism) and Westernism (of which scientific 
worldview is a part). Accordingly, the symbolic universe proposition suggested two directions in my 
research:
1. The need to study the history of the collective, which means to examine the histories of 
social knowledge-formations in the given society
2. The need to study the system and institutions of knowledge transmission (education)
For that reason, my research began with an in-depth investigation of the history of modernization in 
Indonesia by way of colonization. From the sociology of knowledge point of view, colonization seeks 
to inculcate a universal rationality while shattering the epistemic and moral community of pre-
modern civilizations including that of Islam. My research includes an investigation of the ideological 
offspring that the combined power of colonialization and western hegemony have spawned in the 
development of modern education in Indonesia. In the Muslim world at large, Carl W. Ernst (1994) 
identified these ideologies are:
1. The pseudo-religion of nationalism 
2. The positivistic belief in science, racism and evolutionism as a rationale for unbridled 
imperialism
3. The erosion of the public role of religion
These three ideologies are in perfect correspondence with the three constituents that I identified of 
particular Indonesian Muslims symbolic universes, namely: Nationalism, Westernism, and Islam.
The study of symbolic universe entails the constructivist-interpretivist approaches of qualitative 
research methods. In this sense, the research draws on and engages with post-modernisms critique 
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of modernism which involves analyses of modernism to undermine its claims to universal truth
(Howarth, 1995).
Following that, while I concur with a systems-thinking approach in dealing with socio-
ecological issues, as a pragmatist, I chose to be realistic and to focus on social relations. Therefore, 
dissecting society along the lines of symbolic universe as ones center of allegiance is a necessity in 
order to make meaningful study of a pluralistic society such as Indonesia possible, and, if anything, 
find solutions that are realistic and doable. In light of this, this research is a study of the Indonesian 
Muslims symbolic universes, and a study of Islamic education and learning communities among 
Indonesian Muslims with a focus on four Muslim groups, drawing rigorously on both sociology of 
religion and sociology of knowledge. It attempts to understand the role of an Islamic symbolic 
universe in determining the willingness and possibility of Indonesian Muslim communities advancing
relocalisation projects for survival and sustainability. That is, the creation of, or transforming the 
existing communities into, less-unsustainable communities which are largely self-sufficient, with self-
local governance (Leonard & Barry, 2009; Bailey et.al, 2010; Barry, 2012). As concrete actions, a 
number of organizations such as Transition Network, Global Ecovillage Network, Findhorn 
Foundation, and Gaia Trust have attempted relocalisation models. The main goals of relocalisation 
are to increase community energy security, to strengthen local economies, and to dramatically 
improve environmental conditions and social equity. They developed strategies to build societies 
based on the local production of food, energy and goods, and the local development of currency, 
governance and culture. Lincoln Envirotown Trust (2016) in New Zealand is an example of a
transition town that I have observed since 2011. The movement includes various projects such as: 
experimenting with sustainable housing, promoting waste reduction, reducing use of single-
passenger autos, growing more local food, community garden, providing hands-on education about 
producing your own health food, ecosystem restoration, monitoring the quality of community water, 
engendering a robust local economy via support of local businesses, and the timebank  a trade in 
time credits rather than money which has been set up to strengthen community by creating 
opportunities for people to meet their neighbours and pool their reources and skills. Not less 
importantly, while the relocalisation movement envisions a world of empowered citizens and 
communities through designing and implementing their own pathways to a sustainable future, it 
aims to build bridges of hope and international solidarity (see e.g. Findhorn Foundation Statement, 
2016; GEN Ecovillage, 2016; Transition Network and Solidarity, 2016). At this point, my research also 
investigates to what extent Islam can accommodate holism and supports international solidarity.
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Above all, it is worth highlighting that I do not welcome the break-up of the Indonesian 
nation-state, but aim to be realistic and pragmatic, because in reality, Indonesian Muslim 
communities have been surviving for centuries with barely any help from external parties. Reflecting 
the story of Abraha and Abdul Muttalib in the current situation, peak oil and climate change appear 
as Abraha and his elephant troop who want to destroy people and the earth, and like Abdul 
Muttalib, I hold a pragmatic position. That is, attempting relocalisation for people in the Third World 
context in particular, to take charge of their own destinies. 
1.1 Developing the Research Problem  
Strong correlations between development schemes in the Third world and environmental 
degradation are widely acknowledged, but the consequences of irreversible decline of world oil 
production for the massive development and urbanization taking place in the developing world 
remains remarkably understudied. The research aims to envisage Indonesian Muslim groups from all 
branches of Islam to become agents of resilience helping their members and sympathizers make the 
transition from a pro-development oil dependent society. Theorists about resilience (e.g. Trainer, 
2000; Leonard and Barry, 2009, Barry, 2012) include the creation of less-unsustainable communities 
that are largely self-sufficient with self-local governance. The concept is referred to as endogenous 
relocalisation.  
Another crucial issue needing examination in the context of the Third World is the issue of 
sustainability. Sustainability has been defined as meeting the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (The Brundtland 
Commission, 1987). Nevertheless, there has been some difficulty in operationalizing this principle. It 
is either regarded as too broad a term to be usefully applied, or an oxymoron when used in the 
notion of sustainable development that has been criticized severely as it is increasingly embraced 
by big businesses as part of their corporate green-wash.  In the Third World context, sustainability 
is even more elusive. The Brundtland Commissions report warned that the Third World faces the 
most daunting challenge of sustainability (Adams, 2001) while Pelt (1993) and others argue that 
sustainability in the Third World is highly intractable because the problems reside in the connection 
between inequality, poverty and environmental degradation. 
Appendix 3 shows Indonesias deforestation rate and natural disaster statistics. Continued 
rampant corruption and a poor legal system are widely identified as the gravest problem in 
environmental governance and natural resource exploitation. Due to its geographical and 
topographical position Indonesia has had some of the most devastating natural disasters in the 
world and Figure 3 shows that the occurrence has become more frequent since the 1970s and 
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suddenly intensified since the early 2000s (statistics released on its website by the Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana, National Board for Disaster Management). Figure 4 indicates the nature 
of major disasters  flood, draught, storm, and landslide  is anthropogenic. Pragmatic research is 
concerned with applications: what works, and solutions to problems such as this (Creswell, 1998). 
It is noteworthy that all problem-oriented thought is infused with future consciousness and 
expectations of the continuity of historical existence.
Being engaged in the Third World problems on the one hand, and observing global politics 
and capitalisms enduring domination and control over the post-colonial world, on the other, gives
rise to a sentiment than can easily overshadow the need of a global collaboration for complex 
environmental challenges.  The following brief review of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change issues 
illustrates the heart of the matter. The Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC, 1997) recognizes that:
(1) Developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of Greenhouse 
gases emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, 
and place a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of 'common but 
differentiated responsibilities'. Without action to mitigate, emissions will rise strongly; and
emissions from developing countries are likely to rise more rapidly.  Consequently, it calls all 
nations for sharp and immediate reduction in Greenhouse gases emissions.
(2) While there has been an upsurge of international conferences, negotiations, action plans, 
treaties, and other initiatives on climate change in the past two to three decades, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) talks have experienced more 
failures than success in international diplomacy. Among the most important climate change 
summits were the 1972 Stockholm Conference; the 1992 Rio Earth Summit; the 2002 World 
Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg; and the UN Climate Summit in 
Copenhagen in 2009 to agree on the funding required to end deforestation. It has become 
obvious that the real challenge for a global environmental diplomacy is to overcome the 
legitimacy of the individual nation states interest. Respect for national sovereignty requires 
agreement from many governments and no government can be forced to agree or to be 
obligated without its consent (Speth, 2002), hence, countries continued to defend their 
sovereignty against undue encroachment (Park et al, 2008:3). Therefore, treaties are hard 
to attain. 
Given the interconnected nature of the vast network of the earths ecology, any solution, including a 
relocalisation approach, must have a global dimension as well. Herein, I saw the potential of the 
Ummah, global Muslim community, to advance the Islamic global environmental movement. My
background as a member of Muslim society, a student of Islam, and a social and environmental 
activist gave me insights into the role of education in association with the problems at hand. 
Therefore, I was interested in investigating anthropological and epistemological aspects of 
sustainability in conjunction with socio-ecological problems in a Third World country such as 
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Indonesia as both an ex-colonized and nowadays, developing country. While many scholars, 
philosophers in particular, have argued about the ecological crisis being the consequence of Faustian 
pursuit of modern knowledge and its education system (Orr, 1991, 1994; Nasr, 1996, 1997, 2001a, 
2004; Strachan, 2009), and that a flawed system has been disseminated globally, not many are 
aware that Indonesian Muslims possess a vast number of living social-religious-institutions that 
have the potential for civic-engagement in the event of ecological-emergency. Moreover, the 
consequence of the tightfisted Dutch colonial government not providing popular education (Ricklefs 
et al, 2010; Frankema, 2014) has left Indonesia as a fertile ground for the development of Islamic 
education institutions such as pesantren and madrasah 11. Further, the Indonesian Muslims learning
tradition also takes the forms of learning communities known as pengajian, majlis taklim, halqah, 
daurah12. Through the network of Ulama, these Islamic learning communities have transcended 
ethnic and nation-state borders as well. From my view, traditionalist pesantren, can become 
potential institutions to disseminate sustainability education far more effectively than secular 
institutions because they are deeply rooted in Indonesian society. In addition, the pesantren
education, that involves personalization of knowledge by murabbi13 educators (the kyais), who 
disseminate knowledge through living in it (Kazmi, 1991), is able to nurture and internalize 
sustainability-literacy within pupils.  
  
11
Pesantren is a home-grown traditional Islamic institute comparable to the ashram for Hindus or vihara for 
Buddhists, where disciples stay in the dormitories to learn religious philosophies, martial arts and meditation. 
Pesantren education emphasizes core values of sincerity, simplicity, and individual autonomy, solidarity and 
self-control. A sense of individual commitment to the faith is developed as young men and women are 
separated from their families. Close bonding between the student (santri) and the teacher (kyai, Javanese, 
means the same as the Arabic ulama) is developed as they learn closely from the teachers. In the past, 
pesantren were often referred to as pondok pesantren or just pondok  a word meaning a hut built of bamboo 
or other light materials. This usage reflected a heritage of humble origins and scholars wandering in search of 
knowledge. Pringle (2010) has commented that the pesantren tradition has a lot in common with the monastic 
tradition in Christianity, without the obligation of celibacy or a life-long commitment (p. 122), and Taylor 
(2004) noted that the pesantren community did not shun the world for religious contemplation, so they are 
not a monastic community. Further, Taylor has noted that the pesantren also keeps alive Javas poetic 
tradition, composing moral tracts and romances in Javanese, and that all the great poets in the past have had a 
pesantren education. Madrasah are another form of Islamic education, overseen by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs in Indonesia (see Chapter 7).
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Regular class conducted to teach Islam and Islamic practices
13
Murabbi is a fairly common and popular concept in literature on Islamic education. The concept was conceived 
and practiced during the early period of Muslim civilisation. The term murabbi can be understood from the 
Arabic word of rabba  yu rabbi  tarbiyah, which means educating, caring, growing, and teaching with 
loving. Being a murabbi is being a person who possesses the knowledge, then he or she processes and 
interprets the information gathered from the surrounding world through the action. Murabbi is not only 
knowledgeable and wise but also pious, kind, and considerate, a person who combines a life of learning with a 
life of virtue, and hence a perfect and an ideal person to learn from. Murabbi is based on the understanding 
that one needs more than intellectual ability to comprehend the knowledge in text, but rather one needs time 
to personalise it by living it. In this sense, the traditionalist kyai and nyai in pesantren are the murabbis. 
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There are about 24,409 pesantren across the archipelago of Indonesia (data of Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, 2009). Pesantren learning communities comprised of those whose dwellings are 
within a bounded physical location similar to the ecovillage in the West, and those whose members, 
despite not living in the same place, are connected by emotional ties and spiritual leadership. A rapid 
and high-impact scale of changes requires leadership from established and culturally-rooted 
institutions in the societies. Therefore, pesantren, in their existing condition and potential for 
empowerment, are worth-studying. In addition, as I was interested in examining the role of the 
Islamic symbolic universe in its adherents interactions with and decisions about the environment, 
particularly within the context of the Indonesian nation-state with its pro-development orientation, I 
aimed to elaborate my theoretical framework by reviewing the debates of Muslim scholars over the 
reconstruction of knowledge. 
Clarifying Terminologies:
Given the widely acknowledged terminological chaos concerning the terms of Muslim groups, I 
need to make clear from the onset that terms traditionalist, modernist and reformist used in the 
thesis referred to categories made by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Nasr, 1994, 2001a) and conform further 
with authors on Islam in Indonesia, such as Robert Pringle (2010). Nasrs categorization of Muslim 
groups into traditionalist, modernist and reformist, was made in light of the decline of the traditional 
perspective of Islam in the wake of the historical process of modernization of the Muslim world and 
the subsequent rise of Islam as an ideology (see Lumbard, 2004). As I aimed to engage with post-
modernisms critique of modernism, I was interested in looking at traditional Islam closely. 
Accordingly, the term tradition as used here:
is at once al-din in the meta-historical transcendent reality, which embraces all aspects of 
religion and its ramifications, al-Sunnah [my addition: Sunna], or that which, based upon 
sacred models, has become tradition as this word is usually understood, and al-silsilah, or 
the chain which relates each period, episode or stage of life and thought in the traditional 
world to the Origin, as one sees so clearly in Sufism. Tradition, therefore, is like a tree, the 
roots of which are sunk through revelation in the Divine Nature and from which the trunk 
and branches have grown over the ages. (Nasr, 1994:13) 
Further, according to Nasr, traditional Islam is Islam that lives in a worldview that views the cosmos, 
the universe, as reflections of the Divine Names and Qualities (asmaul Husna) and their Interactions 
(2001a:240). Concerning education, he describes traditional Islam as refusing to separate knowledge 
from the sacred, and therefore the category of secular science was totally alien to its unitary view 
of knowledge. That definition points to the worldview of the Gnostics of Islam (Sufis, or, the Arif).  
Regarding modernist Muslims, Nasr describes the modernist schools range from: 
14
those which wish to reinterpret Islam in the light of humanistic and rationalistic trends of 
Western thought and which ally themselves with the prevailing paradigm of liberalism in the 
West, to others which are drawn to Marxist world-view and which have become much more 
numerous during the decades following the Second World War (1994:301-2). 
Among the modernist figures by Nasrs category are scholars and thinkers attracted to French 
existentialism and the ones deeply influenced by Marxist thought. Nasr added:
This class of modernists has usually been deeply concerned at the same time with the social 
aspect of Islam and often a kind of Third World philosophy, which has been a hallmark of 
French intellectual circles since the Second World War, circles within which most of this type 
of Muslim reformist thinkers have been nurtured. (1994:302)  
At this point, while juxtaposing traditionalist and modernist, Nasr tells us to distinguish 
between the authentic traditional and that of pseudo traditional perspective of Islam which is 
counter traditional, but which also displays certain characteristics outwardly similar to the 
traditional (1994:18). He classifies the Salafis and Wahabis reformers as pseudo-traditionalists. He 
argues that the pseudo-traditional Islam, while claiming to revive Islam or to restore Islam to its 
original purity with the battle cry of returning to the Quran and Sunna - is in fact creating 
something very different from the traditional Islam which was brought by the Prophet and which has 
survived and grown like a living tree during the last fourteen centuries (1994:18). In his portrayal, 
the pseudo-traditionalists intellectual attitudes are characterized by a positive emphasis upon the 
Shariah and yet, an opposition to Sufism and the mystical life as well as to Islamic philosophy and 
much of the rest of the Islamic intellectual tradition (2001a:134-5). 
Considering what terms would be appropriate for Indonesian Muslims, I found Pringle (2010) 
was helpful. Pringle struggled with the terminological issues as well. He scrutinized one by one: 
Traditionalist, Reformist, Modernist, Salafi, Wahabi, Jihadist, Salafi-Jihadist, neo-Sufi (neo, can be 
attached to almost anything, neo-Santri, even neo-Modernist), Radicals, Fundamentalist, Orthodox --
except Islamists and Liberals which might have not been popular by the time he wrote his book. 
Finally, Pringle decided to use Traditionalist and Reformist to describe the two poles of 
Indonesian Islam. He describes Traditionalist as Sufi-influenced Islam, and Reformist as a more 
legalistic style emphasizing the requirements of doctrine as interpreted by the trends in global or 
transnational Islam of this day (Pringle, 2010:35). Pringles definitions are compatible with Nasrs, 
i.e.: Traditionalists are Sufi-influenced, and Reformists are Shariah-minded. Pringle added Others 
sometimes use Modernist to describe what I am calling Reformist (p.13). That is also in 
correspondence with Nasrs exposition of the Reformists as those who, in the name of an Islam that 
was rationalistically interpreted (thereby rejecting Sufism and the super-rational dimension of 
Islam), outwardly oppose things Western while at the same time allowing modern ideas to fill the 
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vacuum created in their mind and soul, as a result of their rejection of the Islamic intellectual 
traditions (1994, 2001a). In sum, that was how I came to define Traditionalist, Reformist and
Modernist in the thesis. 
1.2 The Research Subjects
The distinctive features of Islamic societies everywhere are the developments of communal, 
religious, and political institutions (Lapidus, 2002). I classified Indonesian Muslims into community 
and non-community Muslims. The former are those who live in religious communities or are activist 
members of religious communities, thus having a stronger sense of community and therefore the 
Ummah is a primary concern or focus. The latter are those who do not belong to any sort of 
religious community, hence the Ummah is secondary. The latter group are individuals who choose to 
live separate lives similar to the majority of the population in the Western world.
Indonesian Islam is characterized by an unusually high degree of organization (Bruinessen, 
2013:21). The subjects of this research, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Hidayatullah and 
An-Nadzir community in South Sulawesi have, in varied degrees, engaged in endogenous community 
development.  Community development refers to activities and practices of leaders, activists, 
involved citizens and professionals to improve various aspects of local communities (UNTERM, 
2014). Endogenous, refers to the causes, goals, ideas and motivations originating from within, 
rather than from without (Haverkort and Rist, 2007:7). Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 
particular, are regarded by many authors as the worlds largest mass-based and independent Muslim 
organisations. They have been providing education, health and social welfare services for decades. 
Relying on Berger and Luckmanns sociology of knowledge and the symbolic interactionist approach
in which people are understood to act toward things based on the meaning those things have for 
them, and these meanings are derived from social interaction and modified through interpretation, I 
seek to understand the relations between knowledge, meaning, and actions, in order to gain a 
better sociological understanding of these Muslim groups and their voluntary actions. Thereby, the 
thesis includes sociology of knowledge research -- that is concerned with how social knowledge is 
shared with others in a society -- into Muslims learning traditions and institutions, with the ultimate 
objective to find more effective, realistic and doable sustainability education for the Indonesian 
Muslim populace. This thesis also includes sociology of religion - whose task is to understand the 
ways in which religions not only influence, but are influenced by, the behaviour of both individuals 
and collectivities (Davie, 2007).
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1.3 Research Questions
1. Can the existing Muslim groups take a role in transitioning peak oil and climate change 
for the Indonesian Muslims?
2. What endogenous features are already there among the Indonesian Muslim groups 
which can possibly be developed into relocalisation to build less-unsustainable Muslim 
communities, which are largely self-sufficient, with self-local governance? 
3. In what ways could Indonesian Muslim groups respond to the call for global 
environmental actions to achieve the whole earth one world family vision? In other 
words, in what ways can the global Muslim community (Ummah) provide an alternative 
to global environmental governance? 
4. How can Muslim social science be done?
1.4 The Aims and Significance of This Study
Despite continuous media references -both international and national- to Muslims and negative 
attributes, ranging from backwardness to violence, I believe in the genuinely good nature of most 
Muslim people the world over. This led me to the centre point of sociology of knowledge according 
to which religion, ideologies and theoretical ideas are seen as closely related to social interests and 
conflicts (Berger and Luckmann, 1991). Therefore, the thesis aims to develop a more adequate 
theoretical framework to understand the voluntaristic nature of Muslim groups actions and to 
establish appropriate methods for studying a world of meaning of the actors, both individually and 
collectively. Besides seriously taking into account that cultural context and history are fundamental 
aspects of human cognition, the thesis shows that a different conceptualisation of reality and of 
knowledge between Islam and the modern West has been the root of misunderstanding of 
Muslims individual and social lives. On top of conflicts and power struggles, different cultural 
definitions of the good life between one and another has made the contrast even more 
unbridgeable. The debates between Muslim thinkers in the reconstruction of knowledge that 
attempt to seek dialogue between Islam and modernity leads to the need for transformative
understanding through an hermeneutical approach for a fruitful dialogue to occur (Zaidi, 2006).  
Given that the research problem itself is concerned with socio-ecological issues in Indonesia, 
I aim to use the aforesaid theoretical framework and qualitative methods to explore the following 
issues and to contribute to the field of religion and ecology:
1. Willingness, ability and the possibility of the existing Indonesian Muslim groups to advance 
relocalisation as defined in the literature, for their survival and ecological sustainability.
2. What practical, cultural and ideological issues are involved in the Muslim communities being 
studied?
3. Possibility for the existing Indonesian Muslim groups to advance global Islamic environmental
actions.
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Thus, Chapter 1 has stated the outline of this study and explained the significance and aims of this 
research.
Chapter 2 develops an interpretive theoretical framework to study the relations between 
knowledge, meaning, and action that will be used for researching Indonesian Muslims and their 
symbolic universes. It explores the cognitive and affective component of a symbolic universe, studies 
the meaning-bestowing function of it, and how social interactions contribute to the creation of 
meaning. In the end, it discusses the incompatibility between the modern and Islamic system of 
thought and presents the debates over the Muslim reconstruction of knowledge project.
Chapter 3 outlines the constructivist-interpretivist methods used in the research.
Chapter 4 reviews the socio-ecological problems in a Third World country from different 
perspectives, political-economic and anthropological-epistemological, in order to achieve an holistic 
understanding of all issues that are involved. Herein, the personality characters: warriors, those who 
view economic and political issues as underlying the problem and sages, who see spiritual crisis at its 
heart, are examined14. Subsequently, chapter 4 reviews relocalisation ideals and movements as well 
as the features of Islam to explore the possibility of endogenous relocalisation to be advanced by 
existing local Muslim communities.
Chapter 5 narrates the national history of Indonesia. It describes the formation of nationalism, 
Islam and westernism as three symbolic universes for Indonesian Muslims, and how they interact. 
The chapter highlights the interlinkage between environmental issues and national development.
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These terms are my own. In this research, I found that humans have different inborn traits, and these traits are 
responsible for leading them to view problems from different angles. For an explanation, I adopted the human 
typologies understood in traditional knowledge such as the Hindu caste system that divides people into four in 
which it was understood as their essential reality and without pejorative connotations which have become 
associated with them in the modern world. There are people who are inclined to be the sages; or, warriors; or, 
economic players; or, workers (Nasr, 1989:179). The warriors have the courage to fight and protect the people 
and the world; the sages are contemplative by nature and have an intellectual and sacerdotal 
inclination. The economic players have a mercantile nature, and finally, the workers are those 
whose virtue is to follow and to be led, to work according to the dictates of those who lead them. 
The contested truths between the Sages and the Warriors popped up recurrently throughout the 
research project, ranging from environmental studies to religious issues, and extending from 
literature review to fieldwork. In my view, from that perspective, the contest reflects the so-called 
Sufi-Salafi duality in Islamic studies. See more about the latter in 2.4.1.1.
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Chapter 6 presents the modernist Muhammadiyah and its modern schools, and the traditionalist NU 
and its network of pesantren. It highlights responses of the two organisations against present-day 
socio-ecological crisis and probes into the strength and weaknesses of each organisation with 
respect to relocalisation. The chapter also highlights different modes of education between modern 
schools and traditionalist pesantren and investigates the strengths and weaknesses of each in 
disseminating sustainability-literacy.  
Chapter 7 discusses comparatively sustainability education in the context of modern schools and 
traditionalist pesantren in order to explore the potential of Indonesian Islamic learning traditions.
Chapter 8 presents the network of fenced15-pesantren communities by Hidayatullah, particularly the 
mother pesantren in Balikpapan, and the An-Nadzir rural community in South Sulawesi. It highlights 
the history and events that shed light on the meanings of fenced-pesantren for the leaders and 
recruits. The chapter presents their similarities with, and deficiencies in relation to, green-intentional 
communities in the Western world for a vision that I have, namely, to use the fenced-pesantren 
approach for endogenous Islamic relocalisation models to promote more sustainable ways of living 
to the Indonesian Muslim society at large.
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis.
Finally, this study is significant for the following reasons:
1. It fills the academic gaps in understanding both the individual and social lives of the Muslims. 
Through use of a constructivist-interpretivist qualitative approach with Berger and Luckmanns 
symbolic universe, which encompasses cognitive, normative and affective components, this 
study explains two enduring contentions. One is between Indonesian Muslims and nationalism 
of the nation-state, and the other between Muslims thoughts and a modern scientific 
worldview.
2. With the inclusion of an esoteric dimension of religion recognised in Islamic epistemology as a 
legitimate part of knowledge, it modifies Berger and Luckmanns sociology of knowledge and 
Bergers sociology of religion to provide a better sociological understanding of the voluntary 
nature of religious actions.
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Translated from an Indonesian language berpagar. That is my own term. I was inspired to use the word pagar
(fence) from an answer of respondent Muniem from LPBI NU as he described the NUs pesantren as tidak 
berpagar (have no fence) so that pesantren and the public fuse, to signify the style of the NU in contrast to 
Hidayatullahs pesantren.
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3. With the inclusion of Muslim thinkers, it provides understanding beyond Foucauldian 
knowledge and power nexus of what have been at the heart of Muslims reconstruction of 
knowledge project.
4. The division of human personality into sages and warriors contributes to the understanding of 
dualisms, such as traditionalist and reformist interpretations of Islam, and anthropological-
epistemological and political-economic views of the causes of ecological crisis in 
environmental studies.
5. It demonstrates different symbolic universes at play in a post-colonial society such as 
Indonesia, and how they determine the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of sustainability-literacy 
campaigns.  
6. It gives new ideas on relocalisation in the Third World, including all issues involved.
7. It gives insights into deconstruction and reconstruction of all aspects of education needed in 
order to be consistent with the reality of depleting natural resources and the deteriorating 
condition of the earth.
8. It provides a deeper understanding of religious conflicts and contributes to the perennial 
question of how to co-exist in a pluralistic society.
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Chapter 2
Knowledge in Community: Sociological Perspective
In the end we will conserve only what we love; we will love only what we understand; and we will 
understand only what we have been taught.
(Baba Dioum, Senegalese poet)
2.1 Introduction  theorising social knowledge
In order to investigate the willingness, ability and opportunities for Muslim communities in 
Indonesia to advance relocalisation projects, I begin by examining theoretical approaches that will 
help explain the voluntaristic dimension of the social actions of religious people. Here I use 
sociological theories that make culture central to social analysis, rather than making struggles for 
economic gain and power central. In advancing arguments based on the centrality of culture, I rely
on the theory of social constructivism, as developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann 
(1991[1966]) in their key contribution to the sociology of knowledge, The Social Construction of 
Reality. By combining salient ideas from Marx, Nietzsche, Mead, and historicists especially Wilhelm 
Dilthey, and by rethinking the concept of 'social knowledge', they expanded both the definition of 
social knowledge and the field of the sociology of knowledge.  From Marx it gets the concepts of 
ideology16; from Nietzsche his false consciousness17 and anti-idealism18; and from the historicists 
the insistence that no historical situation could be understood except in its own terms19.  
Berger and Luckmann conceptualised society not as a system or a mechanism, but rather as 
a symbolic construction composed of ideas, meaning and language. Their concept of society is 
therefore more readily applicable to the study of Muslims in the context of a globalized world than 
the modern notion of society whereby society was naturally mapped on to the bounded region of 
the nation state20. Furthermore, Berger and Luckmanns sociology of knowledge delineates the 
processes by which realities are socially constructed and symbolic universes as sacred cosmic 
references are established. This is the basis of the sociology of religion expounded by Berger in The 
  
16
Ideas serving as weapons for social interests.
17  
Thought that is alienated from the real social being of the thinker.
18
Added additional perspectives on human thought as an instrument in the struggle for survival and power.
19
Which is translated as an emphasis on the social situation of thought.
20
This understanding grew up within the sociologies that emerged in the era of European nationalism.
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Sacred Canopy (1967). In light of the central and authoritative nature of the Quran and Sunna21 for
individual and social lives of Muslims accross the epochs and geographical boundaries, Berger and 
Luckmanns concept is, therefore, more appropriate to the Muslims socio-political phenomenon 
than the anti-unifying, anti-general concepts of the post-1960 critical theorists such as Foucault, who
objected to a social theory that aims to grasp the essential structure and meaning of a society or an 
historical epoch, in favor of, local, flexible and provisional understandings. Berger and Luckmann 
(1991) also provide insights into the relationship between human thought and the social context 
within which it arises. From that perspective, cognitive reactions against the subjugation of non-
Western civilizations (such as of Islam) by Western civilization in the name of the Enligtenment 
project that was carried by the old and neo colonialism, can be framed within Berger and 
Luckmanns sociology of knowledge alongside Foucaults knowledge/power analysis in which 
knowledge is seen as inextricably linked to power (Foucault, 1972, 1980; Hindess, 1996; Seidman, 
2008).
Phillip Hammond (1969) argued that a just evaluation of one sociologist of religion by 
another is rare, as he believes, it is rare for the reason that it is difficult (Hammond, 1969:415). 
Consequently, there has been no codified body of theory against which to measure its practitioners. 
He also believed that this could be because no agreement exists on what the central tasks of the 
sociology of religion are. In a more recent publication, The Sociology of Religion, Grace Davie (2007) 
concludes that the task of sociology of religion is to understand the ways in which religions not only 
influence, but are influenced by, the behaviour of both individuals and collectivities. She considers 
that this approach is just as relevant to late modernity as it has been to previous generations. 
My own evaluation of Berger and Luckmanns sociology of knowledge is a phenomenological 
one. I claim that, as a theoretical device, it is able to explain Muslims attitudes toward their religion, 
but only as far as the exoteric dimension of Islam (its law and traditions of practice) is concerned.  
Islam (like other religions) also has an esoteric or mystical dimension. I argue below that by failing to 
acknowledge or include the esoteric dimension of religious knowledge, Berger and Luckmanns 
sociology of knowledge is not capable of comprehending or explaining the voluntaristic nature of 
religious actions. This omission of the mystical dimension and its significance has, I argue, impeded 
the development of a sociology of religion which rings true from the interior perspectives of those 
who practice a religion  something that I contend is indispensable if religiosity in modern times is to 
be better understood. Thus, while I subscribe to the premises of Berger and Luckmanns social 
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Traditions of Prophet Muhammad
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construction of reality in which religion, alongside political ideologies and theoretical ideas, is seen 
as closely tied to social interests and conflicts, I also introduce the concept which undergirds the 
sacred purview of reality in oriental philosophy22 (Sawai, 2009). Accordingly, the tenet of the 
'Perennial Philosophy'23 that religion begins with the origin of the human state itself is propounded
to be taken seriously, with the corollary of modifying Berger and Luckmanns concept of the 
'symbolic universe', and setting religious symbolic universes apart from the secular ones.  
Finally, the notion of sacred canopy as a cosmic frame of reference that Berger and 
Luckmann developed provides a theoretical framework to appreciate the so-called unified systemic 
worldview that has been widely referred to in the sustainable community development literature. 
The term covers the concept of an epistemic and moral community in pre-modern civilizations in 
which there was moral, cognitive and interpretive unity, and therefore meaning resided in 
axiomatically shared and publicly inscribed beliefs and understandings. As world history has 
unfolded since the sixteenth century CE, by way of the colonization of the Americas, Asia, Africa and 
Oceania by European powers, there have been aggressive attempts to shatter unified systemic 
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Oriental philosophy needs to be distinguished from orientalism. The former is concerned with variegated 
traditional oriental thought which has been developed in the orient since ancient times (Nasr, 2001a). The 
latter is a discourse which produces the orient as an object of power and knowledge. A number of themes in 
the discourse provides an explanation of oriental stagnation, offering covertly a legitimation of Western 
supremacy and colonial power, makes categorisation of oriental politics as despotic thus needs Western 
democracy, and contrasting the rationality of the occident with the sensual irrationalism of the orient (Turner, 
1989)
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At the beginning of the 20th century, while the West was strongly in the grip of anti-metaphysical and anti-
religious philosophies, there was a counter-trend towards restating the 'Perennial Philosophy'. This strain of 
thought was in opposition to modern European philosophies, considering them as deviations from the 
perennial heritage of humanity. Much of the activity of this school is related to Islam, and was based on the 
inner dimension of Islamic revelation (See Nasr, 2004). Perennial philosophy is also known as the Traditionalist 
School. This school is concerned with religion in its trans-historical reality, and refuses to accept the 
historicism of the academic approach. Although the traditionalist school does not neglect the social or 
psychological aspects of religion, it refuses to reduce religion to its social or psychological manifestations. 
Compared to other approaches, the traditionalist school encompasses more of the field of religion and 
therefore allows a meaningful understanding of a greater portion of the very complicated reality of religion. 
However, this school should not be identified with the sentimentalism that sees all religions as being the same.
Further, only this school is able to provide the key to the understanding the complexities and enigmas of a 
single religion and the significance of the plurality of religions and their interrelationship. Concerning the 
nature of reality, the traditionalists refuse to accept as valid what they see as the truncated vision of reality 
currently held in the Western world, which has come to constitute the background for most studies of religion, 
especially in academic circles. Moreover, Perennial philosophers attempt to reaffirm the theomorphic nature 
of man as opposed to the plethora of definitions of man which have reduced the human condition to a 
biological organism (the trousered ape of Darwin), the social being determined by his material circumstances 
of Marx, the puppet of illicit desires and seething excitations buried in the sub-conscious of Freud, a 
cowardly herd of animals redeemed only by the will to power of the Ubermensch of Nietzsche, and so on. 
See Oldmeadow and Stoddart (2010:280). Despite the value they may have in shedding light on certain aspects 
of human being, in the views of the perennialists, the truncated concepts of man held by those thinkers have -
by relinquishing consideration of human spiritual faculties - failed to understand religions as spiritual realities.
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epistemologies and de-divinize the world in the quest for universal rationality'. The result has been 
the emergence of mutilated unified systemic worldviews for those (such as the adherents of Islam) 
whose symbolic universes survive, and their civilizations have therefore continued (albeit truncated), 
while there was also an increased scale, scope and power of formal rationalization and bureaucracy 
accompanying the hegemonic imposition of Western culture. The reaction to colonisation in many 
colonised states has been the formation of two corresponding secular symbolic universes, namely, 
nationalism and 'Westernism'. Thus it is possible to categorize Indonesian Muslims according to 
which of the three symbolic universes is dominant (see Table 3). 
When Islam is the dominant symbolic universe, it is then possible to further investigate and 
understand the unity of Muhammads nation (see Table 3) on the level of (1) thought language, 
(2) moral grounds, and (3) allegiances, describing a collective phenomenon that (actually or 
potentially) transcends ethnic and national boundaries despite great differences among its 
adherents. Achieving such unity is reliant upon the important role played by 'symbolic universe 
maintenance personnel' (the Ulama and group leaders and their learning-communities) and 
specifically to their ability to confer identity, continuity with the past, and a shared belief in an ideal 
society. 'Muhammads nation' thus possesses features, elements and characteristics that are lacking 
in contemporary societies that are characterised by postmodernism and lack of faith in an all-
encompassing ideology. Taken together, they constitute the potential of 'Muhammad's nation' to 
advance a more effective and far-reaching global environmental movement. 
2.2. The social construction of reality  an interpretive theoretical framework
First of all, we need to be clear that the subject matter of sociology is people and the world of 
everyday life. The world of everyday life is a world that originates in peoples thoughts and actions 
and is maintained as real by these (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:33). The sociology of knowledge is 
concerned with everything that passes for knowledge in a society. It deals with the relationship 
between human thought and the social context within which it arises. Among other things, it studies 
the social role of ideologies. In this approach, ideas - be they political ideologies, religions, or 
theoretical ideas - are not understood as pure expressions of reason, but as being closely tied to 
social interests and conflicts. For example, ideas on the superiority of one class over another can 
function as instruments of class domination. According to Berger and Luckmann (1991) the central 
problem of the sociology of knowledge is contained in a nutshell in Pascals famous statement 
What is truth on one side of the Pyrenees is error on the other (p.17). In their Social Construction 
of Reality (Berger and Luckmann [1966], 1991), the key points of their theories are:
1. Reality is socially constructed
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It is worth noting, unlike philosophy, sociology does not go too far as to examine the 
foundation of reality. It only contends with reality as it was taken for granted by 
people in the street. Any philosophical prolegomena of reality is considered as pre-
sociological (pp.33-4). Nonetheless, given the particular purpose of their treatise they 
cannot completely by-pass the philosophical problems. To address this fundamental 
issue, they put forward a method they believe will be an adequate solution for the 
philosophical problems as a starting point for sociological analysis, namely, 
phenomenological analysis. Through phenomenological analysis, they elaborate in a 
step-by-step complex theoretical system the process of the social construction of what 
people in collectivity conceive as reality, and hence, of knowledge that guides their 
conduct in everyday life. 
2. Sociology of knowledge is also concerned with how (the process) reality of everyday life 
is shared with others in a society, and how it is available to the common-sense of the 
ordinary member of society.
3. The process of knowledge distribution includes:
a. Transmission of knowledge (education, school, learning circle, etc.).
b. Experiences (because sociology is concerned with social world, experience in this term 
refers only to the ones from social interactions).
4. The process of construction of knowledge (of reality) and the process of construction of 
social order is believed to take place concomitantly. 
For Berger and Luckmann, society is understood as an ongoing dialectical process composed of three 
steps of: 1) externalization, 2) objectivation and 3) internalization. Their theory begins with social 
processes in the formation of the self until self is experienced as a subjectively and objectively 
recognizable identity (p.68). Afterward, men together produce a human environment with the 
totality of its socio-cultural and psychological formations. It stands to this reason that social order is 
understood as human product, or to be precise, social order is an ongoing human production. It is 
produced by humans in the course of their ongoing externalization24. From here onwards is what 
Berger and Luckmann call externalization.
Externalization, Objectivation, Internalization
Because social order both in its genesis (past) and its existence (present) is a human product, no 
ontological status may be ascribed to it (p.70). Berger and Luckmann assert that habitualization is a 
key feature of human being. All human activity is subject to habitualization. Any action that is 
repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern (pp.70-2), which can be reproduced with less 
effort. Even a solitary individual must habitualize his own actions. In his solitary state, he has at least 
one friend, that is, his own operating procedure to conduct his life from the moment he wakes up in 
the morning to the moment he gets back to sleep. Habitualization carries psychological gain, it 
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Externalization is the process of interacting with the world (p.69).
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narrows choices and frees individuals from the burden of making decisions all the time. The process 
of habitualization precedes any institutionalization (pp.74-85).
Every institution must have typification of habitualized action which is shared by all 
members. For that reason, every institution controls human conduct by setting up predefined 
patterns of conduct, which channel the members conducts in one direction as against the many 
other directions that would theoretically be possible. Berger and Luckmann argue that 
institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions (Note: 
human beings always have typificatory schemes in their minds. They use that to apprehend their 
fellow human beings). Even if only two persons, A and B, are in contact, A and B will begin to play 
roles vis-à-vis each other, some of which will be performed separately, some in common. For 
illustration, A is a Muslim, and B is a non-Muslim. A watches B perform, B watches A perform. In the 
long run, each will be able to predict the others action. Each is able to identify the recurrent pattern 
of the others action: A always does this, B always does that. Here is where the roles of each 
begins. Even though there are only two individuals in this illustration and the reciprocal typification 
is not yet institutionalized, the nucleus of an institution is already present. Their life together is now 
defined by a widening sphere of taken-for-granted routines. In this way A and B are said to have 
constructed their own world. Their institutional world has become objectified. 
During the time of construction of the institutions, when interaction was only between A 
and B, their objectivity remained tenuous, easily changeable, and even playful. But then as A and B 
were getting older, they had to transmit the institutions they had made to the next generation 
(assuming they had children). For the children, this institutional world was the world, and for the 
parents the institutional world was no longer playful, it now became serious. The process of 
transmission strengthens the parents sense of reality. The institutional world was now experienced 
by people outside A and B as an objective reality. It had a history. It was there before these people 
were born and will be there after their death. This is what Berger and Luckmann call Objectivation 
it is when a reality confronts its original producer (which is the human him/herself) as facticity 
external to him/her. Language helps to provide logic for the objectivated social world (pp.82-7). The 
third step of individual self and societys ongoing process is internalization; it refers to the process 
by which the objectivated social world attains the character of subjectivity (pp.149-204). This occurs 
after the objectivated social world has been incorporated into subjective consciousness through the 
process of socialization to become part of the individuals subjective identity. From the three steps 
altogether, society emerges as having both objective and subjective reality, and in this manner the 
intersubjective commonsense world is constructed as a world that a man/woman shares with others. 
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At the same point with objectivation, the institutional world requires legitimation. That is, 
ways by which it can be explained and justified (p.79). For A and B, this was their biographical 
memory, but for the new generations, this was the tradition. To these new generations, the original 
meaning of the institution was inaccessible in terms of memory. It therefore became necessary to 
interpret this meaning to them in various legitimating formulas. This had to be consistent and 
comprehensive in terms of the institutional order if they were to carry conviction to the new 
generation. The same story must be told to all the children (pp.78-9). Accordingly, legitimation is a 
second-order of objectivation. It make objectively available and subjectively plausible the products 
of first-order objectivation that have been institutionalized. Berger and Luckmann elaborate 
legitimation process into four levels. The fourth level is the development of a sacred canopy  a 
symbolic universe. 
Before we continue, it is important to underscore the nature of institutions as follows:
1. Institutions always have a history. It is impossible to understand an institution adequately 
without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced.   
2. Once formed, institutions have a tendency to persist. However, the process of 
institutionalization is not irreversible. For a variety of historical reasons, the scope of 
institutionalized actions may diminish and de-institutionalization may take place in certain 
areas of social life. For example, individualism in modern industrial society includes 
deinstitutionalization in the private sphere.
2.2.1 The Symbolic Universe Construction
As a matter of fact, only a small part of human experience is retained in ones consciousness (p.85). 
The experiences that are so retained become sedimented as memorable entities. With these 
memorable entities A makes sense of his or her biography. If a number of individuals share a 
common biography, intersubjective sedimentation takes place. Intersubjective sedimentation can be 
called truly social only when it has been objectivated in a sign system because then it is possible to 
reiterate the objectification of those experiences (those memorable entities) (p.85). The sign system 
could be linguistic or others (I believes an icon such as a cross for the crucifixion of Jesus is a potent 
example). Only then, these experiences can be transmitted from one generation to the next, and 
from one collectivity to another. An objectively available sign system bestows a status of anonymity 
on the sedimented experiences by detaching them from their original context of concrete individual 
biographies, and making them generally available to all who share, or may share in the future, in the 
sign system in question (p.85).  In my view, this explication is pertinent to Islam and Muslim with 
regard to the history of Prophet Muhammad, his companions, and the Sunna that will be described 
further later. 
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With the help of language, people dont need to reconstruct the original process of 
formation. Language objectivates the shared experiences and makes them available to all within the 
linguistic community, thus, becoming both the basis and the instrument of the collective stock of 
knowledge. Furthermore, language provides the means for objectifying new experiences, allowing 
their incorporation into the already existing stock of knowledge, and it is the most important means 
by which the objectivated and objectified sedimentations are transmitted in the tradition of the 
collectivity in question (p.86). Language becomes the depository of a large aggregate of collective 
sedimentation, and also makes the origin of actual sedimentation become unimportant. With 
language, legitimation is possible. Explain and justify are keywords of legitimation. Legitimation 
explains the institutional world by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings and 
justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives. Therefore, 
legitimation is a matter of values and knowledge. Legitimation not only tells the individual why he 
or she should perform one action and not another, it also tells him why things are what they are. In 
other words, knowledge precedes values in the legitimation of institutions (p.111). 
For realities other than those of everyday experience, the process of legitimation (and 
signification) takes place as symbolic processes (p.113). This level of legitimation is different from 
the others. It is distinguished from the others by its scope of meaningful integration. Here Berger 
and Luckmann posit a hierarchical series of symbolic frameworks to give meaning and integration to 
the ever-widening segments of life. With the recognition that every set of activities is connected to 
something larger than itself in order to have meaning the meanings already attached to discrete 
objectivation processes need to be integrated to allow each of us to function as a whole person, and 
they also need to be legitimated to make sense. Berger and Luckmann coined the term symbolic 
universe to refer to what provides broader meaning to everyday life. Now, all sectors of the 
institutional order are integrated in an all-embracing frame of reference, which now constitutes a 
universe in the literal sense of the word, because all human experience can now be conceived of as 
taking place within it (p.114). 
Symbolic universe is significant to both individual and social (group). For an individual, it has 
the legitimating function of ones biography and ones subjective identity: ones identity is 
legitimated by placing it within the context of a symbolic universe (p.118). For the social group, 
symbolic universe provides comprehensive integration of discrete sectors of institutionalized 
conducts and processes (p.121). Symbolic universe also orders history as it locates all collective 
events in a cohesive unity that includes past, present and future (p.120). 
28
The symbolic universe is conceived as a matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively 
real meanings; the entire historic society and the entire biography of the individual are seen 
as events taking place within this universe. ...Its meaning bestowing capacity far exceeds the 
domain of social life, so that the individual may locate within it even in his most solitary 
experiences. (p.114)
The symbolic universe also orders history. It locates all collective events in a cohesive unity 
that includes past, present and future. With regard to the past, it establishes a memory 
that is shared by all the individuals socialized within the collectivity. With regard to the 
future, it establishes a common frame of reference for the projection of individual actions. 
Thus the symbolic universe links men with their predecessors and their successors in a 
meaningful totality, serving to transcend the finitude of individual existence and bestowing 
meaning upon the individuals death.  All the members of a society can now conceive of 
themselves as belonging to a meaningful universe, which was there before they were born 
and will be there after they die. The empirical community is transposed on to a cosmic plane 
and made majestically independent of the vicissitudes of individual existence. (p.121)
One of the most important characters of a symbolic universe is that it also encompasses marginal 
situations of the life of the individual (p.114). Marginal situations constitute the most acute threat to 
taken-for-granted, routinized existence in society. In this situation the function of symbolic universe 
is to allow one to return to reality  that is, reality of everyday life (p.116). Furthermore, Berger and 
Luckmann (1991) also conceptualize machineries of symbolic universe maintenance (pp.122-134). 
They argue that specific procedures of universe-maintenance become necessary when the symbolic 
universe becomes a problem (p.123). As long as this is not the case, a symbolic universe is self-
maintaining. In addition, they assert that the origins of a symbolic universe have their roots in the 
constitution of man (p.121). They are: (a) Human as world-constructor (pp.121-2); (b) Humans fear 
of chaos (pp.118, 121); (c) Humans need of security and belonging (p.117); (d) Humans need of 
explanation of inevitable death (p.119).
Building upon the already-elaborated frame of reference of sociology of knowledge he 
constructed with Luckmann ([1966] 1991), Berger (1967, 1968) developed a sociology of religion. 
The concept of the symbolic universe occupies a prominent place in his overall conceptual 
framework. He identifies religion as a type of symbolic universe. The religious and secular symbolic 
universes, he continued, may perform much the same function and thus may compete with one 
another for adherents. It is important to stress that Berger defines religion, in The Sacred Canopy
(Berger, 1967:51), as: the establishment, through human activity, of an all-embracing sacred order, 
that is, of a sacred cosmos that will be capable of maintaining itself in the ever-present face of 
chaos. 
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Now it might be clear that Berger and Luckmanns sociology of knowledge and Bergers 
sociology of religion imply the following inferences relevant to the research:
1. As a social order, religion such as Islam was socially constructed. Therefore, it is human 
beings product.
2. There is no ontological root can be ascribed to Islam and the Muslim community. 
3. Thus, the only plausible explanation for Prophet Muhammad and his Sunna is that he is a 
charismatic leader, full stop. Notably, this is what many Western scholars (including 
renowned Max Weber (Turner, 1998)) subscribe to explain the prophet and the full tenet of 
Islam.
Is this the best way to characterise the 'reality' of religion by religious communities, especially the 
Islamic groups which are the subject of this thesis? 
2.2.2 Symbolic Universe Redefined
I suggest there are a number of weaknesses in Bergers framework of a religious symbolic universe. 
They start with Berger and Luckmann's (1991) underlying philosophical assumptions about 
humankind in which a human being has biological and social (and no spiritual) constitutions only, 
with a corollary that a solitary human being is being on the animal level (p.69). They also highlight 
the significance of chaos in their theoretical framework of society: All social reality is precarious. All 
societies are constructions in the face of chaos (pp.121-2). They describe further, with examples, 
the types of anomic terrors that arise whenever the legitimations that obscure this precariousness 
are threatened, or collapse. The death of a king, especially if it occurs with sudden violence, is an 
example. The popular reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy is another potent 
illustration. Berger and Luckmann recall how that had to be followed immediately with the most 
solemn reaffirmations of the continuing reality of the sheltering symbols. They continue by pointing 
out that the root of symbolic universe lies in the constitution of humans themselves as the world 
constructors. That implies his or her capacity for world-openness, which in turn exposes him or her 
to the constant possibility of conflict between order and chaos.  Elsewhere, their discussion suggests 
that we are persistently haunted by the prospect of our own death as we realize the temporal 
structure of our everyday life (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:37, 41). Are these the only or the best 
assumptions about human nature or the human condition on which to base a sociology of religion? 
The Sacred Reality
From the perspective of Islam, Berger and Luckmanns conception of reality has reduced reality by 
the fact that their inquiries were pondered and reflected upon within Kantian25 thought. For Kant, 
  
25
Kants agnosticism and Descartes cogito have been seen as pivotal in the process of destroying the 
sacramental quality of knowledge (Nasr, 1989).
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noumena and phenomena must be separated, for only phenomena is the source of knowledge 
(hence, reality), while noumena such as religion, God, and divinity are merely the subject of faith 
that cannot provide knowledge. In contrast, noumena and phenomena cannot be separated in Islam. 
Phenomena -as it is subject to change- is the lowest level of knowledge, whereas the highest level 
must come from something that is not subject to change. Such an approach to reality has been 
shared by Oriental Philosophy in general as argued by Toshihiko Izutsu (Sawai, 2009). By Oriental 
Philosophy, Izutsu means varieations in oriental thought including those from the Middle East, India 
and China. Izutsu shows while there are obviously no historical connections, Oriental Philosophy 
shares an understanding of hierarchy of reality that spans from a superficial level to a deep 
level. Oriental Philosophy also understands hierarchy of vision in perceiving reality, from those in 
the empirical world to those in its original reality - that is, to see a thing in its 
indetermination. Oriental thoughts share a common characteristic regarding consciousness, 
understood as what is needed to open the depth of reality. Consciousness is attained through their 
own religious or philosophical experiences, through their own special and systematic trainings 
(Sawai, 2009:137). Additionally, Oriental Philosophy shares a common understanding of 
multilayered structures of consciousness. For Izutsu, Western thought, in contrast, leads eventually 
to naïve realism - that is, a philosophical position which holds that things really are as they are 
perceived by us (Sawai, 2009:136), not a thing as it is in its original reality. Izutsu also highlights, in 
Oriental Philosophy, the many is found at the superficial level of reality, but when coming to a 
deep level, there is only the one. At that level, Oriental Philosophy speaks about void, 
nothingness (Sawai, 2009:137), likewise, at a deep level Islam speaks of God as the ONLY Being, the 
ultimate Reality. The main stream of Oriental Philosophy has been traditionally anti-cosmic, that 
is, ontologically destructive (Sawai, 2009:133). Oriental philosophers always speak about negation 
of the reality of things and events in an empirical world. Terms such as illusion and dream are 
used by oriental philosophers to designate this concept of non-realistic characteristic of reality
(Sawai, 2009:134-5). 
In order to provide a better sociological understanding of religion in order to understand 
people who practice oriental religions and their traditions, the two concepts of reality, profane and 
sacred, need to be bridged. Firstly, to complement Berger and Luckmann, I would like to advance 
five assumptions derived from the traditionalist school26 of philosophy. This school represents the 
perspective of religious people themselves on the universal and perennial nature of humans. These 
assumptions about the nature of humans and their condition are:
  
26
It is often referred to as the perennial philosophy. See Footnote 1. 
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1. Humans stand between two unknowns, the first being their state before terrestrial life, and the 
second their state after death 
2. Humans are situated in a universal hierarchy of being. (For example, everyone is born as a child of 
two parents, which necessarily entails an unconditional parent-child hierarchy. By analogy, this 
situation is extended to encompass ruled-ruler and created-creator hierarchies. This 
understanding of a hierarchy of being is particularly important in discussion of Islamic 
communities, where obedience to the ruler is understood as obligatory)27
3. Humans need to find shelter in the vast stretches of cosmic existence 
4. Humans need something bigger to be committed to, the one that Maslow realized later on and 
thus, sought to rectify his earlier assumptions28
5. Humans have a deep need for certainty.  (Berger also took this into account in his 
desecularization thesis  see below.)
Furthermore, some recent psychological research on the human propensity to religious belief 
appears to be supportive of the assumptions listed above. These include:
(1) An international project led by Oxford University academics, conducted in 20 countries, 
which found that human thought is rooted in religious concepts. They gathered evidence 
that suggests that religion is a common facet of human nature across different societies
(Barrett, 2011)
(2) Work by the neuroscientist Andrew Newberg, which suggests that not only do humans have 
habits of thought that lead them to see the supernatural in the natural and the 
extraordinary in the ordinary, but also that our brains may be 'wired for God', as shown by 
neuro-imaging studies that suggest that we come preloaded with the software for belief. 
Newberg found that the parietal lobe in the brain, which detects where our body physically 
ends and the larger world begins, can be 'silenced' by intense prayer or meditation, 
producing a sense of oneness with the cosmos or God (Newberg, 2001; 2006; 2009; 2010).
Another problem I see with Berger and Luckmanns assumptions is related to their view that 
ordinary members of society invariably inhabit a symbolic universe in a taken-for-granted attitude. I
argue that this has not always been the case, given that not every place in the world experienced the 
secularization of Western Europe29 (e.g. Davie, 2007 and Karpov, 2010)30. The research encountered 
  
27
Cf. the well known Hadith: Listen to and obey your leader, even if he is an Abyssinian slave.
28
Towards the end of his life Abraham Maslow recognized that he had been mistaken, and that self-actualization 
is not the ultimate end. While envisioning the higher psychology he spoke of a psychology which is 
transpersonal, transhuman, centered in the cosmos rather than in human needs and interests, going beyond 
humanness, identity, self-actualization, and the like. He also said that we need something bigger than we 
are to be awed by and to commit ourselves to. (Maslow, 1999:xl)
29
In the Muslim world in particular, Gellner (1991) has written: no secularization has taken place in the world of 
Islam. See also Binder (1988) and Rahman, (1984)
30
Davie (2007 p.2) identified an overwhelming preoccupation with secularization as the dominant paradigm in 
the sociology of religion should be seen in the light of European case in which it worked relatively well. 
Karpov argues there is cultural lag among the sociologists to respond to desecularization phenomena 
realistically. Debates still largely revolve around an 18th and 19th century agenda originally set to herald 
religions decline in the West. Further, while survey-based assessments of religious trends have proliferated in 
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respondents who had questioned the taken-for-grated realities and went through a mystical journey 
to attain the absolute truth. Further, in the Muslim world context, Berger and Luckmann 
downplayed two important things they themselves mentioned in The Social Construction of Reality
regarding what will pass for knowledge. One, is the ongoing presence of what they termed 
significant persons in the internalization process of the society members (pp.151-200), or the 
transmitters of traditional knowledge (p.88); or the carriers of special knowledge who are 
institutionally defined (pp.157-8), or the full-time personnel for symbolic universe maintenance 
(p.135); and the other is my own argument about experiences of a mystical-religious nature that the 
ordinary members of society can imbibe from these. 
To contribute to the body of knowledge of the sociology of religion, I put forward an 
alternative phenomenological analysis to that of Berger and Luckmann, which demonstrates the 
universality of religion at certain levels. This has been developed in order to better understand the 
spiritual dimension of desecularization forces at play, and the opportunities, as well as challenges, in 
contemporary pluralistic and multicultural societies. I begin by observing that implicit in Bergers 
approach are the assumptions of Cartesian dualism31.  Cartesian dualism posits the subject and the 
object as separate, independent and of real substance: as soon as I make an object of anything, I 
have to realize that it is the subject which objectifies something, it is only the subject who can do 
that, without the subject there is no object, and without the object there is no subject. The question 
is, then, whether this dualistic subject-object formulation is real or only mental. The elusive and 
problematic conundrum of subject-object has been one of the fundamental questions in philosophy 
since its inception32. Either both the subject and object, mind and matter are real; or both are 
unreal, just imaginary. The latter is an extreme form of skepticism, wherein everything is relative and 
could not be known for sure, and I believe that this is devastating for the human mind  especially in 
view of the assumption posited above that a universal characteristic of human beings is their need of 
certainty. 
     
recent decades, large-scale content analytical studies of the philosophy, literature, arts and other cultural 
subsystem of a given religion have been marginal if not altogether forsaken by social scientists. 
31
The Cartesian model has been regarded as one of the inescapable frameworks (Taylor 1989:3), traditions 
and streams of thought that circumscribe and shape the ways in which we conceive what it is to be a human 
agent, a person or a self (Jovchelovitch, 2007:16).
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See, among others, Yazdi. M. (1992); Yazdi, A.(1999)
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When Descartes posits 'cogito ergo sum' he makes I, that is the subject, as the only 
certainty33. Still, he cannot explain and understand the subject-object relation. Modern science, on 
the other hand, assumes that the subject-object dualism is real. Although science cannot prove the 
reality of our experience, science has been most successful in explaining its empirical facts.  
Then there is mysticism. Mystical thought holds that there is an original unity of subject and 
object, and to attain this unity is the goal of religion. Interestingly, this conception of underlying 
reality has been the perennial staple of religious and philosophical thought throughout the history of 
humanity. Almost every philosopher or religion speaks of this supreme reality.
The methods by which one achieves the desired union of subject and object are a major 
topic of discussion within the body of knowledge of mysticism34.  Systematic methods to kill the ego 
or I are the most commonly suggested routes to such union. The thinking behind this is that when 
'you' are still there, no matter how little you are, you will continuously be in thrall to subject-object 
dualism: I have a problem - I and the problem; I want something - I and that something. You will 
also constantly be troubled by the questions of theodicy because you have your own standards of 
justice and goodness. The Sufis solve this problem by ceasing to exist and letting the Supreme Reality 
alone exist through a series of methods to kill I. To quote Persian Sufi, Hafiz (1317-1392), Hafiz, 
you yourself are the veil for the self, move then from the midst (Parsania, 2006:79). This self-
extinction is called fana in the Islamic tradition.35 Suddenly, all problems disappear because I - who 
used to have those problems  has gone. If Wittgenstein solves the I have a problem through the 
disappearance of the problem (when he talked about living the right way involving acceptance of, or 
agreement with, the world) (Clack, 1999), the Sufis solve the problem by the disappearance of I. By 
the same token, this also solves the fundamental questions in formal theology that envisage God 
and the world as Creator and created in a completely distinct and absolute manner. It can be said, 
  
33..He expresses, at the beginning of his second Meditation, the aspiration of finding like Archimedes a 
point that is firm and immovable, of being fortunate enough to discover only one thing that is certain and 
indubitable (Descartes 1641/1989:85, cited in Jovchelovitch (2001:17). The center of Descartes anxiety is still 
very much part of our troubles today: how can we be sure that our representation of the world is not 
deceiving us? How can I be certain that my knowledge of the world corresponds to the world outside me? 
They were triggered by the interminable doubts that inhabited his mind, by the instability of human 
knowledge about the world, by a malignant demon he invoked in his writings, whose tricks could deceive the 
senses and cast the shadow of doubt upon everything (Jovchelovitch, 2001:17).   
34
See among others, Studstill (2005).
35
See in various Sufi treatises. The notion of fana (self-annihilation), for example, was eloquently elucidated in 
the famous Futuh al-Ghaib (the Revelations of the Unseen) (Gilani, 1996) by Syekh Abdul Qadir Djilani (1077-
1166).
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nonetheless, that here is the significance of tradition36 in Islam. This Islamic tradition requires acts of 
obedience aimed at maintaining humility in order to prevent the self from being inflated back into a 
separate existence again. 
Here it is worth noting that the tradition of the Prophet, Sunna, has always been at the 
center of the Islamic symbolic universe. Sunna is the second source of Islamic jurisprudence, the first 
being the Quran -the sacred text that for Muslims remains the verbatim words of God37. Both 
sources are regarded as indispensable. Hadith (the Prophets sayings and deeds) are part of the 
Sunna. This underscores the centrality of Muhammad to Islamic spirituality, and hence is the 
meeting ground for diverse branches of Islam. Table 1 describes different provinces and levels of 
meaning of Muhammad to different Muslim individuals, and hence groups38, integrated in a 
symbolic totality of an Islamic symbolic universe. They range from intrinsic, psychological, symbolic-
interactionist and spiritual meanings, ascribed to the persons state of affair and levels of the self. 
The tradition of practical mysticism involves meticulous training of the self. A whole science 
of the soul in Sufism has been developed, based on the progressive perfection and transformation of 
the self toward the Self, which is the ultimate selfhood, through the transformation of the nafs. In 
Arabic the word nafs means at once soul, self and ego. In Sufism there is a differentiation between 
the Spirit (ruh) and the psyche (nafs). As ordinarily understood, the nafs is the source of limitation, 
passion and fallenness, the source of all that makes man selfish and self-centered. This needs to be 
transformed with the help of the Spirit. Understanding this is of importance with regard to what the 
research findings show about how best to interpret the voluntaristic nature of some types (the 
esoteric-inclined) of Muslim groups. Needless to say, the spiritual journey understood in Sufism 
entails engagement in the social world. 
According to this tradition, when the nafs attains the stage of soul at peace (nafs al-
mutmainnah) it gains knowledge of certainty and reposes in peace. This certainty can be explained 
  
36
Sunna means tradition of the Prophet or the way of the Prophet.
37
Islamic society since its inception has been founded on the basis of the Book (Quran) and the Tradition 
(Sunna). The Quran and Sunna have been the prime sources of Islamic epistemology. Muslims have derived 
their laws and regulations - about the management of their personal, familial, communal, commercial, and 
political lives - from these two sources. When there is no explicit verse in the Quran or refernce in the Sunna, 
laws are derived from the available sources where they seem to come to a consensus (ijtihad wa istinbat).  
Only on occasions when the three sources are not available is recourse to analogy and comparison taken (qiyas 
wa ray) (Mutahhari, 2004:23-4). 
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Individual personality also gets involved in the diversity of idiosyncrasy among religious groups, given that in 
religion as in every other area of human endeavour, individual personalities play a much larger role than most 
social scientists and historians are willing to concede (Berger, 1999:13).
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using the frame of reference of the mystic as elucidated above - the union of subject and object, the 
knower and the known. This circumstance is known as the unitive knowledge, which is referred to 
as Marifah or Marifat Allah. It is about knowledge of the Supreme Reality, not by a man as an 
individual but by the divine center of human intelligence39, which transcends the spatio-temporal 
order. In this formulation, the spiritual journey does not consist of speculative philosophy or 
dogmatic theology, but is an experimental science.40 The lack of consideration of this dimension in 
Bergers sociology of religion in my view makes it inadequate for explaining the religious 
communities I have studied, and especially the voluntaristic dimension of religious actions. 
2.2.3. Contemporary Symbolic Universe
While Berger and Luckmann (1991) suggest religion as the most common symbolic universe in 
societies before modern times, Payne (2011) in a study of the Church of Greece argues that 
nationalism is a new religion that arose out of the ashes of the demise of traditional religious 
communities through the promotion of the vernacular in print languages and the fall of royal 
dynasties (p.8). In studying a pluralistic society such as Indonesias where Islam and nationalism 
compete fiercely for individual identity and obedience, it is important to remember what Berger and 
Luckmann (pp 13-30) claim that the central problem of the sociology of knowledge is contained in a 
nutshell in Pascals famous statement What is truth on one side of the Pyrenees is error on the 
other (p. 17). 
What symbolic universes are there in modern societies? Robert Wuthnow (1992) has 
investigated forms of religion that fit the sacred canopy metaphor. His research tends to support 
Bergers idea that in pluralistic societies individuals are likely to draw on several symbolic 
universes to cope with broad questions of meaning and purpose (p.24). Wuthnow also draws 
attention to the fact that even in highly secularized societies most people are willing to discuss broad 
questions of meaning and purpose in life and to reflect on such cosmic questions. He presents 
empirical evidence to support the idea that it is experiences at the margin of everyday reality that 
tend to be an important source of reflection about broader questions of meaning and purpose. With 
this in mind, I would like to highlight similarities shared by religious and secular symbolic universes, 




In the Islamic tradition the Gnostic or illuminated sage is called al-arif biLlah, the Gnostic who knows through 
or by God.
40
See, e.g. Chittick (1984) and Nasr (2001a). 
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1. A meaning-bestowing capacity that far exceeds the domain of social life, so that the 
individual may locate himself within it even in his most solitary experiences (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1991:114).
2. A cognitive and a social dimension.
3. They are social products with a history (p.115), Berger and Luckmann (1991) suggest if 
one is to understand their meaning, one has to understand the history of their production 
(p.115).
The differences between religion and nationalism rest in issues of meaning. This requires 
incorporating an analysis of the spiritual meaning of religion that is drawn from personal spiritual 
experiences as well as the traditions of the religion already given.
There are two common ways of accounting for the origin of meaning in the social sciences. 
The first regards meaning as being intrinsic to the thing under consideration, while the second 
regards meaning as an accretion of the thing being considered, associated with psychological 
elements such as feelings, memories, motives, etc. Given that the relationship between ideas and 
their sustaining social processes is always a dialectical one, we also need to consider a third method 
of accounting meaning in the body of theory, namely symbolic interactionism. Symbolic 
interactionists (Blumer, 1969) have a long history of building a non-positivistic sociology through 
studying meaning in rigorous ways. The symbolic interactionist framework holds that meaning arises 
from the processes of interaction between people.  Thus society as a whole is seen as a process of 
symbolic interaction. In opposition to behaviourist theory, symbolic interactionists argue that 
humans do not react automatically to external stimuli, but rather subject them to a process of 
definition and interpretation. The meaning of things that people act towards are derived from social 
interaction and modified through interpretation. This means that humans engage in minded and 
self-reflexive behaviour in making reactions. Symbolic interactionism offers an appropriate 
metaphysics of human nature and human group life which neuropsychology does not and cannot 
(Becker, 2009:125). Becker (2009) notes that numerous sociological studies of culture (and religion, 
as part of culture) have been inspired by symbolic interactionism. With respect to cultural studies, 
the interactionists emphasis on process stands, as Herbert Blumer insists, as a corrective to any 
view which insists that culture or social structure determines what people do (Becker, 2009:6). I 
believe this is especially pertinent to empirical research on religious people and their actions. 
Therefore, symbolic interactionism is an appropriate theoretical framework to complement Berger 
and Luckmans theories on the creation of symbolic universes, with Berger and Luckmann providing 
evidence that realities are socially constructed, while Blumer deals with how such meanings are 
socially constructed through interactions. 
37
In regard to the latter, the symbolic interactionist Herbert Blumer (1969) argues that the 
nature of any and every object consists of the meaning that it has for the person for whom it is an 
object.  An object may have a different meaning for different individuals. This meaning sets the way 
in which he or she sees the object, the way in which he or she is prepared to act toward it, and the 
way in which he or she is ready to talk about it. The three basic premises of symbolic interactionism 
are: firstly, people act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them, 
secondly, that the meanings of such things are derived from, or arise out of, the social interaction 
that one has with ones fellows; and thirdly, these meanings are handled in or modified through an 
interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things they encounter (Blumer, 1969:1-
20).
In the following table I sketch a knowledge-meaning-action formulation by integrating 
symbolic interactionism, which sees humans as action, and symbolic universe which views human 
as perception. With regard to the meaning section of the table, I incorporate a fourth origin of 
meaning to differentiate religious from secular symbolic universes, and to recognize to the greatest 
extent possible the degree to which religion involves human activity. The fourth origin of meaning 
used in this instance, in the religious symbolic universes, is mystical experiences as the producers of 
non-representational41 knowledge and subsequent spiritual meanings.  While social science is largely 
aware of various levels of realities and of meanings42, my proposition is beyond that. I aim to raise 
awareness that there is inadequacy in the concept of human as mundane-being held in the present 
state of social sciences and the perspective of human thought as mere instrument in the struggle for 
survival and power, in both the idealist and anti-idealist schools.
  
41
Put simply, non-conceptual knowledge, ilm al-huduri in Islam
42
Such as those mentioned in Berger and Luckmann (1991): the various layers of experience, and the different 
structures of meaning involved in, say, being bitten by a dog, remembering having been bitten by a dog, having 
a phobia about all dogs, and so forth (p.35).
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Table 1 Knowledge Meaning Action Model in Religious Symbolic Universe
Knowledge Interplay between Knowledge and Meaning Action





Three origins (source) of meaning have been widely 
accepted in social theories. They are intrinsic, 
psychological, and Symbolic Interactionism
Source-1:  Meaning
Product:   Action
Example: 
Information about Prophet 
Muhammad
1. Muhammad is the last Prophet
 ► creates intrinsic meaning                
1.Intrinsic Muhammad is the last
Prophet for those who believe ►
Following the practices of the 
Prophet
2. Muhammad is genealogically 
an Arab ► creates 
psychological meaning       
2.Psychological        Perhaps, for the Arabs and the  
progeny ►
Sentimental love (could be blind 
love too)
3.Muhammad is being offended





Examples are abound ►
 
Reaction against offense, e.g. by 
Satanic Verses of Salman 
Rushdie; the movie Innocence of 
Muslim; Faith Freedom internet 
forum (As the Prophet was 
humiliated and people defended, 
the meaning of the Prophet was 
escalated even higher)
I propose the second source of 
knowledge to be incorporated 
in religious symbolic universe, 
namely, mystical experience.
I propose the fourth source of meaning drawn from 
mystical experience to be incorporated in religious 
symbolic universe, namely, spiritual meaning.
I propose the second source of 
action drawn from spiritual 
meaning to be incorporated in 
religious symbolic 





But when the person needs to 
name that experience in 
verbalized thought, he has to use 
language. That means he needs 
to shuffle through his stock of 
representational knowledge
4. From Mystical experience and Mystical knowledge, 
spiritual meaning emerged. ►
There is gradation of spiritual meaning according to 
gradation of the self, and hence, of consciousness. 




Mystical experience associated 
with Prophet Muhammad ►
creates spiritual meanings
Gradation of spiritual meaning of Prophet Muhammad 
(the following illustration was made for the sake of 
discussion only) 
Amir has spiritual meaning of the Prophet grade-1 ►  
 
Love action grade-1
Siti has spiritual meaning of the the Prophet grade-2 ►  Love action grade-2
Sukino has spiritual meaning of the Prophet grade-3 ►  Love action grade-3
The highest spiritual meaning of the Prophet is "Nur 
Muhammad" as articulated by a number of respondents: 
Emha, Rangka, Said Aqil, Munhanif  ►
The highest level of love action 
(khawas al-khawas, the 
perfected ones, in Sufism)
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Table 2 Knowledge-Meaning-Action in Secular Symbolic Universe
Knowledge Interplay between Knowledge and Meaning Action






Crigins  of Meaning
(Three origins: intrinsic, psychological, and 
Symbolic Interactionist)
Product :   Action
Example: 
Information about ABC country 
1. ABC is where you live ►
 creates intrinsic meaning                
1.Intrinsic   Being a citizen ► ABC is simply a place to live
2. ABC is your father land ►
 creates psychological 
 meaning       
2.Psychological     Feeling of attachment 
   to ABC ►
Love of ABC and makes ABC 
his identity
3. ABC is a Third World
 country, oppressed 




Interactionist   Nationalist sentiment ► Nationalists struggle for 
ABC independence and 
national identity 
The Islamic system of thought recognises non-representational knowledge as ilm huduri (Arabic for 
knowledge by presence) besides ilm husuli (knowledge by correspondence). Mehdi Hairi Yazdi 
(2002) expounds this concept philosophically in The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic 
Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence. Alongside knowledge of our own sensations, feelings, and 
bodies, mystical experiences -characterised by noetic quality- is knowledge by presence. Notably, in 
maintaining a uniform understanding of awareness, modern philosophy often disparaged the 
inclusion of these species of knowledge into the corpus of thinking. The exclusion, however, does 
not ipso facto prove the falsehood of these types of knowledge. In fact, they continue to submit 
themselves to philosophical inquiry and stand to further the search for the nature of being. Within 
knowledge by presence, the object is essential to the notion of knowledge and immanent in the 
mind of the knowing-subject without needing representation. It has all its relations within the 
framework of itself, such that the whole anatomy of the notion can hold true without any 
implication of an external objective reference calling for an exterior relation (Yazdi, 2002:43). It is 
immediately present in the mind of the knowing-subject and thus logically implied in the definition 
of the conception of knowledge itself. The division of knowledge into two in Islam, requires 
identification of the object into: (1) subjective, or essential, object, which is no other than the 
knowing-subject; and (2) objective, or accidental, object, which is the known-object -- and thus 
subsequently into: (1) immanent (internal) and (2) transitive (external) object (Yazdi, 2002:27-56). 
This division sheds light further on an understanding of hierarchy of vision in perceiving reality, 
through special and systematic training for the self of the knowing-subject in oriental religions 
already discussed. Knowledge by correspondence, on the other hand, operates within the 
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framework of completely separate knowing-subject and known-object, and requires correspondence 
relations between one and another. Because correspondence is indeed a dyadic relation, it logically 
follows that whenever the relation holds there must be a conjunction between the knowing-subject 
and the known-object. Therefore, the external object plays a major role in the essentiality of 
knowledge by correspondence, because if there were no external object there could be no 
representation of it, hence, no possibility of the existence of that knowledge at all.  
It should be clear while the dichotomy of subject and object is not totally negated in Islamic 
system of thought for, in fact, it is the function of human beings vision that makes the duality 
appear. The Islamic system aims to establish the integrity and systematic unity of human reason by 
pulling together all forms and manifestation of human awareness. In modern psychology, there are 
three hypotheses that attempt to explain how representation operates in the human mind. One of 
them, the Language of Thought formulation (Kim, 1990)43 holds that language is the central 
feature of all cognition. The corollary is that all thoughts are sentence-like. Such a framework can 
be understood within Islamic system as an exegesis of the verse of Quran (Q:2:30-9) saying that God 
taught Adam (signifies human) the names of everything, and with this knowledge Adam is even able 
to inform the angels their names, which the angels themselves did not know because God did not 
teach them (humans level in Islam is higher than angel). This corresponds with a language of 
thought formulation that representational knowledge is sentence-like. On the other hand, by their 
very nature, the mystics are the ones most sensible of the precariousness of representational 
knowledge. This is evident in Sufi poetry where the poets show that they are aware of the difficulties 
inherent in accessing the absolute truth behind words. A passage in one of the poems of Ibn Arabi, 
the great mystic of Islam, goes: Deliver us, oh Allah, from the sea of names!. More importantly, the 
power of meaning to determine ones actions (as indicated in the table above) makes the symbolic 
universe not only a pair of glasses that the person uses to peer into social realities to make sense of 
them, but also something that possesses the power to draw allegiances, which then set forth the 
normative authority (this refers to an explanation of what makes normative claims legitimately 
binding for that person, i.e. why he or she should regulate his or her actions with respect to 
particular normative claims). Moreover, besides normative elements, symbolic universes also 
encompass cognitive and affective components.
  
43
The other two hypotheses are: Intentional Psychology/Realism and, Avoiding Magical Theories of Mind. See 
Sterelny (1990).
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Symbolic Universe contested: The case of Indonesia
Few countries in the world could match Indonesias diversity of population where some 300 
different ethnicities live together. Ethnic conflicts have happened every now and then since the 
formation of the nation state (see Chapter 5). The greater the diversity of symbolic universe 
constituents in any given society the more complex problems emerge in the process of the social 
construction of intersubjective reality in that society, that is, a subjective world that the members 
share with each other in collectivity. In the midst of inequality, most notably, of wealth and power, 
the complexity multiplies around pragmatic issues. This opens the possibility of hybridization, i.e. 
the deliberate effort to synthesize different symbolic universes. Such hybridization helps explain the 
hate-love relationship between nationalists and 'Westernists' in Indonesian society. These are two 
ordinarily opposing groups which disagree on many issues, but see eye to eye with regard to 
supporting the capitalist developmentalism paradigm. In similar vein there are the attempts by 
modernist Muslims to hybridize Islam and 'Westernism' throughout the Muslim world in order to 
construct a modern society that participates economically and politically in the global system. Berger 
(2002) specifically refers to this particular group in Indonesia, which has emerged since the demise 
of Suharto, as pro-capitalist, pro-democratic, tolerant of religious pluralism, but decisively 
committed to the Muslim faith (Berger, 2002:13)  
It is possible to classify Indonesian Muslim society, which is fairly secularized, into three 
groups according to the most dominant symbolic universes that they embrace, that is, the universe 
that compels their allegiance and provides normative authority. The three universes are Islam, 
nationalism and 'Westernism'.
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The Indonesian Muslims categorized under Muhammads nation group in Table 3 are probably a 
numerical minority. As Robert Pringle says in Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and 
Diversity:
In the case of Indonesia, the term Muslim is also problematic. It usually means anyone 
whose faith is Islam, about 85% of the population. But it is also often used to mean someone 
who is politically a Muslim, as opposed to being a nationalist or a secularist, and votes for an 
Islamic political party. In this sense Muslims have always been a minority of the Indonesian 
population and remain so, despite the increase in Islamic religious observance in recent years. 
(Pringle, 2010:11) 
Nevertheless, with a recognition that the relationships between ideas and their sustaining social 
processes are always dialectical, in this thesis I seriously consider the potential of Muhammads 
nation to advance relocalisation projects and to mobilize the environmental movement to rebuild 
sustainable Muslim communities with local self-governance. I do so for two reasons: firstly, the 
resilience of Islamic communities and movements at any given moment in Indonesian history, and 
secondly, the emergence of transnational Islamic movements. 
2.3 Disenchanting the World, Shattering the Unified Systemic Worldview
Berger and Luckmanns theory of social order and symbolic universe provides a framework to 
understand how the unified systemic worldview that the literature on sustainable community 
development refers to (Maser, 1997) is relevant to the social formation of indigenous communities. 
In Sustainable Community Development: principle and concepts, Maser (1997) for instance, believes 
that the unspoiled indigenous culture may be operated by what he terms a unified systemic 
worldview and the components of a community will change when the social focus shifts towards an 
'expansionist economic worldview'. He further notes that in a unified systemic worldview people 
will realize that they are but one species among the many in a dynamic, ever-changing, interactive, 
interconnected, interdependent system, and a new sense of community will encompass all living 
things, including soils, within the common area (Maser, 1997:99). There are five purposes that a 
local community in a unified systemic worldview serves (p.100):
1. Social participation  where and how people are able to interact with one another to 
create the relationships necessary for a feeling of value and self-worth
2. Mutual aid  services and support offered in times of individual or familial need
3. Economic products, as well as the availability of such commodities as food and clothing 
in the local area
4. Socialization  educating people about cultural values and acceptable norms. Social 
control  the means for maintaining those cultural values and acceptable norms
Maser contends that the current disintegration of family and community in American life has made 
it unlikely that most people in that country really have an intimate sense of belonging to a local 
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community. He believes that the people have largely lost their sense of connection to and with a 
community. Further, he argues that one reason for this lack of strong community connections might 
be the adoption of an expansionist economic worldview in which accumulating material possessions 
takes the place of developing a spirituality that is manifested in quality relationships and mutual 
caring. He asserts that if human society and its environment are ever to become sustainable it is 
necessary to rediscover or recreate our sense of community in order to balance the material with 
the spiritual, the pieces with the whole - which is the essential balance required in a unified systemic 
worldview (Maser, 1997:100).
Conversely, the disenchantment45 of the world, for Max Weber, is the essence of what is 
called modernity. Weber contends that the rationalization that characterises modernity will 
eventually shatter the unified systemic epistemologies that constitute pre-modern worldviews.  
According to Richard Jenkins, there are two aspects of disenchantment that reinforce each other. 
One is the secularization and the decline of magic, and the other is the increasing scale, scope, and 
power of the formal-rational logics and processes in the areas of science, bureaucracy, law and 
policy-making (Jenkins, 2000:12).  Jenkins describes disenchantment thus:
It is the historical process by which the natural world and all areas of human experience 
become experienced and understood as less mysterious; defined, at least in principle, as 
knowable, predictable and manipulable by humans; conquered by and incorporated into the 
interpretive scheme of science and rational government. In a disenchanted world everything 
becomes understandable and tameable, even if not, for the moment, understood and 
tamed. Increasingly the world becomes human-centered and the universe  only apparently 
paradoxically- more impersonal. (Jenkins, 2000:12)
Webers disenchantment thesis seems to have been based on a number of assumptions, two key 
ones being that history has some direction, and that time is linear. Both these assumptions are 
distinctive to Western culture, with Jenkins claiming:
Even if we disregard the rich variety of communities and ethnicities in the pre-modern 
world, there is every reason to suggest that the European world, at least, has been 
disenchanted, in the sense of epistemically fragmented, for as long as we can perceive in the 
historical record. (Jenkins, 2000:15) 
However, the diverse array of oppositional re-enchantment that we see today tells us that the world 
may never have really been disenchanted, or only unevenly so, and that the progressive 
banishment of mystery in the face of objective knowledge is an idea which was more defensible in 
Webers day than it is today (Jenkins, 2000:17). In respect of disenchantment and re-enchantment,
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He borrowed the expression from Friedrich Schiller when he spoke about de-divinization of the world.
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we are witnessing in modern societies an array of opposing tendencies, themes and forces, and thus 
the world is arguably more mysterious today than ever. Peter Berger himself, after contributing to 
the sociological literature on secularization, admitted that he had mistakenly predicted an overall 
secularization. (Berger, 1999). The growing evidence of the resurgence of public religion in the late 
twentieth century has proved otherwise. In The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion 
and World Politics, a collection of articles published in 1999 which Berger edited, he indicated the 
possible origins of counter-secularization forces. Two possible sources are nominated. One is 
associated with humankinds deep need of certainty, and the other with the resentment of the 
masses who are not part of the elites Enlightenment program. As Berger expresses it:
One: Modernity tends to undermine the taken-for-granted certainties by which people lived 
through most of history. This is an uncomfortable state of affairs, for many an intolerable 
one, and religious movements that claim to give certainty have great appeal. 
Two: A purely secular view of reality has its principal social location in an elite culture that, 
not surprisingly, is resented by large numbers of people who are not part of it but who feel 
its influence (most troublingly, as their children are subjected to an education that ignores or 
even directly attacks their own beliefs and values). Religious movements with a strongly 
anti-secular bent can therefore appeal to people with resentments that sometimes have 
quite non-religious sources. (Berger, 1999:11)
Having recognized all that, it may be understood that the relocalisation itself falls under the re-
enchantment category alongside desecularization, religious fundamentalism and varied resistance to 
mainstream paradigms and consumer lifestyles. As Jenkins (2000:18) puts it:
More generally, one can point to a wide range of substantial (re)enchantments which are 
decidedly modern: religious fundamentalism, whatever its hue; alternative lifestyles, many 
of them explicit resistances to urbanism and capitalism; neo-paganism and other invented 
spiritual traditions; and psychoanalysis/psychotherapy.
Jenkins also recognizes that the diverse portfolio of perspectives and practices that developed as a 
response to the rationalism of the Enlightenment shelters under the umbrella of romanticism, an 
imagining of and yearning for a mythical pre-modern, un-rationalized past. One may argue, 
therefore, that sustainable community development projects will necessarily exhibit tensions 
between rationalism and romanticism. On the other hand, we are seeing that while the modern 
world is in some respects becoming more homogeneous via the process known as globalization, it 
remains as divided by heterogeneity of culture as ever.  Hannerz (1992:217-67) argues that the 
global ecumene involves convergence and polycentric variety; likewise Jenkins says:
The homogenizing effects of globalization necessarily produce a response in the 
(re)invention, valorization, and assertion of locality and distinctiveness. Homogeneity and 
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heterogeneity can no more be divorced than the formal and the informal, or similarity and 
difference. The one entails the other. (Jenkins, 2000:16) 
Finally, given that the unchallenged hegemony of the Western scientific paradigm began to fragment 
in the twentieth century, and that modern human sciences are increasingly understood as 
contingent rather than permanent and in need of other interpretive models, one can argue that the 
characteristic postmodernist rejection of totalizing theory; and pursuit of localizing and 
contingent theories (Bennett, 2005:28) could in itself be seen as part of the re-enchantment forces 
that open up the possibility of greater epistemological pluralism. 
2.4. Re-enchanting the World, Reconstructing the Unified Systemic Worldview 
Given the current state of economy, politics, disintegrating families, violent social relations, 
uncertain sense of security, and the confused condition of our guiding values, Maser contends that 
the language of community is one way of overcoming an increasingly common yearning for clearer 
ethical values on which to base a politics filled with meaning and purpose, or to reconnect people 
with a set of shared values and principles with which to embrace the uncertainties of life. Maser 
proposes community development, which is the democratic process at the local level of our 
domestic lives, to be the best opportunity for applying the democratic process. Ethics must 
therefore be nurtured as one of the most valuable assets in making human conditions work (pp.99-
107).
He argues that rekindling the spirit of community is a choice which it is difficult to make 
because we often accept the route of least resistance in collective thinking that is embodied in the 
current worldview, and only a few will chart their course against the current, driven by an inner need 
to find their lifes fulfillment in and through sustainable community (Maser, 1997:242). According to 
Maser, as they dare to risk criticism by the mainstreamers, these few people will become more 
focused, and with increasing focus the clarity of the vision they behold comes ever closer to their 
grasp. He applauds these people as the true pioneers of our time who are, instead of simply wanting 
to turn back the clock, forward-looking and in coherence with an emergent holistic paradigm. As 
they reach a place where materialism and spirituality are balanced, he argues that their focus will be 
so concentrated, their faith so strong, that what to others seems to be effortful will become to them 
increasingly effortless (Maser, 1997:242). It is therefore important at this point to make it clear that 
attaining a sustainable lifestyle or Utopian-inspired ecological art of living requires that societys 
focus shifts from having to being (Fromm, 1979), and moves towards finding a balanced 
configuration of components of life. This is what was proposed by Hannah Arendt, a prominent 
twentieth century thinker on the good life as glossed in de Geus (2009). She argues that human 
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fulfillment and living a rewarding, complete and well-spent life can best be approached from the 
perspective of a proper and balanced ordering of action, work and labor. 
Not unlike Berger and Luckmann (1991), Maser (1997:38-44) too, in my view, has ignored 
the domain which had always been an integral part of the unified systemic worldview of pre-
modern indigenous societies, namely, the transcendent spiritual order46.  Given that the worldview 
or paradigm is a basic set of beliefs that guide action (Guba, 1990:17), the unified systemic 
worldview must be seen as existing not in the empirical order but in the so-called symbolic 
universe of the given community. In the following section the debates among Muslim thinkers will 
be introduced, regarding reconstructing the unified systemic worldview of Islam through 
reconstruction of knowledge where no barrier would appear to exist between the sacred and the 
secular. 
2.4.1 Muslims Cognitive Transformation
Sociology of knowledge studies the social role of ideologies. In this approach, ideas - be they political 
ideologies, religions, or theoretical ideas - are not understood as pure expressions of reason, but as 
being closely tied to social interests and conflicts. Accordingly, ideas on the superiority of one 
civilisation over another can function as instruments of subjugation and imperialism. Many have 
argued in this sense that western-style education in the Third World is continuing Western 
colonialism. The connection between knowledge and power and interaction between institutions 
and discourses have been the focus of Foucaults studies (Seidman, 2008). Foucaults deep interest 
in the social sciences has led him to investigate the social effects of knowledge such as psychiatry, 
criminology, penology, demography, sexology, economics and sociology. He asserted that 
discourses that aim to reveal the truth of the abnormal personality or of human sexuality or the 
criminal, help to create and control the very objects they claim to know. (Seidman, 2008: 361).
Henceforth, scientific knowledge functions as a major social power through the state, the family, and
institutions that support social welfare. As a result, the social scientific disciplines shape the 
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Many have argued that the  primal religions or indigenous religions (so called in contrast to revealed 
religions such as Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism) have for millennia been the guardians 
of the natural environment with an ear finely tuned to the message of the earth (See Nasr, 1996 and 
Descola, 1986). Despite great differences in their myths and practices these religions present a remarkable 
morphological resemblance as far as the relation to nature or earth is concerned. The vision of the whole was 
always related to the sense of the holy, or sense of the sacred, which nature displays at every turn. The Quran 
says of this, wherever you turn there is the Face of God (Q:2: 115). In this way of seeing things, the non-
existence of a sense of the sacred in modern culture implies that the adoption of the unified systemic 
worldview that Maser would like to propose as a basis for sustainable community development is well-nigh 
impossible, because to lose the sense of the sacred is also to become blind to the whole, and ultimately to 
forget the total order.
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dominant ideas about who we are, what is permissible, what can be said, by whom, when, and in 
what form (Seidman, 2008: 362). Until Foucault, this power/knowledge configuration had been 
submerged by the Enlightenment scientific vision which underpins aspects of developmentalism in 
Indonesia. Further, as a rejection of Western Enlightenment tradition Foucault puts forward an 
alternative to a scientific vision of human studies that he called genealogy which shows dominant 
discourses defining the social universe as natural conceal social interests and power relations. 
(Seidman, 2008:359). Through his genealogical social analysis Foucault aims to show that the 
dominant knowledges are entangled in a history of social conflict, and central to this history is the 
exclusion or marginalization of discourses that speak for oppressed groups. This thesis adopts 
Foucaults power/knowledge concept in investigating domination upon the Third World through 
discourses. At this point, different human personality characteristics as inborn traits have been 
adopted (see 1.4) to explain different cognitive reactions by the oppressed, Muslim groups  the 
reactions that manifested with the emergence of reformist and modernist Muslims since the 19th
century. In this respect, alongside the power of the Islamic symbolic universe described above to 
contain within its orbit the dialectical relationships between Islam and modernity amongst pious 
Muslims, symbolic interactionism appears as helpful.
The symbolic interactionist perspective is that human conduct is a meaningful product of 
situated social interaction among self-conscious individuals (Hewitt, 2010) and provides a framework 
for individuals rather than culture or social structure- concerning their actions. Symbolic 
interactionists argue that humans do not react automatically to external stimuli, but rather subject 
them to a process of definition and interpretation. They portray social behaviour from the 
perspective of participants by closely studying the concrete situations in which they form what is 
labelled conduct. Further:
Symbolic interactionists examine how people define situations and act on the basis of those 
definitions, as well as how the self is shaped by group membership and by the real and 
imagined boundaries between groups. Symbolic interactionists have investigated such 
topics as race and ethnic group relations, the formation of subcultures, life in communities 
and urban neighbourhoods, and collective behaviour. (Hewitt, 2010: 881)
From that perspective, the early reformist movement was a product of the situated social 
interaction Muslims had with the colonial West and modernity.  Muslims reacted towards modernity 
according to their definition of what modernity was. The meanings of modernity that they acted 
towards were derived from social interactions they had with it and modified through interpretation. 
Different human personality characteristics appear to explain different lines of interpretation of 
modernity made by different Muslim groups. To the warrior types, the defeat of the Muslim world 
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and the violent European colonisation led them to suggest that Western sciences and technology 
were the secret of Western power, and thus Muslims needed to appropriate them and transform 
cognitively to adopt these. This group is commonly referred to as reformist or early modernist 
Muslims. To the sages the onslaught of rationalisation in the name of disenchantment led them to 
suggest that western thought is a worldview that is void of the sacred and marginalises religiously 
inspired worldviews, hence, the West is kufr, infidel. This led them to continuously be wary of 
modern-Western influences in the Muslims minds. A chronological advancement of the debates 
among Muslim thinkers on cultural, philosophical and cognitive transformation deemed necessary to 
confront modernity, is to follow.
2.4.1.1 Early Modernist Muslims
Reformist Muslims began with the figures such as Afghani (1838-1897), Abduh (Egypt, 18491905), 
and Iqbal (1875-1938). Scholars in the field refer to Islamic reformism interchangeably with the Salafi 
movement, Islamic revivalism, Islamic resurgence, political Islam, and Islamism. Another term that is 
recently used is Islamic fundamentalism. The first wave of reform movements emerged in the 19th 
century on the proposition that European imperial expansion was due to Muslims' religious laxity. A 
central issue in the debate among reformist intellectuals in the Middle East was whether to fight 
colonialism through political struggle or cultural struggle (Fuad, 2004). The former was championed 
by Afghani, whose appeal to Muslims around the world to unite against Western colonialism and to 
fight for immediate independence became the basis of Pan-Islamism. The latter was championed by 
Abduh who appealed for education of the Muslim people. Adopting the former would mean going 
for an armed revolutionary struggle, and adopting the latter for the longer struggle of setting up new 
educational institutions and reforming existing ones. Both influenced greatly Islamic movements in 
Indonesia (see Section 5.3). 
Salafi reformists combined an anti-imperialist, pan-Islamic vision with an admiration for 
modern rationality and science, which they regarded as sources of Western progress and dominance 
(Zaidi, 2006). Abduh, for instance, stressed the role of reason, contending that, though there may be 
in religion that which transcends the understanding, there is nothing which reason finds impossible. 
He also believed that Muslims could adopt European science which itself owed (in his view) a great 
deal to Islam (Bennet, 2005:21). Another figure, Iqbal, is known to have advocated progress, 
arguing that in fact the Quran itself teaches that life is the process of progressive creation which 
necessitates that each generation -guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors- should 
be permitted to solve its own problems. While Iqbal was often accused of borrowing too much from 
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Western philosophy, he was also not uncritical of the West. He denounced the Wests petty 
nationalism and saw its materialistic worldview as bankrupt (Bennett, 2005). 
It is worth noting, that the use of terms reformist and fundamentalist borrowed from the 
Protestant Christian Movement in the 19th century have caused confusion and were considered 
problematic by a notable group of academic scholars and Islamic activists. Firstly, there was no true 
affinity between Protestanismism and Islamic reform. The latter call for return to the Quran and 
Sunna (traditions of Prophet Muhammad) in order to purify Islam from accretions of which locally-
derived customs were part. Afsaruddin (2012) reminds, that fundamentalism in the Christian context 
refers to Protestant Christian movements which insisted on the acceptance of the Bible as the literal 
word of God, this is simply different to Islam because a Muslim by definition is someone who accepts 
the Qur'an as the literal word of God, whether one is a conservative or liberal Muslim, there is a 
consensus on this issue; one cannot be a Muslim without accepting that the Quran is a divine, 
revealed text (Afsaruddin, 2012). Therefore, from this point of view, it doesn't make sense to talk 
of Muslim fundamentalists as a separate group within Islam. With this warning in mind, it is better 
to speak of Islamic revivalist or reform movements, and particularly in the 20th century, to talk 
about modernist Islam and political Islam (Afsaruddin, 2012). 
Clearly, there was direct correlation between colonial political-economic power with their 
military forces in the Muslim world and Islamic reformism. It must be highlighted, for the reformists, 
modern science and technology were the secret of colonial power, and hence, had to be 
appropriated to resist them. For this reason the Reformists have been labelled as early Modernists 
as well, since they are the ones who have propagated modern education in the Muslim world. 
Critiques by the Sages
The Reformists or modernists Muslims have been criticised severely by the Traditionalist scholars 
(Nasr, 2001; Lumbard, 2004). For them, both movements represent subversion of traditional values 
and teachings from within the Islamic tradition. 
In an effort to transform Islamic civilization, each has in fact hastened the onset of the very 
illness they sought to ameliorate. Rather than contemplating and evaluating Western 
civilization through the Islamic intellectual tradition, modernists have embraced many tenets 
of Western thought out of a deep sense of inferiority-a sense which results from mistaking 
the power of Western nations for the truth of Western ideologies. (Lumbard, 2004:69) 
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This whole scene of Islamic movements and thoughts brought to my mind, Gadamers (1976) 
conception of prejudice47 to explain what has made some of the Muslims react against colonial 
power by reinterpreting Islam as a counter ideology, whereas others continue to reject the 
ideologisation of Islam which in their view is nothing but de-divinising Islam. The former are 
inclined to political Islam whereas the latter to the sound knowledge of Islam. From then on, the 
diversity of interpretations of Islam, and hence of learning communities, emerged. It ultimately led 
to the diversity of social movements that carry Islam as either an ideal or source of inspirations. In 
this respect, Moaddel and Talattofs (2000) accounts are important. In discussing the modernists and 
fundamentalists they enumerated, nevertheless, factors they hold to have been uniting the two 
streams with the rest of the Muslims. They are: (i) The One God (Allah); (ii) The Book (Quran); (iii) 
Prophet Muhammad; and (iv) The Prophets traditions (Sunna):
In their efforts to formulate a distinctively Islamic response to the problems facing their 
communities, these thinkers could not and should not violate such core principles of Islam as 
Gods unity, the Quran being His word that descended to the people through Prophet 
Muhammad, and other fundamental religious dogma explicitly stated in the Quran (Moaddel 
and Talattof, 2000:3). 
They noted further, Besides the fact that they were devout Muslims, violating such principles 
meant that they would lose their right to speak as Muslims (p.3). In relation to the key argument of 
the thesis about the uniting power of a symbolic universe, I highlight that disagreements between 
diverse groups of Muslims were around the interpretation of Islam in the context of modernity and 
not about the classical jurisprudence itself as Nasr (2001:251) also suggests. Esposito (2002) pointed 
out that in Islam what matters is not orthodoxy (correct doctrine) but orthopraxy (correct action). 
These uniting factors are crucial in my theoretical framework according to which Islamic movements 
can be considered as an alternative to a global environmental movement for the Muslim world by 
capitalising on the Islamic symbolic universe.
Relatedly, Zaidi (2006) argues further, that reformist figures, even those such as Qutb, 
Mawdudi and Hassan al-Banna who have been dubbed fathers of Islamic fundamentalism, or 
ideologues and pamphleteers (El-Fadl, 2001:56), at least did sense some of the implications of the 
cognitive transformation underlying modernity. Zaidi argues by giving the example of a well-known 
Islamist argument raised by Mawdudi that the liberal notion of popular sovereignty supersedes the 
sovereignty of God. Such an argument, according to Zaidi, should have not been simply rejected as 
  
47  In his hermeneutics, Gadamer argues that prejudice defines the ground the interpreter him/herself 
occupies when he/she understands. Gadamer did not use prejudice as a negative category, instead he aims to 
raise an awareness (and an acceptance) of individuals own pre-judgments (prejudices) and influence attempts 
to understand a text. I ponder that it is usually individuals own biases that are responsible for what is selected 
to study. It is unlikely that individuals research a text that they have no interest in.
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superficial as individuals may also acknowledge the increasing exclusion of the Transcendent from 
the political and moral realms. Similar treatment should have been applied to Qutbs denunciation 
of modernity as an Age of Jahiliyah (an Age of Ignorance) because of modernitys reliance on a 
strictly rationalist-empiricist epistemology that repudiates the authority of metaphysical truths. 
Undoubtedly, Mawdudi and Qutb were speaking for an epistemology that is not limited to the 
earthly realities. 
Finally, while the political Islam of the 19th century was shaped by the struggle for 
independence, thus, prone to nationalist sentiments (in Indonesia, see Chapter 5), the present-day 
globalisation has given birth to non-nationalist and global-Islam which is more in accordance with 
the anti-nationalism and anti-tribalism of Islam. This phenomenon should be seen in the light of 
Berger and Luckmann (1991), that social change must be understood as standing in a dialectical 
relationship to the history of ideas, and Blumer (1969), that meanings are socially constructed 
through interactions. Globalisation, in terms of an enormous increase in the possibilities of 
communication between an increasing number of people throughout the world, has helped the 
Ummah become reified against the background of, and in interaction with, emerging global culture, 
most of it Western, and indeed American, both in origin and content. That is accompanied with 
promises of an international civil society towards democratic global governance, on the one hand, 
and on the other, American economic and political hegemony with the cultural consequences of a 
homogenised world resembling a Disneyland (Berger, 2002; 2003). In this sense, a transnational 
Islamic movement arises out of the reified notion of Ummah in a dialectical relationship, and in 
interaction with globalisation. The contemporary development of global Islam or transnational Islam 
cannot be underestimated in contemplating an endogenous Islamic relocalisation model that is fully 
attuned to a changing global environment. 
2.4.1.2 Reconstruction of Knowledge Project
There are, among Muslim thinkers, those who realise that cultural, philosophical and cognitive 
transformations conceptualised within modernity require far more sophisticated treatments of the 
subject from a Muslim perspective than have been provided by political reformists, jihadists, neo-
revivalists and revolutionaries48(Zaidi, 2006:70) already given. They posited instead a cognitive 
transformation through reconstruction of knowledge. Three names of scholars have been the most 
well-known on this project: Nasrs attempt to reformulate an Islamic science, al-Faruqis attempt to 
Islamise the humanities and social science and the Ijmalis critique of al-Faruqis project. Zaidi (2006) 
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Ones whose movements were re-enchanting the political, who Zaidi argued have obscured more holistic 
treatments of modernity from a Muslim perspective (p.69).
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outlines the project in chronological order. This suggests that there is more to Muslims desire to re-
enchant the world than simply anti-imperialist sentiments - an account that corroborates my core 
argument in the onset of this chapter, that society is not just a struggle for economic gain and 
power. Zaidis account resonates with Manzos (1991) and Tuckers (1999) critiques of dependency 
theory49 as well. According to them, because the dependency theory explains development from the 
logic of capital50, it remained modernist and the cultural effect it was having on particular segments 
of the population, such as indigenous peoples, was not considered. Accordingly, Muslims 
reconstruction of knowledge must be placed beyond Foucaults (1972) relationship between 
discourse and power, for it is concerned with broader questions than the issues of power in which 
economic and development schemes are always embedded. Using my theoretical framework, 
reconstruction of knowledge appears as signalling a clash of symbolic universe. What the 
proponents really pursue is cognitive consonance with the social construction of reality under an 
Islamic symbolic universe according to which God is Reality (al-Haq) and wherein the Muslims 
religious convictions and the world correspond. Consequently, to return to an Islamic civilisation in 
which there is moral, cognitive and interpretive unity, the proponents believe that it is imperative 
for the Muslim world to revitalise Islamic thought and to end what is perceived as the Wests 
epistemological imperialism, for the latter cannot meet the need of Muslims and is at the core of 
the economic and cultural poverty of the Muslim world (see Bennett, 2005). On this matter, Chapter 
4 presents a number of authors who will argue that the imperialist and colonial development 
strategies have used theories of development as means to progress. The development theories 
stemming from the WWII era echo the Enlightenment discourse and capitalist notions of economic 
growth, and this Eurocentric development brought together modernisation and industrialisation 
(Preston, 1996). It assumes that progress equals economic growth which necessarily involves 
technological sophistication, urbanisation and high levels of consumption. Further, as knowledge is 
socially constructed and thus inextricably linked to power (Foucault, 1972, 1980; Hindess, 1996), the 
assumptions of Eurocentric development continue to marginalise indigenous peoples and their 
knowledge.
The early modernist narrative already given provides the cognitive-historical background of 
the formation of Reformist/Modernist Muhammadiyah and the Traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama being 
studied in Indonesia, including the splinter groups that followed, such as Hidayatullah and Qahhars 
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A theory of development that has been critical of the modernisation theory which held that all societies 
progress through similar stages of development from a Eurocentric perspective
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It was influenced by Marxist concepts of inherent inequality in capitalism and understands underdevelopment
as rooted in political structures and power relations (Preston, 1996).
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movement that have used Islam as a political ideology. In the next discussion, I will present the 
reconstruction of knowledge espoused by Seyyed Hossein Nasr to provide a philosophical exposition 
of the cognitive transformation needed towards sustainability-literacy that the thesis seeks to 
articulate. This will be followed by the Ijmali ideas, to substantiate the call for reopening the gates of 
ijtihad51 that the thesis also attempts to call for; a subject that has been common parlance among 
Muslim scholars world over, including those in Indonesia. With regard to ijtihad, Nasr warns that 
opinion in Islamic law cannot be practised by a mind that has been transformed by the tenets of 
modernism (Nasr, 2001:193). Ijtihad requires both profound critical attitudes toward the modern 
world combined with a deep understanding of this world. 
Nasrs Reconstruction of Knowledge
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the prominent contemporary representative of traditionalist Islam, is known to 
be very critical of the uncritical assimilation of Islam and modernity that both modernists and 
fundamentalists advocate. He considers their apologetic turn since the late nineteenth century to 
have gradually nurtured a certain type of Muslim religious thinker who had already unconsciously 
lost the intellectual battle to modernism and the West, and was now seeking only to defend his faith 
by showing that somehow practically every fashionable thought of the time had been Islamic before 
being adopted by the West (Nasr, 2001:133-4). He criticised the Salafis attempts to purify Islam 
by returning to the sources of the religion, yet throwing away the later development of the Islamic 
traditions.  This included Islamic philosophy and much of the rest of the Islamic intellectual tradition 
besides artistic traditions, and also their rejection of Sufism and the mystical life in their positive 
emphasis upon the Shariah (Nasr, 2001:134-5). 
Regarding Western science and technology, Nasr criticises modernists and fundamentalists 
for what they both regard as an act of repossession under the argument that Western science and 
technology depends on knowledge that was originally acquired, mainly via Spain, from the Muslim 
world. Thus, when Muslims utilise Western technology, in fact they repossess what was originally 
theirs. He is especially critical of Muslim attempts to appropriate Western concepts and 
philosophical trends while neglecting Islamic metaphysics. According to him, the process of 
reconstruction of knowledge must begin with Muslims awareness that modern science is not 
identical with ilm, knowledge, that the Quran exhorts the believers to seek, and that Prophet 
Muhammad instructed his followers to seek from cradle to the grave (in a Hadith). Nasr contends 
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Ijtihad is literally the intellectual effort of trained Islamic scholars to arrive at legal rulings not covered in the 
sacred sources. In the 10th century the point was reached when the scholars of all schools felt that all essential 
questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled. Henceforth, the gates of ijtihad were closed. 
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that Muslims must realise that modern science is the most anthropocentric form of knowledge 
possible since it makes human reason and empirical data the sole criteria for the validity of all 
knowledge (1975). According to him, the character of modern science and Islamic science are 
diametrically opposed to each other: Western science denies the One and denies the relevance of 
the Transcendence (Nasr, 1989, 1993, 2007). By denying different orders of reality, the natural and 
social sciences exclude all other possibilities of knowing and destroy the sacred and metaphysical 
foundations of knowledge. Therefore, Nasr reminded modernists and fundamentalists alike that the 
nature and character of Islamic science are entirely different from those of modern science. In Nasrs 
language, Islamic sciences have a centre and modern sciences have no centre.  
Besides philosophy and mysticism, environmental issues are one of Nasrs major interests. 
His profound criticism of modernity and Western science and technology was made against the 
background of the destruction they have brought to the natural environment; the creation of a 
world which makes the real appear illusory and the illusory real and a civilisation which has no 
meaning other than moving at accelerated speed. In response to Iqbals idea of progress mentioned 
earlier, and Iqbals attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of Islams conception of God, time and 
space with Hegelian and Bergsonian conceptions, Nasr commented that secularism and 
evolutionism, in fact, represent the greatest philosophical threat (Nasr, 1993). That is because they 
have been appropriated by Muslim intellectuals such as Iqbal without realising that scientism 
extends the claims of evolutionism into the social realm, where it leads humans to forget God since 
it suggests that humans can become perfect solely by the processes of evolution and progress. Nasr 
is a student of the transcendental school of Mulla Sadra, Islamic Gnosticism Irfan, and Sufism. He 
once commented (2007) that the doctrine of substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah ) of 
Mulla Sadra, the 17th century Persian philosopher, can explain the theory of evolution without 
bringing in Darwinian ideas which exclude the role of Gods hand in evolutionary changes52. Further, 
he denounced Iqbal for his attempt to synthesise the Sufi concept of al-insan al-kamil (the Perfect 




If you really master the doctrine of substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah) of Mulla Sadra, the great 
seventeenth century Persian Islamic philosopher, you can explain a theory of evolution without being 
Darwinian evolutionist. You can believe in both the archetypal realities in Gods Knowledge that are reflected 
in the temporal flow and the constant flow and motion of the substance of the material world which bears the 
imprints of those archetypes. When I was studying Islamic philosophy in Persia, I studied just this one idea of 
Mulla Sadra for a whole year: the trans-substantial movement in the cosmos. How can God know this flow? 
Will this not introduce change in Gods knowledge? We studied just that one idea for months. This is, needless 
to say, a complicated issue; it is not for children. We have few people in the Islamic world who can understand 
such deep theological and philosophical ideas and are at the same time, good biologists and physicists, and 
that is a tragedy (Nasr, 2007, p166). 
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On the other hand, Nasr recognised re-enchantment currents within modernity towards 
Romanticism, and argues that without the revival of philosophy and metaphysics in the true sense, 
they will not be able to overcome the de-sacralisation of knowledge. Therefore, for him, 
reconstruction of knowledge must once again turn to the concept of Tawhid53 in its metaphysical 
perspective (rather than its theological notion), to reveal the underlying unity and interrelatedness 
of all that exists and rediscover the primordial bond between God and humanity that has been 
severed. In all his writings, Nasr restated the concept of man as abd and khalifah of God in Islam. In 
the The Need for a Sacred Science (2004), he examined the fallacy of the Western linear conception 
of time, history and progress. He expounds elaborately time and human progress from a scientia 
sacra perspective. Herein he explains relations between time and Eternity, cyclical time in Oriental 
religions, and linear time which came to the fore in Western philosophy and science as a result of a 
complex set of factors related to the secularization of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation as 
well as certain other philosophical and scientific ideas (p.31). Since Descartes, purely quantitative 
conception of time and space came into being as defined mathematically by the x,y,z Cartesian 
coordinates to which t (time) is added. Henceforth, the nexus between the phenomenal world and 
higher level of existence was ruptured. Nasr explicates further the relation between a linear concept 
of time in the West and the idea of human progress through material evolution. The conquest of 
Asia, Africa and the New World not only have brought great wealth into Europe but also confidence 
in humans ability to conquer the world and to remold it. This success was due to the secularisation 
of humans and in turn hastened the process of secularisation and this-worldliness by encouraging 
human beings to devote all their energies to worldly activities as the hereafter became a more and 
more distant concept or belief rather than an immediate reality. 
Henceforth, the idea of perfection and progress of the soul toward its upward, vertical 
dimension towards God (see progressive perfection and transformation of the self toward the Self, 
in science of the soul in Sufism, in section 2.2.2) was transferred to a purely this-worldly and 
temporal progress. As an advocate for perennial philosophy, Nasrs substantive critique of scientism 
and modernity is not meant solely for the benefit of Muslims but is a general defense of the 
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Tawhid is the core of Islamic beliefs. Muslim theologians and Sufis from the early period were concerned with 
the meaning of tawhid, since it stands at the heart of Islamic revelations. Theologians tend to define it as Unity 
of the Godhead, while the Sufis interpret it as the principial Unity of all domains of reality and the subservience 
of all things in the Divine principle. From the tawhid perspective, Islam views religion not as a single instance of 
Divine guidance but all the revelations sent through the 124,000 prophets mentioned in traditional Islamic 
sources to the people of all ages and nations, of which the last in the present cycle of humanity is Muhammad. 
Jesus is one of the major prophets of Islam. Prophet Muhammad himself claimed not to have brought anything 
new but to have re-stated the Truth claimed by all the previous prophets and to have re-established the 
primordial tradition (al-din-al-hanif) which is the Truth lying within the nature of things. 
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traditional conception of the Sacred.  In his Knowledge and the Sacred, he chronicled the gradual 
process of desacralisation of knowledge that originated in the West by pointing to the history of 
Christianity. According to him, since the beginning, Christianity expanded in a world already suffering 
from rationalism and naturalism which had stifled the spirit and hardened the heart as the seat of 
intelligence, dividing reason from its ontological root (1989:35).  It, therefore:
had to present itself as a way of love which had to sweep aside completely all the ways of 
knowing that lay before it, not distinguishing in its general theological formulations 
between intellection and ratiocination and preferring quite rightly a true theology and a 
false cosmology to a false theology and a true cosmology.  All knowledge appeared to a
large number of Christian theologians as pride of intelligence and a climate was created 
which, from early days, was not completely favorable to the sapiential perspective. As a 
result, the mainstream of Christian theology, especially after the early centuries, insisted 
upon the credo ut intelligam, a formula later identified with Saint Anselm, while limiting the 
function of intellection to that of a handmaid of faith rather than the means of 
sanctification, which of course would not exclude the element of faith. (Nasr, 1989:35-6)
Nasr has made a nuanced and notional understanding of the words to know and knowledge that 
may easily be taken for granted. From his point of view, knowledge extends in hierarchy from an 
empirical and rational mode of knowing to the highest form of knowledge, that is, the unitive 
knowledge (Nasr, 1989), or al-marifah previously given in section 2.2.1. Correspondingly, to know 
extends from ratiocination to intellection. Nasr believes a new kind of scholar is needed to lead the 
Muslims into the future, scholars who know traditional Islam and the Western world in depth. Zaidi 
(2006) contrasted Nasrs re-sacralisation of knowledge, which is a reversal of the process of 
rationalisation, with Webers Entzauberundprozess. He quoted Nasrs statement: Certainly my goal 
is to move in the opposite direction than what Max Weber called the Entzauberundprozess (Nasr, 
2001:274).  
Since the1960s, Nasr has been a prolific writer on environmental issues as much as in Islamic 
philosophy. For him, environmental crisis has deep spiritual, philosophical and religious roots and 
causes: it involves both the natural world as well as the microcosm within humans, and between 
these dimensions there are integral links. Therefore, although he recognises the role of science and 
technology in the making of the crisis, he does not see it as merely the result of bad engineering and 
faulty economic planning. Rather, it is a matter of modern technology in combination with the new 
image of man that has developed in the West since the Renaissance which he called the 
promethean man, the man who then carried out the industrial revolution:  
As soon as the concept of nature changed and nature became a secularized mass, just an 
it, and what I have elsewhere called Promethean man was born, there was bound to be 
this destruction.  After that change, man no longer felt any responsibility for nature. 
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Nature served only as a source of materials; it could be dominated and used for whatever 
purpose and in whichever way without having any rights of its own. (Nasr, 2007:125)
He exhorts us to be aware of the sternness of the crisis and rejected the ideas that the 
environmental crisis today is just another one that humankind has once had in the history. 
Not that there was no contention or strife between man and nature before, not that ten 
thousand years ago when man was becoming agricultural, that shift had no impact on the 
natural environment, but such shifts did not create a crisis for there was a remarkable
ecological harmony which continued. Had there been a crisis of the dimension we have now 
at that time, it is most likely that we would not even exist today (Nasr, 2007:120).
In response, Muzaffar Iqbal, another Muslim scholar, asserts that Nasrs position on environmental 
crisis is impossible for Western sensibilities:
I say this because you are suggesting a fundamental shift in our view of God and nature and 
that, I think, may be very difficult for the general populace in the West. It may be asking too 
much from a non-Muslim to change his or her views about God and His relationship with 
humanity and nature. What you were saying about the nature of the change that took place 
in the West during the Renaissance is, after all, a significant historical development that has 
affected the course of Western civilization to such an extent that to ask for such a radical 
change- the kind of change you are suggesting- is to ask for a total re-orientation of the 
belief system  from a homocentric to a theomorphic, and that may be too much (Iqbal in 
Nasr, 2007:132)
This is why Iqbal thinks that it may be easier for the Muslim world to recognise the roots of the 
environmental crisis for it would not involve such a huge step for the Muslims. 
Muslims already have a certain set of beliefs which they partially apply in their lives  for 
instance, not eating pork  and perhaps it is easier for them to take the next step and 
understand that the natural environment is sacred and has rights upon them, just as they 
respect laws regarding eating, they can admit that there are certain laws regarding the 
natural world as well and respect them (Iqbal in Nasr, 2007:129)
To such a comment, Nasr added that not only are there explicit commands in the Quran and Hadith 
about the treatment of Gods creation but also in almost all languages spoken in the Muslim world 
there is a very rich tradition of the love of nature, in poetry and in aphorisms which deal with the 
subject. Then there are the works of Muslim philosophers and Sufis on the philosophy of nature.
Therefore, Muslims have to resuscitate this tradition which has only recently been partially 
forgotten. Nasr agrees that this heritage can be revived much more easily for the Muslims than the 
Western tradition for contemporary Westerners. But Muslim governments, he added, do not want 
to pay attention to this matter, even when they are paying lip service to Islam, because they want to 
become masters of modern technology as fast as possible for political, military and economic 
reasons (Nasr, 2007:134). 
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Finally, Nasr points out the deep philosophical issues underlying the great paradox of the 
modern world. That is, modern Western science emphasizes the continuity while modern Western 
culture emphasizes discontinuity (Nasr, 2007:171) so much as to enable modern man to destroy 
much of the rest of creation in the name of human welfare. He asserts that Muslims have 
tremendous responsibility because Islam is one of the very few civilisations left in the world which is
non-Western and which also has a vast scientific and intellectual tradition, and which can provide 
alternatives (Nasr, 2011). Otherwise, where shall we be going?, we are going to evolve ourselves 
into non-existence (Nasr, 2007:52).
Sardars Reopen the Gates of ijtihad
Together with Pervez Manzoor54, Ziauddin Sardar advocates an Ijmali (from ijma, social consensus 
and jaml, beauty/wholeness) approach that seeks to synthesise pure knowledge with moral 
knowledge. Its guiding principles are social consensus (ijma), trusteeship (khilafah), public welfare 
(istilah) and justice (adl). Sardar (1984, 1985, 1987, 1989, 2011) shares the following in common with 
Nasr:
(1) He wants to end what he calls the Wests epistemological imperialism by revitalising Islamic 
thought. He also holds that Western science has mistakenly and dangerously separated 
ethics and morality from its epistemology (Sardar, 1985).
(2) He shares their concern to Islamise knowledge and argues very strongly that the Muslim 
world must develop its own paradigm as an alternative to that of the West which cannot 
meet the needs of Muslims.
(3) He argues that the world needs epistemological pluralism where different cultures work out 
their own way of being, doing and knowing, construct their own science and technologies 
and undertake their own civilisational projects, instead of copying the West (Sardar, 1989: 
7). He is convinced that no civilisation can retain its vitality if it does not possess its own 
science. He denounced the claim of Western science to be neutral and value-free. Rather, it 
is profoundly secular and deeply rooted in Western free-market values, which are both alien 
to Islam (1989:48) 
(4) He also shares with Nasr in advocating system thinking and criticising 
compartmentalisation of knowledge, since neither nature nor human activities are divided 
into watertight compartments marked sociology, psychology (1989:99).
According to Sardar, sciences in the Muslim world today are sciences that have been imported from 
the West. Such science fails to meet the needs of Muslim countries because it originates from a 
worldview that has divorced enquiry from such core values as justice and humanitys trusteeship of 
nature, which are the central plank of Islamic beliefs and essential to the pursuit of science in the 
Muslim world.  He continued with what happens when Muslim scientists are unable to incorporate 
Islamic values into their work: they suffer acute schizophrenia (1989:24) trapped between their 
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Who will appear in the discussion of the Sages view of ecological crisis in section 4.2.2 (Manzoor, 1984), and 
section 4.4 (Manzoor, 1988).  
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operational and non-operational knowledge. By operational knowledge, he refers to technical know-
how such as engineering, and by non-operational knowledge he refers to their value system. By this 
account, Sardar implored the Muslims to be aware of the clash between the Islamic knowledge 
system whereby there is moral, cognitive and interpretive unity, and the modern system of thought. 
Also, he articulated the correspondence between values and knowledge in a symbolic universe 
discussed in section 2.2.1. 
Therefore, Sardar criticised al-Faruqi (1981, 1988, 1992) for his synthesis between the best 
that Western science can offer and Islamic values, because such synthesis would fail to produce a 
viable methodology to enable this. Even Faruqis principle of equating knowledge and truth, 
according to him, is unhelpful to the project of developing a pragmatic epistemology. Sardar also 
criticised Nasrs Gnostic approach. It seems to be attributable to his lack of a grasp of Nasrs 
metaphysical conception of knowledge and of knowing already elucidated. In his most recent work, 
though, he seemed to correct this position as he began to appreciate the mystical quest for 
understanding the Absolute (Sardar, 2011:374-5). Like Nasr, Sardar (1987) agrees that Islam must 
not be reduced to an ideology, which Nasr says, is a Western concept (Nasr, 1990:306). He (Sardar, 
1985) describes ideology as the antithesis of Islam, an enterprise of suppression and not a force for 
liberation. Ideology he says, closes down thought and analysis and ensures that mistakes and 
errors are perpetuated, while Islam requires an open attitude (pp.81-2). What distinguishes 
Sardar from other thinkers is his insistence for revival of ijtihad. With the closing of the gates55 of 
ijtihad, Islamic science truly became a matter of history (1989:18). In sum, the following chart 
illustrates how Sardar (1989) views Islamic science and Western science. He often claims that Islamic 
science will treat the environment with more respect than Western science, exercising stewardship 
as a divine duty.
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Sardar (1987) argues the gates were probably closed to prevent unqualified people from misusing this. 
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Table 4 Western and Islamic Science
Western science Islamic science
Puts its faith in rationality Places its faith in revelation
Values science for the sake of science Sees science as a form of worship which has a 
spiritual and moral function
Posits one all-powerful method as the only way 
of knowing reality
Uses many methods based on reason as well as 
revelation
Claims impartiality  to be value-free; a scientist 
is not responsible for the use of which his/her 
work is put
Claims partiality  towards the truth; 
consequences must be morally good
Claims the absence of bias Admits the presence of subjectivity
Reduces the world to what can be empirically 
verified
Admits the reality of the spiritual dimension
Is fragmented into disciplines Values synthesis, is multi-disciplinary but holistic 
in its approach
2.4.2 Critics of Reconstruction of Knowledge
To get a complete picture of Muslim scholars we need to recognise that the onslaught of 
rationalisation has made modernity appear as a largely normative account possessing right or wrong 
moral judgments for a sizeable portion of the population (Featherstone, 1991:6). Yet, it is a 
worldview that marginalises religiously inspired worldviews by depriving knowledge of its 
teleological and sacred qualities (Zaidi, 2006). Along this line of argument one can expect there 
would be pro-modernity thinkers among Muslim scholars towards reconstruction of knowledge, 
besides not all Muslim scholars comprehend the philosophical problems that reconstruction aims to 
rectify.  Zaidi (2006) presents the critics of the literature on reconstruction among others as Bassam 
Tibbi, Oliver Roy, Mona Abaza, and Georg Stauth. Roy (1994) and Tibi (1995) argue that the 
literature of reconstruction simply represents an ideological reaction to Western economics and 
political dominance, and an encroachment of religious fundamentalism into academia. Zaidi (2006) 
also presents a defender of reconstruction, Pieterse (1996), who argues the ideological charge to 
reconstruction of knowledge discourse is rather meaningless and engages in the all too familiar 
tropes of Orientalist scholarship which serves only to reassure us moderns that obscurantism lurks 
on the other side (Zaidi, 2006:80). For Zaidi, such an attitude can be seen as post-Enlightenment 
reflex of ideology critique, which threatens always to impose itself before the Other (Zaidi, 2006: 
81). 
At the heart of Abaza and Stauths persistent criticism of reconstruction is what they see as 
the unawareness of the protagonists that they are part of a global cultural system that itself calls for 
the essentialisation of local truths, which, they believe, has taken place already through Orientalist 
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discourses. They see a problem in the going native of the natives themselves. Abaza further 
questions the authenticity of reconstruction, and accused Nasr as being an Orientalized Oriental 
because he draws upon the work of Henry Corbin.  On that, Zaidi shows the fallacy of Abazas 
argument. For him, the going native of the native should not be a problem in view of the truth in 
the role of the Other in constituting the Self - especially as Nasr has been quite open in 
acknowledging the influence on his thought of Western sources that are critical of modernity. 
Elsewhere, in his more recent writing, Stauth (2002) put his hope in the possibility of new 
methodologies in the cultural sciences. He, however, still doubted that the protagonists can 
contribute to such new methodology since they critique an outdated model of positivistic science 
that does not account for a hermeneutically informed model of science. This is relevant to this thesis 
methodology that adopts a constructivist-interpretivist approach with an understanding that culture, 
context and history are fundamental aspects of human cognition, and that there is a link between 
cognition, meaning and action.
In the social sciences domain, a self-critique of reconstruction was made by Farid Alatas 
(1993). He first outlined the definitions of Islamisation of knowledge and Islamic science as 
understood by three Muslim scholars: Nasr, Al-Faruqi and Naquib al-Attas. To Alatas, Nasrs notion 
of Islamised knowledge is best captured by the expression scientia sacra or sacred knowledge. This 
refers to knowledge that lies at the heart of every revelation and is the center of that circle which 
encompasses and defines tradition (Nasr, 1989:130). The eclipse of sacred knowledge in the 
modern world already given, causes a need for a science which can relate the various levels of 
knowledge once again to the sacred (Nasr, 2004:173). Further, what defines Islamic science as 
Islamic, for Nasr (1980), is (1) its paradigm which is based on the Islamic worldview, and (2) the 
minds and eyes of the scientists are Muslim minds and eyes transformed by the spirit and form of 
the Quran.  Al-Faruqi, on the other hand, called upon Muslim scholars to recast every discipline in 
modern knowledge so as to embody the principles of Islam in its methodology, in its strategy, in 
what it regards as its data, its problems, its objectives, and its aspirations (Al-Faruqi, 1988:16). Each 
discipline must be remolded along a triple axis that constitutes the concept of tawhid (unity), that is: 
unity of knowledge; of life; and of history. Unlike Nasr whose notion of Islamised knowledge 
transcends the religious boundaries towards scientia sacra, which is a transcendent unity of 
religions, Islamisation of knowledge for Al-Faruqi serves the cause of Islam (Al-Faruqi, 1988). The 
third scholar, Al-Attas, like Nasr, was concerned firstly with the effects of Westernisation on 
Muslims minds and eyes (Al-Attas, 1978:130-1). Al-Attas posited that Islamisation of knowledge 
requires a liberation of knowledge from interpretations based on secular ideology. Especially, the 
isolation of the elements and key concepts in human sciences that constitute Western culture and 
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civilisation, such as: (1) the dualistic vision of reality and truth, locked in despairing combat (Al-
Attas 1978:135); (2) the denial of absolute values and affirmation of relative values, as reflected in: 
nothing can be certain, except the certainty that nothing can be certain (p.136); and (3) the drama 
and tragedy of unattainment held in the West as universal human nature and existence (pp.136-7, 
155) 56. Once knowledge is freed from these elements, it becomes true knowledge, that is, in 
harmony with the essential nature (fitra) of human, and thereby, Islamic.  
Farid Alatas (1995:97-99) detailed his critiques of reconstruction apropos social sciences. 
The most relevant to the thesis is as follows. He pointed out that the call for Islamisation of 
knowledge goes beyond the assertion that science is value-laden. The proponents do not refer to 
merely the value content of social scientific research activities, but to the very principles, methods, 
theories, and concepts in the social sciences that are to be Islamized. The question is, what are the 
ways that a discipline of social sciences is defined by Islam and takes on an Islamic character? Is it 
that the discipline is to be defined by Islamic metaphysics and epistemology? If so, will that be 
adequate if the affirmations of Islamic philosophy are also common to many philosophical systems?
The three points of liberation of Al-Attas are in correspondence with my position in the 
thesis. To enumerate, they are, (1) my assumptions of the universal nature of humanity, (fitra) in 
which the primordial bond between humans and God is recognised, thus, humans and society are 
not just a struggle for economic gain and power; (2) my viewpoint that knowledge of certainty is 
possible, and therein is humans felicity; (3) my cautious stance to normative judgment (drawn from 
my belief of God as the Ultimate Reality - a liberation from a dualistic vision of reality) with regard to 
any historical instances the research is concerned  - which may appear to readers as suggesting 
nothing is right and nothing really wrong; (4) finally, my sociological framework that legitimates 
truth claims within any religion, and the claims are not necessarily related to one another. 
Therefore, through the methodology and theoretical framework, I intend to undertake Islamisation 
of sociology for my own project  an attempt that can be offered particularly to respond to Alatas 
questions aforementioned. 
2.4.3 Is reconstruction of knowledge an issue in Indonesia?
Bennett (2005) divided Muslim thinkers into two broad categories: Left and Right.  The Right 
are the Islamists who want to Islamise the world, while the Left want to humanise Islam. The Right 
sees Islam as a political religious entity and an ideology, while for the Left Islam is a faith, a spiritual 
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For him the spirit of Western culture and civilisation is quite rightly depicted by the drama of Promethean and 
Camusian Sisyphus, which are alien to Islam.
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and ethical tradition. The Right looks to the past for perfection, thus, language such as return, 
awaken and reawaken, and renewal (tajdid) is typical of the Islamist movement, whereas, the 
Left looks toward the future, thus, the modernists and progressives speak of reconstructing (Iqbal, 
1930) or of rethinking Islam (Arkoun, 1934).  According to Bennett, Tibi, Arkoun, Mernissi, Rahman 
and Soroush are on the Left, while the proponents of reconstruction of knowledge, Nasr, the Ijmali
group, and al-Faruqi, are on the Right (p.107). Apparently, Bennetts categorisation does not always 
help. As already given, the protagonists of reconstruction of knowledge are the staunch critics of 
those who made Islam a political ideology. Moreover, Nasr is a prominent scholar in Islamic 
mysticism and perennial philosophy; and Sardar, instead of looking to the past, calls for Muslims to 
plan and work toward a vibrant future (2006), and calls for reopening the gate of ijtihad otherwise 
Islamic science remains a matter of history (1989).
As for Indonesia, I argue, given the strong colonial overtone of modern education in the 
Third World, the incompatibility of modern and Islamic systems of thought has been understudied. 
Except for the debate among the Muhammadiyah thinkers compiled by Fuad (2004) and the 
enduring contention between the Islamic education system and the imposition of national curricula 
such as outlined in Zuhdi (2006), the problems engendered by the incongruent two systems of 
thought have not been academically examined and documented. My fieldwork findings, however, 
will show that the protagonists of reconstruction such as Nasr, Sardar, and al-Faruqi perceive the 
reality of the Muslims in the grass roots more intuitively than the scholars on the Left who 
dismissed reconstruction of knowledge literature. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter develops an integrated framework to articulate the relationship between (a)
knowledge, (b) meaning, and (c) action. Each one emerged as having two dimensions, philosophical 
and sociological. 
1) The philosophical knowledge, which spiritual realm is part of, is concerned with cognition and 
representation. It is further classified into i) knowledge-by-correspondence (ilm husuli) and (ii) 
knowledge-by-presence (ilm huduri). 
2) The Sociological knowledge or social knowledge, on the other hand, is not a cognitive mental 
construction, which is achieved by progressively detaching ones self from emotional, social and 
cultural links, as Jovchelovitch (2007:137) puts it. In this sense, Berger and Luckmanns (1991) 
social construction of reality is in agreement with Jovchelovitchs (2007) knowledge in context. 
Both argues there are social, historical, and cultural contexts of human cognition, and that there 
is intersubjective architecture of the representations that produce knowledge. Therefore, unlike 
philosophical knowledge, sociological knowledge is a plastic phenomenon depending on who, 
how, what, why, and what for of the representation process. 
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Following that train of argument, there are, accordingly, two dimensions of meaning. I call them (1) 
philosophical meaning, in which spiritual is being part of, and (2) sociological meaning derived 
from social interactions, which is none other than the symbolic interactionism premise of meaning.  
Further, there are two dimensions of action. I call them (1) philosophical action, in which spiritual is 
being part of, and (2) sociological action derived from social interactions.  
There are also two dimensions of reality: (1) philosophical reality and (2) sociological reality.  
Philosophical reality comprises reality understood in Occidental philosophy, and the different 
concept in Oriental philosophy of which spiritual reality is part.  Sociological reality is, in fact, what 
Berger and Luckmann expounds in their Social Construction of Reality. 
Table 5 Philosophical and Sociological Knowledge, Meaning, Action, Reality
Philosophical Sociological
Knowledge i) Knowledge by 
correspondence
ii) Knowledge by presence
Social knowledge
It is social knowledge referred 







It is meaning referred to in 
symbolic interactionism
Action Philosophical action 
(including spiritual action, such 
as love)
Sociological action
It is actions referred to in 
symbolic interactionism
Reality i) Reality in Occidental 
philosophy
ii) Reality in Oriental Philosophy 
(including spiritual reality)
Sociological reality 
It is socially constructed reality 
referred to in Berger and 
Luckmann (1991) 
It stands to these arguments that Berger and Luckmanns sociological approach to religion as a 
symbolic universe, a sacred canopy, is not adequate to explain religious actions by the adherents. 
Therefore, religion must be singled out from secular symbolic universes such as nationalism and 
westernism. While the premise of a symbolic universe, to a large extent, is sufficient in explaining 
the exoteric dimension of Islam, Berger and Luckmanns sociological approach to religion is not 
capable of fully understanding the voluntaristic nature of religious actions without including the 
esoteric dimension, namely (1) spiritual knowledge, (2) spiritual meaning, and (3) spiritual action. 
Further, it has been explicated that not only a different symbolic universe implies a different 
centre of allegiance, but each one also has a history, cognitive and social dimensions, as well as 
meaning-bestowing capacity. Therefore, a number of points come out as inferences.
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1. Every religion, which necessarily has its own history, sacred books, individual prophets, and 
prophets traditions, gives rise to a different system of thought and different language (of 
thought).
2. Therefore, one cannot possibly use one religion as a standard to measure the truth and 
falsity of the other.
3. Finally, a more extensive conclusion can be made here. If rationality is the quality of being in 
possession of reason, which implies the conformity of ones belief with ones reasons to 
believe, or, conformity of ones action with ones reasons for action, it is no exaggeration to 
conclude that there cannot be, -or hardly be-, universal rationality under different symbolic 
universes. The issues behind Muslims reconstruction of knowledge proves this proposition. 
Thereby, dialogue and communication between knowledge systems - such as between 
modern thought and Islam, is a very complex and difficult task, some even doubt if this kind 
of task is possible at all57. 
4. Only in mysticism - which speaks of the unity of subject and object, and hence, is not 
concerned so much with form and multiplicity  is it possible to converse about universal 
truth. 
Moreover, Muslim reconstruction of knowledge debates seems to prove what Jovchelovitch holds 
about the incommunicability of worldviews (2006:109-112) that exist in the communication with 
the knowledge of others. Consequently, Muslims reconstruction of knowledge project that 
attempts to seek dialogue between Islam and modernity, and to address the possibility of 
epistemological pluralism that exists in a world characterised at once by homogeneity and 
heterogeneity, needs to be understood in a hermeneutic-dialogical manner (Zaidi, 2006). Herein I 
concur with Nasr that no easy synthesis between Islam and Western civilisation is possible, and with 
Zaidi, that at best a transformative understanding can be attempted for a fruitful dialogue to occur. 
By employing Berger and Luckmanns sociology of knowledge, and the constructivist-interpretivist 
approach of qualitative research methods, I, therefore, aim for my thesis to contribute to those. 
Bergers (1967) sacred canopy provides a theoretical framework to appreciate the so-called 
unified systemic worldview that has been widely referred to in the sustainable community 
development literature. A unified systemic worldview is the concept of an epistemic and moral 
community in pre-modern civilisations in which there was moral, cognitive and interpretive unity, 
and therefore meaning resided in axiomatically shared and publicly inscribed beliefs and 
understandings. From this perspective, colonialism appeared as an aggressive attempt to shatter 
unified systemic epistemologies and de-divinise the world in the quest for universal rationality'. 
Running counter to Orientalism that makes the orient as merely an object of power and 
knowledge of the occident, and hence, being different from the West is a problem, this thesis aims 
to argue that non western communities have world views with equal right to consideration. 
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Among others, Needham (1972) argued that once individuals step outside their own representations,  
language, and culture, all that remain are senseless forms (Jovchelovitch 2006:112).
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Differences are beauty, and hence need to be celebrated. Using the symbolic universe premise in 
explaining Muslims voluntaristic actions, I demonstrate that understanding an Islamic symbolic 
universe whose centre is the Quran and the Sunna is imperative to understand Muslim thoughts and 
actions. It also suggests that homo islamicus58 of the Orientalist might not be a myth. The homo 
islamicus, in this thesis is the Muhammads nation  though it is important to stress that these are 
descriptive categories, not value judgments. They are the leaders and active members of Muslim 
groups. Under the proposal of Berger and Luckmann (1991) that social change must be understood 
as standing in a dialectical relationship to the history of ideas, and of symbolic interactionisms tenet 
that meanings are socially constructed through interactions, my framework corresponds with the 
theory that sees religion as civilisation with a great variety of local cultures (Sardar, 1996; Tibi, 
1998:6). This view is able to shed light on the emergence of a reformist movement in the 19th 
century and transnational Islam today, as sub-universes under the Islamic symbolic universe. 
Furthermore, while, the symbolic universe that encompasses cognitive, normative and 
affective components, besides dictating allegiance, is able to explain enduring contentions between 
Indonesian Muslims and secular-nationalists, and contentions between Muslims thoughts and 
modern-Western thoughts, Foucault (1972, 1980) accentuates further the discourse-power relations 
that the research fieldwork in Chapter 7 found applicable to the cases of Indonesian modernist 
Muslims. 
Finally, the symbolic universe framework implies epistemological pluralism, which seems to 
be the opposite of the whole earth one world family vision of the environmentalists. How this 
ironic twist can be overcome is to be found in the fieldwork.  
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One day a fisherman was lying on a beautiful beach with his fishing pole propped up in the sand and his solitary 
line cast out into the sparkling blue surf. He was enjoying the warmth of the afternoon sun and the prospect of 
catching a fish.
About that time, a businessman came walking down the beach trying to relieve some of the stress of his 
workday. He noticed the fisherman sitting on the beach and decided to find out why this fisherman was fishing 
instead of working harder to make a living for himself and his family.
"You aren't going to catch many fish that way," said the businessman to the fisherman, "you should be working 
rather than lying on the beach!"
The fisherman looked up at the businessman, smiled and replied, "And what will my reward be?"
"Well, you can get bigger nets and catch more fish!" was the businessman's answer.
"And then what will my reward be?" asked the fisherman, still smiling.
The businessman replied, "You will make money and you'll be able to buy a boat which will then result in larger 
catches of fish!"
"And then what will my reward be?" asked the fisherman again.
The businessman was beginning to get a little irritated with the fisherman's questions.
"You can buy a bigger boat and hire some people to work for you!" he said.
"And then what will my reward be?" repeated the fisherman.
The businessman was getting angry. "Don't you understand? You can build up a fleet of fishing boats, sail all 
over the world, and let all your employees catch fish for you!"
Once again the fisherman asked, "And then what will my reward be?"
The businessman was red with rage and shouted at the fisherman, "Don't you understand that you can become 
so rich that you will never have to work for your living again! You can spend all the rest of your days sitting on 
this beach looking at the sunset. You won't have a care in the world!"




This research is a sociological study of the Indonesian Muslim communities in relation to the socio-
ecological crisis in the country. The research intends to study their responses to the Islamic 
worldview, laws, ethics, values and norms, given the subject matter of sociology of knowledge 
already given (see Chapter 2). The social interests, conflict and competing symbolic universes 
between religion and secular ideologies such as nationalism and westernism are recognized, the 
research needs to consider social interactions between Muslims and the state. Accordingly, while 
these Muslims are treated in this study as part of the Ummah (global Muslim community) their 
context as Indonesian citizens is also examined. Thus, their symbolic universes are of central 
importance. 
Chapter 1 presents my background, hence, my paradigm as the basic belief system or 
worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and 
epistemologically fundamental ways (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:105). While it was clearly stated in 
Chapter 1 that given the sternness of the intertwining social and ecological problem, I adopted a 
pragmatic approach in seeking a solution, nevertheless, in Chapter 2 I problematised the 
metaphysical assumptions undergirding the conventional paradigm in social science. Chapter 2 
develops a theoretical framework that I believe is able to nurture a dialogue and understanding 
between different, or radically different, traditions and communities between Muslims and the 
secular Wests. Thereby, the thesis engages in postmodernism, in the sense of a mode of 
interrogation that seeks to problematise the epistemological assumptions and notions of rationality 
which characterise much of social science. Assuming the task of postmodern social theory: to act as 
a translation service within an interpretive framework (Bauman, 1988; Smart, 1996:423-4), I aim to 
gain detailed insight regarding the situation of Muslims in general (for the Islamic symbolic universe 
signifies the Ummah, global Muslim community), and the Indonesian Muslim groups in particular, so 
as to answer the question why are these people acting the way they do?. Therefore, qualitative 
method with a constructivist-interpretivist approach was considered the most appropriate design for 
the research. By Creswell (1998)s definition, the research paradigm falls under pragmatism as well, 
for pragmatism is concerned with applications: what works, and solutions to problems. 
Taken together, pragmatism combined with constructivist-interpretivist paradigms in a 
postmodern research of Muslim groups, on the stern and complex social and environmental 
problems, must necessarily allow the other to speak freely, and different value positions to emerge 
without being moderated. For this, the parable in the heading of the chapter serves two purposes. 
One, it articulates that fundamental and universal human needs encompass physical, psychological, 
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social and spiritual well-beings - and happiness is all that matters since happiness is what everyone 
strives for. More to the point of the research problem, happiness does not necessarily require 
modernity and developmentalism. Two, in this research the people involved are analyzed and the 
outcomes of their community-development undertakings are evaluated in the way that -to a certain 
extent- was portrayed by the parable. That is, the people have been listened to and the research 
reflects entrance into their worldview and exploration of what works. Such capacity to suspend 
convictions, interests, and prejudices and ultimately to put into parentheses the researchers agenda 
in order to listen to the research subjects, is what is needed as the requirement to map out and 
uncover local social knowledge that is usually undermined by modern presumptions dominant 
among the social researchers. 
This chapter details the methodology design used to explore the ways, and to what extent, 
Muslim organizations in Indonesia are able to advance relocalization for their community members
to respond to peak oil and climate change challenges, and to mitigate poverty and create socially 
and environmentally sustainable Muslim communities, and advocate changes in members daily 
lives. Further inquiry to be sought is about overcoming the ironic twist identified in Chapter 2 
between on the one hand, the persistence of symbolic universes which implies plurality of 
knowledge; and on the other, the whole earth one world family vision of the environmentalists to 
which plurality of knowledge is a challenge.
The first part of this chapter addresses the scoping fieldwork used in this research to identify 
all the forms of the Indonesian Muslim organization. The subsequent parts address the methods 
used in the research of Indonesian Muslim organizations namely, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU); a network of pesantren communities, Hidayatullah; and a small rural Muslim 
community, an-Nadzir in South Sulawesi. Discussion on the research model involves data collection, 
recruitment and data analysis. 
3.2 Research Methodology
3.2.1 Overarching Research Methods
Debates on socio-ecological problems and ecological politics in the literature discussed in Chapter 4 
have been used to frame the overarching research questions as follows:
1. What do Islam and Muslim groups in Indonesia offer to mitigate poverty and 
environmental crisis?
2. What endogenous features are already present among the Indonesian Muslim groups
which can possibly be developed into relocalization to build sustainable, largely self-
sufficient Muslim communities, with self-local governance?
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3. In what ways could Indonesian Muslim groups respond to the call for global 
environmental actions to achieve the whole earth-one world family vision? In other 
words, in what ways can the global Muslim community (Ummah) provide an alternative 
to global environmental governance?
Using qualitative inquiry as generally described by Denzin (1998), the research questions are social 
inquiries about the transformation of the existing Muslim communities toward relocalization. They 
required methods that address the existing community development activities and their potential 
for solutions. As stated earlier, the research paradigm is primarily pragmatism. Pragmatist 
researchers focus on the practical implications of the research and strive to emphasize the 
importance of conducting research that best addresses the research problem (Creswell, 1998). 
Creswell (p.23) elaborates, pragmatist researchers look to the what and how to research based 
on its intended consequences  where they want to go with it. This research, therefore, has utilized 
the techniques and procedures that best meet its aims, which involves not only exploring the 
groups potential for change but also their  
a. nature of consumption
b. nature of economy
c. cultural definition of good life
d. governability and,
e. social cohesion between Muslims of inter-ethnicities within the community
A total of 125 participants comprised of leaders and active members of the NU, Muhammadiyah, 
Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir were involved. In order to provide information about the nature of 
consumption in the community, their lifestyles were observed. To provide information necessary to 
understand their cultural definition of a good life, the ideals that the learning-communities 
(including schools, pesantren) had been advocating were investigated. Furthermore, the 
ethnographic approach would describe a culture in order to understand their way of life to move 
from what is heard or observed to what is actually meant (Neuman, 1997:347). Right here, it is 
argued that in constructivist-interpretivist research, an adequate knowledge of the symbolic 
universe of the religious community being studied is necessary. It refers to knowledge of its history 
of formation, as well as knowledge of the system of thought and value within the given religion. 
Furthermore, in the previous chapter, Berger and Luckmanns sociology of knowledge has 
contributed to a conceptual framework of reality as social construction, and hence, knowing as 
social action; as well as the expressiveness of knowledge insofar as it seeks to represent subjective, 
intersubjective and objective worlds. The significance of an interpretivist-constructivist approach, as 
defined by Denzin & Lincoln (1998), to be incorporated into this pragmatist research is becoming
clearer, for there is a link between meaning, orientation, and action, as argued by many: 
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It is because of this ineluctable link between meaning, orientation, and action that 
naturalistic field researchers emphasize the importance of accessing and understanding the 
meaning systems of those studied (Denzin, 1989b; Emerson, 2001; Geertz, 1973, quoted in 
Lofland et al., 2006:133).  
Through case studies, the research explored the nature of the economy of the community and 
sought to understand how social cohesion between Muslims of inter-ethnicities were formed and 
the way the members were governed. Case studies provide a rich and detailed description from the 
viewpoint of an insider. 
Additionally, while this study of sustainable local community development was inspired by 
Schumachers (1973) small is beautiful maxim, the fact that small can be ugly too cannot be 
ignored - that is when there is total disregard of the outside world.  Therefore, through in-depth 
interviews and discourse and content analysis of the printed and audio-visual material the 
organizations produced, the research also explores the groups potential for overcoming symbolic 
universe barriers and to investigate in what ways it is possible to create collaborative ecological 
actions with the rest of the Indonesian societies, and with the world community at large.
3.2.2 Scoping Fieldwork
The first step in this research was scoping fieldwork that was done in the Christmas holiday period in 
2010. The underlying cultural factors characterizing each form of Indonesian Muslim community and 
the way they are connected to the global Muslim community (Ummah) were sought for 
identification.
During the scoping fieldwork, two NU-affiliated pesantren communities in rural East Java 
were visited, and the Hidayatullah head pesantren in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, where the leaders 
were met in unofficial visits known by the Muslims as silaturrahim, meaning, friendship between 
Muslims. The scoping fieldwork provided strong suggestions for consideration of Berger and 
Luckmanns Social Construction of Reality. After the fieldwork, the anthropological literature on the 
Indonesian Muslims and the history of the Islamic movement in Indonesia was reviewed in order to 
have better understanding of the socio-cultural-historical background of the Muslim groups being 
studied. Clifford Geertzs (1976) famous study of Javanese religion broadly divides Indonesian 
Muslims into three groups: santri, priyayi and abangan. Santri is a group of people who strictly 
maintain religious teachings. According to Geertz, santri culture is anti-bureaucratic, independent 
and egalitarian. Abangan is a group of people who are not concerned with the formal practice of 
religion, and in politics they tend to support secular, non-religious parties. Priyayi are the elite 
Javanese, they are a group of syncretic people who believe more in Hindu-Javanese values than in 
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Islamic ones, and in politics, like abangan, priyayi support the secular nationalist parties. Many 
scholars have criticized Geertzs classification, emphasizing that Indonesian Islam is a more complex 
mix of diverse groups that cannot be described in one generalization. Pringle (2010:11), for instance, 
suggests, it is difficult to label the diversity of Islam in Indonesia which reflects the complexity of 
the country itself. One of the broader classifications inspired by the global religious-political 
typology was made by an Indonesian author, Deliar Noer (1973a). He classifies Indonesian Muslims 
according to their religious-political attitudes into Traditionalist and Reformist; both groups are 
within the santri communities of Geertzs categorization. It is noteworthy that most of the works 
already undertaken on the Indonesian Muslims and the typologies produced have been mainly 
reflective of religio-political attitudes. No one making rigorous sociological analysis of the people
involved was found to produce a typology that has greater detail from the community theoretical 
perspective. Perhaps, Candland (2000) was the only exception since he argues that faith can be a 
form of social capital, for a community of believers need not have repeated face-to-face interactions 
to place trust in one another59. Meanwhile, I am in agreement with Berger and Luckmann (1991:146) 
that no history of ideas takes place in isolation from the blood and sweat of general history. 
There is continuity between historical and contemporary patterns of cross-regional Islamic 
discourse. Thus, there is a need to search beyond the existing typologies of Indonesian Muslims so as 
to consider the most recent effects of globalization manifested in the so-called transnational 
Islam. 
From my scoping fieldwork and the focus of this study of the Muslim communities, the 
Indonesian Muslim society was differentiated into, roughly, two groups: (1) community Muslims, 
those who live or are activists in religious communities, thus having a stronger sense of community 
and therefore the Ummah is a primary concern or focus; and (2) non-community Muslims, those 
who do not belong to any sort of religious community, hence the Ummah is secondary (See Table 6). 
The latter group contains individuals who choose to live separate lives similar to the majority of the 
population in the Western world. They range from the mosque-goers who get together with other 
Muslims every once in a while and whose males come at least once a week in the Friday prayer 
congregation; to the ones who no longer consider themselves a member of the Ummah although 
Islam might still be stated as his/her religion in his/her KTP (Indonesian identification card). The 
research did not study non-community Muslims because being employers and employees of, and 
hence dependent on, either government bodies or corporations, they did not seem to possess the 
  
59
Candland studied four religious associations considered to have sustained social capital through faith. They are 
the NU of Indonesia, Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, Sarvodaja Shramadana of Srilanka, and Santi Asok of Thailand. 
Each operates non-profit, voluntary community development. 
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capability and freedom to make a difference that relocalization requires. Moreover, simply they are 
not members of any community from which any community development attempts can be 
advanced.
The outline of Indonesian Muslim societies can be described in the following table wherein 
the participants of this research are situated:
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yuppies, part 
of the working 
class, and the 
elites. 
The Traditionalist Mixed Reformist Traditionalist
Muslim Intelligentsias are distributed throughout the two groups
Pesantren are homegrown traditional Islamic education institutes (See Chapter 1). Having evolved 
for centuries they have produced huge networks of pesantren communities. NU is a mass 
organization. The lifeblood of the organization is the network of pesantren and the kyai (clerics). 
They expanded their influence through the creation of learning communities60 (majlis taklim, 
pengajian) in the larger society of Indonesian Muslims. Kyai are highly respected and widely 
consulted for spiritual, religious advice, as well as matters concerning health, family and community. 
There are about 14,000 NU-affiliated pesantren around Indonesia and each one has at least one kyai. 
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Refers to a group of people who share common emotions, values or beliefs and are actively engaged in 
learning together from each other and by habituation (Bonk, 2004).
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The NU-affiliated pesantren community is characterized as fenceless whereby connected  spiritual 
leadership, emotional ties, cultural values, and Islamic school of thought connect a group of people, 
although they do not necessarily settle in the same location. Since their boundaries are more 
permeable the NU pesantren members are commonly referred to as inclusive Islam.
The fenced-pesantren communities of Hidayatullah emerged out of the comparable 
yearning for what Maser (1997:101) noted as the creation of sustainable community. That is, to be 
meaningful, a community must imply membership in a human-scale collective where people can 
encounter one another face to face, and therefore, nurture human-scale structural systems within 
which people can feel safe and at home. 
In contrast to the pesantren community, whose sense of community was developed through 
a relationship with the spiritual leader (kyai), the members of the organizational communities such 
as Muhammadiyah are connected merely by the values they share, the school of thought in which 
they believe, and the movement they participate in, without the centrality of, and the emotional ties 
with personal leaders. 
Besides pesantren, the Sufi order (tarekat) is another institution that is attached to the kyai.
The primary role of pesantren is educating the santri (student), whereas the activity of the tarekat or 
tasawuf focuses on building batin (the inner life of a person, the transformation of self in successive 
grades) (Turmudi, 2006).  Nevertheless, there is a strict set of rules of the religiously legitimate Sufi 
order in such a way that not just anybody is qualified to found a new Sufi order. The NU kyai only 
recognizes and allows Muslims to practice tarekat who are legitimate (mutabarah). They recognize 
forty-six mutabarah orders61. These orders have been founded and operated for centuries in a way 
unrestricted by geographical boundaries. Hence, the Sufi networks have always been transnational. 
Also, these Sufi orders have long been part of the fenceless pesantren too.
The new Transnational Islam phenomenon that emerged in the aftermath of contemporary 
globalization is often called Islamist (see Chapter 2). The network capabilities of these Islamist 
groups have serious implications for the national politics and mainstream public domain in the 
countries in which they operate because the local conflicts in those areas can now be elevated to the 
global level (Noor, 2009).
I can pinpoint my place in the sketched typology of the Indonesian Muslim. Coming from a 
somewhat well-off Muslim family with mixed Indonesian-Arab background and mixed Traditionalist-
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See them in  http://www.dokumenpemudatqn.com/2012/06/nama-nama-tarekat-mutabaroh.html
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Reformist upbringing, my father and mother were among the very few Indonesian Muslims with 
santri background (see Geertz above) that received university education in the 1950s. I had the 
opportunity to study in Indonesian madrasah, government schools and institutes, and an Islamic 
college where Islamic knowledge was obtained. Such circumstances enabled me to view the 
problems of the Indonesian Muslim societies as both an insider and outsider. Being a Muslim, 
empathy with the grievances of the Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere is experienced, and 
practicing the thariqah (tasawuf), I can empathize with the religious experiences that some 
respondents explicitly or implicitly expressed. However, having been involved in varied secular-
nationalist developmental projects in the past, which most of the time divorced me from the 
community lives I wished to improve, I view myself as an outsider. 
Upon completion of the scoping exercise and the reading, the decision was made to focus 
the research on NU and Muhammadiyah to represent fenceless pesantren and organization-based 
communities. The main reason involved in their selection is that they are the oldest Muslim 
organizations in Indonesia and that no study of Indonesian Muslim society can be done without 
considering the two organizations. They both have a large membership and sympathizers, and 
represent mainstream Islam in Indonesia. Both are often regarded as the largest independent 
Islamic organizations in the entire Islamic world (Bruinessen, 2004; Ricklefs, 2010; Pringle, 2010 and 
others). Not only have they established networks of learning communities but they have also 
engaged in education, health and social welfare. The research also selected the Hidayatullah 
network with mother pesantren in East Kalimantan and an-Nadzir in South Sulawesi for the category 
of fenced-pesantren communities due to the intentional community approach they used in 
advancing the Islamic social movement.  An-Nadzir and Hidayatullah have been connected through 
the emotional ties and familial bonds of the founder with the Darul Islam leaders in South Sulawesi 
(see Chapter 5 and 7). Despite the preliminary information collected from the internet blogs about 
An-Nadzir that tend to discredit them as eccentric people, I was particularly interested in this group 
because of their ecologically-sound farming practices that support the community and also expected 
to meet highly esoteric people who might give distinct views of environmental issues from an Islamic 
mysticism perspective. Another reason for selecting the Muslim communities outside Java is to avoid 
the Java-centric tendency of cultural studies in Indonesian Muslim society so far.  Detailed discussion 
of these communities and organizations is provided in Chapter 6 and 7.
3.3 Data Collection and Informants
The main period of research was carried out in Indonesia for approximately 10 months. By online 
news and contacts with relatives and friends in Indonesia while being in New Zealand, I kept abreast 
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of Indonesias situation in relation to the research topic. Primary data was collected by me in the 
fieldwork that was stored in 39 audiotapes. The secondary data includes a box of books, magazines, 
news, leaflets and VCD produced by the three organizations under study, as well as their 
communities and their community development activities. 
3.3.1 Data Collection
Data collection was conducted through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, participant 
observations, and compilation of secondary data concerning two major issues: 
- The governmental policies on development and the socio-ecological issues. The 
respondents awareness on those issues was sought.
- Current issues on Islam in Indonesia in relation to globalization, Indonesian politics, and 
development programmes. 
In addition to the above data collection methods, daily accounts of observations and experience 
were written and compiled in diary format. The texts obtained from the interviews and the daily 
notes taken by me have been coded. The coding process involved the categorizing of the texts into 
key ideas. The interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesian language, my first language. In many 
instances during the interviews, people in Java used Javanese expressions and jokes. It should be 
noted that I speak Javanese with Eastern Java dialect and understands the other dialects very well. 
The conversations in the case study communities in East Kalimantan and South Sulawesi were 
conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. As the conversations were translated, the translating process 
suggested by Birbili (2000) was referred to as a guide, especially in determining a better translation 
strategy to be adopted in the data analysis. Translation is described by Birbili (2000) as more than 
just changing the words or as Simon (1996:137-8, cited in Temple, 2002:5) asserts: 
The solutions to many of the translators dilemmas are not to be found in dictionaries, but 
rather in an understanding the way language is tied to local realities, to literally forms and to 
changing identities. Translators must constantly make decisions about the cultural meaning 
which language carries, and evaluate the degree to which the two different worlds they 
inhabit are the same.
According to Birbilli (2000), if the researcher managed to receive clear answers with coherent 
sentences from the interviewee, he or she should translate the text word for word. However, if 
the construction of the sentences received from the interviewee is complicated, it is suggested that 
the researcher summarizes the data.
3.3.2 Informants  
Un-structured interviews were held with:
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1. National and provincial leaders of the three organizations: Muhammadiyah, NU, 
Hidayatullah
2. Leaders of the case study communities: fenced-pesantren: Hidayatullah, an-Nadzir 
Focus Group followed by Un-structured (semi-structured) Interview with:
1. Active Members of NU (the fenceless pesantren community) 
2. Active Members of Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir (the fenced-pesantren communities)
3. Active Members of Muhammadiyah (the organizational community)
The members of the NU and Muhammadiyah who were contacted for the research lived in urban 
and rural areas around Jakarta and Surabaya, the capital of East Java where the organisations have a 
large membership. The members of Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir are the individuals living in the case 
study communities. Participant observations were held in the case studies communities. I stayed in 
the communities as a guest for approximately two weeks. I also attended the Hidayatullah national 
annual meeting on June 20-24, 2013, in Balikpapan. 












Interviews (and, or, 









Interviews and/or focus 
groups (21 people)
Communities living in the enclaves
Hidayatullah, an-Nadzir
Interview and, or, focus group. The 
leaders and members in total
(46 people).
Participant Observations
The case studies of fenced-pesantren communities were carried out in the selected places as shown 
in the following table.
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Nowadays it is regarded as Islamist
Traditionalist-influenced Reformist
The founders are Muhammadiyahs 
cadre
Characteristic Lack of esoterism Highly esoteric
Organization Nation-wide networked Single
Nation-wide enterprise Local enterprise
Establishment Approx.30yrs Approx.30yrs
The national and provincial leaders were interviewed in their Jakarta and Surabaya offices. 
Focus group discussions were carried out in single sex groups. The range of topics in the interview 
and discussion are elaborated below. Interviews, and or, focus group discussions were recorded and 
photos were taken of the people interviewed, including activities within the communities with their 
permission. Interviews with the leaders lasted approximately one hour, and with the members about 
15-30 minutes each. The transcripts of interviews with the leaders were returned to them for 
comment. No negative responses were given to me afterward. Further, during the data collection it 
was realised that there was a need to investigate the youth, transnational and Islamists view of 
the problems, besides Muhammadiyah, NU, Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir. Therefore, additionally, 3 
persons were interviewed: Hizbut Tahrirs spokesperson, a leader of young Muslims Emha Ainun 
Nadjib who is known to be very critical of the government, and Islamist scholar Adian Husaini. This 
provided a matrix for the understanding of the competences and ineptitudes of diverse Muslim 
groups in relation to relocalization. 
3.3.3 Information Sought and Range of Topics Interviewed/Discussed
3.3.3.1 Four Organisations
National and Provincial Leaders of Three Organizations:
1. Their opinion about development policies in Indonesia
2. Their awareness about the latest environmental conditions in Indonesia, regarding:
a. Deforestation, industrial pollution, oil supply and demand, etc.
b. The importance of Indonesias forest as the second (or third) lung of the 
earth.
3. Their awareness about the causes of and actors in, environmental degradation in 
Indonesia
4. Information about the level of poverty among their members
5. Information regarding what the organizations have done about the two issues in 
question:
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a. Their environmental programs
b. Their poverty reduction program
c. In which aspects the programs fall short
6. After describing relocalization briefly, organizations were asked about their opinion 
regarding re-localization or alternative community for their members, whether 
that is possible, in terms of:
a. Land holding?
b. Ecological restoration skills and knowledge of the organizations?
c. Financial capability?
d. Their capability to deploy an Islamic economic system as an alternative to 
the national economics?
7. Their opinions about the possibility of their organizations taking collaborative 
actions with organizations from the West, such as Global Ecovillage Network (GEN) 
and the Transition Town Network, in terms of empowerment, skills, knowledge and 
financial support; as well as the issues that are involved, if such cooperation is 
possible.
8. To get insight from NU, whose members are traditionally in the fenceless 
communities, and to Muhammadiyah who does not establish pesantren, whether 
fenced-pesantren-like intentional communities are desirable to their members.
Provincial members of Organization Communities (Muhammadiyah and NU only, because 
Hidayatullah was covered in Case Studies of Fenced-Pesantren)
1. Their awareness about environmental issues
2. Their opinion regarding what they think they can do about them.
3. Population control /family planning
4. Motor vehicle usage and consumption of industrial products
5. Alternative economics
6. Ecological restorations
3.3.3.2 Fenced-Pesantren Case Studies:
Community Leaders:
1. Information about the organizations policies on the ownership of the property
2. Information about financial support of the organization to the communities
3. Information about the organizations strengths and weaknesses in performing 
ecological restoration activities and poverty reduction:
a. Financially
b. Skills and knowledge
c. Management
d. Land holding
e. Relation with local/central government
f. Relation with surrounding communities
Community Members and Leaders: Information about their life
1. The members motivations to live in the fenced-pesantren (intentional community)
2. Whether they are better off
3. Their own description of the community
4. How the conflicts are settled among the members
5. Their opinion of the organization
6. Their opinion about environmental activities in the community
7. Aspects of their life which support environmental sustainability
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8. Whether they wish their children to continue living in the community
9. Observation of how pesantren culture works
10. Observation of other issues involved in sustainability issues which had not yet been 
identified by me
3.4 The Research Process
The proposal for this research was submitted to the University of Canterbury Ethics Committee 
before any interviewing commenced (see Appendix-7). The research is neither anonymous nor 
confidential for the leaders of the communities being studied. Informed consent was obtained 
through a signed consent form. Appointments with the organization leaders, national and provincial, 
were arranged through direct contact with the offices. Appointments with the members of the 
organizations learning communities were arranged through social networks. Appointments with 
the case study fenced-pesantren were arranged through the Jakarta head office. Requests for 
access to the case study communities were presented to the leaders in person upon arrival. There 
was no necessary selection of research informants in this qualitative research and there was not 
much difficulty in making appointments with the leaders and in gaining access to the communities. 
In retrospect, my social network played a significant role in this matter. I, as a citizen of Indonesia 
and a member of the Ummah who is happy to continue being so, would like to declare that this 
research has no intention to harm any respondent or their organizations. If the thesis somehow 
appears as being critical to any one organisation or any one individual, this should, therefore, be 
measured from the ethos of tawa saubil haqq62 (Q: 103:3) between one Muslim and another.
It is important to note that in every Muslim organization there are leaders, active members 
and sympathizers. While sympathizers constitute much bigger numbers, active members are almost 
always the ones who participated in the community development activities of the organizations, 
thus, they are also leaders in that sense. The NU and Muhammadiyah leaders and members 
interviewed were largely open to giving their candid opinions and signed the consent forms. In 
contrast, the Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir leaders were more cautious about the intention of this 
research. Only after face-to-face introduction of the research background was I accepted. However, 
in general, they responded openly to the questions. As the community leaders provided access to 
the enclave of pesantren communities, the members of the communities followed them and 
welcomed my presence. In the Hidayatullah enclaves, everyone being interviewed signed the 
consent forms, while in An-Nadzir, the members refused to sign saying that they would follow their 
top leaders, thus, if the leaders agreed to sign then they too deemed themselves included.
  
62
(Recommend one another to the truth).
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3.5 Data Analysis
The research method includes analysis and interpretation of archives; individual interviews; focus 
group discussions and participant-observations. In contrast to quantitative researchers, qualitative 
researchers measure with a wider variety of techniques and devise measures for difficult-to-observe 
aspects of the social world (Neuman, 1997). Most of the things that this research is interested in 
cannot be directly observed (attitudes, ideology), or are intangible (desirability, ability). 
Consequently, before any measuring could be carried out, a clear idea was needed about the specific 
interests and the measurement itself took place during data collection; as Neuman (1997:181) 
states, While quantitative researchers think about variables and convert them into specific actions 
during a planning stageQualitative researchers measure during the data collection process. Denzin 
& Lincoln (1998) argue that the interpretivist-constructivist emphasizes the world of experience as it 
is lived, felt, and undergone by social actors and the ability of the outsider to perceive and 
understand their social world63. To achieve that goal, the data collected in this research were 
focused on the aspects of social setting that include: 1.meaning, or cognitive aspects; 2.emotional 
aspect; and 3.ranking. 
It is also important that in conducting qualitative research the theoretical framework and 
methods match what the researcher wants to know (Braun, 2006). Regarding the meaning or 
cognitive aspects, the insights of symbolic universe and symbolic interactionism were employed as 
the interpretive science in the pursuit to portray and understand the process of subjective 
interpretation and the meaning-making. They were also employed in the previous chapter to 
understand the link between meaning, orientation and action. Therefore, both Blumers (1969) 
symbolic interactionism that suggests man as action, and Berger and Luckmanns (1999) symbolic 
universe that suggests man as perception were utilized to complement each other in accessing and 
understanding the meaning system of the people being studied. 
On the emotion or sentiment aspect, human archetypes or personality have been 
considered (see Chapter 2 regarding the Sages and Warriors) to understand that reality is not only 
socially constructed, but sometimes also individually. Further, the data also focused on ranking to 
examine ones ability and possibility to advance relocalization. The higher the level of ones 
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A symbolic interactionist, Blumer, argues that the nature of any and every object consists of the meaning that 
it has for the person for whom it is an object.  An object may have a different meaning for different individuals. 
This meaning sets the way in which he sees the object, the way in which he is prepared to act toward it, and 
the way in which he is ready to talk about it. Two premises of Symbolic Interactionism are: firstly, people act 
toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them, and the second premise, which 
needs highlighting in the case of the people under study, is that the meanings of such things are derived from, 
or arise out of, the social interaction that one has with ones fellow (Blumer, 1969).
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dependence on the government or present economic order to survive, the lower ranking the 
individual or groups potential is to bring about social transformation such as relocalization. In other 
words, the more independent a group, the more potential they have. Correspondingly, the 
entrepreneural individuals have more potential than government officials or corporate managers to 
generate changes. Also, the higher needs of conformity a group has with, hence exploited by, 
modernity, the lower potential and freedom the group has to advance endogenous Islamic 
relocalization. Ranking was also applied towards the size of the membership and infrastructure of 
the organizations and communities. The larger the size and the more nation-wide reaching of 
groups infrastructure, the more potential and more effective they are.  
Denzin & Lincoln contend that qualitative researchers stress not only the socially 
constructed nature of reality but also the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is 
studied and the situational constraints that shape inquiry (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Chapter 1 
chronicled my engagement with what is being studied and outlined the paradigms and worldviews 
that I brought to the research project. In addition, my academic and practical background in Islamic 
philosophy and mysticism has provided the required understanding of Islamic system of thought and 
value to bring in verstehen64 to grasp the meanings of actions from the actors point of view and to 
wear their shoes. The two backgrounds have been especially pertinent in a pragmatist research of 
the Muslim communities wherein diversity exists, because for a pragmatist, the world is not viewed 
as an absolute unity, so neither is it seen in the social world of the Muslim actors who participated in 
this study. In addition, as a pragmatist I am not committed to any one system of community 
development, therefore, equal weight has been given to each approach undertaken by all branches 
of Islam, ranging from the non-modernist Traditionalists to the modernist Reformists with the four 
qualities of human well-being: physical, psychological, social and spiritual, to provide the final input. 
From the data analysis the organizations were ranked by their potential and effectiveness for social 
transformation. 
3.6 Theme Finding
The analysis of this research begins in the field, at the time of observation and interviewing, as I 
identified problems and concepts that appear likely to help in understanding the situation. When the 
fieldwork was completed, the coding process and text-mining of the data in this analysis were 
performed manually. There are four major themes and a number of subthemes that have emerged 
from this research: A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the 
  
64
Systemic interpretive process in which an outside observer of a culture attempts to relate to it and understand 
others
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research question, and represents some level of patterned responses or meaning within the data 
set (Braun, 2006:82). They came from responses that appeared recurrently, combined with my 
prior understanding of Islamic worldview, and familiarity with the following subjects: the plethora of 
discourses and writings on contemporary issues that runs through the Muslim world; the Third 
World issues in relation to social and environmental problems; the issues involved in relocalization 
attempts in the West as identified in the literature and the research questions. Historical, cultural 
and political dimensions of Islam in Indonesia defined the context within which to examine 
theoretically and empirically the Indonesian Muslims relation with Islam as an overarching symbolic 
system. They provide a background for assessing their willingness, ability and possibility to pursue 
the relocalization ideals and actions aimed at developing sustainable and just Muslim communities 
with self-local governance. Since the research focused on finding solutions, the research orientation 
is more inductive (developing a new theory) than deductive (confirmatory). However, with
examination of long Muslim philosophical and intellectual traditions already in place being an 
important element of the research, few insights are really new and therefore, induction does not 
necessarily lead to novel theoretical insights (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). Drawing from existing 
social theories and these long Islamic intellectual traditions, the inferential process of this research 
creatively produced a new research question and theoretical framework to modify the existing social 
theory based on surprising research evidence  a process known as abduction (Timmermans and 
Tavory, 2012). Abductive logic is adopted when we engage in imaginative thinking about intriguing 
findings and then return to the field to check our conjectures (Charmaz, 2009:137-8). From the 
abductive analysis, the research leads to developing the following themes: (1) clash of symbolic 
universe; (2) mistrust argued as colonial legacy; (3) Islam as a social movement; and (4) my 
philosophical assumptions and values which defined a belief in happiness as an ultimate human 
need has led to an unexpected theme of happiness. In discussing sustainability and the limited 
natural resource dilemma, the latter theme suggests the need to classify the Third Worlders 
happiness into two types as explicated in 7.2.5, one is ascribed to ones lack of knowledge, and the 
other of contentment. Finally, the research provides insight into a possible model for endogenous 
Islamic relocalization, a theme that emerged from the fenced-pesantren community development in 
Chapter 7. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the main methodological framework and processes adopted in this 
research. In-depth interviews, ethnography and case study methods used to gather information 
have been discussed and the consructivist-interpretivist approach to analyze data has been 
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explicated.  The chapters that follow concentrate on the concept of endogenous relocalisation in the 
context of Muslim communities, against the background of global environmental crisis. 
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Chapter 4
For a Concept of Endogenous Relocalisation
[Say]: To you be your way and to me mine (The Quran: 109:6)
We cant solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them 
(Albert Einstein)
4.1 Introduction
First of all, I concur with Oosthoek (2005), that the greatest challenge of sustainability is to overturn 
the historically deeply-embedded assumption that progress or development by way of unlimited 
natural resources exploitation is both inevitable and desirable. Therefore, this chapter aims to 
review the works already done to return to smaller scale, more self-reliant communities with simpler 
ways of living. This model of community development is termed as relocalisation. Relocalisation 
contends with combined concerns about peak oil, climate change, and industrial-economic 
globalization. From the onset it is worth highlighting that the proponents of relocalisation seek to 
dissociate the movement from its predecessor, conventional environmentalism and sustainable 
development. Relocalisation does not seek to shift the larger society at once, rather, to work on a 
community scale. It draws upon multiple disciplines with pragmatic strategies shaped around the 
limits to growth analysis. It aims to equip people with resilience and adaptive capabilities in the 
face of looming scarcity and environmental degradation. This chapter aims to develop a concept of 
endogenous65 relocalisation as an insurgent planning66 movement to be carried out by, and for, 
Muslim communities themselves to respond to the challenge of peak oil and climate change.
To draw an holistic understanding of the socio-ecological problems in a Third World country
like Indonesia, I present in the following section (4.2) a number of authors who argue from different 
perspectives: both political-economic, and anthropological-epistemological. Herein, the personality 
character patterns used to classify the Muslims grouping in section 2.4 appear to characterize the 
authors as well. The former group, the warriors, among others are Jerry Mander, Edward Goldsmith, 
David Korten and Herman Daly. In their analyses, massive global development projects bring long 
term benefits only to a minority who sit at the hub of the process and to a slightly larger minority 
  
65
Endogenous development refers to the sum of views, values and practices which marginalised, silenced or 
oppressed societal actors create from within in response to the initiatives of development coming from 
outside or being implemented top-down (Haverkort and Rist 2007:7)
66
Radical planning practices from the standpoint of the global South, seasoned by the complexities of state-
citizen relation in colonial and post-colonial regimes (Miraftab, 2009). Insurgence manifests in different spaces, 
geographical, social, political and technological. It encompasses ideas about access, democracy and 
participation (ACSP, 2012).
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that can retain economic connection to it, while the rest of humanity is left groping for fewer jobs 
and less land, living in violent societies on a ravaged planet (Mander and Goldsmith, 1996:6). In the 
end, however, even to those minority beneficiaries, the benefits are temporary and unsustainable. 
Mander and Goldsmith (1996:12) quoted one ex-world leading financier, James Goldsmith, who said 
that for those people it will be like winning at poker on the Titanic.  
Quite different views were given by the sages group. Authors in religious environmentalism 
in this group do not see the crisis as being simply economic or technological. It is much more a moral 
and spiritual crisis. Their views suggest the unchecked materialism that stemmed from the Scientific 
and Industrial Revolution has been the root of the problem. They are, among others, Richard C. Foltz 
et al, Tony Watling, Mary Evelyn Tucker, David L. Johnston and Whitney Bauman et al. I will briefly 
discuss their arguments to make a case for studying Indonesian Muslim groups leaders and active 
members to provide long-term solutions to the complex development-environment problems. This 
involves considering the importance of moral force and spiritual energy to galvanize actions, and the 
need for collective identity to mobilize people in larger segments of the population. Concerning this 
assertion, the notes of Nguitragool (2012) on the study of environmental governance in Indonesia 
must be taken into account. According to him, a lack of large-scale social cohesion in present-day 
Indonesia between civil society organizations and the public, has been a key issue besides a poor 
legal system. 
The discussion of flawed paradigms of developmentalism and economic globalization in 
section 4.2 leads to the rationale for relocalisation in 4.3. The relocalisation activists literature gives
practical sense to deal with the complex development-environment issues in the Third World. 
Jonathan Dawson, Ross Jackson, Ted Trainer, Rob Hopkins, and John Barry discuss grassroots actions 
and the practical problems involved. They provide green intentional community models as a 
rejection of what they see as an outmoded dominant western worldview in favour of one that 
recognizes human-ecosystem interdependence. These models are propounded as concrete actions 
that can be done here and now on a small-scale by like-minded people who are committed to do 
so. They are supposed to represent a model that can be duplicated, and their culture can be 
propagated, to convert society at large. According to the ulterior motives for making these, I 
classified them into:
(1) The redemptionists who have been driven by psychological dissonance between a sense of 
their own values and ethical standards and the behaviour that people are forced to adopt 
through participation in consumer-capitalist society, and
(2) The survivalists who aim to prepare for the conditions of scarcity, which they anticipate will 
result from peak oil, climate change and looming ecological collapse.
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Despite heated debates of relocalisation in the literature, it is worth noting that there have been no 
rigorous studies of endogenous relocalisation models conducted in the Muslim world, nor any non-
positivist qualitative researches undertaken to examine the desirability of Eurocentric development 
models to the Muslim population outside the elites  the very people who have been subject to 
development and Western Enlightenment projects. This situation reminded me of Foucaults 
relationship between discourse and power. In broad terms, Foucaults critique is to reveal how 
certain values are taken for granted by the acceptance of certain scientific models, and how the 
acceptance of those models as true makes it impossible to articulate alternative values (Howarth, 
1995). 
Martin Kohrs notes on economic globalization in the Third World reinforce my line of 
argument in proposing endogenous Islamic relocalisation in section 4.4. Given the global-extent of 
the environmental crisis, section 4.4 contends with solutions that have a global dimension. Against 
that background, this section provides a context for putting forward Islam and Muslim activism as an 
alternative to the global environmental movement for the Muslim world. The pragmatic 
considerations within the analysis of Islamic activism and the Ummah to advance an alternative 
movement needs to take into account the Muslim worlds problems from a Muslims own point of 
view. For this, I begin with two responses common in the Muslim world identified by Manzoor 
(1988), namely, civil society and Islamic state approaches. I put forward the third model, 
relocalisation with self-local governance into perspective, to envision a global network of 
endogenous relocalisation by local Muslim communities within minimal states (Nozick, 2013) in the 
post-oil world. Section 4.5 presents urbanization in Indonesia as the context for relocalisation. 
Examples of environmental activism by Muslims are given in section 4.6. 
4.2. Towards an Holistic Understanding of the Problems
Exploring in depth the theme of sustainability with which the research is concerned, namely, 1) the 
Third World context of Indonesia; 2) faith-based social movements and religious environmentalism; 
3) a pragmatic research that aims to find solutions, I classified literature into three streams. The first 
and the second are called the Warriors and the Sages, for their authors and thinkers 
correspondingly resonate with the personality characters already given. The Warriors denote 
knightly or political power and government-oriented traits; whereas the Sages denote sapiential or 
spiritual, and truth-seeking traits. The two characters have interpreted one problem through 
different spectacles. Both Warriors and Sages are composed of the protesters and activists. The 
former declare opposition without taking further actions, the latter take the lead to initiate and put 
the ideas into actions. Finally, the third body of literature has been entitled, the Relocalisation 
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Activists. It provides insights into pragmatic and strategic issues involved in the relocalisation 
attempts. 
On the Third World issues, the Warriors authors have been in the anti-globalization camp, a 
synonym for anti-capitalism, whereas the Sages -especially the Muslims-  are those who hold that 
the Third World crises are rooted in the moral and spiritual-destruction impacts of colonialism and 
post-colonial modernization that marginalizes religious worldviews. The Warrior literature provides 
insights into highly-charged issues that are most specific to the Muslim Warriors groups activism 
outlined in sections 2.4.1 and 5.3. They represent the Reformist movements that emerged during 
the 19th century in response to European colonial power.
4.2.1 The Warriors
Warriors discourse can be identified by the common characteristics of their revolutionary aims to 
challenge the established capitalist order.  These anti-globalization protesters argue that economic 
globalization today is no different to the old colonialism. However, the scale is new; so is the new 
global rules by which it now operates; the presence of technology to speed up its application 
everywhere and freely without restriction; and the abrupt shift of global political power that it 
introduces.  Nader and Wallach (1996) added what is also new is the fact that world democratic 
countries voted to suppress their own democratically enacted laws in order to conform to the rules 
of the new central global bureaucracy. Another important account of the anti-globalization protester 
relevant to this research is the homogenization of global culture, lifestyle, and the level of 
technological immersion alongside aggressive advocacy of a uniform worldwide development model 
with the corresponding dismantlement of local economies.
According to the above-mentioned authors, economic globalization, which involves arguably 
the most fundamental redesign of the worlds political and economic arrangement since at least the 
Industrial Revolution, is based on flawed paradigms. They emphasized the preposterousness of the 
very idea that on a finite earth, an economic system based on limitless growth can be supported. 
Correspondingly, they criticized the global economys principles of economic growth and free trade. 
Thus, Daly (2005:80) imagined quite a different economic future:
The facts are plain and uncontestable: the biosphere is finite, nongrowing, closed (except for 
the constant input of solar energy), and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics. Any 
subsystem, such as the economy, must at some point cease growing and adapt itself to a 
dynamic equilibrium, something like a steady state.  
Also, Warriors question the ideology of development itself and argue that using GNP (Gross National 
Product) as the primary tool to judge economic progress is actually a self-delusion. The global 
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economy of today is shaped by the enduring pattern of colonialism. The present-day colonialism 
according to them, is a new kind of corporate colonialism (Goldsmith, 1996; Korten, 1995, 1996) 
supported by a casino economy ruled by currency speculators (Barnet, 1996).
4.2.2. The Sages: Deep versus Religious Ecologists
Sages view the environmental crises as being rooted in the deeper level of human being. This camp 
consists of religious ecologists previously mentioned, and deep ecologists. Both groups have their 
own philosophers. For the larger argument in the remainder of the thesis, I highlight the differences 
between religious ecologists and deep ecologists. The difference is not obvious until their 
orientations are considered. While the deep-ecologist is eco-centric, the religious ecologist is Theo-
centric.
The Deep Ecologists
The deep ecologists, hold that ecology reveals that nature has intrinsic value (Lovelock, 1979; 
Rolston, 1992). Deep ecologists have heralded ecology as a truly post-modern science which rejects 
the modernist separation of fact and value, and discovers value in its subject matter (Howarth, 
1995).
Ecosystems, they claim, are shown to be not merely highly complex mechanisms. They 
display features such as self-directedness, purposiveness, harmony and balance They have 
suggested that ecology reveals that ecosystems are more than the sum of their parts. They 
have likened ecosystems to human communities, suggesting that balance and harmony are 
achieved by the members or components acting 'for the sake of' the 'whole [The 'deep' 
interpretation] might even be suggested that the ecosphere has something comparable to 
human consciousness that its unpredictability is due to its having something comparable to 
human freedom (Howarth, 1995:787-788).
Concerning a deep ecological view of nature, Manzoor (1986) made an important point from an 
Islamic perspective. He insists on distinguishing between sacralization and divinization of nature. 
The distinction clearly signifies different orientations. Islam views nature as the portent of God, and 
it certainly opposes desacralization of nature while it forbids divinization of nature, only God being 
the Divine. Nasrs (2004) description of the deep vision of nature in Islamic belief, whereby nature is 
the portent (ayah) of God, is appropriate here:
The Quran depicts nature as being ultimately a theophany which both veils and reveals 
God to those whose inner eye has not become blinded by the concupiscent ego and the 
centrifugal tendencies of the passionate soul. (Nasr, 2004:131)
The cosmic dimension of the Quran was elaborated over the centuries by many Muslim 
sages who referred to the cosmic or ontological Quran (al-Quran al-takwini) as distinct from 
and complementing the composed or written Quran (al-Quran al-tadwini). For them the 
forms of nature were literally ayat Allah, vestigial Dei, a concept that was certainly known to 
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the traditional West before, with the advent of rationalism, symbols were turned into brute 
facts (Nasr, 2004:131).
Moreover, Nasr (1996:281) notes that the rapport between sacred rites and the harmony and order 
of nature is so much emphasized in Islam that, according to a Hadith67, the world will not come to an 
end as long as there are people on earth who remember the Name of God and continue to invoke 
Allah, Allah a practice central to the ritual of Sufism. In this respect, the esoteric concept of 
walayah elucidates humans guardianship of the earth. The word walayah from the root w-l-y means 
proximity. The concept is reciprocal. According to Quranic teachings, Allah is very near to all things. 
That means, human beings are near to Allah. Yet, the proximity is perceived only by those who 
have achieved human perfection. Thus, someone who attained walayah is called wali Allah (the 
trusted, or friend of God). Accordingly, through the wali God governs the world invisibly, a power 
without which the order of nature would turn into chaos and the world would flounder. The concept 
of walayah is shared by both Sunni and Shia through Sufi orders68.  According to Matsumoto (2010), 
the concept walåyah is intrinsic to the philosophic tradition of Islam which is not found in other 
philosophic traditions. For this reason, philosophic inquiry into the concept walåyah will help us to 
have true insight into the essence of Islamic thought (Matsumoto, 2010:17).  Based upon this 
concept, on the popular level throughout the Islamic world, there is a belief that God places on earth 
at all times saintly men and women who through their presence and the rituals and prayers that 
they perform preserve the order of nature (Nasr, 1996:281).  
Further, the central theological anthropology of Islam is that human is both, vicegerent 
(khalifah) and servant (abd) of God. The vicegerent is responsible on earth to God for his/her
actions, and the custodian and protector of earth of which he/she is given authority to control on 
the condition that he/she remains faithful to him/herself as the khalifah which is the central 
terrestrial figure. The Quran asserts explicitly. I am setting on the earth a vice-gerent (khalifah). 
Nonetheless, this quality of vicegerency is complemented by that of servantship (al-ubudiyah)
towards God.
Man is Gods servant (abd Allah) and must obey Him accordingly. As abd Allah he must be 
passive towards God and receptive to the grace that flows from the world above. As khalifah 
Allah he must be active in the world sustaining cosmic harmony and disseminating the grace 
for which he is the channel as a result of his being the center creature in the terrestrial 
order. In the same way that God sustains and cares for the world, man is His vice-gerent 
must nurture and care for the ambience in which he plays the central role. He cannot 
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See Imam al-Qurtubis (1214-1273)
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Because the Sufi belongs to the inner dimension of Islam and transcends Shariah differences as well as the 
Sunni-Shia dichotomy (Nasr,2002:63)
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neglect the care of the natural world without betraying that trust (al-amanah) which he 
accepted when he bore witness to Gods Lordship in the pray eternal covenant (al-mithaq) 
to which the Quran refers in famous verse, Am I not your Lord?, They (that is, members of 
humanity) uttered Yea, we bear witness. (Q:7:172). Secular Muslim, on the other hand, sees 
the power of man as ruler upon the earth emphasized at the expense of his servanthood so 
that he is considered to be not the khalifah Allah, the vicegerent of God, but the khalifah of 
his own ego or of some worldly power or collectivity. (Nasr, 1993:134)
With such a perspective of human in Islam, thus, an inference:
nothing is more dangerous for the natural environment than the practice of the power of 
vice-gerency by a humanity which no longer accept to be Gods servant, obedient to His 
commands and laws. There is no more dangerous a creature on earth than a khalifat Allah 
who no longer considers himself to be abd Allah and who therefore does not see himself as 
owing allegiance to a being beyond himself (Nasr, 1993:134-5)
The Religious Ecologists
Unlike the Warriors, this group does not see the crisis as being simply economic or technological, 
but rather moral and spiritual issues. The dominant modern Western worldview is seen to have 
given rise to the problem. 
The base of the crisis is not seen as being simply economic or technological, however. 
Rather, it is seen as much a moral and spiritual issue at heart, about the idea of nature as 
much as its physical form, a result of a dominant modern Western worldview (What Taylor 
(2001:1-2) terms the modern social imaginary), a particular anthropocentric and 
mechanistic imagination devaluing nature and overvaluing humanity, seeing nature as a 
resource - devoid of intrinsic value, subjective meaning or spirit to be used for the benefit of 
humanity, leading to destructive rather than protective action towards it (humanity is 
envisioned as dominant and active, separate from a nature that is subservient and passive 
what is seen as the disenchantment of nature, a moral and spiritual emptiness or 
disorientation, without any guiding environmental ethic, other than an anthropocentric one) 
(Watling, 2009:2)
In general, they see the environmental crisis as a direct offspring of the scientific and industrial 
revolutions with their unchecked materialism which was superimposed over the spiritual and ethical 
values of society (Bruun and Kalland, 1995). Philosopher Habermas (2010) is deeply concerned that, 
in consequence, the moral grounds for transforming the economic globalization that is devouring 
earths ecosystem are unavailable or inadequately stated in secular philosophy alone. The 
proposition of philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a prominent representative of the school of 
traditional religions, is appropriate here. Nasr points out the philosophical roots of the Scientific and 
Industrial Revolution. He speaks of the philosophy of people in rebellion against Heaven, the 
promethean man, being at the root of everything wrong with modernism. This philosophy has, then, 
been carried in the baggage of modern sciences (Nasr, 1996, 2001, 2007, 1989), thus:
The independent critical function which reason should exercise vis-à-vis science, which is 
its own creation, has disappeared, and henceforth science which is the child of human
92
mind has itself become the judge of human values & the criterion of truth  It is a science 
that makes certain assumptions as to the nature of reality (time, space, matter, etc.), but 
once these assumptions were made and a science came into being based upon them, they 
have been comfortably forgotten and the results of this science made to be the 
determining factor as to true nature of reality.  (Nasr, 1969:25)
Guenon (2004) emphasizes the quantitative character of modern science as a general tendency 
which seeks, as an ideal, the reduction of all quality to quantity, and all that is essential in the 
metaphysical sense to the material and substantial. 
Foltz et al (2003) is a collection of Muslim environmentalist scholars who write from the 
Islamic metaphysics and the Sharia point of view. With a single Islamic view of where humans belong 
in the hierarchy of being (human as vicegerent, khalifah, and servant, abd, of God), the book 
presents various perspectives of the Muslims on Islam and ecology that can serve as an introduction 
to Muslim environmentalism that, in central respect, is different from modern environmentalism.  
They include: the Sufis vision of the animate nature of universe and the primordial nature of 
humans (fitra) to live in harmony with nature; the question of how traditional Islam can guide 
contemporary Muslims in dealing with environmental crisis effectively; the obstacles in practicing 
Islamic environmental ethics in the modern world; the fact that traditional Islamic laws that 
addressed environmental management are no longer practiced in much of the Muslim world69; 
critiques of interest-based global banking systems that engender profit-seeking at the expense of 
environment and human communities; and the family planning in Muslim societies. 
Watling (2009) studies a wide variety of religious traditions from East and West to explore 
religious innovations that allow an ecotopian vision to surface. According to him, ecological 
interpretations of Islam stress it as being a religion of the book (Watling, 2009:158-172). He sees 
the Quran, Prophet Muhammad and Sharia as a way to awaken a higher consciousness of unified 
nature of humanity, nature, and God reminiscent of the Islamic unified systemic worldview 
discussed in section 2.3. Hope and Young (2000) gave three examples of Muslims in environmental 
actions promoting population control in Nairobi and Cairo. They portray lives of key spiritual leaders 
and activists in different religions searching to give life to a new or renewed human relationship with 
nature. 
Bauman et al (2011) write on religion and ecology as a field that studies both the broad 
intellectual traditions of religion (the attitudes and views of religious leaders, sacred texts, and 
traditions) and the everyday reality of religion on the ground (the practices and actions of the 
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In an unusual example, in the Islamic Republic of Iran Islamic principles were beginning to be applied to 
environmental protection at both government and grassroots level.
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adherents of religions in their everyday lives). They hold that the methodological commitment of 
this field is a synthesis of a scholarly attention to religious worldviews and to lived religion. They 
refuse to choose one as the primary focus, but are committed to understand both as 
complementary and mutually informative. Bohannon and OBrien (2011) write about 
Environmental Justice (EJ) and Eco-Justice- the environmental movements related to social 
injustice in America where these terms: environmental injustice, environmental racism first 
appeared.   The EJ movement took shape when the United Church of Christ (UCC) became involved 
with a black majority, rural community in Warren County. They were protesting the proposed siting 
in their country of a waste dump for Polychlorinated biphenyl, a highly toxic chemical. 
In 1986 the UCCs Commission for racial Justice became involved and sought to link what 
was happening in Warren County to a wider national trendThis survey led to a watershed 
documentToxic Wastes and Race. The key finding was that, even when socio-economic 
factors are considered, race is the most statistically significant predictor in the siting of 
hazardous wastes (Bohannon and OBrien, 2011:167).
The Eco Justice movement urged Christians to recognize the eco justice crisis  the historic 
turning point at which the abuse of nature and the injustices to human being place the future in 
grave jeopardy, both for natural systems and for human society (Bohannon and OBrien, 2011:171). 
Furthermore, on the heel of Lynn White (1966) and Toynbee (1971), Bauman et al (2011:59-61) 
present the debates between DeWitt, a zoologist and evangelical theologian, who seeks to recover 
ecological themes that he believes have always existed in Christianity, and the markedly different 
approach of Hessel and Ruether, the editors of Christianity and Ecology. The latter call for a 
reformation of their [Christian] tradition, which preserves its key elements but adapt others in light 
of contemporary realities (Bauman et al, 2011:61). Another view is of Taylor (2009a, 2009b) who 
focuses on dark green religions which he defines as those that develop from a deep sense of 
belonging to and connectedness in nature while perceiving the earth and its living systems to be 
sacred and interconnected (Bauman et al, 2011:61). Taylor does not believe that there are 
inviolable revelations that will provide clear and final answers. Thus Taylor proposes to replace 
traditions like Christianity with a call for a different and  from his perspective - far more ecological 
religion. In Taylors view, religions like Christianity might become green but they will view their 
environmental responsibilities as, at most, one of a variety of ethical responsibilities, and so will not 
prioritize the natural world as much as dark green religions which place sacred value in the world 
of nature (Bauman et al, 2011:61). For him most of the worlds major religions have worldviews 
that are antithetical to and compete with the worldviews found in the dark green religions (p.61)
Answering critical views of religion such as those of Taylor, Manzoor (1986) and Nasr (1996) 
protested the absence of Islam from most works on religion and environmentalism. According to 
94
Nasr, when monotheistic world religions were criticized for reasons aforementioned, practically no 
account is taken of Islam except when it is criticized as part of the monotheistic family (Nasr, 1996: 
214). More relevant to this research, they argue that little has been said of a billion Muslims who still 
live in Islams traditional cosmologies, in a world peopled by angels and jinn, or psychic forces when 
everything is alive and under the command of God (Nasr, 1996:214). As for the case of Indonesia, 
Nasr and Manzoors arguments are apt to respond to criticism of monotheistic religion made by 
Indonesians such as in the novel, Bilangan Fu by Ayu Utami (2008). The novel juxtaposed 
monotheistic religion vis-à-vis adat in which divinization of nature similar to Taylors dark-green 
religions is often part. Discussion on this particular issue appeared in the fieldwork in section 8.3.
Grim and Tucker (2014:13) began with the critical question, if lives on earth are severely 
endangered, why have religions been so late to participate in solutions to ecological challenges?
They suggest, nevertheless, that the combined power of science, technology, economic growth and 
modernization may well be the case that has overshadowed traditional connections to nature in the 
world religions.  They contend with the promises and problems of religious environmentalism. They 
hold that religions have fostered worldviews, symbol systems, ethical teaching, and ritual practices 
in religious ecologies that have the potential to inspire human imagination and evoke human energy 
for life-enhancing transformation (Tucker and Grim, 2014:26) which can be harnessed for 
environmental and social change. Further, religions are the wellspring of cultures and civilizations 
and repositories of knowledge about sacred human relations, guiding human affairs, and orienting 
human-earth interactions. They noted that the United Nations Environmental Protection (UNEP) 
recognized this potential and has been working with religious communities since 1987. Nonetheless, 
relevant to the research objectives defined in Chapter 1, Grim and Tucker (2014) discuss the 
problems and promises of religion on environmental issues. According to them, among the 
potentials is the fact that religions are the largest NGOs in the world. Religions also make the claim 
of allegiances that transcend differences of race, class, gender and nationality (Grim and Tucker, 
2014:26). On the other hand, among the problems are that religions can be dogmatic, intolerant, 
hierarchical and patriarchal.
Elsewhere, Johnstons (2010) thesis seeks to construct a Muslim-Christian theological 
discourse on creation and humanity that could help adherents of both faiths work together to 
preserve our planet. He begins with an understanding of historical issues. 
Following on the heels of the Renaissance and its cosmopolitan outlook, the era of Western 
colonialism in effect coincided with the fall of the last Muslim enclave of Andalusia, the 
proud city of Granada (1492). One of the ironies of history is that it was the pluralistic, 
largely tolerant and knowledge-thirsty civilization of Muslim Spain that ignited the 
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Renaissance in the first place. Sadly, this inclusive impulse of Andalusia was overpowered 
and destroyed by the twin engines of religious imperialism and the greed for power and 
money. What is more, the discovery of the Americas helped to fuel the growing European 
appetite for trade, and, in the wake of Industrial Revolution, its search for new markets to 
absorb a surplus of goods in fact, the Protestant Reformation helped to break the 
monopoly of Rome on the interpretation of the Christian tradition in the West and provided 
a new impetus to the expanding reality of nation-states (Johnston, 2010:5-6)  
He marshals world history to arrive at Postmodernity - a complex movement with salient points: 
1. Radical questioning (and often rejection) of the Enlightenments view of history as a unitary 
human march toward progress, and when modernitys optimism is dampened (p.12)
2. The Enlightenments dogma of objective scientific truth incorporated into Western 
consciousness is left behind (p.12)
3. Rejection of Enlightenment rationalism raises afresh the fundamental questions of 
epistemology (what do we know and how do we come to know it); ontology (what is being 
and how does it relate to truth); hermeneutics (how do persons apprehend the meaning of a 
text or interpret phenomena which they perceive through their five senses, whether the 
data of scientific research or the past events of history?) (p.12)
4. Postmodernism often takes on radical political stances. A case in point is Foucaults 
denouncing of the power dimension behind discourse (p.13)
5. Postmodernism is also a hodge-podge of social movements and currents of thought in revolt 
against the certainties of Western Enlightenment project. (p.13)
In his view, postmodernism offers both hopes and problems to Muslim-Christian relations: first, 
postmodernism confirms the general Muslim sense of feeling oppressed by a Western-led 
neoliberal, corporate-run globalization process (p.14); second, postmodernism has rehabilitated the 
value of local culture and multiculturalism (p.15); finally, postmodernist hermeneutics subvert the 
literalism and rigidity of both Muslim and Christian conservatives in their approach to the Quran and 
Bible (p.15).
The Sages and the Research
In sum, the Sages literature inspired researching the potential of Muslims epistemic communities 
including their education institutions such as the personalization of knowledge by murabbi
educators in traditionalist pesantren. The argument goes as follows. From the constructivists point 
of view, the idea of nature, like everything else, is socially constructed and is a product of human 
culture. When we talk about the natural world, we reflect the values and assumptions of our 
societies (Bauman et al, 2011:56). This means that nature has a social dimension. Accordingly, 
knowledge and sciences carry with them the philosophies upon which they were constructed. 
Here I argue that different social constructions of knowledge between modern and non-modern 
civilizations have created significant gaps in propagating awareness of environmental crisis to the 
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Third World population where non-western civilizations70 continue to present. Notably, a modern 
scientific worldview of nature does not speak with the same thought-language of the people living 
within different symbolic systems. For example, in an International Science Policy Workshop held in 
Bogor, Indonesia, 16-18 June 2014, which I attended, Lucy Emerton from the Environment 
Management Group 71 who once worked in Thailand, stated that to translate the complex 
environmental issues into the Thai language was hardly possible. In this situation, the gaps between 
scientists and lay-people get even wider, and consequently, while the Third World scientists and 
environmentalists pursue the scientific ways of environmental actions, the masses were doing 
everything else. With that in mind, I put forward that an Islamic global environmental movement to 
be carried out endogenously by the Muslims, might be much more effective as an alternative to 
secular environmental movements in Muslim majority countries.  In this matter, Foltzs (2002) 
reminder is appropriate, to allow plurality of environmental movement outside the dominant 
Western-modern worldview to emerge: 
The modernist vision of technology and progress is most responsible for throwing the life-
support system of the entire planet out of balance. Yet, if we Westerners stop shouting our 
own solutions long enough to hear the many and varied voices that we have these past five 
centuries been striving to silence, we might be surprised to learn that they are telling us 
much of value about the world. We may even find that the solutions to our problems are 
already available, but the cultural blinders imposed by the dominant ideology have 
prevented us from seeing them. (Foltz et al., 2002:3)
4.2.3. The Relocalisation Activists: Redemptionists versus Survivalists 
Relocalisation is a radical green political movement. As the effects of economic policies that 
ignore the needs of people and the planet become blindingly obvious, resistance is growing 
everywhere. In post-industrial societies there are groups of people trying to create what they claim 
would be a sustainable and just society. They often aim to achieve this by turning to the local 
economy, putting the means of production under social control (instead of market forces and profit),
and having self-governance. These movements try to create room for social, ecological and spiritual 
values (Norberg, 2002; Dawson, 2006). Relocalisation aims to reweave the fabric of communities, 
rebuild sustainable, largely self-sufficient communities, and establish self-local governance. A more 
specific definition of relocalisation was made in response to impending peak oil challenges by a
collaboration of International Transition Network and Post Carbon Institute (2010):
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Relocalisation is a strategy to build societies based on the local production of food, energy 
and goods, and the local development of currency, governance and culture. The main goals 
of relocalisation are to increase community energy security, to strengthen local economies, 
and to improve environmental conditions and social equity. The relocalisation strategy 
developed in response to the environmental, social, political, and economic impacts of 
global-over reliance on cheap energy.
Against the background of complex development-environment problems and widespread poverty, I 
envisioned the relocalisation model to be practical and operable for the Indonesian Muslim groups 
such as Muhammadiyah, NU, Hidayatullah and others, considering their achievements in community 
development so far, and the nature of Islam and ecology already given.
Many of the relocalisation ideals are inspired by the Western thinker, Schumacher, who 
himself was inspired by local Asian communities in his well-known book Small is Beautiful (1989). 
The Gandhian ideal no-affluence-no-poverty has been one of the movements fundamentals, 
suggesting eco-socialism. Ecovillages are some of the most holistic and most important examples of 
relocalisation. The movements believe that these smaller-scale communities nurture more intimate 
relations among people and ensure that everyone is seen, heard and recognized  thus providing a 
sense of individual identity that is lacking in the anonymity and isolation of mass society (Norberg, 
2002). Furthermore, Norberg argues that when people live in smaller-scale social and economic 
units, where mutual support is necessary, the human capacity for caring and kindness is enhanced.
Ecovillages provide models for living close to the land and in community with one another  a vision 
that is inspiring for the increasing numbers of people who long to live in a way that is spiritually 
rewarding as well as ecologically sustainable. Increasingly, relocalisation has been debated as people 
have discovered that complex, interconnected issues must be dealt with rapidly and effectively if 
they are to achieve a resilient future in the face of climate change and peak oil (Leonard 2009, 
Hopkins 2008, Shuman 2000, Trainer 1998, 2006, Fotopoulos 2002, 2006, Garden 2006). The 
relocalisation activists believe that all good intentions and sophisticated analyses of global problems 
and solutions by academics, politicians, think tanks and concerned ordinary people mean nothing 
until, and unless, individual citizens take personal actions to change their lifestyles. Two factions of 
this literature are noteworthy. I call them the redemptionists and survivalists according to their 
ulterior motives.  
The Redemptionist
Based on the assumption that nature is finite and what economists call economic growth in reality
is the liquidation of the natural wealth of the planet (Solnit, 2004), the redemptionists argue that the 
rich nations can only live as they do now because they have been taking and using up most of the 
scarce resources, and preventing most of the worlds people from having anything like a fair share. 
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Therefore, the redemptionists strongly argue that the rich nations cannot morally endorse their way 
of life and must accept the need to move to far simpler and less resource expensive ways (Trainer 
1985, 1995, 2000; Jackson 2002). They advocate that the Third World should aim to rely on their 
own goods and services in order to escape from what they see as unfair relations with the First 
World, and the Third World should re-localize the problems as they become too complex and too 
interconnected. They often refer to economic analyses of the post-colonial Third World (such as 
those by Maren, 2002; Rosberg, 2005; Rich, 1995; Frank, 1984; Chossudovsky, 1988, 1991; 
Clairmonte, 1986; Easterly, 2002; Hancock, 1994) to infer that satisfactory development for the Third 
World is totally impossible in a global economy driven by market mechanisms (Trainer 1995, 1998, 
2000, 2006), or, for that matter, by Bretton Woods-style economic assistance. There has been an 
increase in development in the Third World, but most of it has been completely inappropriate to the 
needs of the majority of people. Foreign investors never invest in what is most needed. These 
mechanisms have brought about Third World development in the interests of the rich, i.e. the Third 
Word elites, the transnational corporations and the people in rich countries who consume the Third 
Words raw materials. Thus, conventional-capitalist development is increasingly being seen as a 
process of plunder.  
Further, alongside the argument that the scale of most social and economic institutions 
throughout the worlds history before the advent of colonialism and imperialism had been at the 
local level as opposed to regional, inter-regional or global, the anti-globalization authors argue that 
the process of globalization has to be brought to a halt as soon as possible and reversed. 
Relocalisation is a shift in the direction of revitalized local, diversified and at least partially self-
sufficient smaller economies (Mander 1996:13). Mander believes this model offers more chance of 
success than the currently promoted, clearly utopian, globally-centralized expansionist model. 
Counter to the charge by the defenders of the global economy that local economy can be 
provincial and autocratic, Mander (1996) argues that considerable historical evidence showed 
local and indigenous economic-political systems have usually been more stable and peaceful than 
the chaotic one seen in the Third World or developing world today. In addition, the localists contend 
that the problems will be solved by production of local consumption  using local resources, under 
the guidance and control of local communities, and reflecting local and regional cultures and 
traditions within the limits of nature. Following this train of thought, trade must be limited to 
providing those things that cannot be provided locally. Norberg (1996) speaks of shifting direction 
from global dependence to local interdependence; Berry (1996) makes a passionate plea for a return 
to community and an argument that a new political opportunity now exists, namely, the party of 
community against the parties of globalization; and Goldsmith (1996) calls for reversing 
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globalization by firstly identifying the ways in which corporations and the state have usurped all 
aspects of individuals lives and in response, viable local communities and participatory democracy 
are reestablished.
Influenced by this thought, there are groups of people who undertake intentional 
community living projects. They seek a whole new way of creating a new society, an alternative 
society. Instead of doing battle with the ponderous dinosaur of the old society with all its fault and 
wrongs, we would just go out and create a new one, is the adage of these movements (Bang 
2005:32). The single theme in all relocalisation groups is their attempts to produce a coherent and 
holistic approach to confront social and ecological problems through the creation of the 
alternative society model, minimizing ecological impact but maximizing human happiness and well-
being. Jackson (2002) founded GEN, a network of intentional communities aimed to build such an 
alternative society. He believes that they will eventually win out because the current system is not 
meeting the needs of a large percentage of the worlds population. Regarding the Third World 
problems, he contends that the people in the West are predominantly unaware: 
the global society of the 21st century is in crisis  spiritually, socially and environmentally, 
though Western media mostly do not reflect this view, and this is not surprising since the 
crisis is most visible in the other 90% of the worlds population (Jackson and Jackson, 
2002:130). 
Another protagonist of intentional community movement, Trainer (2000), argues that to change and 
build a sustainable, just and satisfactory society, there is a requirement for a change from the 
materialistic and hedonistic lifestyles into a Simpler Way in which everyone will live very frugally 
and self- sufficiently in economies that are mostly small and have highly localized, self-sufficient and 
cooperative ways under social control (i.e. not determined by market forces or profit), and without 
any economic growth. None of these structural changes is possible without huge and radical value 
change (Trainer, 2000). For Trainer, the fate of the planet depends on the future of the global 
ecovillage movement and there is nothing more important for individiduals to do now than to help 
the movement flourish (Trainer, 2006). Thus, the crucial task that must be performed is to have built 
the impressive examples of eco-villages which will show that a workable and attractive alternative is 
available (Trainer, 2000, 2006).
Gaia Trust, Findhorn Foundation, Schumacher Society, Sierra Club, Global Ecovillage 
Network (GEN), are among the redemptionist groups by my classification. They have developed 
ecovillages around the world and engaged in numerous fields of activity: the design of low-impact 
human settlements, promoting sustainable local economics, organic and locally based food 
production and processing, earth restoration, revival of participatory, community-scale governance, 
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social inclusion, peace activism and international solidarity, holistic - whole person education, and 
many others. Their activities may include water management, healing, culture and arts, waste 
management and recycling, spiritual enquiry and so on (Dawson 2006, Bang 2005, Jackson 2002). In 
sum, Jackson (2002) argues, the ecovillage movement is a reaction to the global socio-ecological 
crisis, but in positive and constructive mode, based on personal action in changing lifestyle in 
keeping with the longer term needs of a global society in ecological balance. They may well be the 
models for the rest of the world to turn to, when the reality of the current crisis is finally 
acknowledged (Jackson, 2002:130). In its latest development, GEN made a strategic shift from an 
inward emphasis on self-sufficiency toward more outward concentration on educational efforts and 
making cross linkages with citizen initiatives such as the Transition Town movement (Dawson, 2013) 
below.
The Survivalist
Literature belonging to the survivalist category is characterized by its practical and solution-
oriented initiatives aiming to create communities with the practical capacity to be resilient in the 
face of the dual challenge of climate change and peak oil over which local communities have little 
control. While it continues the long-tradition of grassroots and other environmental-social 
movements that have campaigned against environmentally and socially damaging practices, it has 
arrived at last at the conclusion that its too late for sustainability72. Accordingly, the only realistic 
response would be to adapt creatively the global resource shortages, thus, transitioning into post-
carbon world (Bailey et.al, 2010; Barry, 2012). Henceforth, the concept of resilience emerges as a 
key human capacity to deal with uncertainties and vulnerability, just as we cannot eliminate 
vulnerability, resilience must be the capacity to withstand and recover from wounding and harm 
we cannot eliminate (Barry, 2012: 80). Subsequently, the word resilience is used as replacement for 
sustainability, and less unsustainable for sustainable (Bailey et.al, 2010; Barry, 2012). The Transition 
Town (TT) movement by Transition Network, an example of this group, has become the fastest 
growing environmental movement in the global North (Hopkins, 2008). With over 30 official TT 
initiatives in the UK, the concept is now spreading to New Zealand, Canada and many more 
countries. Authors on Transition practice include Rob Hopkins, Liam Leonard, John Barry, and 
Stephen Quilley. The relocalisation theme at the heart of Transition movement was drawn from the 
logic of peak oil,  that in the long term, chronic energy shock will engender a much more localized 
bio-regional pattern of economic production and consumption (Heinberg, 2005; Kunstler, 2005, 
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This is the position one can find in authors such as Kunstler (2005), Lovelock (2006) and Korowicz (2010). For 
them, humanity has already passed a tipping point and that we are inexorably on a downward trajectory in 
terms of energy use, social complexity, population growth, economic growth, and so on.
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2008). Imminent and permanent short fall in oil supply will increase year on year with massive geo-
political, economic and social consequences. It also considers the reality and implications of rapid 
and potentially catastrophic climate change. In The Transition Handbook, From Oil Dependency to 
Local Resilience, Hopkins (2008) enumerates a number of distinct characteristics of TT:
(1) is not a protest movement, it is non-confrontational
(2) Supports national and multilateral efforts to reduce emissions and to develop new  
energy technologies and infrastructures
(3) Leaves climate change protest to environmental campaigning groups, NGOs, and 
activists oriented towards a global civil society.
(4) Takes resource and environmentally caused geo-political conflict for granted
(5) Rather than campaigning against globalization or in favour of a globalization from 
below, the TT project is premised on the end of globalization and the inevitability of 
environmentally induced socio-economic and political disorder. 
(6) Sees the time for seeing globalization as an invincible and unassailable behemoth, or 
localization as some kind of lifestyle choice, is over (Hopkins, 2008:15) and Small is 
Inevitable (Hopkins, 2008:68).
(7) Seeks to take charge of their own destinies and to develop relocalisation strategies, 
initiatives that anticipate what is seen to be inevitable reversal of globalization.
(8) Argues that positive and up-lifting visions of a more friendly post-oil future are more 
likely to induce active participation and behavioral change.
(9) Demonstrates the future with less oil could be preferable to the present (Hopkins, 
2008:53; Kunstler, 2005)
The focus on the practical typifies Transition initiatives. In practice, measuring a 
communitys resilience is to undertake a SWOT analysis, that is, an informed examination of its 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats for advancing Transition movement (Barry, 
2012). To address the mechanics of personal and social change the Transition Network used models 
from addiction studies to explore the psychology of how individuals modify behaviors and acquire 
positive ones73 (Bailey et.al, 2010). Several techniques from organizational studies to promote 
community changes have been utilized in the Transition movement. The first is the creation of 
shadow economic, social and technological infrastructures in readiness for the failure of existing 
systems, PPI (Parallel Public Infrastructure) (Bailey et.al, 2010). These include:
infrastructure to support locally-produced products, energy storage, public transport, 
currencies, seed storage, grains, reforestation, general municipal services, information 
sharing, and shortened supply chain (Bailey et.al, 2010:599)
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Typically the arguments claim that the first response people make when informed of peak oil and climate 
change and the inevitable transition at some near point in the future to a post-oil and climate change and 
transformed economy and society in the twenty-first century is, like an addict being confronted with their 
addiction, one of denial. Then comes anger, negotiation/compromise, before-if all goes well-acceptance, 
reflection, change and action to post-addiction state (Barry, 2012:101).
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Quite importantly, instead of informed by forecasting, PPI is informed by backcasting, a technique 
employed by several disciplines to explore the steps involved in achieving desired future states 
(Bailey et.al, 2010). Mass communication technology including internet and open-source software 
has been crucial to the dissemination of Transition messages (Bailey et al, 2010). According to Barry 
(2012), the notion of resilience entails: creativity (make new inventions in response to necessity), as 
well as older virtues of fortitude, courage, foresight and prudence. Similar to green intentional 
community movements, the transition movement is indeed utopian, but their utopianism is deeply 
pragmatic (Sargisson, 2009). 
To summarize, against the dual challenge of peak oil and climate change, the relocalisation
movement appears very different from conventional environmentalism, or, the exhausted, co-
opted and compromised connotations of orthodox sustainable development, or the naïve techno-
optimism, or, ecological modernization, or the green version of business as usual (Barry, 2012; 
Bailey et.al, 2010). Relocalisation does not speak about a nation-state-scale of changes towards 
sustainable trajectories through changes in technology, the economy and government. Rather, it 
comes close to survivalism (Barry, 2012). It draws upon pragmatic strategies to save as much as 
we can of civilization, and as many people as we can (Barry, 2012:83).
In response, Trainer gives a very positive view of the survivalists approaches. According to 
him, if the world ever manages to create a tapestry of highly localized, zero-growth economies, it 
will have to be due to something like the Transition Town movement (Hopkins, 2008).  But he also 
makes a friendly critique of the movement, worrying too much emphasis has been given merely on 
building resilience within consumer-capitalist society without giving attention to replacing the 
fundamental structure of consumer-capitalist society (Trainer, 2009a, 2009b). He argues that the 
existing economy is quite capable of accommodating what the Transition movement is doing. Thus, 
the Transition movement should attempt to replace the core institutions of consumer capitalism, 
rather than merely building resilience within them. Trainer puts forward a radical zero growth 
economy in which, 
(1) There can be no interest payments to eradicate growth
If you do away with growth then there can be no interest payments. The present economy 
literally runs on interest payments of one form or another, an economy without interest 
payments would have to be totally different mechanisms for carrying out many processes 
(Trainer, 2011:77)
(2) There is radical change in cultural attitudes towards consumption, hence, the notion of 
economic sufficiency
(3) Market activity would not be driven by an ethics of profit maximization, but, presumably by some 
ethics of genuine mutual benefit and concern (Trainer, 2011).
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The Challenges of Relocalisation
Besides what is perceived as technophobia, the question of scale has been the most ready criticism 
by conservative environmentalists to the small is beautiful philosophy of relocalisation (Lewis, 
1992). Various challenges to relocalisation attempts have been documented. Middlemiss and Parrish 
(2010) noted that grassroots initiatives for sustainability rely on people with limited power, limited 
resources and limited ability to influence others, so volunteers can face challenges including hostility 
from local people, difficulties in securing funding, and burn out as the strain of volunteering with 
limited support takes its toll. Sargisson (2009) identified financial hardship, unequal income 
distribution, increasing materialism in some members, boredom and distraction from original intent 
of the community as problems in green intentional communities she studied. Trainer identified 
cultural attitudes towards consumption as a huge problem. Consequently, limited choice of lifestyle 
in green intentional communities is identified by de Geus (2009) as a challenge. Thus, What is 
required is much greater social change than Western society has undergone in several hundred 
years (Trainer, 2011:17). Relatedly, being non-confrontational in action, Transition initiatives have 
yet to find strategies to influence corporations who spawn actively energy-dependent lifestyles 
(Bailey et al, 2010:600). As yet, no major corporations have become active partners in Transition 
initiatives. In sum, Dawson, the President of GEN Europe fostering the development of ecovillages in 
Africa identifies cultural renewal and economic empowerment at the root of the problem to be 
addressed in the relocalisation movement:  
There are two key common threads which link the Northern intentional communities and 
Southern community-based initiatives: First, both were seeking to consciously regain greater 
democratic, popular control over community resources that were coming under greater 
attack from corporate capitalism. Second, both recognized that at root, the problem to be 
addressed was at least as much cultural as economic in nature.  That is, in the South, 
traditional communities were being undermined both not only by the aggressive behavior of 
corporations in usurping control over community resources, but also by the barrage of 
media messages undermining traditional values and ways of life. In the North, meanwhile, 
efforts at self-reliance and restraint were swamped by the prevalent corporate-driven 
cultural norm that quality of life could be equated with levels of material consumption. 
Movements both North and South, consequently, defined their objectives equally in terms 
of cultural renewal and economic empowerment.  (Dawson, 2006:18).
Kasper (2008) identified individualism as another challenge to ecovillages. Although people inclined 
to join an ecovillage tend to already reject this characteristic of US society, it is not a simple matter 
to unlearn a lifetime of socialization in the dominant culture. Elsewhere, from a political point of 
view, the Marxist-style criticisms see relocalisation as an utopian project that has no clear anti-
systemic goals (Fotopoulos, 2000), and Bailey et al (2010) admitted, besides penetrating other global 
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networks that remains a major challenge; bridging the gap between community action and the 
political mainstream, is an altogether different challenge.
4.3 Relocalisation in the Green Politics Arena
From what is already presented, relocalisation is therefore a localized green political response to 
predominant un-sustainability, in which the primary aim is to reduce local un-sustainability as much 
as possible and enhance local resilience, rather than engage in much wider political projects to 
realize sustainability (Barry, 2012). This decentralist approach, however, has been criticized by the 
centralist proponent of green politics. How the arguments unfold is important to this research that 
considers the potentials of Muslim communities to advance relocalisation with local, rather than 
states governance. 
Centralist analysis has been called neo-Malthusian or neo-Hobbesian. While there has been 
no new centralist analysis writing since 1970s, Heibroner (1977) and Ophuls (1977) have been 
continually referred to as centralist thinkers in ecological politics literature to date (Marshall, 1994; 
Press, 1996; Radcliffe, 2000). A number of issues raised by centralists in my opinion remained crucial 
in thinking of relocalisation. Centralists do not see the present democratic institutions and economic 
structure as being able to cope with the ecological crisis, and propose centralized expert 
government and a largely authoritarian society. Heilbroner came up with a collectivist state which 
he envisaged had to institute a large degree of intellectual control over its citizens. Further, he 
argues that a central role for an intellectual and skilled elite is needed while the mass of the 
population would have to be kept in the dark concerning disagreements between scientists 
(Heilbroner, 1977:26). In defence of capitalism, he considered an increase in planning and market 
control by both government and multinationals as necessary to sustain capitalism (1977). Heilbroner 
also foresaw the establishment of statist religion, a movement away from individual to communal 
ethic.
What is crucial in the statist religion, as I foresee, is the elevation of the collective and 
communal destiny of man to the forefront of public consciousness, and the absolute 
subordination of private interests to public requirements. (Heilbroner, 1977:95) 
Ophuls (1977) proposes the Hobbesian Solution of a strong state and the need of a scientific elite 
who would determine the requirements of the society. He agreed with Hardins sentiment that 
Injustice is preferable to total ruin (Hardin and Badin, 1977:28)
Better that we should choose Brave New World and try to make it as benign as possible than 
to continue along the path of non-politics; for this would surely earn us  quite justly  the 
enmity of posterity (Ophuls, 1977b:171)
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And he went so far as to consider the oligarchic system as well:
Thus, whatever its level of material affluence, the steady state society will not only be more 
authoritarian and less democratic than the industrial societies of today  the necessity to 
cope with the tragedy of the commons would alone ensure that  but it will also in all 
likelihood be much more oligarchic as well, with only those possessing the ecological and 
other competencies necessary to make prudent decisions allowed full participation in the 
political processes. (Ophuls, 1977:158)  
Overall, Orr and Hill (1978:461) listed four assumptions implicit to all the centralist authors:
1. That an authoritarian state can cope with its own increased size and complexity
2. That it can muster sufficient skill to exert control over the external environment, and
3. That this condition can be maintained in perpetuity
4. That we have no other practical choice (1978:461)
In a diametrically opposed position to centralist, the decentralists hold that the more severe the 
problem the more difficult it would be for a centralist and authoritarian group to manage. For that 
reason, decentralization is inevitable. The political organization along decentralist lines is 
increasingly perceived to be practical and desirable by activists in areas of politics which may not 
have as their original aim an ecological society (Allaby, 1977:244). Decentralists are highly critical of 
the idea of ecological and development experts in the centralists thesis and questioned the role of 
the experts and their relationship to other members of society (Radcliffe, 2000). Within the 
decentralist faction are the eco-socialists which the eco-anarchists belong to. The debates between 
Ted Trainer Simpler Way, Takis Fotopoulos Inclusive Democracy and Mary Garden Leaving 
Utopia are appropriate here. The most debated areas about relocalisation ideas are i) the bottom-
up approach of relocalisation as opposed to the top-down dominant paradigm; and ii) the exclusive 
approach of intentional community as opposed to the inclusiveness of open society.
Trainers decentralist Simpler Way can only be understood by limits to growth analysis. He
rejects the underlying growth paradigm that traditionally shaped both capitalist and socialist 
economics and advocates a zero-growth economy. He advocates a radically low-consumption, 
anarchist answer to the question of social and economic transformation, and rejects conventional 
Marxist strategy of taking control of the state. For him, in a world of very limited resources it will not 
be possible for big centralized or authoritarian governments to run things satisfactorily. The zero-
growth economy must never be introduced from the top-down but must be built from the 
grassroots up, without reliance on state support. The main issue is how to develop existing towns 
and suburbs into participatory eco-villages. The state, no matter how powerful or ruthless or benign, 
simply cant make ecovillages work. They will not work unless there is widespread eagerness to 
cooperate and live simply and self-sufficiently (Trainer, 2000). While favouring renewable energy 
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Trainer (2007) criticizes the general assumption that renewable energy can replace oil to sustain 
consumer societies, and that the advancement of technology can sustain growth paradigm. 
A Marxist, Takis Fotopoulos, the Inclusive Democracy theorist, critiques Trainers Simpler 
Way from a political point of view. He continues to argue that political movement is needed rather 
than simply bottom-up community self-initiated action. For him, only if present antisystemic 
activities prefiguring the system become an integral part of an antisystemic movement, could they 
be part of a solution to the critical problem, rather than the problem itself.  According to Fotopoulos, 
the reason that Trainer adopts a Simpler Way scenario is because for him the greatest problem is 
scarcity, not democracy and power, whereas for the Inclusive Democracy (ID) viewpoint, the 
sustainability and scarcity problem could be solved somehow by the elites if they reach a complete 
cul-de-sac through the introduction of any kind of authoritarian or even fascist measures and 
restrictions they deem necessary at the moment of crisis. So, the real issue is not the problem of 
scarcity or sustainability but, rather, at whose expense these problems are going to be solved: are 
they going to be resolved at the expense of the elites and privileged social classes, or at the expense 
of the working classes and the weaker elements of society. The problem is, therefore, whether or 
not people will establish institutions securing the equal distribution of political, economic and social 
power (direct, economic and social democracy respectively) which can then create the institutional 
preconditions (inclusive democracy  i.e. decentralization in terms of confederated self-reliant 
demoi) as well as the cultural preconditions (paideia) for ecological democracy (Fotopoulos, 2006). 
For Fotopoulos this is a far more likely scenario than Trainers eco-rosy scenario according to 
which people would quickly realize that the old system can no longer provide for them, forcing them 
to turn to local economic development, as governments would no longer be able or willing to run 
things for them, and leading, therefore to the emergence of local systems (Fotopoulos, 2006). He 
also critiques the Simpler Way and ecovillage model (which suggest that individuals could work 
here and now the transformation through small local groups is beginning to take more control over 
their local economies) as simply presuming that the condition could be achieved with no fight 
against capitalism. Even though the Simpler Way is death for capitalism, but the way they will 
defeat it is by ignoring it to death, by turning away from it and building those many bits of the 
alternative that they could easily build right now (Fotopoulos, 2006). According to Fotopoulos that 
premise is outright false. He asserts that he never assumed that the process could be completed 
without a fight against capitalism, simply by ignoring it.
In this respect, Mary Garden also argues that the GEN ecovillage movement does little to 
directly address ecological or environmental crisis as it does not lobby governments or try to change 
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the actions of corporations. In response, Jackson, founder of GEN, argues that individuals should not 
be looking to governments and other powerful institutions to implement solutions. Jackson states 
that the problems involved in living sustainably are too complex and too diverse to be solved from a 
traditional top-down perspective (Garden, 2006). Both Garden and Fotopoulos argue that the 
relationship of society to the economy and polity is completely ignored by GEN, presumably because 
the capitalist market economy and representative democracy are taken for granted. In addition, 
GEN is accused of having partnership links with even the transnational elite-controlled UN and EU. 
Moreover, Garden and Fotopoulos share a common concern of their objection to what they call 
GENs spiritual overtones of the movement (Garden, 2006; Fotopoulos, 2006). Garden has been 
sceptical of the prospect of the eco-village movement being regarded as the most significant 
movement in the twentieth century because the majority of people in the world have never heard of 
it. Those that have are more likely to dismiss it as another New Age rainbow or even find it 
objectionable as John in a blog on LiveJournal.com writes (Garden, 2006): 
It smacks of retreatism: the world can go to hell, but well be okay! He points out that 
people in the world are extricated in a complicated, mostly invisible net of dependencies 
with it. But the problem does not exist at the level of individual choice. An eco-village 
situated within the borders of the US or Italy is not sovereign; its precondition of existence is 
the existence of the American or the Italian state and all that it entails. There is no escape in 
this way; the structure must be altered or nothing else matters3). (Garden, 2006:5)
Answering the critiques to Simpler Way and its alternative community, Trainer argues that 
the creation of eco-villages is neither about salvation nor the proponents are escapists who fled 
from the rat race. Rather, they are made up of people coming together with the right vision to form 
a new society or gradually converting the existing communities towards sustainable communities 
(Trainer, 2000, 2006). Trainer acknowledges the greatest challenge is not with rural intentional 
communities where most impressive examples of ecovillages are at present, but with converting 
existing settlements in dying country towns and the suburbs of big cities. The task is to convert them 
into highly self-sufficient cooperative local economies which are largely self-sufficient. Thus, people 
need to learn to begin producing for themselves their basic needs and other things they require. 
They need to learn to draw the resources from local gardens and restored forests (Trainer, 2006). 
Trainer recognizes the importance of political movement as well, but does not believe the existing 
movements are able to head in the required direction to manage to get to a sustainable and just 
world. He looks, instead, at small local groups that have already started taking more control over 
their local economies. Individuals role, according to Trainer (2006), is to lead and facilitate this 
through the formation of what he calls Community Development Cooperatives (CDC). Trainer (2006) 
points out that this is precisely his main difference with Fotopoulos who gives no help regarding the
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ways individuals might begin the required political movement. In addition, Trainer holds that this 
revolution is about radical change in culture into a worldview which willingly and happily energizes 
the new ways because these new ways cannot be forced or even given, but need to be searched 
creatively. Furthermore, such revolution cannot be led by vanguard parties and there is no value in 
capturing state power. 
If the revolution was simply about replacing capitalist control of consumer society by 
socialist control it could be in principle be done from the top down quickly, and if necessary 
ruthlessly. But the brutal, fundamental fact of coming severe scarcity means that this 
revolution cant be like that. It means that the goal has to be largely autonomous small 
communities managing their local economies and ecosystems well to enable frugal, 
cooperative and highly self-sufficient lifestyles. (Trainer, 2006:3-4)
Trainer, in this respect, is in agreement with me and my thesis of studying existing local Muslim
communities to advance relocalisation endogenously for their members, given that the revolution 
needed can only be developed, worked out, learned by people where they live as they grope to 
local management of their particular local situation and conditions (Trainer, 2006:4).  
4.3.1 Relocalisation and the Research
From what has been presented, obviously, the redemptionists motives of solidarity with the poorer 
South, or deliverance from the sins of the richer North, simply do not apply to the poor in the Third 
World. The survivalists seem to be more logically persuasive for the Muslim groups to mobilize 
provided they are informed of the peak oil and climate change consequences in socio-ecological 
domains. Therefore, the research focused on whether the survivalists motives are able to raise the 
Muslim groups interest in relocalisation ideals. It is worth noting, nevertheless, while the fact that 
ecological and social problems in low income countries are arguably more pressing than in the post-
industrial world74, relocalisation does not yet seem to have attracted the interest of high profile 
environmental groups in the Third World and no one has studied the combined concerns about peak 
oil, climate change, globalization, third world developmentalism and poverty in Indonesia. Studying 
all issues together is critically needed for the following reason. First, peak oil in Indonesia is an 
unmentionable crisis as it is elsewhere as Greer (2013) argues. Second, like anywhere else, climate 
change in Indonesia appeared an abstract and distant issue. Third, the study of globalization without 
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In addition to the bleak prospects of sustainability in the Third World discussed in section 4.2.1, Sunderlin et al
(2005) in their work on livelihoods, forest and conservation in developing countries contend with the question 
whether poverty alleviation and forest conservation can be made convergent rather than divergent given the 
chronic rural poverty and the use of forest resources to prevent rural people from falling into deeper poverty. 
Concerning climate change and agriculture in developing countries, Mendelsohn (1999) argues that tropical 
regions in the developing world are particularly vulnerable to potential damage from environmental changes 
because the poor soils that cover large areas of these regions have made much of the land unusable for 
agriculture.
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raising doubt has been undertaken by many Indonesian scholars in various disciplines. In my opinion, 
without an understanding of the twin challenges of peak oil and climate change, globalization study 
tends to encourage developmentalism and larger participation in the global economy for both 
economic growth and poverty eradication. 
The ecovillage relocalisation movement by GEN is possibly the only prominent strategy that 
has been attempted in the Third World (Dawson, 2006; Jackson, 2002). Nevertheless, the GEN 
initiative is not endogenous75, it has been imported from outside the Asian and African societies 
within which it has been implemented. In fact, while literature on various streams of relocalisation 
has documented the successes and failures of the movement in the Western world, there does not 
yet appear to have been a critical examination of the concept and its exigency, desirability and 
possibility in Third World countries or the Muslim world specifically. The lack of studies was 
commented on by Burke and Arjona (2013) who argued that preconceptions about the Global South 
have impeded the understanding about the challenges of creating ecovillages in the South.
For example, Ross Jacksons argument that people in the South grasp the revolutionary 
potential of ecovillages much quicker than Northerners because they still have their social 
fabrics more or less intact and see the ecovillage model as fully compatible with their village-
based culture leads us to misunderstand the context for and challenges of creating 
ecovillages in the South (Burke and Arjona, 2013:246).
 
Burke and Arjona argue that effective analysis requires that non-Northerners experiences are 
described without falling into common stereotypes of Southerners as either fully comprehensible 
via the lens of poverty or as idyllic villagers with a natural, intuitive, almost magical traditional 
knowledge of ecovillage living (p.246). Further, they said:
Such essentialized preconceptions impede critical reflections on the actual experiences that 
give rise to and result from alternative political ecologies in the Global South. The same 
might be said for stereotypes of the North as a land of economic privilege, social alienation 
and lifestyle-based ecological devastation. The truth is far more interesting and far more 
useful (p.246).
To enter into the debates, I argue that a study of relocalisation in the Third World cannot be done 
without taking into account the enduring unequal power relations in the global political-economic 
order. Historical study and continuing analysis of economic and other relations between First World 
nations and their satellites in the Third World are presented by authors such as Chomsky (2002, 
2003) Clairmonte (1986), Chossudovsky (1988, 1991), Boyce (1989) and Millet (2004). They suggest 
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Endogenous development refers to the sum of views, values and practices which marginalised, silenced or 
oppressed societal actors create from within in response to the initiatives of development coming from 
outside or being implemented top-down (Haverkort and Rist, 2007:7).
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that the Third World is left with little capacity to respond to the challenge of sustainability 
appropriately. Herein, Martin Kohr (1996) from the Third World Network in Penang, Malaysia, one of 
the worlds leading voices of opposition to the present globalization pattern with offices in Asia, 
Africa and South America, is relevant to the research. According to Kohr, the world needs radical 
reshaping of the international economic and financial order so that economic power, wealth and 
income are more equitably distributed and so that the developed world will be forced to lower its 
irrationally high consumption levels:
If this is done, the level of industrial technology will be scaled down and there will be less 
need for the tremendous waste of energy, raw material and resources that now go toward 
the production of superfluous goods simply to maintain effective demand and to keep the 
monstrous economic machine going. If appropriate technology is appropriate for the Third 
World, it is even more essential as a substitute for the environmentally and socially obsolete 
high technology in the developed world (Kohr, 1996:57). 
Yet, Kohr believes that it is almost impossible to hope that the developed world will do this 
voluntarily.  
It will have to be forced to do so, either by a new unity of the Third World in the spirit of 
OPEC in the 1970s and early 1980s or by the economic or physical collapse of the world
economic system (p.57).  
He asserts that although the task to create a new economic and social order based on 
environmentally-sound principles seems impossible, and can make everyone feel it will end in 
defeat, it actually is the greatest challenge of the world today, for it is tackling the issue of the 
survival of the human species and of earth itself.
To sum up, the I have presented the concept of relocalisation as it is debated by its thinkers, 
to make the following points:
1. There is a need for endogenous models of relocalisation to be developed from within the Third 
World communities themselves.
2. Research is needed into the potential of Islam and the global Muslim community (Ummah) to 
advance a global Islamic environmental movement through a global network of endogenous 
relocalisation by local Muslim communities. On this, the following should be taken into 
consideration: 
(i) the non-organizational structure of Islam that suggests the inherently de-centralistic 
nature of Islam; and 
(ii) the quasi-centralized-nature of the Ummah by One God; one Book (the Quran); the 
Prophet Muhammad, and his tradition (Sunna) constitute the Islamic symbolic universe 
already discussed in Chapter 2.
4.4 What Islam has for Relocalisation 
Further to Chapter 2 that explicates the potential of capitalizing on the Islamic symbolic universe to 
mobilize an alternative global environmental movement, this section investigates the features of 
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Islam to examine in what way Islam can accommodate relocalisation. It should be borne in mind, 
nevertheless, that the deliberation of what are considered as positive qualities of Islam in this 
respect should be placed in the context of the knowledge in community framework clarified in 
Chapter 2. That is, the knowledge of Islam as understood by the ordinary Muslims themselves, or, 
how Muslims view Islam themselves. Stated differently, neither does it assume that there is a 
universal rationality which Muslims and non-Muslims will certainly come to agree upon. It should be 
clear that the knowledge in community framework in Chapter 2 implies there is hardly any 
universal rationality under different symbolic universes. In that sense I correspond with 
Jovchelovitch (2007) about incommunicability of worldviews. Therefore, while the thesis may fall 
under the category of postmodernism in that undermines the modernist claim of universal 
rationality, unlike postmodernism that has its own metaphysics despite its frantic attempt to deny 
any metaphysical stance (Farouk-Alli, 2006:32), this thesis articulates Islamic metaphysics. In 
further contrast with postmodernism that relativizes all truth claims, this thesis contends that truth 
claims are legitimate within each symbolic universe and are not necessarily related to others. Thus, it 
promotes hermeneutically-informed understanding beyond merely tolerance. Furthermore, unlike 
postmodernism that does not constitute an alternative social and political project due to its 
inherent cynicism and nihilism (Farouk-Alli, 2006:297), this thesis aims to offer an alternative -albeit 
not a universal project- that is, endogenous Islamic relocalisation. Looked at in this way, 
postmodernism articulates the Islamic principle to deal with plurality that the Quran tells us: lakum 
dinukum waliyadin [Say]: To you be your way, and to me mine (Q: 109:6).  It also articulates the 
Islamic principle that governs relations between humans, attaaruf or acquaintance, as the Quran 
tells us: O people! We have formed you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another 
(Q: 49:13)  it is not to conquer, or convert, or subjugate, but to reach out towards others.
4.4.1 Islamic Utopia of the Medina Society
In a pragmatic research that seeks realistic and doable solutions, this research considers Islamic 
utopia comparable to any other utopian imaginary that has inspired green intentional community 
movements in the West as illustrated in the relocalisation activist literature. Medina community is 
believed by the Muslims to be the most perfect Islamic society, a society according to which all other 
Islamic societies are judged. Medina, the city where the Prophet Muhammad established the first 
Islamic political entity, recognizes religious, social, and cultural plurality among its citizens76. This has 
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The Quran is perhaps the most universalist of all sacred scriptures in the sense of asserting openly that religion 
begins with the origin of the human state itself, that God has revealed religion to all people, and that He has 
created diverse religions so that followers of various religions would vie with each other in piety and virtue 
(See the Quran, 5:48).
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been taken as a model set by the Prophet to reify Islam as a complete system governing all religious, 
social, political, cultural and economic orders and encompassing all things material, spiritual, 
societal, individual, and personal. Interest in Medina society has continuously renewed among 
Muslim communities whenever they face issues of plurality of religion, Islamic politics and 
governance, and justice.  The similitude of Islamic utopia and ecological utopia is perhaps best 
illustrated in the following. In criticism of modern political thinkers on sustainable society through 
ecotopia, de Geus (2009) claimed that the notion of utopia has rarely received any recognition, 
instead it is more often seen as a daydream, romantic and unreachable fantasy (p.78), and the 
inspirational side (p.84) of utopias has been unjustly neglected.
4.4.2. Shariah, a Path to Justice, Happiness and Well-being
In section 4.2, Gandhians prescribed a no affluence-no poverty approach to the dilemmatic socio-
ecological problems in a world that is finite. Herein, I would like to propose for the Muslims an 
approach that is more in accordance with Islamic values whereby justice and equality mean that 
people should have equal opportunity but this does not imply that they should be equal in poverty 
or in riches77. Therefore, it should be clear that I am neither advocating communist principles of 
equality, nor the spiritual sentimentality of the New Age that the following example illustrates. 
Pepper (1991) noted the New Age communards response to the questions of Third World 
exploitation has often been made by subverting justice in their ramification of the concept of 
happiness:
Third World people are exploited. They cant control this. But they can control how they feel. 
They can walk around in a victim consciousness or they can walk around enjoying 
everything. You go to Sri Langka and you see the kids happy, happy, happy. You go to 
America and you are not happy as a raceYou can be happy living in cardboard boxes (cited 
in Pepper, 1991:110).
Thus, I concur with a Marxist critique such as:
The whole New Age package is a mind-bending and soul-destroying enterprise, its main aim 
being to uphold present power relationsin practice, my observation is that radical politics 
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And set not eyes greedily on that by which Allah has made some of you excel others"(Q:4:32); Never stretch 
your eyes towards what We have given to groups of them to enjoy, (Q:15:88). Nonetheless, "...In order that 
it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you..... (Q:59:7); "And in the wealth of the 
rich, there is a share for one who begged and for one who could not beg"(Q:51:19). Further, the Sufi has 
always taught that man is in quest of The Infinite. Even his endless effort toward the gaining of material 
possession and his dissatisfaction with what he has is an echo of this thirst which can not be quenched by the 
finite. This is why the Sufi considers the station of contentment (rida) to be an exalted spiritual condition 
attainable only by those who have reached the proximity of The Infinite (God) and have shed the bonds of 
finite existence. The well-known adage among the Sufis: uridu an la urid  means, I want to have no want 
captures their intention in practising thariqah.
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are denounced as the distressed product of victim consciousness, while conservative 
ideology and practice are accepted without much questionFor, in essence, New Age 
philosophies fit very comfortably with laissez faire individualistic Thatcherite 
economicsWhen faced with problems of oppression or hostility, New Age advise us to just 
let go of your anger  of your emotional attachments to your causeDo not, for Gods sake, 
stay with your feelings of anger, distress or whatever, do not recognize their source and act 
on them, including fighting for social change (Francis. 1991:12-13).
Islamic thought distinguishes the world into alam kabir (macro cosmic) and alam soghir (micro 
cosmic). Alam kabir is concerned with the outer world, the empirical world, and alam soghir the 
inner world. Islamic law is concerned with both. In an interpretivist research of those issues, I argue
that we must have a clear distinction between the two alam (realms) before any analysis of the 
relationship between injustice, poverty, and happiness can be made intellectually. Within my Islamic 
sensibility, I view happiness is concerned with the inner world, whereas poverty and injustice are
within the outer world. In my view, regardless of the injustices inflicted upon them, the oppressed -
without doubt- can be happy too. But in the final analysis, the oppressor too will have to deal with 
the consequence in the outer world, such as the global environment crisis that is being witnessed. By 
confusing the outer world with the inner world, the New Ages view of happiness has subverted the 
highest ethical principle that circumscribes the two alam (realms), namely, doing any harm to 
another is doing harm to oneself. This credo pervades the sacred foundation of Sharia laws that is 
believed as a path to justice, happiness and well-being.
4.4.3 Islamic Economics
The most striking feature of Islamic economics from a Western perspective is the prohibition of 
interest (riba). The elimination of interest payment would clearly involve the rewriting of capitalistic 
economics as it exists today and would produce a major change in the functioning of both national 
and international economic and financial systems (Presley and Sessions, 1994). Therefore, Islamic 
economics is in correspondence with the zero growth economy that Trainer envisions. The 
payment of riba is explicitly prohibited by the Quran and investors must instead be compensated by 
other means, the prevalent method for such remuneration is by means of mudarabah profit and loss 
sharing. In banning riba, Islam seeks to establish a society which is again based upon fairness and 
justice (Quran 2:239). According to Islam, all income should be commensurate with work effort. 
Lending money for interest permits the lender to augment his capital without effort as money does 
not create a surplus value by itself. Only through the marriage between labor and capital can a 
surplus or a deficit result: it is fairer, therefore, for a provider of capital to share the profit or loss 
with the borrower than to obtain a fixed return, regardless of the outcome of the borrowers 
business. According to Presley and Sessions (1994), mudarabah is not quite the same as allowing 
limited liability equity as it requires taking on the losses of companies when they occur, as well as 
114
enjoying the profits. With this exception, there is a rule which prohibits debt and allows equity. 
Presley and Sessions (1994) identify a number of substantial differences in Islamic political economy 
from capitalistic economics:
(i) God is the creator and owner of wealth and people are the vicegerent of God; however, 
people can pursue and use wealth in the form of a trustship from God (Quran 20:6)
(ii) It is divine duty to work. Social justice is the result of productive labor and equal 
opportunities such that everyone can use all their abilities in work and gain just reward 
from that work effort.
(iii) Justice and equality in Islam means that people should have equal opportunity and does 
not imply that they should be equal in poverty or in riches (Chapra, 1985). However it is 
incumbent on the Islamic state to guarantee subsistence level to its citizens, that is a 
minimum level of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education (Quran 2:275-9). 
The major purpose is to moderate social variances within Islamic society, and to enable 
the poor to lead a normal, spiritual and material life in dignity and contentment.
(iv) The scope of economic intervention is broad and can include state interference in many 
areas of economic activity (Saqr, 1986:59). Such interference can take many forms, 
including general guidance and regulation by the State, but also might embrace more 
direct state ownership and direction. The duties assigned to the State under Islam 
primarily consist of commanding, counseling, controlling and protecting. The Quran 
orders society to obey God, His Prophet and their rulers (Quran 4:59) (in that order). An 
Islamic economic system operates on the fundamental principle that the forces of supply 
and demand should work freely in the determination of prices in all markets. Only in 
exceptional circumstances is there a justification for state intervention and even here 
the objective of such intervention is not to hinder freedom of trade but to secure more 
perfect information in the marketplace or to regulate or organize economic activities so 
as to protect economic freedom without harming either buyers or sellers. 
(v) There is no justification for the payment of interest on loans. 
The authors argue that Islamic economics and its mudarabah arrangement are superior compared to 
debt contracts, because it will result in more investment and less volatility of investment.
4.4.4 Todays Problem might be Tomorrows Solutions
In the following discussion there are three issues that overlap one another which must be taken into 
account in envisioning an endogenous relocalisation model for the Ummah. 
1. The fragmentation of the Muslim world into nation-states
2. The contemporary phenomenon of Global Islam
3. The environmentalists view of the world divided into nation-states interests
(1) The fragmented Muslim world
After World War II, the Muslim world appeared to be nothing more than a collection of nation-
states each with limited resources and a myriad of insoluble problems (Sardar, 2006:573). As a 
matter of fact, nationalism in the Muslim majority countries was not without religious implication 
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and created havoc and confusion78. The apprehension of shirk79 has been the key argument of the 
Traditionalist Islam against the Western idea of nation-State (see Chapter 5). From the overall 
perspective of the Islamic world, Nasr (2001) argues that Arab nationalism did much to weaken Islam 
and alienated Muslim peoples from each other, and to dissect and divide the heritage of Islam that 
belongs to all Muslim people by right (p.139). According to Nasr, it is the Arab nationalism that
easily gave rise in reciprocity- to a certain subjective pride of antiquity in the non-Arab Muslims, 
and even resulted in anti-Islamic tendencies in many newly-established non-Arab Muslim countries80
(2001:184). From an Islamic intellectual perspective, Islams denouncement of nationalism and 
tribalism is founded on its theo-centrism principle. This horizontal-allegiance, in my view is like eco-
centrism which has made nature an ultimate end. Both are prone to the same pitfalls. Allegiance and 
responsibilities to nature per se ultimately lead to indifference to humanity, as allegiance to 
humanity per se ultimately leads to indifference to nature (see the debates between deep and social 
ecology in Bookchin (1987)). In contrast, within the theo-centrism and unitary perspective of Islam, 
all aspects of life, as well as all degrees of cosmic manifestation, are governed by a single principle 
and are unified by a common centre. Tawhid, the core belief of Islam, and La ilaha illa Llah means 
ultimately that there is no being or reality other than the Absolute Being or the Absolute Reality, for 
there cannot be two orders of reality. In other words, there is nothing outside the power of God, and 
in a more esoteric sense nothing outside His Being (See Nasr, 2001). Therefore, the Islamic 
worldview is supreme-being-centric as opposed to anthropo-centricm or eco-centric. Nature, 
therefore, is only the portent of God (Arabic: ayah) and there is an inextricable and permanent 
relation between natural environments and the Divine Environment which sustains and permeates 
them that the Quran alludes to in many verses (See Nasr, 1993). 
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As soon as the nationalists came to power since early independence there opened a hidden inner 
contradiction between the handful leaders and the relentless pressure from the masses (Gibb, 1962: 330), for 
the European type of nationalism is by nature against the universalism of Islam.
79
Shirk is the greatest sin in Islam. It is to deify something besides God, including motherland, fatherland and 
patria.
80
...the force of modernism combined with extreme nationalism makes those Arabs affected by it look with a 
sense of pride towards all that is Arabic , including Islam, which is seen in this case as a purely Arabic 
phenomenon, and with disdain towards the non-Arab Muslims, especially the Persians and the Turks. The 
same force make the Persian affected by them feel an intense tension within himself between his Islamic and 
pre-Islamic past, and when the force of Islam weaken within him, a disdain for the Arabs, even to the extent of 
wanting to purify the Persian language of the Arabic influences  (Nasr, 2001:184).
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Manzoor (1988)81 and Farouk-Alli (2006) pronounce that having been disillusioned by the 
failure of modern ideologies to solve the problems of Islamic societies, Muslim thinkers have been 
increasingly turning to authentically Islamic models for help. Manzoor (1988) identified two 
contemporary models being contested: the Sharia-oriented thought and fundamentalist thought. 
The former demonstrated that its natural purview is civil society whose institutions are able to 
bring under its jurisdiction without necessarily coming into conflict with the state, while the 
demand of the latter is nothing less than the capture of political power at the level of the state 
(Manzoor, 1988:2). This research aims to put forward the third model82, relocalisation with self-local 
governance. This could be unique to the Indonesian Muslim groups if there have been no 
community development attempts conducted by Muslim organizations outside Indonesia, or rather 
it could simply have been overlooked by Manzoor (1988) in his presentation. It is the self-help 
community development model, the category that is most pertinent to the issues, problems and 
agendas of the research. Concurrently, the third model corresponds to the trend that Nasr contends 
as well: 
one can envisage the possibility of the rise, once again, of a trend in the future towards a 
kind of Islamic political thought which combines the ideal of the unity of the Islamic world, 
based on culture, Divine Law, intellectual life, etc., with separate political units which 
embrace the majority peoples and cultural zones of the Islamic world, such as the Arabic, 
the Persians, the Turkish, etc.. (Nasr, 1994:313).
Manzoor projects the unity of Islam as a world civilization derives in large measure from its 
possession of a sacred law, the Shariah, which is envisaged by Muslims to embody the divine will 
that annunciates the principle of moral order. He argues, nonetheless, that creative interpretation 
of Shariah is necessary: 
Only a creative reinterpretation of the Shariahs legacy that enables it to work under 
modern conditions and yet be in consonance with the Islamic conscience, would lend 
meaning and cogency to the moral and civilizational aspirations of Muslims today (Manzoor, 
1988:1).  
For the sake of clarification, Manzoor adds that the movement back to the Shariah represents a 
reactionary backlash against the modern forces of progress and Enlightenment, a phenomenon that 
may be contrary to popular opinion in the West and even in some Muslim circles (1988:1). 
Furthermore, Manzoor argues that the Shariah-mindedness of the Reformist is associated with the 
notion of justice and equity in Islam: 
  
81 In the Introduction of a collection of writings based on papers presented at the International Islamic 
Conference on Dawa and Development in the Muslim World: The Future Perspective (Mecca, 11-15 
October, 1987). 
82 See Chapter 7.
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For submerged beneath all the cross-currents of political activism and resurgence lies the 
bedrock of Islamic conscience that serves as the moral foundation of the Muslims historical 
search for justice and equity. (Manzoor, 1988:1)
(2) The contemporary phenomenon of Global Islam
Along a similar line of argument, according to Sardar (2006), as global politics is increasingly 
becoming civilizational politics, it is imperative for Muslims to see themselves not in terms of 
nation-states and national interests, but as a civilization and in terms of civilizational interests 
(p.573). He argues further that as a global civilization, Muslims possess vast resources and enormous 
potentials, which would enable them to solve most of their problems. 
Only when molded into a civilization, which involves pooling of resources and sharing of 
potentials of Muslim countries to tackle common problems and goals, would Muslims be 
able to move beyond parochial concerns of fragmenting nation-state and acute global 
marginalization toward shaping a vibrant and dynamic future for themselves. (Sardar, 
2006:574)
For Sardar, one of the main strengths of Islam is its diversity: 
a diversity that exhibits itself in numerous historic ways of expressing Islam: a diversity that 
is enveloped by a unity: a unity that manifests itself as a matrix of concepts and values that 
all Muslims accept without qualification (p.574)
When this religious diversity is combined with an ethnic plurality, the bewildering number of 
ethnicities within the world of Islam, Sardar continued, the true multicultural nature of Islam comes 
to the fore. Finally, The plurality and diversity of Islam are the cornerstones for shaping a dynamic, 
thriving Muslim civilization of the future. (p.574)
(3) The environmentalists view of world divided into nation-states interests
On the other hand, increasing global interactions have made the apprehension of whole earth, one 
world family vision of the environmentalist easier. Early forms of environmentalism framed the 
concept of nature in local and national terms aimed at defending and protecting local environment 
or the national heritage, but during the twentieth century the meaning of nature was gradually 
expanded into the international level and then from the 1970s into a much more global version 
(Sutton, 2000). However, ironically, national sovereignty continuously stand in the way of creating 
an international framework for collective actions. Toynbee (1976) depicts rightly:
The present-day global set of local sovereign states isnot capable of saving the biosphere 
from man-made pollution or of conserving the biospheres non-replaceable natural 
resourcesWill mankind murder Mother Earth or will he redeem her? This is the enigmatic 
question which now confronts (sic) Man. (pp. 593-6)
A sweeping inter-linkage between modernization and the rest of the environmental-development 
issues discussed in this chapter was given by Wallerstein (1992). He argues that the eighteenth-
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century Enlightenment asserted the possibility of a conscious rational reform of society, the idea of 
progress, and the virtues of science vis-à-vis religion. It gave rise to the modern idea that treated 
each individual as a free centred subject with rational control over his or her destiny, and that 
control extended to the nation-state level. Thus, each nation-state was considered to be sovereign 
and free to rationally control its progressive development. The further elaboration of these ideas in 
classical political economy produced the grounds for the emergence of a developmentalist ideology.
Referring to the centralist-decentralist positions of ecological politics in Radcliffe (2000), I argue that 
the trend and aspiration toward a unified, yet decentralized, Islamic world and the movement back 
to the Shariah must be viewed as an opportunity of a new vehicle for global environmental-
movement within the Ummah to transitioning peak oil, scarcity and climate change. By grasping 
overall features of Islam and the latest development in the Muslim world, the reseacrher puts 
forward an endogenous relocalisation model that has a global dimension, namely, Global network 
of endogenous relocalisation by local Muslim communities within minimal states. Minimal state or 
night watchman state is a form of government in political philosophy where the states legitimate 
function is only the protection of individual from assault, theft, breach of contract, or frauds (e.g. see 
Nozick, 2013). The advocates of this school are called minarchists. They argue that the state has no 
right to use its force to interfere with transactions between people. The only legitimate 
governmental institutions are the military, police and courts. I believe this scheme might serve best 
the conditions of the post-oil world. Nonetheless, numerous issues remain to be addressed given the 
non-organizational structure of Islam where there is no central religious authority for the whole 
Ummah:
1. The question of who makes the decision and how they are to be enforced in such a decentralized 
system based upon participatory democracy, given the solutions required to solve ecological 
problems would be too difficult for average people to accept. Such issues were among the 
investigation needed of the organizations being studied.
2. The question about the methods of transition to such a system and the issues of coordination 
regarding the scientific activities and distribution of resources. 
3. More importantly, the coordination of global actions and policies need to face the ground reality 
of ineluctable peculiarities of local problems. 
Having described the Muslim world in general, what follows is the present-day situation of 
Indonesia, the field of the research.
4.5 The Field: Indonesia. Big is Not Beautiful
The contemporary society and political life of Indonesia are characterized by pervasive 
fragmentation (Aspinall, 2013) and rapid urbanization (Firman, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2009; Cybriwsky, 
2001; Bunnell, 2011) with its socio-cultural consequences in forms of weakening social cohesion and 
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sense of community (Colletta, 1999; Greenstein et al, 2000; Buehler, 2003; Keiner, 2005; Leem, 
2012). These researches support further the rationale of the thesis on Muslim groups to advance 
endogenous relocalisation. 
Nguitragools study (2012) of environmental governance in Indonesia gives an insight 
relevant to the research. He shows that the lack of large-scale social cohesion between civil society 
organizations and the public has been a key issue in Indonesian society besides a poor legal system. 
By lack of social cohesion, he refers to the fragmentation along the axis of class inequality and 
identity politics. He identifies social cohesion as especially crucial for effective environmental 
governance. It is the minimum level of social collectivity  in terms of social bonds, solidarity and 
trusts that manifest in forms of shared identity, interest and societal goal - required to exert 
adequate pressure to allow public monitoring and mobilization to function as both motivation and 
constraints to the government. Indonesia provides a precious example that large scale public 
cohesion in the Third World countries is neither stable nor permanent. With a highly-diverse 
population by ethnicity and religion, the two identities have always been ready to provide a layer of 
self-identification and social bonding from which political mobilization could take place whenever 
dissatisfaction appears. The emphasis on ethnicity, kinship and familial bond which has been 
particularly salient of Indonesian social and political lives is also the one that encouraged corruption, 
collusion and nepotism which have become so entrenched. A history of political oppression and 
economic inequality has given rise to local and indigenous elites which intensified socio-political 
fragmentation during the decentralization era, and therefore, undermined larger social cohesion 
while corruption, collusion and nepotism continue to persist or even escalate and become 
decentralized and less predictable. 
Growing consumerism and the emergence of a new middle class in Asian countries as the 
inevitable result of economic growth has at least two implications on environmental issues: the 
problem of waste and moral confusion. For example, with a population of around 50 million, the 
province of West Java where the Jakarta-Bandung urban belt resides, generates nearly 50,000 
tonnes of solid waste per day. Only 50-60% is collected  the rest is dumped in canals, vacant lots, or 
burned. Secondly, under these circumstances, the mentality of the villagers and indigenous 
communities alike, who supposedly live in harmony with nature, is corroding, and the idea that 
cash and the economy are everything was driven into peoples mind (Nguitragool, 2009:64). 
Therefore, the environmental campaigns by the NGOs that romanticize the image of local 
communities as the guardian of the rainforests are increasingly seen as an unrealistic depiction given 
the changing realities of their lives. In fact, having been forced to take on the path of modernization, 
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the villagers and indigenous communities are getting confused by the NGOs and academia who 
advocate that their ancestors ways of life are in fact correct (Nguitragool 2012).  
4.6 Muslims Actions for the Environment
Finally, the review of what Muslims have attempted to deal with regarding environmental issues is 
necessary here. What follows are religious environmental movements and my commentaries on how 
they differ from the relocalisation approach.  
Alliance of Religion and Conservation (ARC), sister organization of WWF International, is probably 
the most prominent faith-based environmental actions organization. ARC is claimed to be a secular 
body that aims to help the worlds major religions develop their own environmental programmes 
based on their core teachings, beliefs and practices. The idea behind ARC emerged in 1986:
Realizing that local religious leaders are often active and influential within their 
communities, he [Prince Philip] concluded that helping local religious leaders appreciate 
their responsibility for the environment and explain that responsibility to the people in their 
communities would raise environmental awareness around the world83
Eco-pesantren is a program to introduce ecological awareness into the Islamic school curriculum 
that was launched in Indonesia by the Ministry of Environment in 2009.  It was one of the programs 
alongside green and clean campus; eco office; and love flowers and animals. Mangunjaya et al
(2010, 2012) hold that the clerics (Ulama) in general and large Muslim organizations, such as 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, would be the right partners for the 
government and NGOs to popularize the environmental movement effectively. The paucity of 
scholarly writings on eco pesantren, other than a simple description of the program such as in 
Mangunjaya (2010:128), is plausible due to its infancy at the time this research is undertaken. Still, 
there are legitimate reasons to question the capability of the program to proceed and reach out to 
24,000 pesantren all over the country, given the meager budget and lack of authority of the Ministry 
of Environment (Nguitragool, 2012:66), and the fact that none of the pesantren has been fully 
funded by the government or are under its control. 
Muslim Association for Climate Change Action (MACCA) is an example of an attempt by the 
Muslims to respond to environmental problems by organizing conferences in the trans-national 
sphere.  The first meeting was held in July 2009 in Istanbul where some 200 Muslim scholars, 
representatives of Islamic civil society, organizations and representatives of Environmental 





Senegal, and Kuwait were present.  They agreed to spend the next seven years making and planning 
serious commitments to protecting the natural environment and combating climate change. The 
plan was drawn up by Earth Mates Dialogue Centre, an NGO based in the UK, and supported by ARC 
and UNDP. The idea of an action plan began with a 2008 workshop in Kuwait where 22 participants 
from 14 countries met for the first time. The action plan proposed an investigation in every level of 
Muslim activity from daily life to annual pilgrimages, from holy cities to the future training of 
Imams. Other proposals include:
- developing the major Muslim cities as green city models for other Islamic urban areas
- developing an Islamic label for environmentally friendly goods and services
- creating a best practice environmental guide for Islamic businesses
The project was planned to be be managed through the formation of a new umbrella organisation, 
MACCA, the Muslim Associations for Climate Change Action. In April 2010, the International Muslim 
Conference on Climate Change was held in Bogor, Indonesia to set up MACCA to become a 
membership organization with different levels of membership and involvement. Unfortunately, after 
all the enthusiastic undertakings, what followed was the anticlimax of the conference. Ismed 
Haddad, a prominent and senior figure in Indonesias environmental movement, the person in 
charge of organizing the event in Bogor, enumerated two obstacles to MACCAs success. One, no 
entry (for the MACCA) to UNFCC84, and the other is, no reliable leadership. For the purpose of this 
research, it is worth highlighting that point one is surprisingly counterintuitive to all the efforts of 
global environmental governance already discussed. By not giving space to non-state movement 
such as MACCA, it appears to me that the UN was playing another version of what Zimmerman 
(1989) called the Wests hidden power trip. 
It is important to identify that this research of Indonesian Muslim groups and the pesantren
communities begins with a very different set of assumptions, paradigm and point of departure than 
those of Mangunjaya (2010, 2012). Owing to my activist background, I have been skeptical about any 
exogenous 85 models. The ARC-type of optimism on the potential of religious leaders and 
organizations did not address the key problems of sustainability that are associated with i) the 
nature of economy, of which the pesantren leaders have no control; ii) the nature of consumption, 
which large corporations, not the Ulama, have formulated; iii) and the cultural definition of the 
good life, which the Ulama have been struggling to exhort their adherents to follow given the so-
called modernization process has taken complete control of it.  In conclusion, the I identified the 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
85
Growing or originating from outside.
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following potential drawbacks of the aforementioned faith-based environmental movements to be 
taken into account in seeking an alternative model:
1. MACCA did not seem to be initiated (in all Muslim countries) by local Muslim communities from 
grassroots-up-towards the global Muslim community (Ummah). Rather, it was initiated by Muslim 
scientists and environmentalists, hence, not endogenous. This kind of movement is prone to 
leadership problems, thus, unsustainable.
2. The ideas behind Eco-Pesantren simply failed to address the heart of the problems associated 
with the nature of economy; the nature of consumption; and the developmentalism paradigm of 
which religious leaders, communities and pesantren people have no control.
3. Mangunjayas (2010, 2012) optimism that the NGOs and government agencies to work with 
Muslim organizations such as NU would be more effective to popularize environmental 
movement is a premature claim as the fieldwork in Chapter 6 will indicate. How would the 
Muslim organizations be effective to propagate Islamic ecological values if they have no 
jurisdictions? This argument substantiates the self-governance feature of relocalisation models 
that I am envisioning in the thesis.
4. In contrast to Johnstons (2010) approach to Islam-Christianity relations that suggest action needs 
to begin with an understanding of historical issues presented in section 4.2.2, the ARCs 
assumptions that secular conservation groups can work with Islamic-based organizations to reach 
grassroots more effectively is simply a naivety. 
4.7 Conclusion
The warrior literature provides insights into the political-economic grievances shared by warrior
Muslims groups against the enduring domination and control over the Muslim world. The sages
literature inspired researching the potential of Muslims epistemic communities including their 
educational institutions such as madrasah and the personalization of knowledge by murabbi
educators in traditionalist pesantren. The relocalisation activisits literature gives practical sense to 
deal with complex development-environment issues in the Third World from here and now. The 
literature emphasizes the need of an alternative society.
The thesis aims to contribute relocalisation with self-local governance as the third model 
following civil society and Islamic state that have been identified as two responses common to the 
failing development in the Muslim world. The non-organizational structure of Islam, that suggests 
the inherently decentralist nature, and the quasi-centralized-nature of the Ummah by one God, one 
Book, the Prophet Muhammad, and his tradition (Sunna), discussed in Chapter 2, suits the 
decentralist position of relocalisation in the green politics arena. Given the fact that the socio-
ecological crisis has reached a global level, the proposed solution must have a global dimension, and 
hence, I envision Islamic global environmental movement through a global network of endogenous 
relocalisation by local Muslim communities within the minimal states. The research, then, focused 
on investigating the potential of the existing Muslim community development to advance 
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endogenous relocalisation by creating impressive examples of alternative societies and bring about a 
cultural revolution. It explores whether the survivalists motives are able to raise the Muslim groups 
interests in relocalisation ideals. 
In the conduct of the research, I concur with Bauman et al in section 4.2.2 that the 
methodological commitment of religion and ecology should rely on synthesis of a scholarly 
attention to religious worldviews and to lived religion. In other words, this field should study both,
the broad intellectual traditions of religion (the attitudes and views of religious leaders, sacred texts, 
and traditions) and the everyday reality of religion on the ground (the practices and actions of the 
adherents of religions in their everyday lives). Considering the potential of the leaders and active 
members of Muslim groups to mobilize changes, the research must limit focus to the former and not 
research everyday practices and actions of Muslims in the society at large. 
Historical narrative of Indonesia in the next chapter illustrates how the cultural definition of 
a well-developed country was shaped and held in the Third World nationalists imaginaries. This 
seems to have become an inhibitor among the Third World nationalists from gaining a sense of crisis 
in the face of peak oil and a wide range of environmental issues discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5
A Twin Pregnancy: The National Scene of Indonesia
Symbolic Universes are social products with a history. If one is to understand their meaning, one has to 
understand the history of their productions (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:115)
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides historical narration as a context of the social construction of Indonesian 
nationalism vis-à-vis Indonesian Islam alongside global Islam for Indonesians86. Accordingly, its 
purpose is to present the gestation of twin imagined communities and their symbolic universes. 
One is the nationness of the Indonesian countrymen, and the other is the global Ummah of the 
Muhammads nation- both were outlined in Chapter 2. Contestation between the ideals of the two 
nations -or two imagined communities- began since the formation of Indonesias nation-state and 
intensified during early independence. At this time, secular-nationalism as a conscious creation of 
the modernized educated elite was used as a means of social control in relation to hegemonization 
and modernization. As already recognized in the Instrumentalist approach, nationalism was used to 
unify people from diverse religions and ethnic backgrounds. From the 1970s to the 1990s this 
secular-nationalism was even made sacred and used as a means of social control in an attempt to 
unify all the nations potentials toward a developmentalists programme. In more recent times, as 
Indonesia has entered globalization, this secular-nationalism was reignited once again to respond to 
the weakening of nationness.
To describe the two poles of Indonesian Islam (see 1.1), Pringle (2010) uses Traditionalists 
and Reformists in conformation with terminology used to outline worldwide Muslim groups in 2.4.1. 
The Traditionalist is the Sufi-influenced Islam, and Reformist, Pringle defined as a, more legalistic 
style emphasizing the requirements of doctrine as interpreted by the trends in global or 
transnational Islam of this day (p.35). Pringle was also aware that others may use Modernist for 
what he was calling Reformist because the Reformist movement has been associated with modern 
schooling with a heavy emphasis on general, academic, non-religious subjects oriented towards a 
secular professional career. Likewise, Indonesian Muslim, Deliar Noer (1973) also classifies the 
Indonesian Muslims according to their religious-political attitudes into Traditionalist and Reformist. 
Section 5.2 and 5.3 show that the fortified notion of Ummah appeared for the first time on 
the heels of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 that facilitated the flow of early Reformist Islam 
ideas and was followed by the emergence of Reformist-Traditionalist duality in Indonesian Islam. The 
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In this thesis, both Indonesian Islam and global Islam are the sub-universe under Islamic symbolic universe.
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duality was materialized by the formation of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The two 
organizations have been the largest mass organizations to this day and have become the 
mainstream insofar that one can say every other newer Muslim group must have been founded by 
the offspring of either one. Therefore, no study of Indonesian Muslim society can be made without 
beginning with these two essential organisations. Both Muhammadiyah and NU are active in the 
building of civil society. The community of NU, known as the Nahdliyyin, has been the largest 
population and represents the Traditionalist Islam. The community of Muhammadiyah represents 
the early generation of Reformist Islam. The organization was associated with modernization of the 
Muslim sector through the provision of basic Roman script literacy and further education from 
Modernist Muhammadiyah schools. During colonial times, the tensions between the colonized and 
the colonizer in the archipelago were replete with warfare in which the Muslim leaders and the 
pesantren played critical roles.  That memory has helped to shape the relationship between Islam 
and nationalism. It is a relationship that complicates the future gravitation of the two organizations 
in an antagonistic direction. That is, toward Indonesian nationness on the one hand, and on the 
other, the unity of the Islamic world when the notion of Ummah and the ideal of khilafah have 
become strengthened among a sizeable portion of the Muslim population in the wake of 
globalization with the aids of information and telecommunication technology. 
Section 5.4 and 5.5 highlight the long-standing contention between Muslims and the state, 
and 5.6 outlines the situation of contemporary Indonesian society and politics. The last part of this 
chapter highlights the ongoing conservative turn of Indonesian Islam. In this most current period 
characterized by pragmatism and postmodernism, Islam appeared as a social movement and the 
Prophet Muhammad was resuscitated as the leader in the absence of all-encompassing worldly 
ideologies. This phenomenon is important in exploring every avenue open for an anti-systemic 
movement that opposes and resists the prevailing capitalistic-developmentalist hegemony through 
grass roots grouping to advance the endogenous relocalisation discussed in Chapter 4.
5.2 The Coming of Islam
It has been widely accepted that Southeast Asia (today Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, 
Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma) has long been a crossroads where ideas and people have 
met, bringing new influences and styles (Ricklefs et al, 2010), and Muslims have been in contact with 
Southeast Asia from shortly after the time of the Prophet himself. Historians contend that when 
emissaries were sent to the court of China by the third of the Prophets successors  the Caliph 
Uthman (644-56)  they must have reached there by sea through Southeast Asia (Ricklefs et al, 
2010). Afterward, Islamic ideas evidently travelled to Southeast Asia along the trade routes. When 
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the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, visited Sumatra in 1292, he noted the presence of Muslims in 
some places, and when the Moroccan visitor, Ibn Batuta, visited Samudra Pasai in 1345-1346 he 
reported that the ruler followed the Shafii School of Islamic law, which remains the dominant school 
throughout Southeast Asia today. Prof. A.H. Johns (see Ricklefs et al, 2010:78-79) attempted to 
explain why the local people only began converting to Islam several centuries after traders had been 
travelling through Southeast Asia. He speculated that it was not until the emergence of Sufism as a 
dominant stream of Islam throughout the Muslim world from the 13th century that the locals, 
whose religions before the coming of Islam were characterized by the mystical doctrines of Hinduism 
and Buddhism, might have been attracted to this new faith of Islam if it, too, was presented in a 
mystical form. 
The next phase of Islam in the archipelago now known as Indonesia was the contact it had 
with European powers. With the exception of uncolonized Siam (Thailand), Southeast Asia was 
colonized by almost all the great imperial powers (England, France, Holland, Portugal, Spain and the 
USA). The first Europeans arrived in Indonesia in 1511, when Portuguese traders sought to 
monopolize the sources of nutmeg, cloves and pepper in Maluku. After their conquest of the Islamic 
kingdom on the Malay Peninsula they were followed by Spaniards who both then began to 
propagate Christianity, being most successful in Maluku. Dutch and British traders followed. They 
started their quest for Indonesian spices to sell on the European market at very large profits. In 1602 
the Dutch established the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) which became the dominant European 
source of power. For most of the colonial period, Dutch control over the archipelago was tenuous 
outside of coastal strongholds due to insurgencies, skirmishes, warfares and oppositions in which 
Muslim communities and leaders played important roles. Diponegoro is one of the most memorable 
figures in anti-colonial struggle, a man who links the three worlds of rural Java, the aristocracy and 
Islam. He was a Javanese prince who had been reared in a rural area where he studied in a 
pesantren, consorted with his teachers and became a devout Islamic mystic  hence his reputation 
as the pesantren prince. He once had a mystical experience that he was the ratu adil or saviour in 
Javanese mythology (Pringle, 2010:44). Inspired by the glory of Majapahit87 infused with the vision of 
enacting the Shariah law, he fought against the Dutch and their Javanese allies. Diponegoro was 
arrested in 1830, and afterward, the Dutch were able to rule Java without any serious opposition. 
Since then, Java has experienced the greatest degree of European involvement and real dominance, 
and was thereby much changed by Dutch rule  a process which then shaped the history of 20th
century Indonesia. The struggles of the period 1808-1830 taught the Dutch an important lesson that 
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Believed to be the largest pre-independence kingdom in the archipelago.
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they had to identify in Java as well as in the outer islands, the friends  i.e. the business associates 
and people who can be coopted into ruling on their behalf, from: 
a cooperative local elite, almost invariably one whose authority rested on local customs and 
aristocracy rather than the countervailing elites who claimed leadership based upon their 
Islamic learning and piety. Thus the Dutch identified and often accentuated a dichotomy 
between so-called customary or secular and Islamic elites (Ricklefs et al, 2010:220). 
That policy shaped the history of Indonesian Muslims in the 20th century, for like most of the states 
in the Islamic world, Indonesia did not emerge at independence, but rather inherited dominance by 
elites from colonial administration (Joel 1988). Thus, it was a later growth of an old tree (Vali Nasr, 
2001). Since the end of the Diponegoro war, Javanese society has also been conflicted along lines of 
religious identity, which were deepened with the arrival of Reformist Islam ideas (as discussed in the 
next section), leading to a polarization of nominal (abangan) versus pious (putihan/santri) which has 
been dangerously politicized in post-colonial Indonesia (Ricklefs et al, 2010:223).  
A Novel by Douwes Dekker (1820-1887), Max Havelaar, detailing the abuse of colonial 
power on Tanam Paksa (Enforcement Planting) eventually formed the motivation of the new Ethical 
Policy by which the Dutch government attempted to repay their debt to their colonial subjects by 
providing education. However, it did not deliver widespread educational opportunities rather, it 
reached only some classes of indigenous peoples  generally those members of the elite loyal to the 
colonial government (Ricklefs et al, 2010; Pringle 2010). Frankema (2014:2) argues that the spread of 
popular education was not only hampered by lack of financial commitment, but also notable 
inequalities in the allocation of funds for education and a major reluctance to support investment in 
private education, which may be interpreted as a consequence of the Dutch metropolitan 
commitment to secular rule in an overwhelmingly Islamic society. 
The first educational reforms were at higher levels which brought together some of the most 
intelligent Indonesians who proceeded to produce the earliest leaders of anti-colonial movements. 
In 1889, one of the founders of the Ethical Policy, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, arrived in Indonesia. 
He is most remembered for the divide-and-conquer realpolitik deployed firstly to win the Aceh War 
(1873-1912). Regarding Islam, Hurgronje was more than mildly contemptuous of the Dutch colonial 
regimes ignorance of the faith. He pointed out, with good reasons, that his compatriots had both 
exaggerated and underestimated Islams power (Pringle 2010:47).  He made it very clear that there 
was no well-organized central authority similar to the Papacy existing in Islam, and that the absence 
of priestly authority between God and man and the authority operated through a network of Islamic 
clerics are amongst the defining characteristics of this religion. Hurgronje also argued that the power 
of Islam was nurtured by the pilgrimage to Mecca and the contact made there with foreign Muslims. 
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Coincidently, the opening of the Suez Canal, connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean in 1869, 
caused the pilgrimage (hajj) traffic from Indonesia to the Middle East to grow dramatically and the 
spread of steam shipping around the same time made travel to the Arabian Peninsula easier and 
faster (Ricklefs 2010). Nevertheless, Hurgronje disagreed with the Dutch colonial governments 
decision to place limits on the pilgrimage to restrict the flow of priestly subversives. He also resisted 
the Dutch assumption that since Indonesian Islam remained coloured by local superstition it should 
then be easy for Christian Missionary conversion.
Even in those parts of Java in which orthodox Islam has gained the least grip upon the 
populationthe Hindu pandit (priest) would experience as great difficulties in 
communicating with simple peasants as would the Christian missionary; yet the Muslim Kyai 
if he deigns to stoop to this lowly creature, is assured of a deferential hearing. (Quoted in 
Pringle, 2010:47)     
Instead, Hurgronje suggested offering a modus vivendi to the majority of moderate Muslims 
including lifting restrictions on the pilgrimage while ruthlessly suppressing political fanatics 
promoting rebellion (Pringle, 2010:48). To carry this out successfully he proposed the political utility 
of indigenous pre-Islamic institutions and leaders, including the Javanese aristocracy and the 
customary leaders in the Outer Islands, as a force to counter expanding Islam (Pringle, 2010). Thus, 
his strategy was to oppose Islam to Adat (local custom). He also believed very strongly that Islam 
would inexorably gain ground unless the Dutch promoted Dutch values, and especially Western 
education (Pringle 2010:49). Hurgronjes strategy was grounded in scholarship. He spoke and read 
Arabic, wrote copiously about Islam, and helped Vollenhoven establish a prestigious school of adat
law at Leiden University in the Netherlands (see 5.6.1). Pringle (2010) argues that the substantial 
succession of studies on adat by region covering the whole of The Indies was produced to no avail in 
the sense that they were used only to please the locals whereas in reality they (adat) are not 
effective in protecting the locals interests for reasons enumerated by Pringle below, and discussed 
further in discussion on Adat-Revival in 5.6:
These volumes were supposedly no more than guides to adat law, which in theory cannot 
be codified because it is mostly oral and would lose a necessary element of flexibility 
ifcommitted to writing. This notwithstanding, adat became a formal part of the Dutch 
colonial legal system, which featured different codes for Europeans, native Indonesians, and 
foreign minorities such as Chinese, and it remains an important element of Indonesian law 
today. (p. 49)
While the Dutch authorities continued to police the hajj and set up an office in Jeddah to spy on the 
pilgrims (Pringle, 2010:49), the Dutch began to support a limited amount of education. In the later 
development, as the global depression pinched colonial revenues and the rise of political unrest led 
by educated Indonesians caused increasing problems, Dutch enthusiasm for education of all kinds 
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was dampened. As is shown in the 1930 census  after several decades of effort by Islamic, Christian, 
government and other schools  the Roman literacy rate in indigenous languages across Indonesia 
was only 7.4 per cent, and the literacy rate in Dutch was only 0.3 per cent, for the Dutch had never 
made it a priority to teach their language to Indonesians (Ricklefs et al, 2010:221). On the other 
hand, cultuurstelsel88 that rested upon compulsory labour had created opportunities for indigenous 
entrepreneurs in such fields as shipping, bricklaying, smithing, etc. The newly emerging Javanese 
commercial middle class and outer island entrepreneurs often had connections with Arab trading 
communities in the coastal cities including those who supported the Middle Eastern Islamic reform 
movement. As a result, more Indonesians could afford the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca where they 
encountered reformism first-hand.  
5.3 Misunderstanding between the Warriors and the Sages began
Toward the end of the 19th century, the increasing use of steamships, the Suez Canal, the Ethical 
Policy and educational reform of the Dutch, all coalesced to give rise to a division of society into 
three groups with three different anti-colonial strategies: 1) Secular-Nationalist, 2) Reformist, and 3) 
Traditionalist Islam. As for the second and the third groups, the increased mobility around the 
Muslim world explained Laffans (2003:310) arguement that pilgrimage and the wider Muslim 
world from the last quarter of the nineteenth century were crucial in shaping the imagined notion of 
the archipelago as a region given that the Arab Reformist ideas at the time combined nationalist 
political tendencies with strong Islamic convictions. This time also marked the onset of what I 
termed misunderstandings between the warriors and the sages among the Muslims that appear 
recurrently in the later centuries of Indonesia. It is a misunderstanding when ones personality 
character determines his/her actions and that makes him/her in disagreement with another 
personality character regarding what is an appropriate response according to Islamic teachings to 
the challenges brought by the interactions with the West and modernity already given in 2.4.1.  To 
reiterate, the personality character is understood as basic human motivation and pattern of 
behavior, to explain why there are people who are inclined to be the sages; or, warriors; or, 
economic players; or, workers. Perennial philosophers use the concept to explain the underlying 
philosophy of castes in Hinduism (Nasr, 1989:179). Already given in 2.2.1, the traditionalists -that 
resonate the sages- coexisted relatively easily with many older elements in local customs (adat), 
whereas reformists at the time -that resonate the warriors- argued that the key to closing the gap 
with the secular West was to purge Islam of allegedly improper, locally derived practices (Pringle, 
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Regulations issued by the Dutch government which required each villager to give a part of their land for the 
planting of crops for the export market at a price that is pre-determined. The villagers who had no land had to 
work 75 days a year in the government fields.
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2010). Accordingly, the reformists opposed fiercely syncretistic practices for which no precedent 
could be found in the Quran and Hadith, reflecting their commitment to the revitalization of Islam in 
the face of the Wests ascendance. There were some among the reformists who gradually took an 
apologetic turn and caste Islam as the religion of reason (e.g. see Euben, 1997). The latter are then 
called Modernist Muslims. Two famous names that are now forever associated with Islamic reform 
and modernism are al-Afghani and Abduh (see 2.4.1).  From this point in time the diversity of Islamic 
movement as seen today emerged. 
As for the first group, the secular-nationalists mentioned in the beginning of this section, to 
reiterate, very few of these pre-independence intelligentsias were known as fervent Muslims given 
the criteria of who had access to modern education. This small but influential number of Indonesians 
went to study in Holland. Their stereotyped image of the condescending colonial Dutch (Pringle, 
2010:55) was changed when they were exposed to Leftist Western thinking and returned home 
secularized. They would become the future protagonists of a secular-nationalist-socialist ideology in 
periods to come which is the root of insurmountable disagreements between theirviews and those 
of the Muslims in the later era of Indonesia. The disagreements are twofold: first, differences in 
philosophies89 and then, Islams rejection of nationalism as much as it is against tribalism and 
racism90. Both reflect clash of symbolic universe already given in 2.2.2, namely, Islam against 
nationalism and westernism.
By the end of World War II, Indonesians were becoming more aware of the anti-colonial 
movements. For the few members of the westernized elite mentioned earlier, confronting Dutch 
power was too risky compared to hoping for improvements through cooperation (Pringle, 2010), but 
for the devout Muslims who became the intelligentsia within the framework of Islamic scholarship, 
the alternative source lay in the new ideas from the Middle East, namely, reformist Islam. The 
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Ricklefs et al (2010:469) puts rightly about profound cultural differences between Western and Islam: The 
former generally emphasizes the idea of freedom as a means of liberating individual and social potential for 
good. The latter generally emphasizes the need to control freedom to restrict the individual and social 
potential for evil. It seeks justice rather than freedom.  
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The important feature of the pesantren in relation to the future global-local tensions between Indonesian 
Muslims and the nationalists is rooted in how the pesantren has nurtured fertile ground for the development 
of the ideal of unity of the Islamic world and the concept of the Ummah  the single, world Muslim community 
 which is rooted in Islamic principles. On that, Bruinessen (1994, 121-145) has said:
There is something paradoxical in the pesantren tradition. It is firmly rooted in the Indonesian soil, the 
pondok and pesantren may be called a typically Indonesian institution, in several respects unlike 
traditional schools elsewhere in the Muslim world. But at the same time this tradition is self-consciously 
international in orientation and continues to see not some place in the archipelago but Mecca as its focus 
or orientation.
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reformists, including Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923), the founding father of Muhammadiyah,
are the products of this process in this period. 
Explaining Muhammadiyah with Symbolic Interactionism
Dahlan was born in a pious entrepreneur Muslim family in Yogyakarta which is believed to be in the 
lineage of Maulana Malik Ibrahim, one of the nine wali91. He was reared in traditionalist pesantren. 
At the age of 15, he went to hajj. He stayed in Mecca for 5 years studying Islam from where he 
encountered the ideas of Muslim thinkers associated with Islam reformism (see 2.4.1) such as 
Afghani, Abduh, Rasyid Rida and Ibn Taymiyah (Muhammadiyah, 2012). Two years after he went 
home, he went to hajj again and stayed for another two years further studying Islam from Syekh 
Ahmad Khatib, who happened to be the same teacher of Kyai Haji Hasjim Asyarie, the founder of 
the NU. Returning home in 1904, he applied and was accepted to be a teacher at OSVIA in 
Yogyakarta, a civil servant and teacher school run by the Dutch colonial regime. He also joined 
organizations for the struggle for independence movement, both of the secular and the Muslim 
nationalist activists: Boedi Utomo, Syarikat Islam, Jamiyatul Khair; Pembela Kanjeng Nabi 
Muhammad SAW.  Dahlan was deeply concerned with the poverty and backwardness of Muslims in 
Indonesia. He was immensely moved by Surah al-Maun of the Quran and decided to devote his life 
to propagating it to bring justice towards the orphans, the needy and the hungry (Muhammadiyah, 
2012). Influenced by the aforementioned thinking of Abduh, in 1912 Dahlan founded 
Muhammadiyah (literally, the way of Muhammad) as a welfare organization based on Reformist 
ideology and emphasizing modern education as an anti-colonial strategy (Pringle, 2010; Fuad, 2004). 
He and reformist Islam at the time argued that tradition is the culprit for the backward condition of 
the Muslims, thus, tradition was viewed as having buried deep the real Islam and its power (Fuad, 
2004:403). Therefore, the key to closing the gap with the secular West was to purify and revitalize 
Islam from un-Islamic locally derived customs and propagate the return to the Quran and Sunna.
Accounts of interaction between Dahlan and the West and modernity are explicated by the following 
(see Fuad, 2004, 402-405). 
Since the Dutch colonial government needed to introduce Western education in order to 
create a lower level workforce for its administrative offices, they gave the green-light to 
Muhammadiyahs activities that recognized the possibilities of a new Dutch inspired system of 
education as an instrument of change that might improve the Indonesian Muslim community. The 
Dutchs green-light seemed to have been responded to by Dutch Christian missionary groups as well 
to build and operate not only schools but also hospitals in various places in Java. These had stirred 
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Nine revered saints who spread Islam in the archipelago.
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and inspired Dahlan. Modelled on Christian missionary examples, Muhammadiyah focused its energy 
on proselytizing, education and welfare by establishing hospitals and modern schools, He had found 
them to be the exact programmes he needed in order to achieve his desire both to improve the 
wretched condition of the Muslim communities and to propagate the words of Islam (p.403). 
Notably, cited in Fuad (2004:413), Alfian (1989:160-161)s account shows that Dahlan was good 
friends with some Christian priests. Using a symbolic interactionist perspective in which meaning is 
considered a central part of a persons definition of the situation, which then eventuates in action 
of some sort (Reynolds and Kinney, 2003:887), an explanation is produced. 
The relations between meaning, cognition and action have been explicated in 2.2.2. In this 
way, reality is not given but created through our interactions with one another. Dahlans 
interaction with the Dutch, Christian missionaries and secular nationalist activists defined the 
reality of Muslims backwardness and poverty for him, and also of their hope and aspiration of 
progress from modern education. But at the same time, Islamic symbolic universe, such as Surah al-
Maun of the Quran, remained the all-embracing conception of meaning, and hence, of action, for 
him to respond to that reality.  It becomes clearer when we look at his refutation of the 
traditionalists accusation that said by imitating the Christian Dutch Dahlan was in fact inventing a 
new religion in his Muhammadiyah. Dahlan refuted that, saying: Muhammadiyah attempt to raise 
Islam from its decadence. Too many Muslims, he continued, rely on the exegesis, instead of the 
original source, which is the Quran and Hadith themselves. We call the Ummah to return to the 
Quran and Hadith instead. (Muhammadiyah, 2012). With this in mind I argue that other reformist 
Muslims thinking and actions such as that of Afghani and Abduh already given in 2.4.1 can also be 
explained using the same interactionist approach.  
In 1938 Muhammadiyah claimed to have 1774 schools, 31 public libraries and 834 mosques 
and prayer houses and, with Muhammadiyah in the lead, Muslim schools soon created a literate92
Muslim citizenry which numerically by far surpassed the few Indonesians versed in Western ways 
(Benda, 1958:56). 
As a reaction to the growing strength of Muhammadiyah, which appeared to challenge both 
the traditionalist Islamic style and the status of traditionalist elite, the NU, Nahdlatul Ulama, which 
means, the rise of religious scholars was then established in 1926 by Kyai Haji Wahab Chasbullah 
with the support of East Javas most respected traditionalist scholar, Kyai Haji Hasjim Asyarie, 
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precisely to protect the institutions and practices that were criticized by the reformists. Although 
East Java was always the heartland of NU, it spread to all other parts of the archipelago. 
From 1930-1940, Muhammadiyah had established branches over most of Indonesia, and the 
NU began to found economic and social activities besides its primary function as the guardian of its 
traditionalist Islamic practices. Both were active in anti-colonial movements although in opposing 
directions. The NU forbade the kyai and santri from wearing pantaloons and ties for this being an 
imitation of the Dutch, and from such a cultural movement the NU had been able to produce a 
society that contributed greatly to the struggle for the independence of Indonesia. Conversely, 
Muhammadiyah created schools along modern lines where the Dutch language was used and its 
schools soon became equivalent in quality to the Dutch, Catholic and Protestant schools. During the 
Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945), the two organizations sat together in a federation of 
reformists and traditionalists, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia  Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Muslims), that was sponsored by the Japanese military authorities and explicitly created 
to support the Japanese in World War 2.  Masyumi was born in 1943 and was intended to draw on a 
genuine Islamic base, and in March 1945, the Japanese established an Investigating Committee for 
Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) to draft a constitution. The representatives 
of Masyumi were present in the committee with the other founding fathers of Indonesia. 
The draft of the future state ideology, Pancasila (Sanskrit: five principles), was signed on 
June 22, 1945, as the Djakarta Charter by the future President, Sukarno, the future vice President, 
Hatta, and others, including seven Muslim politicians as the representatives of Masyumi. On August 
17, 1945, the independence of Indonesia was declared by Sukarno and Hatta in Jakarta but seven of 
the words on the first principle (sila) of Pancasila stipulated in the Djakarta Charter (signed two 
months earlier), disappeared. In the charter it was specified as Belief in God with obligation for 
adherents of Islam to carry out Shariah (Islamic Law) but in the constitution proclaimed on August 
17, 1945 it was altered to the simple Belief in God. The intrigues behind the incident were 
complex. The original sila seemed to imply that the state would be responsible for implementing this 
provision, and would thus be some sort of quasi-Islamic State, and the seven words were aborted in 
response to objections by Indonesian Christians, and it was reported that Eastern Indonesia would 
secede if those were retained (Pringle, 2010; Ricklefs et al, 2010). At the end of October 1945 the 
Allied Forces returned to Indonesia but by then, on October 22, NU had proclaimed holy war 
against the Dutch and made participation obligatory for all Muslims. The jihad resolution led to the 
Battle of Surabaya in November 1945. 
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Indonesian independence was finally proclaimed but, as Pringle (2010:69) puts it, the 
Jakarta Charter refused to recede quietly into the mist of history. For Muslims, the loss of those 
seven words has stripped Pancasila bare of its spiritual meaning. In the fieldwork of this research, 
one of leaders of Hidayatullah gave a copy of a book on that particular issue93. The book was 
published quite recently, in 2011. Regarding the role of Islam in the struggle for independence of 
Indonesia, Laffan (2003) has been able to show convincingly that the seeds of what would become 
Indonesian nationalism germinated in two cities in the central lands of Islam  Mecca and Medina 
as much as in Leiden (through some Indonesians who studied there) or Batavia (now Jakarta, where 
many Indonesian secular activists expressed their desire for independence). Notwithstanding, it 
needs highlighting that the disputes over the ideals of independence between the Islamic and 
secular nationalists are as different as night and day. The nationalists believed in pursuing 
independence to create a nation-state for love and attachment to the motherland: ibu pertiwi, or 
tanah air. The Muslim clerics opposed such a nationalist sentiment that demanded complete 
allegiance. For them, freedom is the right of every human being as advocated by Islam, and this 
thereby cannot be pursued for any other goals than the praise of God alone, otherwise they will fall 
into a state of shirk for deification of something other than God (Noer, 1996:281)94. The tensions 
between Islamic and secular nationalisms continued to plague the history of Indonesia95 and this has 
evolved into the most recent development between Islamic nationalists against trans-nationalist 
Islamists, a matter that is discussed in Chapter 7. 
In his work, Sirozi (2010) shows that even contemporary plurality of education in Indonesia 
has its root back in the colonial legacy. Because both secular and religious nationalist leaders have 
developed separate education programs since the colonial era, the new government of Sukarno 
found it difficult to define the character of the national education system. Under an urgent need of 
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Telaah Kritis Dasar Falsafah Negara Republik Indonesia (critical review of Republic Indonesias constitution) 
by H. Bambang Setyo MSc, Introduction by Prof. Dr. Hamdan Zoelva, SH, MH, Judge of Constitutional Court.
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Quoting Hindia Baru, May 30, 1925.
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For example: In the 1960s when Sukarno attempted to blend nationalism, communism and religion (including 
Islam) into a national ideology NASAKOM and the NU leadership decided to support, that caused a great 
distress among the kyai (the pesantren leaders) (Pringle, 2010:116). Another example, although NU and 
Masyumi declared in 1945 that resistance against the returning Allied forces in defense of the new Indonesia 
Fatherland was a holy war, when peace and independence arrived in 1949, and the state turned out to be a 
secular rather than an Islamic state, most Indonesians were uncertain and divided about the place of political 
Islam in the new Republic (Pringle, 2010:65). The tension never ceases to manifest in different forms. The 
most reason issues was about the flag-raising ceremony which is accompanied by the national anthem of 
Indonesia (Indonesia Raya) where people should salute the flag. It has been increasingly criticized by the 
revivalists Islamists and has caused heated debates since 2011 (see Metronews, 2011; ustadzaris.com, 2011; 
muslim.or.id, 2011).
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political compromise, it was partially and temporally overcome by the implementation of a dual 
system. That is, the education model demanded by secular nationalists was accompanied by the 
religious education model demanded by Muslim leaders. The former was termed general, run by 
Department of Education and Culture, and the latter, Islamic, run by the Department of Religious 
Affairs. The result is a complex, hard to follow and dualistic system (Naim, 1996). While the 
general curriculum was designed to fulfill the state needs and aimed at training citizens to have 
national identity, the Islamic curriculum was characterized by Muslim values to attain inner 
perfection and develop a Muslim identity. The general emphasized the social aspect of 
responsibility, the Islamic emphasized religious responsibility. Both were apparently underpinned 
by different philosophies, and thus, continue to run side by side like railway tracks, separated from 
one another to the present day (Naim, 1996). This Dual system is the child of Twin Pregnancy 
mentioned in the outset of this chapter.
5.4 Marginalization of Political Islam
Pringle (2010) contends that marginalization of Political Islam began with the era of the first 
President. Masyumi was banned by Sukarno in 1960 after its frequent clashes with Sukarno and the 
PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). Nationalism was the dominant force of Sukarnos regime with 
Sukarno as its chief commander. He established Pancasila as a state ideology that was hoped to 
become a foundation for national identity. Given the tremendous diversity of Indonesian society, it 
was hoped that it would be a guide in creating a harmonious society based on religious tolerance, 
humanism, nationalism, democracy and social justice, but at that time, Indonesians were not really 
sure who they were, whether they belonged to their regional, or ethnic, or religious, or ideological 
identity (Pringle, 2010). So, in 1957 Sukarno declared Guided Democracy, a non-system of personal, 
authoritarian rule. He assumed, and many Indonesians agreed, that he alone could achieve national 
unity (Pringle, 2010:67). Thus, his famous statement:
I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies. I have blended, blended, 
and blended them until finally they became the present Sukarno (Latif, 2008, p.306, Quoted 
in Geertz 1972, p.322, and Fischer, 1959, p. 154.)
Nevertheless, he was also aware of the incompatibility between Islam and the idea of a nation-state. 
In one of his speeches, Sukarno rhetorically asked, [] can the Nationalist movement be joined with 
the Islamic movement, which essentially denies the nation? [] With full conviction, I answer: 
Yes! (Sukarno, 1970: 38-9, in Burhanudin and Dijk, 2003). Not only did the government ban 
Masyumi and eliminate Islamic political power, but in the 1960s it also began to restrict the political 
activities of Muslim politicians (Hasbullah, 2002). Many activists were put in jail. These jailings had a 
big impact, on the one hand, people had become aware that the Sukarno government, during 
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Guided Democracy, was tyrannical, and therefore had to be overthrown. On the other hand, people 
had become afraid they had to think carefully before opposing the government (Noer, 1987:415, in 
Hasbullah, 2002:7). Further, Hasbullah noted that Muslim hatred of Sukarno and his chief 
supporters, the PKI, was great, and perhaps this was why Muslims were active in helping the New 
Order demolish the Old Order.
As in other infant post-colonial States, the history of the new Indonesian Republic was 
replete with civil war, social upheaval and horrific events. Five of the most significant are: the 
disputes over seven words in the Jakarta Charter (1945), the Communist-led Madiun Affair (1948), 
the Darul Islam uprising (1948-1962), the Outer Islands Rebellion (1957-1958) and the communal 
killings of the anti-communist revolution of 1965-1966 that have profoundly troubled Indonesians to 
this day. The Darul Islam rebellion proved that some Muslims put religion before national unity. It is 
worth noticing that Hidayatullah and the an-Nadzir community being studied were allegedly 
associated with the Darul Islam rebellion. 
Social upheaval and political turmoil in post-colonial Indonesia seemed to be inescapable. 
Notably, among the states of Asia who won independence after World War II, only Vietnam and 
Indonesia did so through armed revolution (Ricklefs et al, 2010). Moreover, there had been long-
standing conflicts that people across the archipelago had had with the colonial government. This 
meant struggles over independence had become customary among the people, and resisting 
legitimacy of the colonial state was part of their everyday lives. Nasr Vali (2005) noted that in most 
places these were done by using culture. Consequently, the new State had difficulty in reversing this 
trend and the national elite did not have much more to offer than to foist an indigenous nationalism 
on the general population by constantly reasserting the States ideology. He says:
Having initiated the masses to resisting authority, the nationalist elite were then saddled 
with the problem of establishing order over a more unruly society. Without the relations of 
order between the State and its subjects in place, the post-colonial State became more 
dependent on ideology to get consent to rule. (Nasr Vali, 2005:12)
He contends further that, in the Muslim world the problems were compounded by an ideological 
challenge from below, which took the form of Islamism  a form whose power rested in the claim 
that it was not tainted by a connection with the West and that it has a base among the masses 
(p.11).
5.5 Indonesian Muslims and Development
Many have commented about the invidious consequences that the new nation-state formation has 
brought to diverse people as they were incorporated, usually by force, into large, impersonal, and 
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usually irresponsible, nation-states (Bodley, 1990). The following discussion features a lethal 
combination of nationalism and the Modern-Western concepts of progress and nationhood upon 
which Indonesian, like many other Third World nation-states ideologies, were anchored, leading to 
the destruction of the social as well as the natural environment. 
Sukarno was ousted in the 1965 anti-communism revolution and these events were 
immensely traumatic to many Indonesians until the present day. His successor, General Suharto, 
ruled Indonesia with his heavy-handed regime for 32 years. Suhartos greatest achievement was to 
promote successfully Indonesias economic development, including development in small towns and 
rural areas. Therefore, he was often dubbed Bapak Pembangunan: the father of development. From 
the chaos of Sukarnos old order, the New Order regime constructed a rapidly growing and 
modernizing economy built upon extractive industries, particularly in the outer islands with the help 
of sudden flows of foreign investment; yet with the physical development heavily concentrated in 
Java. The Outer Islanders became even more convinced that Jakartas rule was robbing them of their 
place as the major producers of Indonesias export earnings from oil, minerals, logs and timber, 
rubber and other cash crops and the grievances from this triggered secession movements in the 
later years. Thus, an archipelago that had limited political coherence before European colonization 
but was connected economically by inter-island trade, was now held together by a nation-state but 
with fewer independent economic links. Hence, as Renan (1882:892) put it, nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist. In addition, 
Anderson (1983) argues that in newly independent states a subjective antiquity appears in the eyes 
of the nationalists. Similarly, Vali Nasr (2001:10) added that the machinery of government was 
operated by the resurgence of traditional conceptions of authority which has taken the form of neo-
patrimonialism96. Those elements have been particularly true in Indonesia during the New Order. 
Hasbullah (2002:7), among others, noted that Suharto personalized himself as a Javanese king and 
internalized the Javanese values and history inherited from his predecessors. This, in the later 
period of development, incited a bitter indignation on the part of the Outer Islanders. For them 
nationalism was merely Javanization as part of the hegemonization of the ruler in Jakarta. Beginning 
in 1978, a national indoctrination programme, P4, was undertaken to inculcate the values of 
Pancasila in all citizens, especially school children and civil servants. Pancasila as an expression of 
nationalism was now used as an instrument of social and political control. It was even made sacred: 
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Further, While certainly being rational and modern, it interestingly is itself the product of colonialism, which 
protected and nurtured traditional institutions of authority and furthermore bolstered its paternalistic view of 
governance through similar colonial conception (Nasr Vali 2001:10).
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the day of the military coup by anti-communist generals, October 1, is commemorated every year as 
Sacred Pancasila Day.
In reference to polarization of nominal abangan and pious santri by the Dutchs policy 
since the end of Diponegoro War, throughout the Suhartos New Order period, economic capital was 
largely in the hands of a Chinese minority, while political capital was in the hands of the abangan 
Javanese priyayi. At the same time the pious santri had been economically and politically 
marginalized: as Wertheim (1975) puts it, they are the outsiders.  According to Hefner (1997:78), 
He (Suharto) was essentially hostile to Islam. Hefner added that many Indonesianists believed that 
the Suharto government was a resolute defender of abangan Javanese values, deeply opposed to 
anything that might expand Muslim influence in Indonesian politics and society (Hasbullah, 
2002:78). The Indonesian Muslim community attitudes are typically those of a minority group 
(Wertheim, 1975; Schwarz, 1997). Hasbullah has said:
In general, this is because politically and economically they were always on the periphery 
and were onlookers of the power circle, or borrowing Wertheims words, the 
representatives of the Moslem community have rather consistently been assigned an 
outsiders role (1975:75). Therefore, far from establishing an Islamic state, or at least 
holding a political hegemony, over the past decades they were the marginalized group and 
their political terrain was peripheral. Regarded as being under long political coercion from 
various Javanese kingdoms, then the European colonial regime and, after the 1945 
independence, from Sukarnos and Soehartos authoritarian regimes, the Muslim community 
has long been the outsiders. (Hasbullah, 2002:6)
Hasbullah (2002) noted that the attempt of Muslims to re-establish Masyumi in 1968 was refused by 
Suharto, who was backed by the military. The ban was also followed by the barring of Masyumi 
leaders from participation in the newly formed Parmusi party. Furthermore, in 1985, under the 
Catholic military Commander General Benny Moerdani, the regime executed a massacre of 
hundreds of Muslims in the 1984 Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) closed-case (Hasbullah, 2002). Once again, 
the government removed Islamic bases from all political parties and mass organizations by insisting 
on Azas Tunggal Pancasila (Pancasila, the Only State Ideology). It has been long accepted that 
Suhartos regime was also authoritarian and based on the power of military.  Ricklefs et al
(2010:383) noted:
The army clamped down on all dissent, restrained only by the limitations of Indonesias 
ramshackle bureaucratic structures. The military had no compunction about banning 
publications and imprisoning, torturing, or murdering opponents. Regime violence was 
particularly unrestrained in the outlying areas of Aceh, East Timor and Papua, where there 
were separatist sentiments and guerrilla resistance.
The Indonesian Muslims felt seriously frustrated since they were not able to increase their political 
position amidst economic disparities.
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The military created a condominium over the country relying on itself and the bureaucracy. 
Student activists and Islamic leaders were soon alienated by their exclusion from the core of 
the regime and by its increasingly obvious corruption. Indeed it was the regimes ever more 
extravagant corruption that did most to undermine its legitimacy as years went by. Ethnic 
Chinese entrepreneurs built mutually lucrative alliances with members of the military elite, 
thereby exacerbating widespread anti-Chinese feelings in the country (Ricklefs et al, 
2010:383).
Since many Indonesian Chinese are Christians, inequality in wealth and power has frequently 
triggered ethnic and religious conflicts up to this time.
Actually, inequality of opportunity was a cause of the reality that during the first years of the 
New Order period when developmentalism began its traction the majority of Muslims were 
uneducated and therefore unable to supply manpower to meet the surge in demands for qualified 
human resources to participate. They were poor and lacking skills, in Ali Murtopos97 words (1989), 
Muslims are the orang sawah  a term that associates them with an unskilled rural society. As the 
political arena was dominated by activists who came from a secular nationalist, Christian, socialist 
background (Hasbullah, 2002), and non-Muslim political actors were holding important positions 
within the circles of the New Order elites, many in Muslim circles came to the conclusion that the 
New Order government has been hijacked by an anti-Muslim alliances of Chinese, Catholics, former 
PSI socialists, and armed officers. Most fingers pointed to Major General Ali Murtopo as the 
mastermind behind these policies (Hefner, 1997:78).  This condition led to a psychology of defeat, 
where, as a majority, they had to face the reality that in fact they are weak in power. They were only 
a majority in numbers but a minority in quality. In turn, the Muslim majority turned out to be a 
minority in mentality (Hasbullah 2002), and, as implied by Schwarz (1997:129), this is clearly an 
anomaly. 
Schwarz concludes that the anomaly of a majority group that feels it is treated like a 
minority is often found in the relationship between and within Indonesias religious 
communities. Schwarz feels that, Muslim leaders often sound and act like members of a 
persecuted minority (1997, pp.129-30). When Muslims were enduring the most extreme 
political suppression at the beginning of the New Order, Mohammad Natsir, a Masjumi 
leader, expressed his anger by accurately and sorrowfully describing this condition: They 
have treated us like cats with ring worm. (McVey, 1983:199).  
Surveying Suhartos authoritarian government, Wertheim (1975:88, in Hasbullah 2002) concludes:
No doubt, the ummat Islam in Indonesia feels seriously frustrated. Not only has Islam not 
been able to increase its political position since Soekarnos fall; in fact Islam has been 
relegated to a position rather similar to the one it occupied during the colonial period. In this 
sense, too, the Soeharto regime could be called neo-colonialist. As during colonial times, 
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the regime wants Islamic organizations to refrain from any political activity and to stick to 
innocuous, purely religious pursuits
Many Third World authors on development studies write about this particular issue regarding 
national elites who turn to being new colonialists. Two of Indias leading scientists and 
environmental activists, Vandana Shiva and Jayanta Bandyo-Padhyay (Court, 1990:189), have 
argued:
Economic Growth was a new colonialism, draining resources away from those who needed 
them most. The discontinuity lay in the fact that it was now new national elites, not colonial 
powers, that masterminded the exploitation on grounds of national interests and growing 
gross national products, and it was accomplished with more powerful technologies of 
appropriation and destruction.
According to Nasr Vali (2005), the imperatives of hegemony and growth are particularly challenging 
to post-colonial states: 
The continuity between the colonial and postcolonial states has to do with the fact that at 
the moment of independence an underdeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie was unable to 
contain the overdeveloped colonial state or to countervail the formidable alliances with key 
classes and social groups that bolstered colonial authority. Equally significant was the fact 
that the ruling bureaucratic elite that had managed the colonial state remain in control after 
independence. They had been a product of colonialism and had internalized its values of 
governance (p.10). 
Further, Nas Vali argues that, colonialism saddled the postcolonial state with attitudes and 
ambitions that have redoubled its desire for hegemony and yet made its attainment more elusive 
(p.11), besides, the disparagement of Islam by later generations of Muslim98 governments had been 
much shaped by the colonial attitude to religion, particularly to Islam (p.42).
5.6 Indonesia Today
Further to Section 4.6, contemporary Indonesian society and politics are characterized by 
decentralization, fragmentation, systemic patronage, corruption, and nationalism that remain in 
dominant force. To complicate the situation further, these occurrences  took place in coincidence 
with two global forces of contradictory nature: on the one hand, postmodernism that extols local 
narratives and diversity to replace grand and universal narratives, thus, the revival of adat (local 
customary); and on the other, the rise of radical Islam that calls for unity of the global Muslim 
community, the Ummah, which gave rise to some degree of global-local tensions on the religious 
level of the Indonesian Muslims.
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He described the case of India and Pakistan.
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5.6 1 Nationalism and Adat-Revival in the Midst of Globalization
Even in the present day, Indonesian nationalism remains a dominant force. In correspondence with 
Berger and Luckmann (1991), Benedict Anderson (2006) contends that nationality and nationalism 
are cultural artefacts of a particular kind, and that to understand properly why today they command 
such a profound emotional legitimacy needs careful consideration of historical context. This has 
been particularly true of Indonesia in the light of its pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial pasts 
and how the country has constantly been threatened by internal clashes along both ideological and 
regional fault lines. That has nurtured a fear of internal revolt and disintegration, thus, a besieged 
mentality with regard to internal enemies, particularly Islam, with the history of Muslims rebellions 
already given. Anti-Malaysia is another recurrent theme (see Noor, 2009). 
In a deeply pluralistic society such as Indonesia, pluralism of norms has always been a 
concern. Because of these, legal anthropology and legal pluralism are recognized as important 
subjects in the Indonesian universities. In Indonesian law, adat, Islam, and positive law of statutes, 
are each considered to be the sources of law. The Indonesian word adat is often translated as 
custom or customary law. Adat has a wide range of usages. It has multiple meanings and often 
conflicting implications. The concept has become quite complicated as it has been interpreted in 
several ways throughout Indonesian history, reflecting the social situation in each period. The birth 
of adat law was midwifed by Vollenhoven at the school of adat law in Leiden University in the 1920s.  
Originally, the mere customs of the colony could not be considered as a form of law (Takano 2008) 
but Vollenhoven overturned that. Notwithstanding, the informal and uncodified character of most 
adat, and the idealization of order and stability, makes adat easy to be manipulated politically. In 
this regard, Davidson and Henley (2007) use the term The protean politics of adat. Section 5.2 
presented Hurgronjes policy on using adat law as a smokescreen to prevent the Muslims from 
endorsing Shariah law.  
For the nationalists, the triumph of adat law school was partly good and partly bad. The 
acknowledgement of adat laws meant different ethnic groups were supposed to be governed 
according to their own diverse laws and customs, which meant undermining the nationalists 
attempt to draw national unity in diversity. Yet, Sukarnos Guided Democracy and especially 
Suhartos New Order invoked adat and emphasized the shared characteristics of adat such as 
gotong royong (mutual aid) and musyawarah-mufakat (unanimous agreement reached after 
thorough discussion) to assure obedience to authority (see Bourchier, 1997). In this respect, 
Thorburn (2002) noted the protean nature of adat in relation to devastation of natural resources 
during Suhartos reign. The New Order regime uniquely combined traditional Javanese 
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patrimonialism, deference and social stratification with unfettered capitalistic acquisition and 
expansion, and with a liberal dose of military power and pomp. Thorburn (2002) said:
This mixture gave rise to a development juggernaut that undermined existing local social 
and normative orders as ruthlessly as it depleted forests and other natural riches. Prominent 
motifs permeating New Order society and governance included frequent references to adat
and the ubiquitous political mantras musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus). 
These were invoked as justifications for a range of political measures and economic policies, 
and to censure anyone who tried to object. The same myth of adat was conjured as well 
by the regimes critics, and by local communities attempting to retain or regain some control 
over the pace or direction of local change (p.618)
The fall of the Suhartos regime in 1998 was followed by a rapid decentralization movement. It also 
marked the beginning of what is discussed in the post-modernism, re-enchantment and 
desecularization literatures as an array of opposing tendencies, themes and forces. As more roles 
were given to local governments, adat became a vehicle for peoples voices against state control as 
well as a tool of ethno politics. This strengthened communal bonds and ethnic identities in many 
cases that gave rise to xenophobia which led to violence against migrants from other provinces.  
There was also the emergence of local elites who became raja kecil (small kings) that gave rise to 
decentralized corruption.  As movements of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) spread 
worldwide, adat gained a new practical position (Takano, 2008). However, due to the prior 
weakening of adat as a result of urbanization and modernization, people are in fact no longer 
familiar with them, and the originality of adat are questionable and their aims are not easy to 
understand. Takano (2008) noted further that adat lack specific methods for conflict resolution, and 
therefore at the district court level adat is considered not to be here. Moreover, the vocabularies 
of adat such as musyawarah-mufakat are quite often mixed up with the new words win-win 
solution to meet the needs of foreign investors. 
On the other hand, the end of Suhartos regime cleared the way for desecularization forces 
to happen. It marked the emergence of so-called transnational Islam in Indonesia, whence there 
began (1) increasing awareness of global Islamic issues among Indonesian Muslims, and (2) their 
participation in global Muslim discourses and activities centered on jihad and Shariah law. Islamists 
believe that such movement could neutralize the diversity of adat.  In this sense, the adat-revival 
appears as a secular complement to Islam [revival], as Headley (2008:4) puts it. The former revives 
without any ultimate cosmological reference, whereas the latter calls to return to the Quran and 
Sunna. Davidson and Henley (2007) present four factors to explain the nature and causes of adat
revival: 1) support from international organizations; 2) oppression of the New Order regime; 3) 
opportunity of reformasi (the fall of New Order); and 4) the enduring role of adat in the political 
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imagination of nationalism. Meanwhile, Tania Li (2007) claims that both on a local and national level, 
appeal to adat tends to privilege elites, especially senior men, who are empowered to speak on 
behalf of a presumed whole (Headley, 2008:4). To Li and Davidson and Henley, the adat issues have 
evoked the link between ethnic rights and ethnic cleansing in the Blut and Boden of Nazi Germany. 
In contrast, Davidson and Henley (2007) defend a thesis that in Indonesia, it is Islam that has created 
civility and historically provided the most effective bridge between local cultures (p.31). 
For if one is looking to create civility, in the Enlightenment sense of toleration and restraint 
with respect to differences in culture, opinion and faith, then it is possible to claim that 
Islam plays a kind of civilizing role in Indonesian political life (Davson and Henley, 2007:31-
2; quoted in Headley, 2008:5). 
Davidson and Henley (2007:32) also noted that the current adat revival is not coincidentally 
concentrated either in areas where Islamic conversion is blocked by Christianity or Hindusim, or in 
areas where Islamic conversion has taken place but pre-Islamic elements remain unusually 
important in social life
5.6.2 Patronage and Corruption
While there are positive changes that have occurred in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto, Aspinall 
(2010) and Blunt et al (2012) show that contemporary Indonesia remains a patronage society 
and patronage remains systemic within the government. Clientelistic practices (jobs or other favours 
in the bureaucracy in exchange for support at election time) are how elites exercise their influence. 
In more recent work, Aspinall (2013) contends that clientelistic relationships between politicians and 
their network of supporters is a fundamental ordering principal of the contemporary Indonesian 
state. Notably, money politics and corrupt practices continue to constitute and sustain patronage, as 
Blunt et al (2012) illustrates:
Suppose for a moment that you worked in an organisation where positions were bought and 
sold and where price was dependent on how well you knew the boss, the opportunities the 
position and organisation afforded for illicit gain and how much new business and how 
many new contacts you could bring to the network that you were paying to join. Suppose 
further that, like others who had purchased their jobs, you had borrowed money from your 
extended family or from friends to pay in advance the going priceof about three times 
your annual salaryand that your (official) salary by itself was barely enough to cover the 
basic necessities of life. In Indonesia, these are typical conditions of patronagein which 
state assets are treated as if they were the private property of elected or administrative 
officials or patrons, who are largely unaccountable and rule with the help of networks of 
clients that are paid off for their support (Dwiyanto et al., 2003; Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006; 
World Bank, 2000) The poor are generally considered to be most disadvantaged under 
these conditions (e.g. Diminio, 2009). This logic has made the containment of corruption a 
central feature of development assistance rhetoric (e.g. Doig, 2006). (p.64)
According to Blunt el al (2012) Indonesia is an interesting case of patronage, 
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because its development has entailed such long and close collaboration with market-
oriented agencies, like the World Bank and the United States Agency for International 
Development, and because it has been portrayed in the media and in the donor literature as 
a model of democratic development (Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006) (p.65). 
Yet, in Indonesia and elsewhere, the neo-liberal promise has been that macro-economic and 
governance reform are sufficient to eliminate patronage, rent seeking and other bad practices and 
that steady progress is being made (Blunt et al, 2012). It is worth noting the following:
For Indonesias government, and for other governments with which it has close ties, the 
economic and governance indicators are sufficient to justify describing Indonesia as a 
democratic success story Carothers (2011) has even described Indonesia as a role model 
for post-Mubarak Egypt (Blunt et al, 2012:65)
On the contrary, as Chapter 4 outlined, critical theorists are in agreement with the Warriors view 
outlined in 4.2.1, arguing for Indonesia that in the last 10 years or so, coalitions of government and 
business interests have managed to retain their control of the state apparatus and to put it to their 
own uses for personal gain (e.g. Klinken, 2009; Luebke, 2009). Blunt et al, (2012) review a series of 
studies conducted over the last 10 years that confirm this and also present corroborating data 
gathered in this study during 2011, which, is in contrast to the statements of some governments and 
some scholars already given and to the statements and behaviour of much development assistance. 
Reinforcing further the Warriors view that Third World development is a continual colonialism, 
Blunt et al (2012) noted:
we present empirical evidence to suggest that, whether by design or by default, 
development assistance has contributed to the spread and consolidation of patronageby 
providing resources for predation (confirming earlier findings by, for example, World Bank, 
2000), by not knowing how to address questions of patronage or by simply turning a blind 
eye to it. We are not alone in thinking this (p.65)
In addition, development assistance has been criticised by many for not giving sufficient attention in 
practice to the political mediation of statesociety interactions, including patronage (Blunt et al, 
2012:66). Proyek (Indonesian word for project, denoting development projects) as a source of 
patronage is widely accepted as it continues to characterize Indonesian politics (Aspinall, 2013). 
Additionally, Blunt demonstates that whereever patronage is systemic, standard technocratic forms 
of governance reform alone are not likely to succeed, and are relatively easily deflected or 
reconstituted by patronage networks. Notably, the demise of Suharto with the dramatic political 
turmoil that followed by no means ended the patronage system and corruption. In the New Order's 
centralised control and network of patronage, corruption was regulated by the centralised structure 
and took place mostly at high level. In a contemporary decentralization era, corruption has become 
more decentralised and less predictable (Nguitragool, 2011). 
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Resource nationalism
Indonesia is increasingly described as a country where resource nationalism is on the 
rise (Warburton, 2014). Law 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining (the 2009 Mining Law) is the most 
widely referenced example of Indonesias rising resource nationalism. The natural resource sectors 
have largely steered Indonesias economic growth over the past decade. Mining contributes 12 per 
cent of Indonesias GDP. But large multinational companies dominate the sector, particularly 
American based companies such as Freeport McMoRan and Newmont. Freeport is the countrys 
largest copper producer by far, with 73 per cent of the market share and gross profits of 1.53 billion 
US$ in 2013 (Warburton, 2014). Since 2009 an assertive Indonesian government has begun 
introducing new laws and regulations that attempt to capture a larger share of these industry 
profits. 
People use the term resource nationalism in different ways. Industry commentators, 
journalists and some scholars typically deploy it to criticize government attempts to assert greater 
control over resource sectors at the expense of foreign investors. At best, such analysts frame 
resource nationalism as short-sighted, poor policy-making; at worst they see it as the work of 
corrupt, rent-seeking government elites. The proponents, in contrast, frame nationalist practices as 
a means of giving citizens a larger stake in their own finite resources, and achieving a more just 
system of rent distribution. Yet, while patronage remains systemic and wherein the clientelistic 
relationship between politicians and their network of supporters prevails, it is impossible to depend 
upon the spirit of redistribution, for there will be vested business interests and patronage relations 
among Indonesian legislators, besides the structural power and influence of the countrys massive 
foreign mining companies.
5.6.3 Fragmentation
Aspinalls work (2013:30) shows that Indonesias contemporary society and political life are 
characterised by pervasive fragmentation which he argues is associated with neoliberalism. The 
question then refers to the way(s) patronage distribution and neoliberalism encourage 
fragmentation.  At the most general level, the key link between patronage and fragmentation is that, 
where political connections are built not on the basis of ideological, identity, or like affinities, but on 
the basis of personalistic exchanges of political loyalty and material rewards, the possibilities for 
multiple patrons and clients to compete for individually beneficial political relationships are almost 
endless. A distinctive feature of Indonesian political life at present is its lack of powerful, permanent 
poles of attraction. Fragmentation is visible virtually everywhere. Almost every subset of civil society 
is characterized by atomization and there is myriad new or revivified local identities based on 
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ethnicity and region, with various forms of cultural revival, reinvigoration of customary institutions 
(Adat), proliferation of ethnic associations, and mobilization of local ethnic identities in virtually 
every region. Everywhere, Aspinall (2013) continues, identity patterns are becoming both more 
fragmented and more assertive. Many commentators have viewed such developments in a negative 
light, seeing them as a sign of parochial erosion of the sense of common citizenship required in a 
healthy polity.
In the Muslim societies, there is bewildering multiplication of Islamic movements (Aspinall, 
2013:45-48). The growing influence of transnationally oriented Islamic movements has reduced the 
central importance of Muhammadiyah and NU in defining the moderate mainstream. In urban 
centers, where people are immersed in mobile and diverse social contexts, far removed from the 
closed social environment of the village, many are becoming:
religious seekers who might participate in a Hizbut Tahrir meeting one day, visit a celebrity 
preacher the next, and then download some fatwa from a favorite website the next morning 
before going on to participate in a particularly satisfying Sufi gathering. Religion is in other 
words coming to resemble an increasingly diverse marketplace inhabited by individual 
consumers, rather than being constituted by rigidly defined collective identities and their 
associated organizations into which a person is born and wedded until death. (Aspinall, 
2013:46)
The latter suggests a process of urbanization-induced deinstitutionalization in a private sphere 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1991) discussed in 2.2. Someone born in a traditionalist NU or reformist 
Muhammadiyah family can now choose to abandon their community traditions and join other ones
(detailed in the fieldwork section in Chapter 6); the child of an NU family can join Hizbut Tahrir, as 
the child of Muhammdiyah can join the Sufi order. 
5.7 The Muhammads Nation
Having located the position of Indonesian Islam and its communities in the wider context of 
Indonesias national history in connection with the Muslim world and the global world at large, I will 
explicate the relationship between contemporary globalization, global governance, global social 
movement, global environmental issues, and global Islam99. In what follows, a number of fragments 
are to be put together.
There has been debate on environmental ethics between the anthropocentric and eco-
centric factions. Heilbroner (1977:94-6), for instance, contends on the need of statist religion in 
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Discussed in Chapter 4, besides economic, one of the faces of globalization is when transportation, 
telecommunication and information technologies have allowed distant actions to increase significantly at the 
local level. In the Muslim world, globalization is also characterized by increased presence of transnational 
Islamic movements, such as Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Hizbut Tahrir; and Tablighi Jamaat in Indonesia.
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order to breed a collectivist ethic, and of Ehrlich and Pirages (1974:279-80) on the need of universal 
religion to be present to effect a true social transformation. Elsewhere, many have commented that 
the present model of globalization entails the demise of the state. It is also noted that the present 
pattern of world politics is characterized by governance without government (Rosenau and 
Czempiel, 1992), and furthermore, this period is characterized by pragmatism, postmodernism and a 
lack of faith in all-encompassing ideologies. These characteristics of this time have given rise to 
opposing tendencies toward globalization and localization that the thesis discusses. According to the 
Commission on Global Governance (1995:2), governance is the sum of many ways that individuals 
and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. Under this light, the notion of 
global governance in fact leads to a truly problematic question considering the plight of the Third 
World as identified in Chapter 4: who does really govern the poor nations? 
Because a Global State does not exist, the idea of global governance tends to reinforce the 
role of the powerful state and weaken the role of those who are already weak (OBrien et al, 2000). 
Moreover, the process of global governance encompasses a broad range of actors besides the state. 
They include multilateral economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and the large-
scale private enterprises or multinational corporations that also participate in governance by 
attempting to influence the activities of international organizations and states (OBrien et al, 2000). 
Yet, these actors have been identified in Chapter 4 as associates with what underlies the socio-
ecological problems at hand. In some cases, private enterprises created their own systems of 
regulations and governance (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999 in OBrien et al, 2000). Elsewhere,
authors on peak oil and scarcity such as Howard Kunstler (2005), Richard Heinberg (2005) and 
Homer Dixon (2006) attempt to imagine a completely new civilization, while Herman Daly and 
John Cobb Jr. (1989) attempt to imagine a very different economic future. This situation has given 
rise to an array of grassroots relocalization initiatives in post-industrial societies such as the 
ecovillage and Transition Town stated in Chapter 4. They attempt to fashion fair and sustainable new 
societies. All those seemingly discrete events have to be taken into consideration in this thesis on 
the global relocalization movement by local Muslim communities. 
In social movement theories, there are no universally accepted definitions of the concept of 
a social movement, but Doherty (2002) argues that the following four characteristics are found in 
many definitions. A social movement, firstly, must have a consciously shared collective identity; 
secondly, must act at least partly outside political institutions, using protest as one of its forms of 
action; thirdly, is characterized by un-institutionalized networks of interactions; and fourthly, must 
reject, or challenge, dominant forms of power. In the Muslim world context, Muhammadiyah and 
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NU have demonstrated in this chapter that social movements can emerge from, and be sustained by, 
Islamic education and learning communities. These types of social movement, in one way or 
another, are associated with social interactions and conflicts, thus, a clash of symbolic universes as 
discussed elaborately in Chapter 2. Inequalities in wealth and power between Muslims and the 
secular groups increased the tensions. Thenceforth, the four characteristics of social movements 
summarised by Doherty (2002) have appeared to commonly characterize everything undertaken in 
the name of Islam and the Ummah. For that reason, one can argue, by Dohertys characteristics, that 
Islam and the Ummah in this particular juncture of history -as in the 19th century- have embodied 
into a kind of global social movement. I term the members or activists of this newly-formed social 
movement as the Muhammads nation a term that I choose to signify the presiding presence of 
the Prophet of Islam as the enduring leader of this nation. The Muhammads nation members are 
Muslims, but not every Muslim is a member of the Muhammads nation in this sense. Members of 
this nation stand out from the rest of the Indonesian Muslims in accordance with Doherty (2002), for 
they have a consciously shared collective identity; they act outside political institutions as a result of 
the separation between the church and the state in modern politics; they have an un-
institutionalized network of interaction; and they reject and challenge dominant forms of power. 
Those characteristics are present in the leaders and active members of the Muslim groups or 
communities. The conservative turn of Indonesian Islam that Bruinessen (2013) and others discussed 
recently (Hasan, 2009) can be explained by this Muhammads nation phenomenon. The 
Muhammadiyah and NUs socio-historical background outlined in this chapter can possibly be 
extrapolated to the Muslim world at large to explain the emergence of variegated present-day 
Islamic movements. It is appropriate to examine what Islam and the Muhammads nation 
potentially offer to mitigate the severity of a world divided indefinitely by self-interests of nation-
states, and to collectively respond to global environmental crisis. 
Literature on environmental crisis and peak oil shows that this time is especially dangerous, 
an urgent time, a time of profound crisis. In this regard it is important to give attention to what Gibb 
(1968) predicted concerning the possibility of a response from the Ummah to an unpredictable 
future:
But no outside observer can estimate the strength of those unseen threads which at an hour 
of challenge draw the members of diverse groups into a single community of purpose and 
will, nor the vitality of a great idea, overlaid by the deposits of long centuries, when it is 
faced with new tasks and danger.  The history of Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century is a history of revival and efforts at readjustment under the double stimulus of 
challenge from within and pressing dangers from without. Slowly at first, and not without 
setbacks but with increasing momentum, the Muslim community has gathered itself 
together and begun to look to its defence; re-awakened and alert, it is searching for the 
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programme with which to advance united into an unknown and unpredictable future (Gibb, 
1970:113)   
According to Berger and Luckmanns Sociology of Knowledge, meaning is produced and reproduced 
within a culture through various practices, phenomena and activities which serve as systems of 
signification. Historical narrative described how the present-day globalization has affected the long-
standing contested symbolic universes nationalism, and Islam in Indonesia. As a result, due to the 
continued survival of deep structures within Islamic culture by which meaning is produced and 
reproduced, the meaning of Prophet Muhammad is reproduced and resuscitated once again in 
fragmented Indonesia and the Prophet has re-emerged as a leader in the leaderless society that 
globalization and neoliberalism imply. 
The fieldwork chapters, nevertheless, show that diversity of emphases once again exists. 
They are between the exoteric and esoteric meanings of the Prophet given in Chapter 2. They are 
ranging from those who imitated the reported external qualities of the Prophet, to the ones who call 
for a return to the Quran and Sunna, and at the other end, those who resuscitated the esoteric 
tradition accompanying veneration practices of the Prophet (such as tawassul) which nowadays is 
gaining increasing popularity in Indonesia compared to a few decades ago100. In general, there is the 
majority for whom Islam is essentially an all-embracing ethical and social code, a way of life 
embodied in the Shariah (the exoteric) and there are also those who wish to follow the spiritual life 
in the Thariqah (the esoteric). It is not always possible to draw sharp lines of division between those 
referred to as the Muhammads nation and the rest of the Indonesian Muslims, but the 
classification is useful for the purpose of analysis and discussion. From my observation, unique 
among the Muhammads nation is a strong sense of connectedness in contrast to individualism that 
characterizes the present-day urban Muslims, as well as a distinct sense of direction. They have a 
remarkably high degree of solidarity with the members of the organization or pesantren where they 
belong, as well as a sense of belonging to the Ummah to the point that they are able to assess the 
world in terms of them and us, a characteristic that Doherty (2002:7) sees as necessity before 
people can act together. Further, Doherty added that activists will have stronger solidarity when 
they share values that provide meaning and justification for their actions. In that respect, the culture 
of the Muhammads nation is dominated by a divine norm and a presiding idea that they share 
across national and cultural boundaries into a single Islamic tradition. It is the sacred nature of this 
Islamic tradition that unites the Muhammads nation. Moreover, members also demonstrate the 
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For example: Majlis Nurul Mustafa, Majlis Rasulullah.
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outstanding ability to minimize ethnic and linguistic barriers that are present elsewhere in the 
Indonesian pluralistic society.  
Thus, this research question arises: To what extent can Muhammads nation possibly 
espouse the whole-earth one-world family vision of the environmentalist? The following section 
summarized my interviews on that issue.
Suharsono, a leader of Hidayatullah in the Jakarta head office:
USAID had once offered us some help with some million dollars on an issue which I forgot 
what, it turned into a polemic within Hidayatullah because we had always been suspicious to 
the Wests intentions. Well, maybe they can clean up their toilets or their cities much better 
than we do, but we dont trust they can clean their heads and their hearts from their evil 
intentions (laughter), and yet, they call us corrupt, but who made us corrupt at the first 
place? colonialism is a crime that cannot be redeemed simply with material aids, what they 
did to us in 350 years was idiotizing, darkening. Now lets compare with what Islam did to us 
since the early arrival in Indonesia, we were taught of ethics, even in war, and remember the 
story of the church Aya of Sophia in Constantinople when Islam was in power, very different 
from what the West did to us, Islam came to the West and brought enlightenment       
Candra Kurnia, a leader of Hidayatullah in the Jakarta head office:
Oh, well, we will see if New Zealand [because he saw myself was from a NZ university] is 
any different [than the rest of the West] (laughter) but doing any meaningful works with 
anything from US or UK is very unlikely for us 
Kyai Ahmad Mansur, NU leader in Surabaya urban centre, the founder of Porsikompak, Islamic 
microfinance for micro-business in Surabaya urban area.
First of all what they call global warming, environmental crisis, etcetera is awu-awu
(Eastern Javanese slang, more or less, bullshit). How can they talk about it while continually 
driving us into physical development? you look, now we cant stop constructing new roads, 
malls, high rise building (laughter)
Kyai Miftah Faqih, NU leader, who owned a pesantren in Kartosuro rural district and was a leader 
in the NU Jakarta head office.
Certainly, but everything has to start from here (he put his palm on his chest). Without 
justice and honesty between races and nations, what they call one world family vision is 
merely their futile dreams
Kyai Said Aqil Siraj, Chairman of the NU. 
Definitely, Prophet Muhammad himself always used different terms according to [whether] 
the message was addressed to the Muslims or to all mankind: ya ayyuhal muslimun or ya 
ayyuhan naas. Remember, such as in his hajj wada before he died, in his last wuquf in 
Arafah he began his sermon with ya ayyuhan naas, O people, your life, your property, your 
dignity must be respected because they are sacred - whatever your religion, whatever your 
ethnicity the Prophet was giving a universal message, that was a declaration of human 
right, wasnt it?
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Regardless of the universalistic perspective of Islam given in 4.4101, the long-held tensions between 
Muslims and the West seemed to have engendered mistrusts and fears of the West against what the 
one world family vision of the environmentalists appeared hardly possible for the Muhammads 
nation. 
To investigate further, since I found that NU was among the attendees of the international 
climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009, I asked Siraj, Chairman of the NU, whether the Ummah
remains capable of responding in a united way to the call of climate change issues given that the 
Ummah was no longer under the same political unit. He replied:
As far as the vision of truth, Muslims have always been one. The theological principle of 
Islam is only one, there might be minute differences in our practices between one school 
with another, but that is not a big deal, everyone has to make shalat, everyone has to do 
zakat, everyone goes to hajj, et cetera, et cetera, what has divided us is political interests!, 
so if we return to our universal principles there is only one Islam, one Ummah. Back to your 
question, on that situation, we still have OKI (Bahasa of OIC, The Organization of the Islamic 
Conference/Cooperation), what is the point of OKI if not to unify the vision of Ummah, to 
assemble hand in hand?
When I asked him to envisage whether OKI was capable of undertaking such a task, he replied: 
yes, as far as the North also realizes that this earth belongs to everyone, which means, no 
more triumphalism, no more domination. They have been very-very dzalim this far (Arabic, 
cruel, unjust, evil, referring to the West) - the United Nation security councils for 
instance, isnt that apparent unfairness before our eyes? 169 countries say yes but if one of 
the 5 says no, then all must follow, what is that? And then the Bretton Woods economy too -
all blatant injustices  So, only when both North and South concede and cooperate then we 
Muslims can act together, and OKI will be the right vehicle to mobilize. A neutral and well 
accepted organization, such as NU, is required to initiate [this]
Sirajs answer casts light upon the research questions: in what ways could Indonesian Muslim 
groups respond to the call for global environmental actions to achieve the whole earth-one world 
family vision, or, in what ways can the global Muslim community (Ummah) provide an alternative 
to global environmental governance  an insight that has been contemplated further in the research 
conclusion.
5.8 Conclusion:
A detailed and close examination has revealed the fact that Indonesia has been forced into a global 
economic order and developmentalism within which the participation of Muslim groups has been 
insignificant or even minuscule, and where Islamic values and philosophies hardly play a role at all. 
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Considering the universalistic nature of the Quran which in many verses acknowledges the diversity of religion, 
and the belief of Islam as rahmatan lil alamin (mercy to all nations) that the Quran says in Q21:107. 
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This fact must be taken into account in the study of religion and ecology in answer to common 
questions; why the non-Western religious societies do not reveal any less destructive trends and are 
not less industrial-attracted than the West? (Radcliffe, 2000:93-4). This issue is explained further in 
the fieldwork. 
In this chapter, it has been demonstrated with Muhammadiyah and NU that social 
movements can emerge from, and be sustained by, Islamic education and learning communities. The 
same phenomenon will appear for other organizations in the fieldwork chapter. These types of social 
movement, in one way or another, are associated with social interactions and conflicts, thus, a clash 
of symbolic universes was discussed elaborately in Chapter 2. Inequalities in wealth and power 
between Muslims and the secular groups only increased the tensions. Thenceforth, the four 
characteristics of social movements summarised by Doherty (2002) have appeared to commonly 
characterize everything undertaken in the name of Islam and the Ummah. For that reason, one can 
argue, by Dohertys characteristics, that Islam and the Ummah since the 19th century to this 
particular juncture of history have embodied some sort of global social movement. I term the 
members or activists of this social movement as the Muhammads nation. Referring to Berger and 
Luckmanns (1991) ongoing dialectical process of social construction of reality in Section 2.2, the 
colonial history and the Wests enduring domination and control over the Muslim world have 
developed a typification of the West as either the Christian West or the infidel (kufr) in Muslims 
mind, and the Muslims continue to use this typification to apprehend the West down to this day. 
The Muhammadiyah and NUs socio-historical background in this chapter can possibly be 
extrapolated into the Muslim world at large to explain the variegated Islamic movements and their 
contemporary ramifications.
The trend and aspiration toward a united, yet decentralized, Islamic world and the 
movement back to the Shariah can be viewed as an opportunity for a global environmental-
movement of a different kind within the Ummah. To illustrate the logical structure of this model, it is 
necessary to envision a world summit being conducted by the Ummah, where Muslim scholars and 
the jurisprudents (fuqaha) make comprehensive deliberation about the environmental problems and 
arrive at consensus (ijma). The council that arranged the summit would also run regular meetings 
afterward. The council could be founded by Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as the 
chairman of NU, Said Aqil Siradj, suggested. Muslim communities around the world are called to 
mobilize ecological actions based upon Islamic jurisprudence in a decentralized Muslim world based 
upon communities. Leaders and active members of the learning-communities in Indonesia and 
elsewhere are the basic nucleuses. They are groups of people that discover the process, organize 
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and make it work. Fieldwork concerning these people has been conducted and the subsequent 
chapters present their responses.
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Chapter 6
Inquiring into Relocalisation: The Muhammads nation in Constant Struggle
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with fieldwork, and focuses on the Modernist and Traditionalist 
community-Muslims represented mainly by Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). It begins 
with a detailed description of Muhammadiyah, then NU. Unlike the NU, the modern approach of 
Muhammadiyahs movement has not been based on pesantren communities. Therefore, data 
collection concerning Muhammadiyah was carried out by interviewing the leaders and active 
members while for the Traditionalist NU the research involved observation of the pesantren and 
interviews with the leaders. 
Besides providing more accounts of the long-standing contest between Western and Islamic 
globalization in Indonesia, this chapter provides examples of social actions advanced by 
Muhammadiyah and NU in confronting the impacts of capitalisms over-utilization of natural 
resources and the disparity of its distribution102. It highlights events and discourses among the 
Muslim groups related to these problems. Ultimately, the fieldwork aims to contribute to build 
holistic understanding of the following:
1) Willingness, ability and possibility of the existing Indonesian Muslim groups to advance 
relocalisation as defined in Chapter 4, to create green intentional community models that 
can be duplicated, and whose culture can be propagated, to convert Muslim society at large 
to live up to the Islamic ecological values, for both survival and sustainability. 
2) Practical, cultural and ideological issues arising or shared by the Muslim communities being 
studied, regarding their ability to undertake relocalisation.
3) Possibility of the existing Muslim groups to take on global Islamic environmental actions, to 
envisage a global relocalisation network by local Muslim communities.
6.2 Muhammadiyah and Modernization in Indonesia
Muhammadiyah is an Indonesian Islamic organization, well known for providing education and 
health services103. Up to the present time, Muhammadiyah is officially recognized as a non-political 
organization. The organization has five levels of leadership with several councils attached to each 
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Nevertheless, the research findings show that despite increasing socio-ecological problems across the 
archipelago, Muhammadiyah and NUs responses to the crisis have been no more than rescuing attempts as 
auxiliaries to the welfare functions they have been playing. This should be understood, given the fact that all 
Muslim groups  Muhammadiyah and NU not excepted - have been outside the power-center and not 
included in policy making in Indonesia, except, of course, through the Department of Religious Affairs, given 
the countrys majority population is Muslim. 
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See 5.3 about the history of Islam reformism behind its formation.
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level: nation, province, country, district and village. Each is responsible for managing the 
organizations affairs at that particular level. Once a year a national conference is held, and other 
regional ones might be held as necessary. In the 2010 report, Muhammadiyah owned and operated 
in total, about 17,000 schools (from kindergarten to high school), 170 colleges and universities, 750 
health services such as public hospitals, clinics, and maternity hospitals; it also maintained 11,500 
mosques. Muhmmadiyahs schools and hospitals were managed under the Amal Usaha 
Muhammadiyah (profit-oriented or entrepreneurial activities) division. For its schools and hospitals 
Muhammadiyah has a hierarchical leadership structure. The provincial leaders are in charge of 
universities, while the lower levels of leadership are responsible for the lower educational levels. 
This structural managerial system is also applied to maintain hospitals104. A different system is 
applied to non-profit institutions, such as mosques and orphanages, which are normally assigned to 
the village level of leadership. Outside schools, Muhammadiyah disseminates ideas through 
pengajian (Islamic study groups) in the mosques and printed media. Economic activities of the 
organization include minimarket and small financial institutions such as Bank Perkreditan Rakyat 
(peoples credit bank). However, Muhammadiyah does not prohibit the members being associated 
with a non-Shariah banking system, because Shariah banking is not internationally connected, one 
of the leaders in the Jakarta office said. 
I did not interview any salaried professionals working in Muhammadiyah schools and 
healthcare. All respondents were leaders and active members -both male and female- who claimed 
to be unsalaried volunteers, they meant their activities as ibadah (part of worshipping God). Except 
some house-wife-only women in Aisyiyyah, the female wing, everyone elses main paid work 
profession was outside their activities in the organization. The initial support for Muhammadiyah 
had come mainly from Muslim middle-class merchants and traders. But sweeping economic changes 
after Indonesias independence caused a sharp decline among the Muslim small town merchants 
and traders who had previously been Muhammadiyah supporters (Fuad, 2004). This, however, did 
not prevent Muhammadiyah from growing. Although weakened substantially, the trading tradition 
among small-town Muslims continued. Their children went on to earn academic degrees, rendering 
Muhammadiyah supporters the most educated among Muslims in Indonesia (Nakamura, 1983, 




For more detailed accounts see Fuad (2004:401-402).
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6.2.1 Socio-Ecological crisis and the Muhammadiyah Leadership
Interplay between nationalists sentiment; reformists resentment of imperialist West; modernists 
aspiration of progress; and inferiority complex about Muslims backwardness and poverty, pervaded 
Muhammadiyah responses during the interviews. They gave rise to a certain degree of ambivalence 
towards environmental concerns. One of the general secretaries of the organization known to be 
knowledgeable of environmental issues, commented:
No education has been given by government, so the Indonesian society is left completely 
unaware of the serious problems the earth is facing now, so, they will say well, climate 
change is simply the will of God. The Ulama know nothing about this either, environmental 
fiqh105 has never been studied as part of the Shariah, interpretations of the Quran and Sunna
made by earlier generations have not been reviewed from the present-day point of view
When I asked him whether that was part of the impact of Western colonization, he said:
No, on the contrary, it is because the human mind had been shackled by religion, so when 
you think scientifically, you will be labeled liberal, secular
On this note, Ahmad Najib Burhani (2013a) writes that Muhammadiyah has now been divided 
between the conservative and the liberal camps. By developing a narrative about the beginning of 
the Muhammadiyah movement the liberals want to make Muhammadiyah more progressive and 
modern which was the original goal of the movement. Liberals intend to convince people that they 
are walking in the footsteps of the movements founders, and they are therefore the legitimate heirs 
of Muhammadiyah. According to Burhani, intellectuals Abdul Munir Mulchan and Sukidi Mulyadi are 
among the proponents of such liberal views.  They mentioned that the founder, Kyai Haji Ahmad 
Dahlan, was both a pluralist and a liberal, and a Muslim par excellence (Mulyadi, 2005). Mulyadi 
describes the early years of Muhammadiyah as a beautiful and excellent time that deserves to be 
replicated in Muhammadiyahs present and future. Therefore, instead of applying the well-known 
motto back to the Quran and Sunna as a battle cry, the liberal group follows the slogan back to 
Ahmad Dahlan and his interpretation of the Quran and Sunna as the principle to liberate people 
from Muhammadiyahs current problems. The other camp, the conservatives, condemns the liberal 
model of reenactment and the idea that the early years of Muhammadiyah should be taken as the 
model for the present. Although they are familiar with the historical record of the founding fathers 
and their deeds, they appear to reject the authority of the historical narrative of Muhammadiyah 
and consider it to be less authoritative than the origin of Islam. One of the leaders of the 
conservative faction, Yunahar Ilyas, firmly rejects the authority of the liberal myths: this is the 
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Muhammadiyah, not the Dahlaniyah (Muhammadiyah means the way of Muhammad; Dahlaniyah 
means the way of Dahlan) (Ilyas, 2013).
Further on environmental issues, the leader added:
Look at the destructions on land, water, air, apart from the 2012 End of the World 
movie106 controversy, I am among those who believe that the Qiyamah  apart from death, 
of course107  - is subject to humans actions, it depends on the extent to which humans look 
after this earth. Since we are now already facing global warming, that means the threats are 
truly imminent. On the one hand climate uncertainty is already happening and yet our 
farmers are not well informed about what is going on and how to deal with those, so we are 
facing truly dire consequences. This is a very-very serious problem if you look from that 
perspective 
He criticized the fuel subsidy that has been provided as well:
Just let the fuel prices soar unsubsidized so that people realize that the fossil fuel we have 
been consuming is unsustainable - the subsidy system is the den of robbers anyway 
(laughter) -  and that we need to reduce the population of motor vehicles. No more cheap 
down-payments for vehicle credit, they only sound good for short term goals and of course, 
for tax purposes   
At the same time, he applauded India, Korea and Malaysia for having been self-reliant in automotive 
industries: 
While Indonesian has been so dependent, TATA in India, PROTON Malaysia, and KIA Korea 
have become tuan rumah [literally host, means, the lord] in their own country
It is worth noting that further elaboration of modernity and the idea of progress in classical political 
economy produced the grounds for the emergence of a developmentalist ideology (Grosfoguel, 
2000) that intensifies expansionist and competition paradigms. Against this backdrop, small is 
beautiful ideals of relocalisation and sustainability are like a lone voice in the wilderness. According 
to the leader, the Indonesians in general are largely unaware of anything related to ecological issues, 
even for the most observable ones, let alone the peak oil. He bet that any Indonesian knows the 
fact that the country had not been an OPEC member since 2004. Nonetheless, he applauded the 
  
106  
The movie sparked protests from the Ulama. It is considered as provocation against Islam because doomsday 
in Islam should not be visualized or predicted for it is the secret of God.
107
Muslims speak of two types of Qiyamah: Qiyamah al-sughra (the small Qiyamah), which occurs at the hour of 
death for each individual, and Qiyamah al-kubra (the major Qiyamah) which occurs at the hour of death for 
the entire world.
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Indonesian President, Yudhoyono, for taking a courageous stance against the North in the UN 
climate change conference in Bali, 2007108. 
The North wanted to make Indonesian forest the earths lung, means, we cant reap any 
advantages from the forest, pragmatically speaking, we are still greatly in need of the 
forest to sustain our people, logging is a crucial income for the country, 32 million of our 
population are under the poverty line...well, but what matters most is how our government 
can stand up and say [he uttered in English] this is my country, I have the authority and 
sovereignty to manage this country, if you want to work with me please do on the basis of 
my agreement, but if you dont then let us manage our own country... Carbon Trade is a 
lucrative business, isnt it? 109
Again, it is worth noting here what Grosfoguel (2000) argues that developmentalism is linked to 
liberal ideology and to the idea of progress. In spite of their policy discrepancies, they all believed in 
national development and in the inevitable progress of the nation-state through the rational 
organization of society. Accordingly, the main bone of contention was how to ensure more wealth 
for a nation-state. 
At the 45th congress in Malang, 2005, Muhammadiyah founded a council for community 
empowerment. Officially stated in the organization profile, the vision of this new council is to seek 
alternative community development models and to encourage social transformation process in the 
Muhammadiyah society with Tawhid (Islamic doctrine) as the spirit of the empowerment activities. 
The actual works included promoting sustainable agriculture best-practices through the pengajian
learning communities in the rural communities110. The leader said, however:   
But these kinds of preaching activities are cultural activities, they are social and voluntary in 
nature. Without structural supports such as government policies, these are just very slow 
movements. Even though, sometimes the government asked us to help in reforestation, 
such as, restoring unproductive land with seeding supplied by the governments, theyre still 
not adequate
Several times within the talks, the leader praised the leadership of the Shia Imams in Iran, where the 
Imams appear as real leaders in real-life issues, not just being imam in the prayer congregation like 





He was referring to the UN Climate Change summit in Bali in 2007 and its dramatic ending. See Appendix-4.
110
The leader provided information on a recent research by Munir Mulchan which shows that the puritan 
farmers are Muhammadiyahs members, whereas in Geertz report (Chapter 3), the farmers are the abangan
(non-practicing Muslims). Mulchan also gave information about the emergence of santri kota (urban 
observant Muslims) all over Indonesia.
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had as to how modernism and Islam can be fused.  Elsewhere, a senior officer in the Jakarta office, 
Sulomo, commented about the environmental crisis:
You want to talk about the environment? But who caused climate change? the greenhouse 
thingy? All these have been rooted in the akhlaq111, akhlaq of the leaders -if we can learn 
from the itibar [lesson] of the prophets we will understand why Indonesia has been 
punished on and on. This is the outcome of the capitalist political-economic order that made 
us the market of their economic activities, market of their culture too, look at whats on our 
TV now-- yourself is a woman, you must understand what I mean - girls with hot pants, 
wearing clothes that look naked-- so disrespectful to women - the result is decadence of 
akhlaq, both among the leaders of this country and young generation. But then they 
provoked: so, where is kuntum khoiru ummah112, then? (sigh) -isnt that very clear? the 
conditions are amar maruf (enjoin right conduct) and nahi munkar (forbid indecency) -if the 
two were not there, thats void -we are in shortage of role models, if we remember Umar 
ibn Khattab, when he was a khalifah he lived very simple life, every night went around the 
city to make sure that everyone got food to eat, he didnt wear beautiful cloths, once he did 
wear double cloth and his people protested because thats not needed, he took it off. So, 
here we have why Allah punished us now.  
The comment suggests that he was very likely to be with the conservative faction of 
Muhammadiyah. His statement articulates not only the centrality of Islamic symbolic universe as 
Foltz et al (2003:xxxiv) mentioned, but also reflects the concerns shared between the Red, the 
Green, and Islam, that Melanie Phillips (2010) speculated as the Red-Black-Green-Islamic Axis113. As 
the members found dissonance between the ideals of modernity and development and the ground 
reality114 of inequality, systemic injustice, and environmental degradation in the country that 
Muhammadiyah had been struggling with, they came to realize the non-existence of a consistent 
role model, and hence, were returning to the Tradition. Bruinessen (2013) noted a conservative 
turn in contemporary Indonesian Islam. Correspondingly, in my analysis of the emergence of the 
Muhammads nation discussed in Chapter 5, the meaning of Prophet Muhammad is reproduced 
and resuscitated once again, and the Prophet re-emerged as a leader in a leaderless society that 
globalization implies. Sulomo also revealed his opinion that the Indonesian population cannot 
possibly escape from the onslaught of values and cultures foreign to the religious ones.
  
111
Arabic term referring to the practice of virtue, morality and manner by the Muslims. 
112
Quran verse: O Ye are the best community sent forth unto mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid 
indecency, and ye believe in Allah (Q:3:110) 
113
In The World Turned Upside Down. The Global Battle Over God, Truth, and Power, Melanie uses Black to refer 
to the fascists.
114
The industrialization and modernization programmes carried out by the Suharto regime have brought signs, 
albeit sporadic, of national prosperity. Yet the basic economic problem of the ummah, as originally perceived 
by the founder, seems to persist. The majority of the ummah remain to constitute the economic underdog of 
the country (Fuad, 2004:411).
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Prof Syafii Maarif, a former chairman of Muhammadiyah, commented about the appalling 
condition of the Muslim world:
Look at what happened in the Arab world, Palestine for example, the Hamas and the Fatah, 
they are not alike, you know? They fight one and another, both with Bismillah, can you 
imagine how tragic is that? We just have to admit this crude fact first, before we can do 
anything
In essence, Maarif was expressing his poignant concern about disunity between Muslims. In other 
words, it was an expression of his inner feeling of unity of brotherhood in faith. This confirms what 
has been expounded in my theoretical framework that the Muhammads nation symbolic universe 
also encompasses affective components besides cognitive and normative. Additionally, it explains 
what has been commented on often by Western observers regarding Muslims. For example, Hope 
(2000) who noted the basic themes in Muslim belief: despite many signs of disunity, most Muslims 
feel that the Islamic world is an entity (p.155). Maarif continued:
We have about some 400 firqah (groups) within the Ummah at the moment, each claims to 
be the true one. Shouldnt it be easy to overcome with the Furqan115? Quran is the criteria! 
Right? Even though different interpretations are inevitable, but still the benang merah116 is 
there. It is egoism and subjectivism that have divided us. We just have not been honest to 
our religion. I will say, the Muslim groups leaders have not been living in Islam prophetically, 
so here we are now, we make Islam only as a ritual religion, a private religion, no 
internalization of its values in our everyday lives, neither we use it in our everyday affairs, so, 
at the end, we are no different than those the materialists when money is presented to us. 
Look at those who sit in the parliament, whether the Islamic parties or not, they are all alike 
Maarif informs that what I term as the paradox117 of alaikum bil jamaah118 being the challenge,
and opportunity within the Ummah. To live in togetherness means to subjugate ones individuality 
to a group. But paradoxically, to live in a group means possessing an equal chance toward a division 
from, or a union with, other groups to constitute the larger collectivity of the Ummah. The reasons 
for uniting or separating could be as simple as ones liking or fondness of a camaraderie. 
Consequently, disunity within the Ummah will likely persist regardless of all the effort to unify the 
Muslim communities into a single pattern of thought and actions. The positive side would be the 
  
115
Used by the Muslims interchangeably to refer to the Quran.
116
Literally, red thread, means in Bahasa as the connector.
117
The inspiration came suddenly at the moment I was interviewing with Kyai Miftah from the NU when he asked 
me back: By the way, which Muslim group are you from?  I answered: Id like to say, not any one, just a 
Muslim. And he replied: No, you cant, a Muslim must have a community, a group that she or he belongs to, 
you must do organization, alaikum bil jamaah.
118  
A Hadith, understood by Muslims as an injunction to live in togetherness. 
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presence of many groups within the Ummah that ensures non-state leaderships are available to 
advance pragmatic solutions for local Muslim communities toward relocalisation, provided that it is 
allowed to happen119.  The negative side is too obvious to need further speculation given the present 
condition of the Ummah as Maarif described. In this sense, the potential of the Ummah to mobilize 
ecological actions in a collaborative, though decentralized and diverse manner, is not a figment, 
given the power of symbolic universe already expounded in Chapter 2.
Maarif continued with a rumour circulating among the Muslims. However unfounded120, the 
rumour reflected Muslims bewilderment about the multidimensional crisis the world is facing:
Oh, have you heard a circulating story in the internet about a Hadith raised by a syeikh in 
Cyprus? He said that the mission of the Prophet Muhammad solallahu alaihi wa salam
(peace be upon him) lasts only up to 1,500 years and then the Qiyamah121. So we are 
approaching the Qiyamah now, you know? That means we have only 65 years left, Well, I 
said, we must remember that our Prophet is not a soothsayer, he never made 
prognostications, when he said about the fall of the Roman empire and that came true it 
was not his foretelling but the saying of the Quran, so we must be very-very careful about 
this matter
In his article, Dunia Islam Yang Masih Rapuh, Republika, February 1, 2011, Maarif criticised 
Islamists views. In his opinion, the Muslim worlds susceptibility to the Wests domination was 
caused by the feebleness of Islamic countries themselves. For him, radical introspection is needed, 
and that requires Muslims being critical of the Muslims themselves. Further, while being quite aware 
of mounting environmental issues, Maarif was disappointed by the Ulamas lack of participation due 
to their loss of contact, hence relevance, with the real-life issues since colonial times. 
Everyone knows the dalil (reference), surah Rum is widely referred, right? dhaharal fasaadu 
fil barri wal bahri bimaa kasabat aydinnaasi  li yudziiqahum badha alladzi amilu laallahum 
yarjiun122. But how to execute that, they dont know. Their knowledge is so limited. 
Because, for the past hundreds of years, you know, Islam cannot be applied in everyday 
affairs, so Islam has evolved into a religion that only deals with doctrines, their 
correspondences to contemporary realities are not so clear to the Muslims anymore. The 
  
119
Considering external forces that continue to divide and conquer the Muslim people.
120
For there is strong prohibition in Islam to forecast the Hour, as the Prophet himself, other than enumerating 
the signs, said About that he who is questioned knows no more than the questioner (in a Hadith meeting 
with Angel Jibril).
121
Qiyamah is known as the day of resurrection. It is understood by the Muslims as eschatological the end of the 
world. Belief in Qiyamah and afterlife is one of the six articles of Islamic faith, alongside belief in One God; the 
angels of God; the Books of God, especially the Quran; the prophets of God, especially Muhammad; Qada and 
Qadar (the supremacy of Gods will, predestination). 
122
Corruption doth appear on land and sea because of which mens hands have done, that He may make them 
taste a part of that which they have done, in order that they may return (Q:30:41)
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Ulama masters the kitab kuning123 only, they dont comprehend the kitab putih124. From 
then on, the gap is just widening
In response to my question about the notion of progress, Maarif gave his opinion that reminds me
of Nasrs criticism of the modernists view of progress a belief that everything will become better 
simply by progressing over time. Such belief makes people forget both God and the limit of nature.
If you look at the Quran, it talks about the progress of time optimistically, such as Surah 
Dhuha, for example, wal akhirotu khoirul laka minal ula125, even though some interpreted it
as saying about the Madinah period as being better than the Makkahs, but at least it is a 
progressive outlook. So when there are Muslims who bring up the pessimistic Hadith, I 
would say those Hadith need to be re-reviewed, re-studied. How come we talk about 
regressing when everybody else is progressing? So, I think what they are doing in Turkey 
now is on the right track, they began with Hadith narration by al-Bukhari Muslim. Im not 
expert on that, but I see the crucial needs to study the exegesis of the Quran and Hadith at 
this particular moment in history. As we see what the Taliban did to the women, they made
their own interpretations of Islam which has been really devastating Islam. For them, 
women are just suargo manut neroko katut126, so someone like you cant possibly make your 
study (laughter)
Maarif was also concerned about population growth in developing countries:
Its really scary! If you look at the prediction, in 2045 Indonesia is predicted to have a 450 
million population. So, let me conclude, I will say that we need a leader who sudah selesai 
dengan dirinya sendiri127 to deal with these very complex issues. Lets be optimistic, 
however, this country is very rich!
Bruinessen (2013) noted that the Muhammadiyahs concern with education has continued. The 
group has been strongly represented in the higher echelons of the Ministry of Education. In the post-
Suharto period, it has successfully attempted to gain control of the Ministry and its view of 
education has influenced the legislation. Detailed description of Muhammadiyahs education is 
presented in chapter 7. In the following section I will examine how the same issues apply to the 
traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia: 
  
123
Classical texts of various Islamic disciplines. These works are collectively known in Indonesia as kitab kuning, 
literally, yellow book. According to Van Bruinessen (1994), that name is allegedly owed to the tinted paper on 
which the first Middle Eastern editions reaching Indonesia was printed. 
124
Literally, white book, means, contemporary debates.
125
And verily, the latter portion will be better for thee than the former (Q:93:4).
126
Javanese old proverb, literally, to the heaven she was passenger, to the hell she was attached, refers to the 
fate of total submission of a woman to her husband.
127
Loosely translated: has accomplished him/herself.
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(1) Do they have a self-reliance culture such as the Muhammadiyahs trading and 
entrepreneurship traditions? 
(2) Do they have as much ambiguous nationalist-globalist tendency as leaders of 
Muhammadiyah?
(3) How strong is the power of Islamic symbolic universe to move the traditionalists?
(4) Finally, in what ways can the traditionalist Muslims be called for relocalisation for survival 
and sustainability? 
6.3 Nahdlatul Ulama: Conserving Islamic Traditions
This section is a presentation of both the Indonesian traditionalist Muslims and the Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) as the coordinating body of their scholars (kyai) and their pesantren. In the literature, NU has 
been considered as a political force (Hefner, 1987; Dijk, 1996; Bush, 2009) and the fatwa128 maker 
alongside MUI-Council of Indonesan Ulama (Laffan, 2005). Literature on pesantren has primarily 
focused on their roles as (i) community development agent (Candland, 2000); (ii) civil society (Sirry, 
2010; Bush, 2009, Hefner, 2000); (iii) loci of Sufi order and the orders recruits (Howell, 2001, 
Dhofier, 1999); and (iv) provider of schooling (Lukens Bull, 2001; Bruinessen, 2009; Pohl, 2009). A 
description of each account will unfold as the discussion goes. It begins with a description of the NU, 
and then focuses on the research interests.
To reiterate what has already been specified in earlier chapters, NU is the worlds largest 
Muslim mass-based organization (Bruinessen, 2004). It has always been a multifunctional 
organization: social, educational, and political (Pringle, 2010). From this research though, I did not 
see the organization as one that can be described easily. Perhaps, Laffan (2005:96) shares my
opinion best. According to him:
Although NU claims the largest mass-membership of any Muslim organization in the world, 
it is still best seen as an alliance of scholars, their pupils and extended families with a 
backbone of prominent 'ulama' known as kiai. Some of these kiais run pesantrens, oversee 
Sufi brotherhoods (tarekat), and even patronise the activities of a range of non-government 
organizations. Taken as a whole, NU is capable of mobilizing large numbers of delegates 
from throughout the archipelago.
The NU community is often called Nahdliyyin. NUs influences are most dominant in Java or among 
the Javanese who make up nearly 42% of the Indonesian population. Before massive urbanization 
took place in Java and other islands, Nahdliyyin were largely rural and pesantren-educated. The 
lifeblood of the NU is the network of kyai. In its present form, NU is basically a charitable body, 
helping to fill many of the shortcomings of the Indonesian government in society (Pringle, 2010). NU 
funds hospitals and organizes local communities (neighborhood or kampung) into more coherent 
groups and helps to combat poverty. There is a central board in Jakarta and provincial boards in each 
  
128
Learned interpretation and religious opinion about an issue by a qualified jurist pertaining to the Islamic law.
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of Indonesia's provinces that direct the organization. The NU has both informally and formally 
affiliated organizations. Organizational affiliates, such as Ikatan Putri-Putri, Fatayat, and Muslimat 
(associations of NU girls, younger women, and older women, respectively), are composed of NU 
members and report to the NU plenary, but have no formal role in the NU hierarchy. Muslimat is an
important association within the NU. It was founded in March 1946 to `improve the well-being and 
status of Muslim women.' (Tristiawati and Munir, 1995:2). The wives of kyai are often the provincial 
leaders within the Muslimat. There are ten such autonomous organizations affiliated to the NU. It is 
revealing of the social solidarity within the NU that these organizations are typically referred to as 
being part of the NU family (Candland, 2000).
With regard to community development, Candland (2000:36) explains that the provincial 
committees administer other organizations within the formal structure of the NU, such as the LKK 
(Lembaga Kemaslahatan Keluarga - Family Welfare Institute) and the LAKPESDAM (Lembaga Kajian 
dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia - Institute for Studies and Human Resource 
Development). There are twelve such formal lembaga (institutions). The LPPNU and LPNU, for
example, coordinate NU activities in the fields of employment generation and rural development. 
One of the organizations formed within the formal structure of the NU was the LKK. It was founded 
in December 1977 to promote family welfare, largely through reproductive health and family 
planning, by the Yayasan Kesejahteraan Muslimat (Women's Welfare Foundation), an institution 
established and operated by Muslimat. Previously, family welfare activities of the NU were 
coordinated by the Yayasan Kesejahteraan Muslimat. The LKK conducts training programs for health
care workers, works with domestic and international governmental and nongovernmental agencies, 
and produces and distributes pamphlets and books on reproductive health. One of the truly 
remarkable accomplishments of the LKK, achieved with the help of the association of young NU 
women, Fatayat, was the reinterpretation of the Quran and Hadith that lead to a fatwa in favour of 
family planning, including specific kinds of tubal ligations and vasectomies (Saifuddin Zuhri et al., 
1979; Masyhuri, 2000). International Planned Parenthood and the United Nations Children's Fund 
have recognized the work of Fatayat and Muslimat as instrumental in promoting reproductive health 
and raising mother and infant survival rates throughout Indonesia.
Like Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organizations, NU has a body for collection of zakat, 
infaq and shodaqoh, the forms of Islamic philanthropy, LAZIS NU (Lembaga Amil, Zakat, Infaq, 
Shodaqoh NU). By the end of 2009, the East Java branch of NU launched a local TV station, TV9, 
aired from Surabaya. TV9 provides alternative information and programs to the mainstream media 
and aimed to be an alternative media for Muslims. Among the programs are the pengajian (learning 
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circles) of the NU-affiliated kyai, entrepreneurship, and entertainment alternatives to the so-called 
infotainments that the Indonesians - women in particular - have been mesmerized by (see 
Heryanto, 2008)129. TV9 entertainments are free of ghibah (backbiting), said Kyai Mutawakkil 
Alallah (Nahdlatul Ulama, 2011), the President Commissioner, in that regard.  In 2012, the same 
branch of NU founded Mabadiku Bintang Sembilan Cooperative, which aimed to empower the NU to 
combat poverty. The cooperative is supposed to turn the NU from lower hand to become an 
upper hand in a Hadith: the upper hand is better than the lower hand (he who gives the charity 
is better than the one who takes it) (Nahldatul Ulama, 2013).  In short, there are governance 
structures for setting up local activities which can be expected to be explored from the NU, the kyais 
and pesantren communities under the Sages and Relocalisation Activists discussions in Chapter 4.   
6.3.1 NU: From anti-systemic, to anti-politics
The NU played an active role in the fight for Indonesian independence and was involved in the 
writing of the ideology of Indonesian state as well as in the indictment of the loss of the seven 
words from Pancasila (Sirry, 2010); and became a political party in 1952. Afterward, NU-state 
relations continued to be complex. Until the early 1980s, the politics of distrust were the main 
feature of the relationship between NU and the state (Sirry, 2010:63). Confrontation with the state 
jeopardized NU by being involved too much in practical politics with little gain. In 1984 at the NU 
Situbondo National Congress, under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, it withdrew from formal 
politics as part of Kembali ke Khittah 1926 (Return to Guidelines 1926)130. Wahid believed that NU 
and its pesantren network could become a vital component of a civil society that inspires democracy 
(Sirry, 2010:70). NU began to promote civil society discourse and shifted its focus from politics to 
social and community development. While it has never again become a political party, NU has 
remained active in the world of Indonesian politics since 1984 (Bush, 2009).  
For Bush (2009:28), the adoption of Khittah26 signaled a victory of intellectual groups over 
the politicians that had dominated the NU for decades, and henceforth, the intellectuals maintained 
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Because the orientation of these infotainment programmes is entertainment, which can make profit by 
creating cheap entertainment, the quality of the information presented in such shows barely has any 
relevance. These programmes are not intended to increase the quality of public understanding of current 
affairs and issues of importance to the public. Rather these programmes deceive society, in particular 
women (Arivia, 2005, cited in Yulianto, 2008:141). Celebrity shows become a kind of air pollution that the 
female audience consumes everydaydissuaded and distracted women from participation in public life of 
major importance (Heryanto, 2008:141)
130
A considerable amount of discussion and debate has been generated about the true purpose of the original 
establishment of NU. Most NU scholars describe the main motivations being religious and social  to maintain 
and protect ahlu sunnah wal jamaahwhich means those who follow the Sunna (Bush, 2001:36)
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a strong position. Nonetheless, both the politicians and anti-politicians invoked Khittah26 and 
harkened back to NUs original purpose and nature in support of their cause (Bush, 2009:28). With 
the anti-political stance the traditionalists began a more overt campaign against conflation of Islam 
and politics (Sirry, 2010:69), yet, some pesantren leaders continue to be interested in politics. 
Moreover, the establishment of National Awakening Party (PKB) in 1998, based largely on an NU 
constituency, and that Abdurrahman Wahid himself decided to run for the presidency, complicated 
the situation even further. What Sirry (2010: 69-71) describes as the complication engendered by 
the rise of Wahid to the presidency caught my attention. Like other Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, 
Wahid had grappled with the idea of nation-state vis-à-vis Islam for a long time. Since the 1970s he 
expressed his thinking through his prolific writing and debating especially what it means to be an 
Indonesian Muslim and detailing the proper relationship between Islam and the state (Burhani, 
2013). 
During his presidency, in interview with Hutanuwatr (2004:226-246)  in which they discuss 
an alternative to a Western model of development in Asia - Wahid said that he believes Islam, as a 
way of life, has no clear concept of state (p.237). He adopted a nation-state idea for Indonesia 
instead, and infused it with the principles that characterized his pursuit of civil society ideals. For 
instance: (i) he wanted to reduce the role of the government, talked in cabinet that ministers should 
not try to curtail or challenge the peoples ability to be active, instead, the government should only 
make plans and then coordinate with the NGOs in organizing activities (p.229); (ii) aiming at food 
sovereignty131, he wanted to save the agriculture sector from foreign investment and multinational 
corporations, and keep it instead for local communities and peoples (p.229). His unfailing good 
presupposition of others demonstrates the pesantren characteristic of husnu dzon (Arabic, thinking 
of others and their actions in positive light), which sadly, cannot always be applied to the so-called 
global-political economic realms, as the following accounts show. While he wanted to change the 
strategy towards economic growth, by not depending on foreign investment, export, and 
industrialization anymore, instead, building a peoples economy and catering for the domestic 
market (p.237), he continued to resist the interviewers negative view of capitalism (p.230-232). He 
put forward, instead, his confidence in agency and the good innate nature of human beings (which 
evokes the Sages in 4.2.2), that even an IMF which in his eyes is only an instrument, can always be 
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Food sovereignty is food self-reliance movement for sustainability, growing from the farmers, fishers, 
indigenous people and landless workers most impacted by global hunger and poverty. Food sovereignty goes 
well beyond ensuring that people have enough food to meet their physical needs. It asserts that people must 
reclaim their power in the food system by rebuilding their relationships between people and the land, and 
between food providers and those who eat. It is rooted in ongoing global struggles over control of food, land, 
water, and livelihoods (e.g. Wittman, 2010; Patel, 2007).
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changed toward serving the people (p.233). Notably, the Rupiah went down steadily throughout his 
period, and the interviewer provoked discussion of that by suggesting it showed that international 
agencies that control the money wanted him to fail (p.233). Still Wahid resisted this argument. 
Furthermore, for peace and stability of the country, Wahid wanted to pardon Suharto and to 
exercise leniency  a proposition that raised anger of Indonesians, mainly of the Western-educated 
intellectuals (p.228). From the relocalisation and knowledge in community perspective, I argue
that Wahid provides a full-circle experimentation of civil society activists trying to apply the small-
scale, largely homogenous communitys contexts of pesantren and its network, in a vast, complex, 
and heterogeneous nation-state system. 
The civil society discourse gained popularity soon after the end of Suharto. Many modernist 
scholars preferred to use masyarakat madani instead -a word associated with the society of 
Medina132. Henceforth, the debates came to ignite another interpretation of civil society as Islamic 
state, which provoked the traditionalists.  For the traditionalists, referring to the Medina charter 
and society means they must hold the political agenda of Islamization. For the modernist, leaving the 
term untranslated has made the traditionalists appear to be victims of Western hegemony of 
meaning (Sirry, 2010:67). Another important impact of the NUs anti-political stance is the 
emergence of a growing number of Muslim NGOs133 targeting the pesantren to become key 
institutions in community development. The pesantren provided Muslim activists with an extensive 
network of institutions that spread throughout Indonesia and down to the grass-roots level (Sirry, 
2010:65). In what follows, I will describe the NUs environmental activism through Lembaga 
Penanggulangan Bencana dan Perubahan Iklim (Disaster and Climate Change Board, henceforth, 
LPBI). Interviews were made with eleven leaders of LPBI in the Jakarta head office. 
6.3.2 Better Late than Never: LPBI NU
LPBI is an ad-hoc committee focusing on the impact of climate change. It is a further development of 
community-based disaster risk management. The committee was established recently (August 
2010). Apparently the NU has been in cooperation with a number of national and international 
donors in disaster management issues. Names such as the Australian Government (AusAID), UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA), Word Wildlife Fund (WWF), Mangrove Forest for the Future (MFF), Consortium for 





In response to Suhartos repressive regime towards political Islam, Indonesia witnessed mushrooming Muslim 
activism.
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Additionally, the NU was with the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia in Conference of the 
Parties (COP 15) and the world conference on climate change in Copenhagen (2009); Bali Roadmap 
(2007); WOC (World Ocean Conference) in Manado (2009); conference of the UN ISDR (International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction) in Bangkok (2007); International MACCA (Moslem Action for Climate 
Change Adaptation) in Bogor (2010); Climate International Project by DNPI (National Council on 
Climate Change) in Jakarta (2010).
All the LPBI leaders interviewed admitted that among the most vulnerable to the natural 
disasters such as flooding and landslide were the Nahdliyyin given that they were mainly in rural and 
lower income urban areas. Yayah Ruchyati told that until 2007 there was no legislation to regulate 
the activities that potentially caused environmental damage. Only when nature was degraded 
everywhere and natural disasters arrived, has the legislation finally been made. This echoes 
Adamss (2001) warning of the late awareness about environmental problems in the Third World, for 
in the initial periods of industrialization, resources were abundant and places where waste could be 
discarded were readily available. I inquired further to Muniem, another LPBI leader: but what 
about sustainable development that Professor Emil Salim has spoken of since 1980s, do you mean 
that concept doesnt work or is just falling short?
Of course not. What kind of sustainable development is that, if what they meant by 
development is constructing high-rise buildings, roads, industries like that? Can you imagine 
how many mountains need to be sacrificed, how many hectares of forest have to be 
destroyed in order to supply granite, marble, stone, wood that a building like that requires? 
What a contradiction that theyve been talking about: development and sustainability - very 
illogical
In the same year LPBI was established (2010), the multinational environmental group WWF joined 
forces with LPBI NU to spread the message about saving the environment. The head of WWF 
Indonesia, Efransjah, said the agreement called for a combination of environmental conservation 
and religious values to deal with the impact of climate change. Efransjah was confident that the NUs 
extensive network would help to disseminate public awareness about preserving the environment 
and biodiversity134. 
The head of LPBI, Avianto Muhtadi, who, at the time, was a PhD student at the University of 
Indonesia, said that LPBI was founded out of the awareness that climate change is a serious threat, 
not only to the coastal areas of an archipelagic country like Indonesia, but also to the inland in the 
form of changing rain pattern and drought that may cause changes in planting seasons and lead to 





Management (BNPB) and being the head of the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (Planas 
PRB).
Before continuing it is necessary to distinguish between LPBI NU and the Nahdliyyin 
pesantren. Apparently, LPBI is an NGO to help any community rather than assuming the role of 
community leader that the kyai takes in his own pesantren community. For a closer look at an LPBI 
project on flood response in Jakarta, I interviewed Wahib who was in charge of the garbage 
management project. He commented immediately, yeah, the corporations enjoy the profit and we 
look after the garbage. Jakarta obviously had a very ineffective garbage system and flooding is just 
one of the consequences135. Wahib explained a project on household garbage management in the 
slum area located just behind an affluent estate, Green Garden, West Jakarta. LPBI trained people 
in that area to find the value of garbage through creativity and to reuse it or compost it. They built 
compost houses and provided facilities and trained the neighborhood leaders to further teach the 
people. I inquired further whether the same trainings were made for the Green Garden residents.
Oh, people living in such a housing complex certainly have a different way of thinking, they 
will say: I can pay for that, so dont bother me with anything like that, but people living 
behind their complex, when the flood came they had to face it, whereas those rich people 
not - even if the flood was so big that their houses got affected, they can easily escape to a 
hotel - the end of the matter!
I asked him whether it was easy to teach these people in the slum area, though.
Well, not so easy. In order to succeed we need to find individuals with high commitment
Whether LPBI is able to expand the garbage management activities outside Jakarta remains to be 
seen. In the fieldwork in Surabaya city, by chance I came to know Fitri (name has been changed), a 
young lady known to be highly committed in garbage management volunteering activities, who 
would have been the right person for Wahibs project. Fitri was a high school teacher who lived in 
kampung Kembang Kuning, a lower class urban settlement. People knew Fitri as being passionate in 
voicing green and clean projects. She trained men and women in Kembang Kuning doing 
composting and garbage work similar to Wahibs project. When she was interviewed, apparently she 
was not in good spirits.
Im tired, really tired. That should be the job of the government, the ruler, not people like 
me. The government had to enforce it, enact it, and then it will work. Honestly, Im fed up. It 
was really hard to persuade the people. If I were sick who would care about me? I came to 





Another important point was made by Ahmad Muryadi, a Nahdliyyin community leader in Kembang 
Kuning neighborhood. I asked him, what he thought about the peoples awareness of waste issues 
and their sense of responsibility towards the stream which appeared filled with garbage and trash 
bags.    
In a nutshell we can say that although people in this area today are none without higher 
college education, at least they got S1 (graduate) if not S2 (Master), but their environmental 
consciousness and social responsibility is, lets say, only at primary-school-level, or at most 
junior high school.  People like that only think about themselves, if you talk to them about 
environment, they will think of their immediate environment, which is only around 
themselves. 
Owing to its ties with the NU, LPBI could have better rapport and ability to communicate with people 
on the grass-root level than other NGOs. But not unlike the disadvantages of NGOs in general 
(William, 1991), it has limited project coverage and limited authority over the project areas in order 
to make impactful and long-lasting changes, besides dependence on outside financial resources. 
6.3.3 Overwhelmed with Obligations
The LPBIs capacity seems to be limited, it is important to note that however entrenched, the 
traditionalist pesantren have been far from able to contain the rapacious capitalist interests to 
ravage the livelihoods of people living nearby. During the visit to pesantren Riyadlul Jannah, Pacet, 
Mojokerto - about 7 km away from Munhanifs pesantren - there were people who came to seek 
help on behalf of the villagers whose places were flooded as sand mining destroyed the riverbank. 
Obviously, these people were not necessarily pesantren members. Gus Yusuf, a young member of 
staff, said that 93 spots in Mojokerto district were in conflict including 50 villages severely harmed.
They protested to the local government, it didnt work, they escalated it to province level, it 
didnt work, they reported it to the police, it didnt work either, so where else to go if not to 
seek refuge with the kyai 
Yusuf also mentioned a potential religious conflict caused by the appropriation of 300 hectares of 
land in Trawas by Ciputra, the most prominent developer in high-class real estate that planned to 
make it a Christian resort complex with a Chinese graveyard, named Trawas Memorial Park. 
In their plot design, there will be a huge Cross, they said it will be the largest Cross in the 
world that will be visible from the air when you are on the plane. They meant it to welcome 
Jesus that they believe will come down in year 2020
Different from the official stance of the NU, Kyai Munhanif puts forward his opinion that there is 
only one way to solve the disparity problems. That is, to enact Shariah law in Indonesia, and for that, 
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all Muslim constituents must support just one Islamic political party. Apparently, Munhanif is not 
with the anti-politcs:
If Indonesia turned to be like this, it is not anybodys fault but the Muslims themselves. 
Kanjeng Nabi (Javanese, blessed Prophet), prescribed that for us 1,400 years ago
zamaanu alannasi yadullunnas minal ulama wal fuqahaThere will come a day when 
the Ummah distances themselves from Ulama (scholars) and Fuqaha (jurists), so Allah will 
send them three things: despot leaders; their works are bereft of blessing; and, died 
without faith.
As he mentioned Shariah law, I asked his opinion about Adat law in comparison. He answered with a 
big smile:
Ive been asked by people about this matter over and over. Let me try to make it simple 
for everyone to understand. Say, if there are 1000 trees in the forest over here, and there 
are 1000 people living in this village. In states law, all trees belong to the state, so, it is up 
to the state to give it to anyone they wish, and in fact, they give them to the big men
(referring to corporations), and we here are only as the onlookers. In Adat law, anyone 
stealing the wood is hurting the adat, hence, the community. But in in Islamic law, the 
1000 trees belong to everyone, remember the surah al-Baqarah of the Quran, wa lakum 
ma fil ardhi jamian so everyone is entitled to one. And if you dont do that, you violate 
Allahs rule, so you have to deal with Him by yourself. Alhamdulillah (praise to Allah), I can 
give numerous examples to these people. Those, who when they were in power, did 
breach Allahs rule by giving clearances on massive forest plunder after Gus Dur stated136
that forest belongs to the people, if you remember (laughter), are now facing Allahs 
punishment, wala tulqu bi aydikum ila at-tahlukah -by destroying others they destroyed 
themselves- all the money they got seemed to slip away just like that, - illness, childs 
problems, mental health problems, and so on -now we can see how they are living in 
misery
In his deliberation, Munhanif seems to have emphasized the equality aspect of Shariah law with 
regard to natural resource distribution for this has been perceived as a major concern of rural 
communities. He forgot to highlight that Shariah law includes treatment of nature as well, without 
which it ends up with what had been attempted by President Abdurrahman Wahid as he previously 
mentioned. His opinion of the supremacy of Shariah over adat law 137 also indicated the 
traditionalists turn, suggesting the homogenizing effect of contemporary globalization upon the 
Muslims.  Azras (2013) commentary is appropriate here:
Thus, in the initial stages, Islam probably occupied only a marginal position in local tradition, 
but through the years, Islam became more central and transcended many diverse local 
traditions. This is clear in the case of the Minangkabau experience of Islam, for instance. In 
  
136  
During his short tenure (1999-2001), President Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur) made a statement 
that turned to be a fiasco. He stated that Indonesian forests belonged to the people. The statement was 
responded to immediately by massive forest plunder by corporations in the name of people right  
137  
See Chapter 5 - the traditionalist used to accommodate local customs.
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the initial process of Islamisation, the Minangkabau people followed the principle of syara 
bersendi adat; adat bersendi syara (syara [Islam] is based on adat [local tradition]; adat is 
based on syara). Later, after the end of the Padri war, this principle was changed into adat 
bersendi syara; syara bersendi kitabullah (adat is based on Islam; Islam is based on the 
Quran). (p.65)
Contrasting positions seem to appear from the top-level of NU leadership in the Jakarta head office. 
In pre-emption towards ideas that appeared to him being against the ideal of NKRI nation-state, one 
leader responded totally negatively to my question about the possibility of a green intentional 
community model with self-local governance for the Nahdliyyin members: 
Like Al-Salam fenced-pesantren [name of the fenced-pesantren group has been changed 
for ethical considerations], is that what you meant? Here is my opinion about them, if it 
were just to liberate their people from dependency on the big system, thats fine, but that 
kind of radical attempt is a problem in itself. Are you aware that their ideology is a 
problematic one? [Note the fenced-pesantren group officially stated Islam, instead of 
Pancasila, as their ideology]
The leader continued:
We, the Nahdliyyin, believe in the middle-way, the moderate way. In our eyes, the present 
situation is still fine. We always have positive thinking that everything can be changed with 
dialogue and consensus. If we have to make changes we will do that together with the whole 
nation, not in such an exclusive system, but with the participatory one.
Eleven leaders interviewed gave almost resolute negative answers towards the green-intentional 
community relocalisation concept with self-local governance: We have the Nahdliyyin pesantren 
community model already, and that works, is their answer. I inquired further regarding what is 
likely if the prognosis of the environmentalist were to be true that there are impending 
environmental cataclysm and converging crisis in all facets of life in the near future. The following 
answers captured the heart of the matter: 
When it comes to be poor, we are the expert (laughter)
That should be a problem for the wealthy, not the Nahdliyyin. We have always been poor, 
being rich is what we have not yet tasted (laughter) 
The Nahdliyyin is very robust. Although they have been among the poorest in Indonesian 
society, very rare, if any, of them committed suicide, their bonding with the kyai has made 
them strong
On the grass-root levels though, both NU and Muhammadiyah leaderships show a moderate level of 
eagerness with the following themes dominating their responses: i) need of model, ii) need of 
knowledge and skills about relocalisation, and iii) need of leadership. Answers from NU and 
Muhammadiyah sympathizers who worked as professionals outside the two organizations 
highlighted i) the need of job security that an intentional community might not be able to provide, 
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and ii) the need of leadership by existing Muslim groups. In fact, all those responses confirm the 
opinion of community builders such as Trainer (2000, 2006) and Jackson (2002) in Chapter 4, who 
believe that social change could best be achieved through the construction and demonstration of an 
ideal model that could be duplicated throughout the country. Nasr (2009:139) also believes that 
green-intentional communities such as ecovillages can be very important models for developing 
saner ways of living.
6.3.4 The Partys Over: Responses to Ecological Crisis
Despite the intertwining challenges of poverty and vulnerability of the poor to environmental 
disasters, this research shows that the NU, like Muhammadiyah, as the largest umbrella of the 
Muslim populace only did what they could do to mitigate the impacts, instead of attempting to 
radically transform the economic policies. This is understandable given that both were peripheral 
from national policy-making capacity. During an interview with Kyai Said Aqil Siraj, the chairman of 
the NU, and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, impressions were given 
of being exasperated by the countrys inability to overcome corruption that gave rise to all crises at a 
multi-dimensional level in Indonesia138. Tellingly, however, giving prudent and cautious responses 
and being wary of taking side with either one extreme, including when answering questions, is the 
unique characteristic of the Nahdliyyins attitudes as shown in the following transcripts. 
I asked Siraj, what would be the best way to deal with the present situation of the socio-
ecological crisis in the country, whether to take a survivalists approach to seize greater control of 
destiny, or fatalistic, to just let it go and whatever will be will be. His answer went as follows:
Well, both extremes are not right. This responsibility is for of all of us together, also with 
the government, to restorein this sense is to return to Tasawuf that taught us: those who 
follow their egos are those who forgot Allah, and those who forgot Allah are those who 
forgot themselves. What is inflicting us now is the result of those. Do you know that the 
Quran mandated it clearly?,  innamaa jazaau al-lladzina yuharibuna Allaha wa rosuulahu wa 
yas awna fi al-ardhi fasadan an yuqottalu aw yushollabuu  aw tuqattaa aydihim wa 
arjuluhum min khilaafin aw funfaw mina al-ardhi , dzaalika lahum khizyun fi al-dunya 
walahum fi al-akhirati adzabun adhiem : The punishment of those who wage war against 
Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is
execution, or crucifixion or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile 
from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the 
Hereafter (Q:5:33)Isnt that terrifying? So, even though the Quran says wa-sakkhara al-
  
138
Maarif wrote in http://maarifinstitute.org/id/berita/berita-media/123/syafii-maarif-indonesia-butuh-
pemimpin-sedikit-gila Indonesia needs courageous, although a bit crazy leader, to save the country from 
corruption. NU in http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2011/03/28/063323446/NU-Kecam-Penghapusan-
Hukuman-Mati-Koruptor proposed the death penalty for corruptors. 
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samawati wa al-bahar139 but that doesnt mean you are free from the obligation to take care 
of it, and the obligation is for all people, not only a certain group 
I asked further, but does that mean you think all people partook equally in destroying nature, 
then?
No, of course the large corporations did. Remember, the Prophet commanded, there are 
three things that cannot be privatized: water, fuel and forest, those are derived from the 
Quran, so, the Divine Law has been violated and there we are nowthe Quran says Walawi 
ittabaa al haqqu ahwaahum lafasadati al-samawatu wal ardu, had the truth followed their 
desires, the heavens and the earth and all those therein would have fallen in total disorder 
(Q:23:71).  This situation takes us back to the Pharaohs time, it was narrated in the Quran 
how the Pharaohs Dynasty was crumbled by the greed of the traders named Qarun and 
Haman, arent they similar to those corporations, then?
So, who do you think should begin to take action?
Well, of course the policies have to be re-reviewed, but as you know we inherited an utterly 
corrupt bureaucracy, a very corrupt one now we have freedom of speech, even too much 
sometimes, we have barely more transparent legal process, but social justice is still very far 
from reality 
What if the young people say that justice can only be gained by fighting back?
Yes, but the cost is too high!
The response of Syafii Maarif of Muhammadiyah was nothing short of indeterminate in tone: 
Certainly, unholy conspiracy between the ruler and the black conglomerates were behind 
all those. What can the religious communities do? At best we can only make normative 
callings, but who is the real ruler?    
In order to analyze the potential of the Muhammadiyah and NU to promote relocalisation ideals that 
also have global visions of reclaiming the balance of the life-support system of the entire earth based 
on personal action in changing lifestyle discussed in Chapter 4, a comparison of their views with the 
newly emerging transnational Islam groups in Indonesia needs to be made.  For example, there is a 
contrast between Muhammadiyah and NUs top leaders responses, with the spokesperson of Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia140, Roni Ruslan, in the answer to my question regarding whether survivalism or 
fatalism approach is best in their perspective. Hizbut Tahrir, the Party of Liberation, is a foreign-
  
139
God has subjected (sakhara) nature to humankind does not mean the ordinary conquest of nature as 
claimed by many modern Muslims thirsty for the power which modern science bestowed upon humans.  
Rather it means the dominion over things which mankind is allowed to exercise only on the condition that it be 
according to Gods Law and precisely because human is Gods vice-gerent on earth.
140  
See 2.4.1 and 3.2.1 about this organization.
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based mass organization which advocates restoration of a global caliphate. By its famous slogan in 
Indonesia Indonesia Will Become Better with Shariah, it has been seen as threatening to Pancasila. 
No, we dont want to vanish together. Go away from Muslim lands, let us take care of 
ourselves using our own Islamic laws, and for sure the environmental crisis will be 
overcome. Let us re-build the khilafah. Remember, khilafah is a mandate from Allah to all 
Muslims, look the Quran surah Al-Imran 140. That is our answer (Roni Ruslan)
In my opinion, both the nature of the problems and the nature of the people in the present-day 
crisis, demand pragmatic rather than heuristic solutions from religion. And also, as Berger and 
Luckmann (1999:146) said, no history of ideas takes place in isolation from the blood and sweat of 
general history. It is against this background that I argue, it can be contextualized that a good 
number of energetic young people have fled their parents to join the more zealous groups in the 
transnational movement. Hizbut Tahrir is known to be quite popular among students and young 
people in the Middle East, including those pursuing their degrees in Western countries (Azra, 
2013:72). In Indonesia, alongside the Prosperous Welfare Party (PKS) who is regarded as the 
Indonesian version of Muslim Brotherhood; apolitical Tablighi Jamaat; and various Salafi
movements, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is a new movement that competes for influence with 
moderate NU and Muhammadiyah (Bruinessen, 2013:3). The energetic image of PKS as combatant 
of corruption and vice also attracted young members of NU and Muhammadiyah (Feillard, 2013). An 
NU spokesman openly acknowledged the infiltration of transnational Islams ideas into its 
communities through mosque activities141. At the most extreme end, research on the religious life of 
terrorist individuals in Indonesia conducted by Puslitbang Kehidupan Keagamaan (Research Center 
of Religious Life) in the Department of Religious Affairs reveals the religious cultural background of 
the Indonesian terrorists are Nahdliyyin, who are discontented with the Nahdliyyin way, then, 
turned to modernists, puritan, and Wahabism-influenced ways of Islam (Sugiyarto, 2009, cited in 
Jamil, 2011:370). Additional research by the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, CSRC, 
Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo (Al-Makassary, 2010) warns that 
radical Islamic groups have attracted many young members of the NU and Muhammadiyah by 
penetrating into the two groups learning communities in their mosques, especially in Jakarta and 
Solo. The book even posed a challenge to the claim made by NU and Muhammadiyah about the 
unanimous acceptance of Pancasila and the unity of nation-state (NKRI) by the members. The 






khilafah.  Kyai Muchid in Surabaya city admitted to me that the Nahdliyyin young generations were 
increasingly attracted to radical Islam.
They might have lost their patience to see mounting problems in our society, you see, we 
have more and more poor people today, what would you say if the costs they had to spend 
in doing the farming was more than what they would earn from selling the crops? look, the 
fish ponds and shrimp ponds in Gresik have now turned into buildings, supermarkets, 
storehouses, factories, the villagers there had nowhere to work, our young people now see 
us as a snail (he refers to the Nahdliyyin, the Traditionalists) well, NU always intends to hug 
them [the Reformists, Islamists] but our philosophy is how to kenek iwake gak buthek 
banyune (Javanese idiom, means literally, the fish caught without troubling the water).
Vice Secretary General of the NU in Jakarta head office, Enceng Sobirin, even acknowledged the 
problem as potentially having wider implications for the existence of the NU and its style of Islam: 
The future of NU is not bright. Firstly, the NU style of Islam is not an instant teaching. It 
demands commitment to go through a long training and socialization in the pesantren or in 
the family in order to grasp the full import of Islam. The style of Islam that we see growing in 
Indonesia today is an instant one, the one that is deliverable in a short time, albeit 
superficially, but perhaps thats the easy way for todays people, even though some will not 
be satisfied with that kind of Islam at the end, I believe. I observed both trends though, the 
increase of people going to instant Islam but also another trend accompanying, the rise of 
interest in Sufism from the non Nahdliyyin background, especially the urban. Thats why 
learning circles of kyai such as Said Aqil Siraj, Quraisy Shihab attracted more and more 
members. At this point I think the gravest task of NU today - which is not so easy - is to 
reformulate its style to meet the condition of the Muslims today, especially as we see 
massive urbanization has altered the entire Java rural lives into urban 
Encengs comment confirms precisely Hasans (2009:237) account of contemporary Indonesian 
Muslims piety:
Unlike religious discussions held in traditional Islamic school (pesantren), While the 
pesantren requires its students to master Islamic subjects using the kitab kuning , new 
centres of Islamic teaching that thrived among urban middle class are inclined to offer a sort 
of instant Islam and practical guide much needed by participants for their everyday life. 
Relying on any accessible texts, the debates were yet assertive in an attempt to objectify 
religious messages. What Eickelman (1992; 1999) calls objectification process signifies the 
emergence of a distinctive style of religious activism oriented to a broad, mass educated 
(national) public rather than a narrow circle of religious adepts (Hefner, 1997)
Urbanization and globalization seem to have altered the mentalities of young constituents. 
Differences between theirs and Muhammadiyahs, are therefore less pronounced now. The situation 
evokes Gadamers hermeneutic principle according to which the interpreters present situation has 
positive value in the process of understanding (Linge, 1977). On the positive side, this could be 
favorable in envisioning a collaborative environmental movement by Muslim groups for there would 
be less peculiarity of local issues to deal with. 
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In the eyes of people like Emha Ainun Nadjib, a prominent figure and a spiritual leader 
especially popular among young people and apposite to speak for the poor, NU possesses enormous 
potential whether they were aware or not. A brief introduction of Emha, also known as Cak Nun, is 
appropriate. Emha, Javanese, is a poet, intellectual, and a prolific preacher who founded a number 
of learning communities in different places. He came from a Masyumi142 family background and used 
to be known as an anti-Suharto activist in Yogyakarta. Assisted by his mother and his brother, he has 
managed to perform a monthly pengajian gathering every full moon night since 1992 at Menturo 
village, Sumobito district, Jombang. The name of the gathering Padang Mbulan, is Javanese for full 
moon. Thousands of members went to Menturo to follow the activity. In his preaching, poetry, 
books and drama, Emha wishes to destroy the walls between different groups of Islam such as NU, 
Muhammadiyah, and so forth. The public loved the activity and soon it became a religious tourism 
for anyone who wishes to find peace of mind. The members of the activity come from all over 
Indonesia, sometimes even from overseas. In this activity, the members are also entertained with 
Islamic music, Shalawatan and Hadrah (view the links in the Footnotes143).  The musical groups 
also come from all over Indonesia. To make the gathering merrier, people make merchandise and 
food markets in the surrounding area. Emha said that he observed glaring instances of the countrys 
leadership being too soft in their dealings of Indonesias foreign relations, we must have been more 
prosperous if we didnt have a government, without a state is even better! Yet, he saw the potential 
of the NU as the only possible savior in this situation given that they are deeply rooted in society. He 
saw the potential of the NU to be alternative to the State:
Yes, NU is able, very able if they were so willing, who else? I observed the NGO like INSIS in 
Yogyakarta, they attempted to advance empowerment of local people, you know? Only in 
doing one RT (neighborhood) they got frustrated (laughter) they turned out to be busy 
themselves while the rest of the people didnt care (laughter) 
But when he was asked whether he would be interested in promoting relocalisation in his learning 
communities, he answered:
No, I dont have that ability. In the situation of Indonesia today, I dont think anyone can do 
that individually. Honestly I feel compassionate for the suffering of our poor people, so I 
dont want to give them any more burden. I will let them enjoy with a little they can get, to 
taste a little bit of what has been gobbled by their elite brothers who sit in the government 
offices and corporations. Theyre just beginning to enjoy motorcycles, so I cant say, oh no-
no, stop, go back to your old bike (laughter). If that prognosis is true and the cataclysm 
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comes, well, wis ayo nek bongko, bongko bareng (rude-Javanese retort: lets go to hell 
together then) (laughter)
He also recognized a problem with the NU:
In this stern situation, if the NU is so willing to grab control, to father the people once 
again, so that those who live in the village feel, O yes, we have a father called Said Aqil 
Siraj then the situation will change drastically. When people had that feeling, their hearts 
were so consoled, whatever they are told to do they will do, including what youre 
envisioning [he meant, relocalisation models], this is the nature of our people. For yourself, 
Im telling you, until the NU have that courage, you should not consider them too seriously 
in your study (laughter)
Over and above, he strongly believes that nothing can be done as long as the grip of external 
domination continues: 
This country needs a leader like Chavez or Ahmadinejad if it is to continue as a country. 
Breaking up relations with the rest of the world is a must, lets say for five years, to let us 
fashion our own solutions to this problem. There is no other way! Do you think those smart 
people in the rich countries will help us out? Come on! They could have fooled students like 
yourself too (laughter)   
Emha made no bones about the Third World self-perception of collective victimhood and, 
reciprocally, collective mistrust of everything associated with the West. His statements also suggest 
that to the politically aware individuals, the NGOs are but pawns for the Western interests in the 
country. Similarly, Sardar (1998) said:
Humanitarian work, charitable work, development assistance and disaster relief are all 
smokescreens for the real motives behind the NGO presence in the South: self-
aggrandizement, promotion of Western values and culture, including conversion to 
Christianity, including dependency, demonstrating the helplessness of those they are 
supposedly helping and promoting what has been aptly described as a disaster 
pornography(p.78) 
Apart from his political expressions, Emha wrote a drama performed by Teater Perdikan in 2012. The 
dramas title Nabi Darurat- Rasul Ad-Hoc, literally, Messenger in Urgency, Ad-Hoc Prophet, 
articulated peoples confusions about the present conditions of the country. The play calls the 
people to return to Nur Muhammad, literally, the light of Muhammad. He was talking about the 
Ultimate Self or the highest attainment of the self, which in Islamic tradition is the perfect man or 
insan kamil that manifested in the human form as Prophet Muhammad. Herein Emha made an 
unignorable point to challenge Berger and Luckmanns approach. Further to what I argued in 2.2.1 
about a dualistic vision of reality having made Berger and Luckmanns approach inadequate to 
explain the religious attitudes of the Muslims being studied, Emhas story posed another challenge 
to Berger and Luckmanns assumption of human nature. The quest by humans to find their Ultimate 
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Selves, to whom there is no more illusion and wherein the felicity lies, cannot be explained 
satisfactorily if the human him/herself is the producer of reality as Berger and Luckmann (1991:67-
70) assumed. Also, implicit to mystical experiences that are associated with the attaining of ones 
Ultimate Self are drives to act that cannot be explained by the three origins of meaning widely 
accepted in social sciences, namely; intrinsic, psychological and meaning that arises in the process of 
interaction between people. For that reason, I put forward in Table 1 another source of meaning 
drawn from mystical experience, namely, spiritual meaning, to be incorporated in the religious 
symbolic universe.
To date, the NU-style of Islam continues to preach contentment, that is, being satiated with 
whatever situation one has in his/her life. A major example is given by a hymn known as Syiir tanpo 
waton (see Appendix 4) that the NU-affiliated mosques chant five times a day prior to daily prayer 
times. Everyone visiting my new house in Surabaya can hear the song with clarity from the mosque 
nearby. However, the mystical approach of the Nahdliyyin towards Shariah laws in verses 2; 3; 4 and 
6 of the hymn could have been factors that drove their younger generations out from the Nahdliyyin 
constituencies, given the Shariah-mindedness of the younger generation as noted by Enceng 
Shobirin above. This resonates with the discussion in chapter 4 regarding the underlying relations 
between Shariah, justice, well-being and happiness which suggest that only Shariah is able to lead 
the Muslim world to justice, happiness and well-being144. Moreover, the nature of present-day 
problems insists people to think of pragmatic solutions. Therefore, discontentment with the 
contentment approach of the Nahdliyyin might have caused the Indonesian Muslims to splinter 
into even more diverse groups. Without giving equal emphasis to Shariah law as much as 
contentment, the Nahdliyyin risked itself to fall prey into Marxs opium of the people critique by 
the young Muslims, as well as being used by the capitalists to protect their agendas.
6.3.5 Urbanization, Conformity and Monolithic Islam
Saniotis (2012:152) claimed approximately 900 of 17,000 pesantren in Indonesia have implemented 
eco-friendly practices such as water, energy and waste management, and Indonesia was coined as 
the home of eco-Islam as many pesantren are now utilizing Islamic ecological principles. To my 
eyes, however, physical appearances of many pesantren in Java were far from signaling an ecological 
awareness. The Indonesian word pesantren is used interchangeably with pondok. Pondok means a 
hut built of bamboo or other light materials. Ziemek (1986) suggests pondok originates from Arabic 
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Sharia aims to foster obedience to God and serves the protection of (i) life; (ii) religion and freedom of it; (iii) 
mind and intellect, including freedom of conscience and thought; (iv) lineage and family; (v) ownership (see 
e.g. Harthout (2011) and Abiad (2008)). The over emphasis of certain aspects of Sharias penal code in the 
media has led to the overshadowing of the moral principles which comprises true Sharia.
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funduk, meaning lodging for travellers. According to Pringle (2010), that reflected a heritage of 
humble origins and scholars wandering in search of knowledge. Today, most pesantren have been 
reconstructed from simple buildings into permanent buildings. Many of them appear as massive 
buildings, partly due to space expansion and the need of facility improvement, which, in my view, 
often ended up reflecting no signs of environmental prudence. In my visit to a rural pesantren an-
Nur Fatmah, in Mbleik village, Mojokerto, East Java, I saw mossed structures of an unfinished three 
story building that showed the construction had been suspended for quite a while. I asked the kyai
why he needed to build classrooms with concrete instead of light materials such as bamboo (which, I 
wondered would be more ecological as well), given that what he was doing would need a lot more 
money to accomplish. He replied in an affirmative tone: Wed like to build proper classrooms for our 
santri, the really good ones, like other schools do. But of course raising funds is not easy. This case 
aptly describes conformity that I notice as being the greatest obstacle to promote ecological 
justification of simplicity in urbanized societies. Conformity is the most general concept to explain 
individual acts in some way because of influence from others. Breckler, Olson and Wiggins (2006) 
note that conformity is nevertheless limited to changes in behavior caused by other people and does 
not refer to effects of other people on internal concepts like attitudes or beliefs. Therefore, people 
can participate in the acts of destroying the environment without necessarily believing in capitalism 
or in the philosophy of progress. In addition, people are more likely to conform in ambiguous 
situations where they are unclear about how they should respond. 
The situation of modernist Muslims already discussed for Muhammadiyah applies to the 
Third-World in general. That is to say, until the Westerners - who represent the dominant worldview 
and culture in the eyes of the ex-colonized - undividedly call for radical shift toward sustainability, 
the ecological issues will remain inconclusive to the latter. For the Muslims in particular, unless the 
discourse was brought up unanimously, and not ambiguously presented side by side with the 
prevailing developmentalism and its capitalistic paradigms, the chance of radical shift towards 
sustainability, or relocalisation, to be heard by the modernist -and revivalists in particular- is low, 
because it will appear as another scheme intended by the West to deceive the Muslims. To the 
traditionalist Muslims, the situation is equally dilemmatic, that is to say, until Islamic laws that 
govern the matters are enacted for the global Ummah, ecological issues will remain secondary. This 
is especially true given that Islam is understood by the adherents as the middle path 
(wasataniyyah), and Muslims the middle nation145 (ummah wasatan). Hence, theologically speaking 
Islam does not condone any forms of extremism. Therefore, an individuals suggestion to make the 
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Thus, We have appointed you a middle nation (Q:2:143).
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lawful (halal) unlawful (haram) is widely accepted by the Muslims as a kind of falsehood. In this 
situation, if things that appear unsustainable conduct in the eyes of the environmentalists are under 
the halal categories, the Muslims are innocent of responsibility. 
Another case in point; eight years after Sardar (2006) celebrated the diversity and 
multiculturalism in Islam as one of its strengths,, in 2014 he was struck by the urbanized face of 
Mecca (NY Times, 2014) as he found the holiest site of Islam had undergone huge transformation in 
the past 10 years. From a dusty dessert town struggling to cope with the ever-increasing number of 
pilgrims arriving for the annual Hajj, Mecca was now a city that soars above its surrounding with a 
glittering array of skyscrapers, shopping malls and luxury hotels. To the al-Saud monarchy, Mecca is 
their vision of the future  a steel and concrete metropolis built on the proceeds of enormous oil 
wealth that showcases their national pride (The Independent, 2011). To the critics, Mecca, once a 
place where Prophet Mohamed insisted all Muslims would be equal, has become a playground for 
the rich, an ultramodern enclave where naked capitalism has usurped spirituality as the city's raison 
d'être. Sardar (NY Times, 2014) bemoaned the far-reaching implication of this on the weakening of 
diversity in Islam.  
The cultural devastation of Mecca has radically transformed the city. Unlike Baghdad, 
Damascus and Cairo, Mecca was never a great intellectual and cultural center of Islam. But it 
was always a pluralistic city where debate among different Muslim sects and schools of 
thought was not unusual. Now it has been reduced to a monolithic religious entity where 
only one, ahistoric, literal interpretation of Islam is permitted, and where all other sects, 
outside of the Salafist brand of Saudi Islam, are regarded as false.
Again, Sardar enunciates Gadamers hermeneutic principle according to which the interpreters 
present situation has positive value in the process of understanding (Linge, 1977). Given the present-
day globalization and urbanization, the trend toward monolithic interpretation of Islam is inevitable. 
In this regard, I concur with Sardar (NY Times, 2014), who also authored Mecca: The Sacred City that 
Mecca is a microcosm of the Muslim world (Sardar, 2014). What happens to and in the city has a 
profound effect on Muslims everywhere.
6.4 Is Re-localisation Desirable to Muhammadiyah and NU? 
Indonesias environmental problems are increasing faster than the Ministry of Environment and the 
existing environmental NGOs can solve. Chapter 4 introduced a relocalisation approach. It contends 
with combined concerns about peak oil, climate change, and industrial-economic globalization, and 
draws upon multiple disciplines with pragmatic strategies shaped around the limits to growth 
analysis. Unlike conventional environmentalism and sustainable development, relocalisation does 
not seek to shift the whole society at once, much less, the entire nation-state. Rather, it seeks to 
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work at a community scale. It aims to equip people with resilience and adaptive capabilities in the 
face of looming scarcity and environmental degradation. It is, therefore, important to know whether 
endogenous Islamic relocalisation is desirable to Muhammadiyah and the NU. 
The most debated issues about relocalisation are the self-initiated nature of the actions that 
seek to act from here and now as opposed to engendering a political movement, and thereby, a 
bottom-up approach that begins at a small-community scale organized by like-minded people as 
opposed to a top-down approach for large scale open society. Herein, I would like to analyze the 
ability, possibility and willingness of Muhammadiyah and NU as large mass-based organizations that 
have been deeply rooted in Indonesian society, to advance relocalisation. Through their schools, 
pesantren and learning communities, one can envision radical changes in the nature of consumption, 
the nature of economy, and the cultural definition of good life can be promoted in accordance with 
todays global ecological conditions. Given the size and achievements of Muhammadiyah and NU in 
community development, I came to envision that the two organizations could become pressure 
groups in demanding land and resource allotments from the Indonesian government for the Muslim 
communities to advance relocalisation by creating green-intentional community models to live up to 
Islamic ecological values and laws, and then to network these communities across the archipelago. 
This way, with the aids of information and telecommunication technology, one can imagine a large-
scale and sweeping relocalisation movement to be advanced by Indonesian Muslim groups. As a 
Muslim-majority country, these Muslim communities could inspire the rest of the Indonesian 
society, and simultaneously through global Muslims networking - again with the help of IT and 
telecommunication technology - could encourage the global Ummah to mobilize Islamic socio-
ecological actions. In this sense, my vision is more like Trainers Simpler Way as detailed in 4.3. 
Trainer, however, has been criticized by Fotopoulos and Garden for having relied on 
communities rather than the state government. In response to the critics, I would like to reintroduce 
two issues. First, I presented President Abdurrahman Wahids attempts to bring about relocalisation 
ideals via the state, and how they failed. Second, I argue in Chapter 1 that a vast country like 
Indonesia cannot cope with the vicissitudes of the peak oil problems, and chapter 5 shows 
pervasive fragmentation that characterizes Indonesia today. Therefore, realistic and doable solutions 
on the local community levels based on balanced local economies, purposeful activity and a culture 
of ideas that are consistent with reality, need to be fashioned. The analysis of Muhammadiyah and 
NUs ability and possibility towards this end was made against a number of challenges to 
relocalisation attempts as previously summarized in chapter 4. They are, on the leadership side, 
people with limited power, limited resources and limited ability to influence others, and the 
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challenge of bridging the gap between community action and the political mainstream. On the 
members side, individualism, consumer-capitalist cultures, economic empowerment, unequal 
income distribution, lack of solidarity, increasing materialism in some members, boredom and 
distraction from original intent have been identified as major problems. It is against these issues that 
I considered the potential of community Muslimsand their distinct worldviews in the first place. 
From my analysis of what was already given in this chapter, I came to conclude that both 
Muhammadiyah and NU organizations are Able, considering their achievements in community 
development, and it is Possible, considering Islamic values and ethos to create an alternative 
economy that does not rest on a growth paradigm. It is supported by the power of the Islamic 
symbolic universe to accommodate holism and to espouse a global, instead of merely local or 
national, relocalisation movement within the framework of Ummah. However, due to a number of 
reasons, the two organizations did not seem to be willing to advance relocalisation. 
With the insights from the following, an overarching issue emerged from the research findings:
ii) historical narratives of Muhammadiyah, NU, and the formation of the Indonesian nation-
state itself (see Chapter 5); 
iii) the symbolic universe theoretical insights;
iv) my familiarity with the plethora of Indonesian news and articles about Muhammadiyah and 
NU who continuously made assertions publicly that both stand for Pancasila and NKRI in 
the face of transnational Islam (e.g. Misrawi, 2010; Muslimedianews, 2014a; 
Muslimedianews, 2014b; Republika, 2014; Madinatuliman, 2015; NU, 2015);
v) research notes and transcripts
The overarching issue is, the difficult position of Muhammadiyah and NU, caught between, 1) 
working for government expectation that they will support the nation-states integrity against the 
rise of disintegration forces, and 2) the reality of the States failure to provide social justice, 
eradicate poverty and vulnerability of the poor to increasing environmental disasters, and 3) the 
combination of those with the flows of transnational Islamic movements along which Shariah
economics has been advocated to replace the existing capitalist political-economic system. 
The idea of self-governance is likely to be the most undesirable element of relocalisation, for 
it may have appeared to the top-level leadership of the Muhammadiyah and NU -who engage 
closely with the Indonesian central government- as inciting secession or disintegration, hence, an 
antithesis to the ideal of NKRI. Emanating from the NUs anti-political stance was an overly pre-
emptive attitude towards any ideas that appear as associated with political Islam, or against the 
ideal of NKRI nation-state. Sirry (2010:69) noted this tendency as well. This particular situation, 
apropos the research, has an unfortunate implication of the impossibility of communicating 
relocalisation ideals lucidly and intellectually with some of the top-level leaderships of the NU and 
Muhammadiyah. What is more, national history as detailed in Chapter 5 shows the two 
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organizations played substantial roles in the struggle for independence from colonial power, and 
hence, to some extent have been entangled with nation-building and a sense of belonging to the 
state-system.  In this sense, the latest flows of Islamic ideas and movements in the form of global or 
transnational Islam provided a pretext and justification for another round of resurgence of 
nationalism. An explanation with Berger and Luckmanns framework can be made here. Similar to 
the emergence of Reformist-Traditionalist duality in the 19th century, the arrival of transnational 
Islam has reinstated the typification of national Islam, which suddenly found correspondence with 
the secular nationalists ideals. A book authored by one of LPBI leaders, respondent Imdadun 
Rahmat (2012), Ideologi Politik PKS. Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parelemen (PKS Political 
Ideology. From Campus Mosques to House of Parliment) is an example of a clash between national 
and transnational Muslims in Indonesia. Another one, Ilusi Negara Islam (the Illusion of an Islamic 
State: Transnational Islam Expansion in Indonesia), (2009), carries two names of important leaders of 
Muhammadiyah and NU, i.e. Syafii Maarif and Abdurahman Wahid. Maarif gives the Prologue to 
the book, and Wahid (1940-2009) who passed away in the year the book was published, is said to be 
the editor. Because Wahid was known to be hard of seeing (sightless) many doubted that he could 
edit a book and have argued the book as merely a hoax to divide and conquer further the Indonesian 
Muslims146. The book argues that transnational Islamist ideas are a Saudi-led conspiracy. It triggered 
heated arguments. One in the Indonesian FaithFreedom internet forum suggested a conspiracy was 
made to prepare a new place that is rich with natural resources (Indonesia) in place of the arid-
unproductive (Arabian) after the oil finished147. The book was claimed to be the result of two years 
of research sponsored by LibForAll foundation. 
In sum, for the NU top-level leadership in Jakarta especially, while they were fully aware of 
the dire consequences of environmental crisis, a pre-emptive attitude towards everything that 
appears as an instigation to secession from the NKRI, or promoting Shariah law, or facilitating 
transnational Islam, pervaded their aversion to relocalisation. There were also strong reasons for the 
unattractiveness of relocalisation that came from their confidence of the viability of existing 
traditionalist pesantren community development models, besides, of course, the acts of surrender 
to Gods Will common among the Muslims in general.
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E.g. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Hidayatullah. HTI retorted that the book was manufactured by LibForAll 
on behalf of the capitalist for fear of Shariah economics: http://m.hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2011/06/13/doktrin-
ansyaad-mbai-kepala-bnpt-paranoid-terhadap-syariat/ Hidayatullah argued that in fact, LibForAll is more 







Chapter 5 shows that Indonesian nationalism remains a dominant force to this day. Benedict 
Anderson (2006), in correspondence with Berger and Luckmanns (1991) symbolic universe, 
contends that nationality and nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind, and that to 
understand properly why today they command such a profound emotional legitimacy needs careful 
consideration of historical context. In the light of Indonesias pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial 
pasts, and how the country has constantly been threatened by internal clashes along both 
ideological and regional fault lines, a fear of internal revolt and disintegration continues to bedevil 
Indonesias government. With the history of Muslims rebellions, Islam has been considered as one 
potential internal enemy too. Therefore, as this chapter shows, on the institutional levels, 
competition for allegiance between nation-state and Islam continues to beset the Muhammadiyah 
and NUs top leaders. This appeared as a major obstacle in the possibility and desirability of 
relocalisation through the creation of green intentional community models with self-local 
governance.  On the personal levels, though, the power of symbolic universe to draw allegiances
that I argued in section 2.2.2, which then set forth normative authority (what makes normative 
claims legitimately binding for that person148) provides a liberating framework for individual 
enterprise. My framework in Chapter 2 -wherein religious symbolic universe is compounded with 
personality characters- recognises the agency of the individual alongside structures to provide the 
explanatory and causal forces in society. For that reason, allegiance to Islam among Muhammadiyah 
and NU individuals can be very personal and cannot be predicted.
The subsequent chapters elaborate further on the dynamics of how Islamic social 
movements (Doherty, 2002)149 can emerge from Muslim learning communities. The development of 
social movements from learning communities can be understood from the relationship between 
cognition and institution as follows. Throughout the existence of Indonesias nation-state (since 
1945), the ongoing question for the Muslim community has been how to create a strong, pious, and 
faithful Islamic society in the context of a modernizing, globalizing and secular state (e.g. see Lukens-
Bull, 2001). Since the onset, I had been intrigued by the Indonesian Muslims learning tradition that 
has been pivotal in conserving Islam in the minds of the Muslims and through which the ideals of 
Islamic society would be sustained across history (See 3.2.1). Besides institutionalized Muslim 
learning traditions such as madrasah and pesantren they take the forms of what is known as 
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Such as why he/she should regulate his/her actions with respect to particular normative claims.
149  
Characterized by: (i) having a consciously shared collective identity; (ii) must act at least partly outside political 
institutions, using protest as one of its forms of action; (iii) characterized by un-institutionalized networks of 
interactions; and (iv) must reject, or challenge, dominant forms of power.
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pengajian, majlis taklim, halqah, daurah150. Through the network of Ulama, these Islamic learning 
communities have transcended ethnic and nation-state borders as well. In Chapter 2 Berger and 
Luckmanns social construction of reality highlights that an individual tends to be shackled by a 
symbolic universe -- a system of symbols that encompasses ideas and meanings. With these in mind 
a framework is formed for the relationship between person and institution, they are: i) Islam as a 
symbolic universe; ii) learning communities as the intermediary between persons and Islam; and iii) 
two levels of institutions, namely, individual organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU, and 
then, the Ummah whereby all individual organizations are subsumed. Eventually, these individual 
organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU appear as what Berger and Luckmann (1991:135) call 
the full-time personnel for symbolic universe maintenance in a non-organizational religion such as 
Islam whereby there is no one central religious authority for the whole Ummah. The subsequent 
chapter presents Muhammadiyah and NU schools, and pesantren, in the quest for suitable 
sustainability-education rather than simply scientific education per se, for Muslim communities.
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Regular classes conducted to teach Islam and Islamic practices.
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Chapter 7
Investigating Learning Communities: Modernist Schools and Traditionalist 
Pesantren
Do not wait: the time will never be 'just right'. Start where you stand, and work whatever tools you may have 
at your command and better tools will be found as you go along (Napoleon Hill)
7.1 Introduction
While Muhammadiyah and NU organisations in their present forms are not promising to advance 
the relocalisation movement towards transitioning for Indonesian Muslim communities, I consider
their potential to encourage relocalisation through the dissemination of sustainability education,
considering the two have a vast infrastructure and are deeply rooted in Indonesian society. Previous 
chapters demonstrate that social movements can emerge from Muslim learning communities, and 
through the network of Ulama (including kyai) these Islamic learning communities have transcended 
ethnic and nation-state borders as well. Thereby, within the sustainability-literacy education (Stibbe, 
2009) and insurgent planning framework mentioned in 4.1, Muhammadiyah and NUs (and in fact all 
other Muslim groups) learning communities, including schools, pesantren, pengajian, majlis taklim, 
halqah, daurah have the potential to be transformed into training centers to mobilize relocalisation,
based upon Islamic values and jurisprudence as detailed in section 4.4. These institutions, in 
preparation for the stark changes due in the future in the interval between the end of cheap oil and 
whatever new energy comes next, can be empowered to create communities with the practical 
capacity to be resilient in the face of peak oil and climate uncertainty. 
Berger and Luckmann (1991) show in Chapter 2 that society is a symbolic construction 
composed of ideas, meaning and language. Chapter 5 shows further social, historical, and cultural 
contexts have been at the basis of the formation of Indonesian social knowledge and social logic. 
Moreover, Jovchelovitch (2007) stresses the pliability of social knowledge according to which social 
knowledge is not only concerned with cognition and representation but is a plastic phenomenon 
dependent on the who, how, what, why, and what for of representation. It follows from these 
arguments that I considers the potential of Muslim learning communities, Muslim groups leaders 
and the Ulama (inluding kyai) have the potential to disseminate sustainability education.  They could 
do this more effectively to Indonesian observant Muslims than the secular counterpart process such 
as the national curriculum programme. My proposition is reinforced further by the following facts:
a. Indonesia has the worlds largest Muslim population.
b. PEW research (2006) shows more than 90% Muslims in Indonesia say religion is very 
important in their life.
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c. Hefner (2013: 49) argues that both ethnographic and survey studies have demonstrated 
Indonesian Muslims these days tend to be quite observant, carrying out religious duties at 
rates comparable to or higher than Muslims in Morocco or Lebanon, and much higher than 
in Iran (Muljani & Liddle 2007, cf. Bakhtiari, 2001) .
Therefore, it can be imagined if the Ulama, kyai, and the groups active members are made 
knowledgeable about the big issues on how mankind live on this planet, and that the world is 
changing, resources are dwindling and the population is growing, and hence, there is increasing 
pressure on food security, fresh water, and the ecosystem, they will be able to translate these 
issues into Muslims language and sensibility to be communicated effectively, leading the Ummah to 
act upon them. In this scheme, the gaps between scientists and lay-people discussed in Foltz et al
(2003) will be overcome. Moreover, these leaders of the Muslim epistemic communities possess a 
worldview which provides the moral grounds for transforming the economic globalization that 
Habermas (1987) argues is not available in a secular worldview. This scheme also echoes Watling 
(2009) who argues that the Quran, Prophet Muhammad and Sharia is a way to awaken Muslims of a 
higher consciousness of the unified nature of humanity, nature, and God.  Therefore, the question is 
what practical mechanism can be utilized to achieve the scheme.
The previous chapter shows that Muslim organisations such as Muhammadiyah and NU have 
charitable bodies for collection of zakat, infaq and shodaqoh, the forms of Islamic philanthropy to 
provide, among others, education for those individuals in need. Besides this, the Indonesians 
Ministry of Religious Affairs has been channeling scholarship funding for the pesantren students to 
pursue higher education in universities (e.g. Kementrian Agama, 2014; 2015). Furthermore, Saudi 
and other Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Oman, UAE, as well as Iran have been providing funding for 
Indonesian Muslim students to study Islam and modern sciences abroad (see for example: KBRI 
Riyadh, 2015; Pusat Info Beasiswa, 2015; Kabarmakkah, 2014; Dikti, 2012; FTK-IAIN, 2015; UIN, 2015; 
Nahdlatul Ulama, 2005). This funding for religious and educational purposes can be redirected 
towards education for relocalisation purposes if the programme is well-prepared and the rationale is 
understood by the sponsors. As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, without an understanding of the 
twin challenge of peak oil and climate change, scholarships for study of modern knowledge overseas 
tend to encourage developmentalism for larger participation in the global economy for both 
economic growth and poverty eradication (also, see Overton, 2010)151. This chapter, thus, aims to 
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As Overton argues that Western aid and development programmes directed at helping poorer countries have 
been largely unsuccessful as indicated by the ratio of income of 20 to 1 between rich and poor countries, he 
commented: our international students, from so called underdeveloped countries, do not accept that 
development is a dead concept. They say youve got what we want, we are here to learn how to get it. 
Overton, 2010)
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explore in detail what endogenous features are already existent among the Muhammadiyah and 
NUs learning communities which can possibly be developed into education towards relocalisation. It 
begins in 7.2 with contextualizing modern education in the centre of present-day development-
environment problems. This evokes discussion on reconstruction of knowledge by Muslim thinkers. 
Sections 7.3 and 7.4 describe Muhammadiyah and NUs education institutions and 
philosophies against the background of the government program in modernizing Indonesian 
Muslims through the national curricula. The processes by which reality (Berger and Luckmann, 
1991) is shared among Muslims and how it is available to the common-sense of members of Muslims 
society is taking place in these Islamic education institutions as well as in the family. In section 7.3 
Foucaults (1972, 1980) discourse-power relations become relevant to explaining the cooptation of 
Indonesian modernist Muslims by developmentalists and how that may inhibit sustainability 
literacy, hence, their sense of crisis, needed to encourage relocalisation today. Section 7.5 discusses 
the strength and weakness of the Muhammadiyah and NUs existing learning communities, followed 
by what is needed by both to facilitate relocalisation to come into existence.  
7.2 Modern Knowledge. A Double-edged Sword
Socio-ecological crisis in Indonesia demonstrates the great irony of modern education and its 
knowledge system. It resonates with the environmental educator David Orrs (1991:2) apt 
conclusion, It is worth noting that this [environmental destruction] is not the work of ignorant 
people. It is, rather, largely the result of work by people with BAs, BScs, LLBs, MBAs, and PhDs. Orr 
reminds us that our education up till now has in some ways created a monster (p.1).
The success of the New Order regime of Suharto which made the development of a modern 
national education system as one of its top priorities has been followed by massive forest plunder 
and unprecedented environmental degradation. In fact, Orrs (1991) critique of modern knowledge 
resonates both with Muslims critiques of the modern knowledge system as I outlined and Kazmis 
(1999) Islamic critique of the modern education system. Both argue that learning, in the modern 
sense of the term, in itself will never make people ethical. This leads to the question of what exactly 
is wrong with modern education. Quoted in Orr (1991:2), Wiesel's answer: 
It emphasized theories instead of values, concepts rather than human beings, abstraction 
rather than consciousness, answers instead of questions, ideology and efficiency rather than 
conscience.
Further, Strachan (2009) and Sachs (2008) presented a systems-thinking perspective according to
which peoples inability to identify the interconnected nature of the crises has been at the heart of 
the socio-ecological crises facing the world today. The protagonists put the blame on the limited 
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experiences of the world that the formal education system is grounded on and the increasingly 
reductionist experience that makes the learners more specialized and less prepared for the 
interconnected complexity of the world (Stibbe, 2009). Therefore, the crises call for interconnected 
and interdisciplinary solutions, and hence, reformation of education. Sustainability education 
intended for relocalisation among Muslims must provide alternative societies for the students to 
have hopes that what they studied is relevant, useful, and in accordance with reality (without an 
alternative society, sustainability education in the hustle and bustle of Third World developmentalist 
programmes is simply unrealistic). Secondly, it needs personalization of knowledge by significant 
persons in the internalization process of the society members (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:151-
200). They are, the Ulama (including kyais) and parents.
7.3 Muhammadiyahs Educational Programme
Chapters 2 and 5 explained one basic premise of the Islamic reformist movement which is based on
the assumption that tradition is the cause of the backward condition of the Muslim population. This 
was seen to have deeply buried the real Islam and its power. Accordingly, reformists believe that 
modern science and technology will provide the key to lift the Muslim Ummah out of poverty and 
backwardness as well as to cleanse Islam of old-fashioned ideas. Being a reformist, then modernist 
Islamic movement, Muhammadiyah has been struggling to reconcile religious requirements with 
those of modernity. Consequently, there is tension between Muhammadiyahs modernizing 
tendency on the one hand, and its desire to remain Islamic on the other (Fuad, 2004). In what 
follows, the manner in which modern science and its knowledge system were appropriated and 
possessed by Indonesian modernist Muslims and their educational institutions, will be detailed.
After Indonesias independence, Muhammadiyah changed its school system in accordance 
with the national system (Fuad, 2004:405). The Indonesian state designs two national curricula: 
general and Islamic. General schools are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, and 
Islamic schools, madrasah, are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs that designs 
the national curriculum for them. The goal of the madrasah curricula is to make the madrasahs part 
of the labor supply mechanism by making their graduates learn general skills that would make them 
employable in the job market (p.406). While a small percentage of the madrasah are public and run 
under the madrasah national system, a large majority of them are privately run. As Fuad (p.406) 
noted, Muhammadiyah schools have adopted one of these two national curricula, and all its colleges 
adopted general curricula. Close to half of the Muhammadiyah schools have opted to be madrasah
which indicates that a significant number among the rank and file of Muhammadiyah supporters are 
concerned about giving their children the basic religious education which they deem adequate at the 
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expense of less general education. Nonetheless, Muhammadiyah continued to be wary of the 
inadequacy of the madrasah system to prepare students for life in modern times. The Indonesian 
state also applies the two curricula system on higher education.
In 1975, the government issued a ministerial decree signed by the Minister of Education; 
Minister of Religious Affairs (then, Mukti Ali, a leader and thinker of Muhammadiyah); and the 
Minister of Internal Affairs, declaring that graduates of the madrasah were considered to be of the 
same level of qualification as those of the general schools (Fuad, 2004:407). They were given access 
to the general university system, and this gave Muhammadiyah a chance to advance through 
establishing its own university systems.  Notably, the state also sought to extend control over the 
Islamic schools (madrasah). The government provided financial benefits for the schools that adopted 
the national curricula. One of the purposes of making the diploma received from the madrasah
equal to one received from a public school was to permit switching between public and Islamic 
schools throughout ones educational career. Due to these changes, the prestige of a madrasah
education increased as more madrasah graduates were accepted into secular colleges and 
universities. 
An explanation of the nationally-deployed modern knowledge system for Indonesian 
Muslims and the role of modernist thinkers can be given from Foucaults power/discourse 
perspective as follows. It should be noted that economic and development schemes are inextricably 
linked to power. For Foucault (1980), power is not synonymous with repression. It operates in, and 
circulates in, all social relations. Discourse is conceptualized as the nexus of powerknowledge
(Foucault, 1977:27). As the New Order regime of Suharto set out on its developmentalist 
programme, it needed to depoliticize Islam. The regime made the development of a modern 
national education system one of its top priorities in order to reinforce the depoliticization of 
Islam (Hwang, 2012:69-72). The developmentalists created disourse and chose modernist Muslim 
thinkers such as of Muhammadiyah to create the discourse of modernity and education for the 
Muslim portion of the population  and thereby, for the state to exercise power over the Muslim 
populace. The effects can be either negative or positive, shaping the subjectivity of individuals 
towards the ideal citizens of the state and/or of Islamic communities. As a result, while the regime 
co-opted existing Islamist groups to its viewpoint, it appeared to be an attempt to increase economic 
opportunities for Islamic school graduates. 
In fact, from a constructionist perspective, knowledge is never free from ideological, political 
and cultural interests (Berger and Luckmann, 1991). Along this line, Zuhdi (2006) writes a history of 
modernization of Indonesias Islamic school curricula. He shows that a curriculum is not something 
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taken for granted but created and constructed by certain people. Zuhdi is in correspondence with 
Goodson (1994) who argues that school curricula are a social artifact conceived and made for 
deliberate human purposes. On top of the problems caused by plurality of education as mentioned 
in section 5.3, Indonesias education system has been continuously troubled by the three contested 
symbolic universes Nationalism, Westernism (i.e. scientific worldview), and Islam. The three have 
competed for influence especially in the character-building curriculum. For illustration, see 
Kemendikbud (2013) and Frederick (2011) where Pancasila was presented as the all-time key 
element152 in the nation building curriculum; Dwirahayu (2001) where Mathematics was put forward 
to be integrated into character education; and Zuhdi (2006) where Islamic education was described 
as having to struggle with the imposition of Pancasila and a secular scientific worldview. As a result, 
Indonesian character-building ends up nowhere. Character-building appeared to be the most 
deficient aspect of the Indonesian school system. It has been widely complained about and debated. 
For illustration a statement by a teacher below captured the heart of the matter: 
Many of the citys teachers have questioned Indonesias education system since apparently 
it can produce International Science Olympics gold-medalists, and yet the country still ranks 
high among the most corrupt in the world153  
And comments by an observer expressed the disappointment:
The immediate problem pertaining to the idea of character education is that it is not an 
entirely new concept. In fact, albeit changes in national curriculum, character education has 
always been present in many forms: Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (PMP), Pendidikan Pancasila 
dan Kewarganegaraan (PPKn), Budi Pekerti, etc. More often than not, it was the approaches 
and the names that were being substituted while the contents remained similar. In short, 
values and norms have always been transferred and cultivated in schools throughout all the 
years. The question therefore lies in why regardless of this, the right attitudes still do not 
seem to be in place. From personal experience, the most common complaints that students 
make about these classes are they are either boring, or full of hypocrisy, or a simple waste of 
time. It is boring and full of hypocrisy because students know that what they witness in real 
life is a far cry from what they are taught to do. When answering multiple-choice 
examination questions, there is a high tendency that students will pick the best normative 
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Beginning under Guided Democracy (195965) and strengthened in the New Order after 1975, a key feature 
of the national curriculumas was the case for other national institutionshas been instruction in the 
Pancasila But with the end of the New Order in 1998 and the beginning of the campaign to decentralize the 
national government, provincial and district-level administrators obtained increasing autonomy in determining 
the content of schooling, and Pancasila began to play a diminishing role in the curriculum (Frederick, 
2011:151). 
There were numerous calls for making June 1 a national holiday, and the Minister of Education said that the 





answers without necessarily buying the ideas. The classes are branded a waste of time 
because grades from these subjects will not earn them the competitive advantage to getting 
into their favourite school or getting a good job154
Herein, I argue that a sense of sustainability that the research is concerned with is nothing but an 
outcome of a character-building process alongside honesty, frugality, responsibility, commitment, 
fair-mindedness, perseverance, and integrity. In a successful character-building education, once 
students are made aware of the limits of nature and of social justice, they will apply the afore-
mentioned qualities (honesty, frugality, responsibility and so on) towards human and non-human 
creatures, and hence, become sustainability-sensitive individuals. Therefore, awareness of the limits 
of nature and of social justice should be made as key part of a character-building education before 
everything else, to prepare a foundation in the students cognition for further education in the 
future. By inference, given the situation of Indonesia and its national curriculum on character-
bulding education, I argue that little, if any, can be expected for a sustainability-literacy education 
from a character-building system that has proved to be a failure, and from the one infused by a 
developmentalism paradigm based upon assumption of unlimited natural resources. Moreover, the 
emphasis of the modern education system in providing skill sets often fails to take into consideration 
environmental limits, social justice, or adaptation to the deteriorating ability of the Earth to support 
human life (Stibbe, 2009). The very first sentence in the governments press release in 2014 
regarding the rationale of the new Indonesias curriculum, makes a blatant example of such 
unawareness: in order to make Indonesia a big country [my bold].and to respond to what the 
analysts have been predicting about the rise of Asia in this century (Kemendikbud, 2014). The 
remarkable economic growth in Asia and the continuing growth rates has made the possibility of so-
called Asian Century a case in point. According to estimates, by the year 2027 China will overtake 
the US as the worlds largest economy and by 2050 its economy will be twice as large as that of the 
US (Jacques, 2009). Alongside China, Engardio (2006) writes about the economic rise of India as well, 
and how the two revolutionized global business. Dahlman (2011) contends that rapid economic 
growth of China and India, combined with their large populations, is creating global environmental 
sustainability problems.     
The complex background already mentioned describes the manner in which the modern 
science and knowledge system was appropriated and possessed by Indonesian modernist Muslims 
and their educational institutions. In addition, besides uncritical acceptance of modernity, I argue





comes to the need to fashion a way to look at humankind in entirety as one, but complex and 
interconnected community, and the earth also as one, but complex and interconnected system. The 
lack of critical attitudes is illustrated in the following. A secretary of the Muhammadiyah Education 
Board, explicitly told me: 
Our schools see nothing is wrong with the modern system of thought. There should be no 
rejection of any education system and any knowledge system, because we are prepared to 
deal with modernity and changes. Our schools operate on the basis that all knowledge is 
from Allah
His statement recalls Nasr and al-Attas critiques of the modernists stance in reconstruction of 
knowledge debates. According to Nasr, modern scientific knowledge cannot be merely absorbed 
into an Islamic worldview due to its anthropocentric form, for it makes human reason and empirical 
data the sole criteria for the validity of all knowledge (Nasr, 2001a). Additionally, by denying 
different orders of reality, the natural and social sciences exclude all other possibilities of knowing 
and destroying the sacred and metaphysical foundations of knowledge. In addition, The classical 
error of modern civilization is to mistake the quantitative accumulation of information for qualitative 
penetration into the inner meaning of things (Nasr, 1989:6).  In this respect, Muhammadiyah has 
indeed been criticized by Indonesian Muslim intellectuals for putting too much emphasis on 
providing schooling and healthcare and lagging behind in producing ideas (Fuad, 2004: 401). At the 
time of the founder, KH. Ahmad Dahlan (See section 5.3), a major strategy was to synthesize religion 
and science in school curricula as though the incongruent epistemologies that exist between Islam 
and the modern Western system of thought would not be an issue, but today, rendering the struggle 
towards the synthesis has become utterly complicated.
Fuad (2004) presented the debates between Muhammadiyah thinkers, Kuntowijoyo, Mukti 
Ali, Amin Abdullah, and Syafii Maarif regarding the difficulties Muhammadiyah has been struggling 
with conceptualizing an alternative modernity - both culturally and epistemologically - based on 
Islam, and their efforts to realize such a concept. Kuntowijoyos critique was centered on the failure 
of Muhammadiyah to cater to the need for an alternative modernity that would allow Indonesian 
Muslims to appropriate modernity and yet remain anchored in their Islamic values, to modernize 
themselves without having to adopt Western symbols (p.408). Others debated about science itself, 
natural sciences in particular.  Ali complained about the lack of integration between science and 
religion, and pointed out further that those who understand Islam do not understand the world 
and among those who understand the modern world only few understand Islamic teachings 
(p.408). Abdullah contends that because the talk has been limited to the level of ethics it never 
touched the root of the problem, which is epistemology (p.409). Yet, according to him, the idea of 
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fusing Islam and modern knowledge is impracticable (p.409), for there is a dilemma between the 
inadequacy of the talk of Islamization of modern knowledge on the level of ethics and the 
insurmountable barrier to going deeper to the level of epistemology (p.409). Abdullah had long 
been concerned with the dichotomization of science and faith in the modern system of thought. He 
launched a project, Epistemologi Keilmuan Interkonektif-Integratif (integrated-interconnected 
epistemology) (Suharyanta and Sutarman, 2012), that aims to produce people who are both religious 
and knowledgeable about science. Counter to Abdullah, Maarif believes that modern science is 
value-free. Like al-Faruqis argument (1988)155, Maarif believes that by applying Islamic ethics 
Muslims can appropriate modern sciences without having to worry about philosophical problems 
(p.408). A quite pragmatic position was put forward by Nung Muhajir from Ahmad Dahlan University 
in Yogyakarta. He argued that theoretical and philosophical problems of Islamic knowledge must be 
pushed back in favor of the practical consideration of improving the economic chances of the 
students (p.409). It is worth noting when Suharto aspired for technological development and 
appointed the technology guru Habibie to set up capital-intensive high technology, Muhammadiyah 
universities responded by creating undergraduate study programmes that enable the economic 
empowerment of the Ummah (p.411):
These include programmes in engineering and business that help young Muslims survive 
competition in the job market. They are also programmes that generate money that 
Muhammadiyah universities need in order to sustain their own continuity (Fuad, 2004:411)
The idea that anything new is necessarily good and desirable because it is currently an era of 
progress is fundamental to the ideology of modernity (Wallerstein, 1992a; 1992b). To the modernist 
Muslims, this attitude has become the greatest challenge to reconstruction of knowledge towards 
Islamic moral, cognitive and interpretive unity discussed in chapter 2. In the same manner, it poses a 
challenge to endogenous relocalisation aspirations discussed in Chapter 4. To add more detail 
concerning epistemology, Muhammadiyah, like reformists generally, tends to avoid the subject of 
Islamic metaphysics such as Sufism and Islamic philosophy. The statement of one leader in Surabaya 
during an interview gives an illustration, we dont mind Sufism, as long as it is al-Ghazalis school, 
not Ibn Arabi. Many have interpreted al-Ghazalis school of Sufism as concerned only with the 
Sufis ethics (e.g. Quasem, 1974), whereas Ibn Arabis is highly philosophical, mystical and relies 
heavily on intellectual intuition (Chittick, 1989). Neglecting the metaphysical element in the 
understanding of Islam, and reducing it to ethics and morality, has impoverished the epistemology of 
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In which he outlines a systematic, 12-step work-plan by which Muslims can actively integrate modern 
knowledge into the corpus of Islamic legacy by eliminating, amending, re-interpreting and adapting its 
components, as the worldview of Islam and its value dictates (Al-Faruqi, 1988:30).
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the modernist Muslims and created a barrier to the understanding of the ontological root of 
knowledge. This evokes what the traditionalist authors such as Lumbard (2004) and Nasr (2001a) 
argued has been behind the decline of knowledge and the rise of ideology in the world of Islam. It 
also recalls the Sages arguments in section 4.2.2 regarding what has undermined humans capacity 
for a deep sense of sustainability.
Self-critique of the Muhammadiyah schools was raised in a focus group of young members 
in Surabaya, equating the proliferation of the schools with potato chips production: 
Muhammadiyah schools are no different than any other schools in Indonesia, only with 
Muhammadiyah flavor added (laughter). Radical comment against the modern knowledge system 
was made by a senior leader in the Advisory Board of Muhammadiyah, Sukriyanto, son of 
charismatic chairman A.R. Fachruddin (1916-1995). Regarding the modern approach of 
Muhammadiyas school, he said: 
I often say to my fellows, only being driven by one Surah of the Quran156 we have gone this 
far, yet the Quran has 114 Surah, so its time to explore the other Surah, we havent done 
that enough, much less to study the ayat kawniah157 
By recognizing the ontological Quran, Sukriyanto was aware of difference between ratiocination and 
intellection that Nasr elucidates (1989). Responding to my question about the curriculum of 
Muhammadiyas schools, he quickly grasped my points and expressed his apprehension, saying that 
he had been troubled by his thoughts that Muhammadiyah schools might have just produced the 
same people as the ones whom the organisation had been criticizing - people who devastated 
Indonesia. 
Finally, the debates between the Muhammadiyah thinkers indicate what Zaidi (2006:82) 
commented on, that Muslims are engaging deeply with the philosophical implication of modernity.  
The overarching theme of the debates and the impossibility for synthesis between Islam and a 
modern worldview, in my argument, is the manifest of the clash between symbolic universes: one is 
the pontifical mans158 and the other is the promethean mans159. My theoretical framework in 
Chapter 2 even leads to suggest that universal rationality is hardly possible under different symbolic 
universes. Justice is a potent example. As for the Islamic symbolic universe, justice is vertically 
  
156  
Quran Surah Al-Maauun. See 5.3.
157  
He referred to the ontological or cosmic Quran, al-Quran al-takwini, as distinct from al-Quran al-tadwini, the 
composed or written Quran.  
158
Bridge between Heaven and the earth
159
Man in rebellion against the Heaven
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legislated (by Divine law), whereas Western justice is legislated horizontally i.e. it is based on 
reciprocal relations between human beings.  
7.3.1 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Modernists Approaches for Sustainability 
The research findings suggest that if Muhammadiyah is expected to advance endogenous 
relocalisation for transforming the existing Muslim communities to meet the reality of dwindling 
natural resources and the deteriorating condition of the earth, their weaknesses lie right at the heart 
of their strengths. Their large network of schools and universities at first glance appeared promising. 
But upon a more detailed look, having been driven by their aims to appropriate modern education 
and progress for Muslims has deprived them of the understanding of the complex world in an 
holistic way that allows them to remain cautious of possible flaws of modernity and the idea of 
progress -- thus, of developmentalist ideology. In this sense, Muhammadiyah is in good company 
with the Indonesian modern-progressive society at large. This complex and mutually-reinforcing 
agenda between nationalist and modernist Muslims implies an insurmountable challenge to the 
Muslims reconstruction of knowledge attempts discussed in section 2.4.1.2 towards the unified 
systemic worldview of Islam whereby there is moral, cognitive and interpretive unity. It equally 
poses a challenge, even for Muslims, to overturn the historically deeply-embedded assumption that 
progress or development by way of unlimited natural resources exploitation is both inevitable and 
desirable as elaborated in Chapter 4. Additionally, the nationalist component in the national 
curricula will become an enormous obstacle when it comes to the need to fashion a way to look at 
humankind in entirety as one but complex and interconnected community, and the earth, as one but 
complex and interconnected system. 
Due to their modern predilection, the modernists are more likely to heed the call for 
relocalisation if it were relayed through the same channels that had called them for modernization 
in the first place. In contemporary times, these channels are Western media, Western governments, 
and Western academia, for they have been the source of the epistemologies of the modernist 
Muslims. However, climate change and global warming have often been dismissed by the Muslims 
the revivalists in particular - as the Wests conspiracy to weaken the Third World and Muslim world 
(e.g. see Globalmuslim, 2012; Islampos, 2014). For that reason, only when modern environmental 
strategies such as Transition Towns really gain traction, will the modernists be inspired. Henceforth, 
pedagogies such as Transformative Sustainability Learning (TSL) that can be integrated across 
existing curricula in tertiary education, will motivate their educational enterprises to change. 
TSL is a series of learning objectives corresponding to cognitive (head), psychomotor (hands) 
and affective (heart) domains of learning that facilitate personal experience for participants 
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resulting in profound changes in knowledge, skills and attitudes related to enhancing 
ecological, social and economic justice. (Sipos et al, 2008:69).
Within the TSL framework, their colleges and universities can take an active role as centers for both 
inquiry and action in local, regional, and global space to disseminate practical and solution-oriented 
initiatives aiming to create communities with the practical capacity to be resilient in the face of the 
dual challenge of climate change and peak oil. This, however, requires the very structural 
foundations and goals of schooling to be examined, and for the most part, rebuilt. Sustainability 
education must be prepared to deconstruct and reconstruct all aspects of teaching and learning 
(Sipos et al, 2008: 70). Modernist Muslims, therefore, must no longer, as Orr (1991) argues, assume 
that it is education that will save us. They need, first of all, to have the ability to examine the 
philosophical baggage of modern sciences, without this the modernist thinkers are not able to 
develop critical thinking to identify the underpinning philosophical assumptions of modernity. The 
latter is required to take place for the cognitive and intellectual transformation that Habermas 
(1987) argues are the co-requisites of modernity itself. On a more profound level, without realizing 
the non-dualistic vision of reality and a comprehensive metaphysical perspective of the unity of all 
phenomena that Islam calls Tawhid, the Muhammadiyah thinkers continue to be confined in the 
dualistic vision of realities, thus, are unable to transcend the impasse of modernity and to engage in 
dialogue with the world outside Islam. 
7.4 Pesantren Learning Communities
The previous section shows how modernity was appropriated by reformist and modernist Muslims 
for Muslims own agenda and was given meaning quite different from its Western origin. It also 
shows that Muslims responses to modernity have been influenced more by internal dynamics within 
Muslim civilization than merely reactions to non-Muslims. In this section I will examine how the 
same issues apply to the traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia: 
(1) What is their educational situation like concerning sense of sustainability and sustainability-
literacy already given? 
(2) How did they respond to modernity? 
(3) What is their position vis-à-vis Muslims reconstruction of knowledge that the thesis argues 
as imperative for nurturing sustainability-literacy via the Muslims own sensibility and 
thought language, in order to disseminate environmental messages more effectively, and 
to incite spontaneity and creativity from a larger portion of Indonesian society? 
Contrary to Clifford Geertzs (1960) prediction160 more than 50 years ago that pesantren
would disappear, Indonesia witnessed pesantren institutions surviving the challenges of modernity. 
  
160  He predicted InThe Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker that they would be crushed by 
modernity. 
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Lukens-Bull (2001) writes, not only have some kyai contradicted these expectations, but that what 
they are engaging in is not mere brokerage (p.350). I had been intrigued by this fact, and wished to 
investigate the secrets behind the pesantrens survivability to envisage whether it is a suitable 
vehicle for the environmental-sustainability agenda. Moreover, given that I argued in section 4.2.2, 
the traditionalist groups are supposedly with the Sages camp, I need to investigate the following:
(1) What is the meaning of pesantren to the members?
(2) How did the tradition survive? 
(3) In what ways could pesantren possibly advance relocalisation? 
(4) If grouping and creating multiplicity are intrinsic to the nature of human being161, to what 
extent is the whole earth-one world family vision of the environmentalist possible for 
the pesantren Muslims?
Lost in Translation
From this research, I argue that the most unfortunate situation to the understanding of the world of 
meaning of a pesantren is the definition given in almost all English writing of pesantren as Islamic 
boarding school (Bruinessen, 2004, 2008; Candland, 2000; Zuhdi, 2006; Frederick, 2011; Maunah, 
2010; Hefner, 2007; Pohl, 2009; Bush, 2009; Tan, 2014; Mangunjaya, 2010; Burhanuddin, 2013; 
Woodward, 2010, 2011; Nilan, 2009; Lukens-Bull, 2001). Words do not always have the same 
meaning within differing contexts. This is especially true in the perspective of different civilizations. 
An understanding of pesantren from the traditionalist Islam is of utmost importance given the 
heated public debate in the West about the presumed role of Islamic education in the spread of 
Muslim militancy. Pesantren is not simply a boarding school. Unlike school in the ordinary sense of 
the term, the centre figure of a pesantren is the kyai, who is the founder and leader of the 
pesantren, as well as the master teacher. And unlike school in the modern sense of the term, a 
pesantren embodies Islamic philosophy of learning a sound knowledge, in which divine knowledge 
is part. As clarified in Chapter 2, divine knowledge is impossible for the reasoning mind to 
comprehend, because reason is based on correspondence whereas there is no correspondence 
between abstract (sacred) spiritual realities and the knowing subjects. Hence, intellectual grasp of 
these realities must be limited to their attributes and effects. Therefore, to know spiritual realities is 
not possible through theoretical understanding, but only when the spiritual seeker has been fully 
liberated from all worldly limitations, conditions and attachments, as in discussion of unitive 
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Alongside what I explicate in Chapter 2 about the power of symbolic universe to segregate humanity into 
diverse epistemic groups.
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knowledge and Sufism (e.g. see Tabatabai, 2009). Therefore, a traditionalist pesantren resembles 
what is known in other Islamic worlds as zawiyah162, the homes of the thariqah. 
Another crucial distinction between modern and Islamic philosophy that needs to be 
highlighted to understand traditionalist pesantren methods is Ricklefs (2010: 469) distinction 
between modern and Islamic culture: The former generally emphasizes the idea of freedom as a 
means of liberating individual and social potential for good. The latter generally emphasizes the 
need to control freedom to restrict the individual and social potential for evil. It seeks justice rather 
than freedom. Misapprehending these core principles has misled most authors on pesantren into 
explaining the pupils attitude of reverent respect for, and unquestioning obedience to, the kyai, by 
simply analyzing it in terms of Weberian charismatic leadership (e.g. Bruinessen, 1994)163. The same 
proposition has been propounded to explain the disciple-master relation in the Sufi order, and 
prophet-follower relation in the whole tenet of Islam (e.g. Turner, 1998). As already outlined in 
Chapter 2, the most basic element of Islamic belief is that God is the Ultimate Reality. This principle 
is hard to grasp without self-extinction or annihilation (fana). In the Sufi tradition, the extinction is 
undergone through stages. To reach the extinction of the self in God (fana fi-Allah), one needs to 
firstly go through extinction in the Master (fana fi al-mursyid), then, extinction in the Prophet (fana 
fi-Rasul). The reformists refused this among other features of the traditionalists164. They reject taqlid
(adherence to past interpretations of Islam), replace what is perceived as uncritical following of the 
classical fiqh texts, and urge the importance of returning directly to the Quran and Sunna, and 
proclaimed the need for independent interpretation or ijtihad (See Bruinessen, 2008; Natana, 2004; 
Parray, 2013). Conversely, for the traditionalists, fiqh belonged to the essential core of Islam, and 
fiqh was impossible without taqlid, following the rulings of the great Ulama of the past who had 
developed the madzhab or classical legal school (Bruinessen, 2008). Traditionalists also stressed the 
harmonization of juridical and mystical aspects of Islamic learning through the teaching of fiqh and 
tasawwuf (Sufism), much as is still done today (Laffan, 2005: 94).
Bruinessen (1994: 4) and Lukens-Bull (2001: 354) noted that the pesantren tradition is 
pervaded by a highly devotional and mystical attitude. Supererogatory prayers and the recitals of 
  
162  
The Zawiyahs fulfilled their primary function, which was the performance of dhikr (calling upon the Divine 
Presence) and learning at the feet of the master (Dockrat, 2003: 363).
163
The same issue has perplexed Pohl (2009:146) in drawing a conclusion from her work of pesantren education, 
as she found ambivalence between the principally egalitarian character of life of pesantren and the 
uncontested authority of the kyai. Although, Hefner points out, vertical structure of authority can in some 
cases serve to maintain social harmony and restore non-violent relation (Pohl, 2009:146).
164  
See 2.4.1 and 5.3.
201
litanies (dzikir, wirid, ratib) complement the canonical obligations.  Many kyai are moreover 
affiliated with a mystical order (tarekat) and teach their followers its specific devotions and mystical 
exercises. Further, Bruinessen (1994:2-5) explains that the traditionalists (i) venerate the Prophet 
highly; (ii) visit the graves of the saints and kyai; and correspondingly, (iii) hold the concept of wasila, 
or spiritual mediation, that there is unbroken chain from ones teacher, living or dead, through 
previous teachers and saints to the Prophet and hence to God. This notion evokes Berger and 
Luckmanns (1991) symbolic universe:
Thus the symbolic universe links men with their predecessors and their successors in a 
meaningful totality, serving to transcend the finitude of individual existence and bestowing 
meaning upon the individuals death. All the members of a society can now conceive of 
themselves as belonging to a meaningful universe, which was there before they were born 
and will be there after they die. The empirical community is transposed onto a cosmic plane 
and made majestically independent of the vicissitudes of individual existence (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1991: 95).
Another distinctive feature of traditionalist pesantren is the transmission of kitab kuning, classical 
texts of the various Islamic disciplines, together with commentaries, glosses and super 
commentaries on these basic texts written over the ages. Although the materials are in written texts, 
their oral transmission is considered essential (Bruinessen, 1994: 3). The pesantren community holds 
kitab kuning to be of high importance in determining how to live as good Muslims in a globalizing 
and modernizing world. These texts are critical components of pesantren curricula (Lukens-Bull, 
2001:352). By the aforementioned criteria, Muhammadiyahs boarding schools, which over the last 
few decades claimed to have been established modeled after the pesantren, cannot be considered 
pesantren in the true sense of the term. In an interview, Kyai Miftah Faqih, the chairman of 
pesantren association of the NU, Mahad Rabitah al-Islamiyah (MRI) with which some 14,000 
traditionalist pesantren are associated, used even stricter criteria, anyone that doesnt teach kitab 
kuning is not a pesantren. 
Concerning the argument of the thesis on the uniting power of symbolic universe, I would 
like to stress that disagreements between reformists, modernists and traditionalists do not negate 
the authoritative centrality of the Quran and the Sunna. Disagreements between them were around 
the interpretation of Islam in the context of modernity and do not involve so much the nature of 
God, eschatology or the practice of the rites of religion as seen in the West in debates between more 
traditional and modern interpreters of religion. Muslims disagreements were most of all around 
interpretations and applications of Islam to the social and human domains (Nasr, 2001:251), and not 
about the classical jurisprudence itself, but whether it can be reinterpreted in the light of modern 
circumstances, and if so how (Pringle, 2010:14). 
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Before presenting the modernization of pesantren, what follows are two precious evidences 
the research revealed in the traditionalist pesantren that can contribute to the debates on plurality 
of epistemology and the sociology of religion. 
There, indeed, is plurality of knowledge
In what follows I highlight research findings from a traditionalist pesantren to support my argument 
that there is plurality of knowledge to be considered in discussing global environmental issues.  In 
my interview with Kyai Munhanif who founded pesantren an-Nur Fatmah in Mbelik, Trawas, East 
Java, I asked his opinion about the seemingly converging ecological catastrophe. He stopped for a 
few seconds before continuing. In the opening of his talk, he changed the language from Bahasa to 
higher Javanese165, denoting politeness and honor to the subject he was about to talk.
Those, the Salafi - mashaAllah (exclamation166), they just dont understand history, they 
may know, but only superficially. If one hastens for something that is not yet the time, he 
will be tortured by that particular thing, thats a Hadith, do you know? -- This world goes 
through five phases: Nubuwah, the age of the prophets, up to Prophet Muhammad solallahu 
alaihi wa salam (peace be upon him), then, Khilafah, the times of the Islamic khilafah167, 
then, Salatin, the times of kingdoms, then, Jababiroh, the times of unrest when nothing can 
govern humankind anymore, not religions, nor states. So, we are now in the Jababiroh
phase. If you ask me till when? Some have thought, perhaps 200 years to go  that if we 
listened to Ronggowarsito168, but of course only Allah knows (laughter). The fifth phase is 
when the Imam Mahdi comes, followed by 3 years drought across the entire world, and then 
Khilafah comes back. So, the Salafis do not need to hurry, its not the time yet for khilafah to 
rule the whole Ummah. After a while, then Jud and Majud will come, thats from the Quran 
you know? Jud will eat all vegetation, and Majud all animals, then people, except a few who 
will survive - thats a great distress, definitely. And then a time will come when the earth 
revives - I guess by all the dead and plants that turned to compost  and the new human 
generation emerges from those few who survive. They are the ones who will make new 
civilizations, new kingdoms, etc. At that time - this story in kitab Badai al-Zuhur goes - the 
earth is so fertile that one mango can be eaten by ten due to the greatness of the fruit, and 
the peoples condition is so prosperous that no one will accept anyones aid (laughter)
Munhanifs deliberation brought to my mind Nasrs (1975) critique of Iqbal and other Salafi 
reformers for falling prey to a linear evolutionary conception of history and progress, and for failing 
to develop traditional Islamic conceptions of Time and Man (See discussion of linear and cyclical 
  
165  
There are degrees of politeness in Javanese language: ngoko, krama andhap, krama madya, krama inggil.
166
Indonesian Muslims sometimes use that to express strong disapproval.
167  
The first system of governance established in Islam.  It is believed to be the perfect way of ruling the Islamic 
Ummah. It is worth noting that khilafah was not intended to be a religious authority, as Islam emphasizes the 
direct link between man and God (ittisal).
168
Ronggowarsito is an eminent Javanese poet who lived in the Kasunanan palace of Surakarta in the 19th 
century. He wrote a number of mystical books.
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time (Nasr, 2004)). Munhanif also articulated a case in point of plurality of knowledge that has been 
argued since the outset of the thesis. Muslims believe in the returning of khilafah that will govern 
the Ummah towards the end time, or the end of this cycle of humanity (upon which God will 
create a new cycle for He is always The Creator, Al-Khaliq). Moreover, the belief of Muslims in 
Qiyamah (the eschatological end-time), Qada and Qadar (predestination), and inevitable death, has 
given to what in the West has led to gloom and doom environmental discourse, quite different 
meanings. If the problems appeared, or perceived, as too hard to confront or even fraught with 
conspiracy as the history of Earth Summits in Appendix 4 shows, Muslims could be easily dissuaded 
from taking actions against anything to do with climate change for it will appear to them as a sign 
that the Hour has come. In this respect, the importance of doctrine of predestination in the beliefs 
and practices of Muslims is worth noting. The doctrine has been reflected in the mentality and 
conduct of Muslim people. Edward William Lane (Cohen-Mor, 2001: 14) who lived in Cairo for an 
extended period of time in the nineteenth century during which he penetrated the inner life of the 
Egyptians, reports: 
Influenced by their belief in predestination, the men display, in times of distressing 
uncertainty, an exemplary patience, and after any afflicting event, a remarkable degree of 
resignation and fortitude, approaching nearly to apathy, generally exhibiting their sorrow 
only by a sigh and the exclamation of Allah Kareem (God is bountiful) When [the
Muslim] see his end approaching, his resignation is still conspicuous; he exclaims, Verily to 
God we belong, and verily to Him we return!        
I found Lanes notes are quite appropriate to describe observant Muslims in Indonesia that I see as 
ascribing to that particular aspect of Islamic doctrine, Qada and Qadar. The same note can be 
reported from my interview with respondent Emha Ainun Nadjib (who lived in Yogyakarta) who 
witnessed the remarkable fortitude of Muslim victims in the Merapi volcano explosion in Yogyakarta 
in 2006. According to Emha, their faith has made the people strong and resilient in extreme 
adversity.
In such panic-stricken situation people ran away exclaiming Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar.  
After things settled down you wont believe to see how they returned to their lives after so 
much loss. They were able to simply say: yo wis takdire [Javanese: well, it was 
predestined. Takdir in Javanese = takdir in Indonesian = taqdir in Arabic, from the root word 
Qadar)] 
Emha continued:
I was stunned to observe this people. I came to a conclusion at the end, that humans have 
unfathomable depths of dimensions that no sciences can explain
Furthermore, the following note of Lane is relevant to the research inquiry of Muslims willingness 
for relocalisation. He remarks further that the belief in predestination does not prevent Muslims 
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from doing or making efforts to obtain what they want, or being careless in avoiding danger, but the 
belief engenders reliance on God:
The same belief in predestination renders the Muslim utterly devoid of presumption with 
regard to his future actions or to any future events. He never speaks of anything that he 
intends to do, or any circumstance which he expects or hopes may come to pass, without 
adding If it be the will of God; and in like manner, in speaking of a past event of which he is 
not certain, he generally prefaces or concludes what he says with expression, God is all-
knowing (or, God is most knowing) (Lane cited in Cohen-Mor 2001: 14-5)
Accordingly, the belief in the supremacy of Gods will implies that Muslims are the least likely to 
pursue transition or relocalisation on the basis of survivalism as outlined in section 4.2.3. Despite all 
the potentials to capitalize on the Islamic symbolic universe to instigate radical socio-ecological 
actions on a global scale, that kind of spiritual repose of Muslims can be both negative and positive 
at once. It is positive to the Muslims themselves as it liberates them from the fear of both minor and 
major Qiyamah. And it can be negative for those who hope radical socio-ecological actions can take 
place if the obstacles are perceived by the Muslims to be invincible. Someone who believes in 
predestination will do his/her best to the farthest extent of his/her ability. Once he/she feels what 
needed further is beyond his/her capacity, he/she will be easily dissuaded to accept the situation as 
his/her fate, thus, become resigned. Therefore, Muslims need to create endogenous relocalisation 
movements by and for themselves whereby socio-ecological actions take place within the matrix of 
Muslims own causes and propagated by Muslims own faith language. Only these attempts have 
the possibility to be responded to with spontaneity and creativity within Muslims own sensibility 
and world of meaning. Here, again, is the importance of hermeneutically-informed Sociology for the 
non-Western societies.
For a Truer Sociology of Religion
Kyai Munhanif (aged 49) founded his pesantren some twenty years ago when he had just completed 
his education at pesantren Sarang, in Rembang, Central Java, owned by Kyai Maimun Zubair known 
as a a wali (saint) who was 90 years old at the time. Feeling his knowledge was not enough he set off
wandering from one kyai to another including a visit to the graves of the wali songo (nine walis)169. 
In my journey I stopped by at a pesantren in Jetis, Mojokerto. When I entered the main 
room the words written on the blackboard caught my eyes, they were exactly the matter 
that I was searching for. Apparently they just had a discussion on that. I said to myself this 
  
169
Nine revered saints of Islam in Indonesia because of their historic role in the spread of Islam. Visiting the 
graves is a practice encouraged in Islam to remember Hereafter and love expression to the deceased, to feel 
them remain being part of the loved ones, and to treat them kindly with salam and dhua (prayer). Because 
some locals have misconstrued the intention of visiting graves into seeking help from the buried instead of 
Allah, the Reformist fiercely opposed the practice. 
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is the place youre looking for. I stayed there for four months studying from the kyai. 
Afterward he told me that I cant proceed further without experiencing it, I was told to go 
and find a new place where I can found my own pesantren.
While  the role of historical and cultural context (local Javanese culture and the history of nine walis) 
to social knowledge in shaping Munhanifs cognition can be understood, without an understanding 
of the spiritual dimension of: (1) knowledge (from what he perceived as a spiritual experience seeing 
at the deep-philosophical question he had been grappling with for a long time written on the 
blackboard); (2) meaning (of visiting the graves of the nine walis), and (3) action (of founding his own 
pesantren), Munhanifs voluntary actions can never be understood.  He provides the example of how 
Berger and Luckmann failed to explain adequately religious attitudes of the Muslims in particular.
Munhanif also problematized Berger and Luckmanns assumption of the taken-for-grantedness of 
religion, and their basic assumptions of man as world constructor. If they were the case, why did 
Munhanif feel that the knowledge he had obtained from his teacher known as a wali was not 
enough? To certain individuals (evoking the sage personality character), granting subjective 
character to the objectivated factities (referring to internalization, the last step in Berger and 
Luckmanns social construction of reality) still does not satisfy their deep-philosophical questions, 
and hence, this has called forth a quest for unitive knowledge (marifah) to know the Ultimate 
Reality, or the Absolute Truth, where subject and object are united.
7.4.1 Modernizing the Traditionalists
Pesantren are privately run and fall under the Ministry of Religion. For Pohl, the prevailing dualistic 
structures and the continued challenges to indigenous educational institutions such as the pesantren 
cannot be understood fully without references to the colonial period. Pohl referred to Hurgronjes 
assertion that indigenous resistance to the colonial regime associated with Islam could best be 
overcome through the process of cultural association: reducing and ultimately defeating the 
influence of Islam in Indonesia. In competition with the attraction of Western education and cultural 
association, Islam could not be but the loser (cited in Pohl, 2011:86). In fact, after Independence in 
1945, the real challenge to pesantren education is the governments national curricula and the 
modernist Muslims discourse (Laffan, 2005; Howell, 2001; Sirry, 2010; Pohl, 2009). The demands for 
formal education and state certification have caused the modification or loss of some pesantren 
characteristics. Abdurrahman Wahid remarked, for instance, 
the santri no longer sought education in different pesantren resulting in a loss of the 
tradition of journeying to study. Rather the demands of state-certified education require 
them to stay at one pesantren for the whole length of formal schooling (cited in Pohl, 
2009:108)
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It is common for todays pesantren to deliver the general curricula (Lukens-Bull, 2001). 
Nevertheless, Pohl (2009) and Laffan (2005) note aspects of Sufi tradition remain strongly present in 
todays pesantren environment, and Howell (2001) presents several authors that have emphasized 
the continuing emphasis of Sufism within the pesantren. An illustration of the influence of Sufi ethics 
in character-building in the pesantren education was given by Pohl (2011:123-124), in a study of 
pesantren al-Muayyad Windan in Mangkuyudan, Surakarta.
Not just the study of religious texts but everything that can be related to life in the 
pesantren and its daily affairs is considered part of the curriculum. In order to illustrate the 
importance of these aspects of pondok life for the educational process, Kiai Dian refers to 
values from the mystical tradition, in part from the Naqsyabandiyah order. The 
Naqsyabandiyah is the mandatory tarekat (Sufi order) at Windan, and all santri belong to it. 
This is partially grounded in the history of the pesantren which in its origin retained strong 
ties with Naqsyabandiyah. Sufi practices such as zikir and tahlil are part of the daily and 
weekly routines. Kiai Dian speaks of the need for a spiritualization of education 
(spiritualisasi pendidikan). Studying religious text alone, he remarks, is not enough to effect 
personal growth. Working with ones hands, he notes, is nobler than a life of incessant 
worship if the latter is supported by the charity and sweat of others.  The different tasks that 
have to be undertaken in the running and upkeep of the pesantren, from cleaning the yard 
to discarding trash and scrubbing sanitary facilities, directly contribute to character building 
and self-improvement as they challenge a santris pride and bring about a sense of dignity of 
and respect for others. (p.124)
While the national policy has imposed particular difficulties for the pesantren (Sirry, 2010), 
notwithstanding, my interview with Kyai Miftah Faqih, the chairman of MRI, suggests pesantrens are 
fully independent institutions. The state could not impose national curricula: although the principles 
in all our pesantren is Wasoyatan Abya li Abna and Talimun Mutaallim (refers to the Islamic classic 
books on philosophy of education), but there is no single curriculum for the Traditionalist pesantren. 
Its simply not the Nahdliyyin way to standardize like that. In general, contemporary pesantren
curricula comprises of i) character development, ii) mysticism, iii) general or secular knowledge, iv) 
vocational training (Lukens-Bull, 2001:354). 
The adoption of a national system of education was not without criticism. Pohl (2011) 
admitted an ambivalent result in her evaluation, which suggests the relevance of Muslim 
reconstruction of knowledge debates (covered in section 2.4.1).
In the wider context our evaluation of the above outlined developments will have to 
concede ambivalent results. Although most pesantren have become co-operative 
institutions within the national system of education, the consequences that the integration 
into the state system has for pesantren is subject to an ongoing debate.  While some see as a 
result of educational integration a well-balanced education that provides both religious and 
general training and allows graduates to continue their studies in the states formal system 
of higher learning, many kiai and santri signaled an awareness of the possible and at times 
207
very real dilemma for pesantren posed by the integration of formal learning, namely that 
students conceive of traditional religious education only as secondary (Pohl, 2011: pp.147-8)
The dilemma signaled that the kyai and santri perceived a dichotomy is present between secular and 
religious courses instead of being united in a unified systemic worldview that Islam espouses where 
there appears no separation between the sacred and the secular. Pohl (2011) makes it clearer:
Furthermore, the question remains of whether the pesantren have achieved a truly 
integrated concept of education or a dualism between religious and formal learning. Some 
critics hold that the addition of formal, secular schooling within the pesantren tradition is 
achieved only by separating rather than integrating these two fields of learning (p.148)
In Pohls view the difficulties of adopting a national system were exacerbated by formidable 
problems of infrastructure such as a lack of financial resources, facilities, equipment, textbooks, as 
well as a scarcity of qualified teaching staff (p.146). Whether it was the dilemma or the lack of 
financial resources that have inhibited the far-reaching modernization reform from occuring across 
the Nahdliyyin pesantren remains to be examined. Come what may, my search for literature, books, 
and archives of articles failed to show that the debates on reconstruction of knowledge as outlined 
in 2.4.1.2 have ever taken place among the kyai and the pesantren learning communities.  This 
suggests that so far, the Nahdliyyin kyai might not have needed to confront the gravitation of the 
Western symbolic universe as much as the modernists in Muhammadiyah. 
Finally, ever since tertiary education has been seen as the vanguard of Indonesian 
modernization and globalization, pesantren leaders view the need to engage in this arena as well in 
order to continue to shape the moral and Islamic values and practices of Indonesias future 
leadership (Lukens-Bull, 2001:355). Lukens Bull outlines six strategies that have been attempted by 
pesantren to respond to modernity and globalisation: i) conducting learning circles on campuses, 
which is considered to fail to mold the students characters and only imparts superficial religious 
knowledge, given the profound difference between knowing about Islam and living Islamic life; ii) 
establish colleges in pesantren, which is relatively rare; iii) establish pesantren on college campuses, 
which is also rare; iv) allow college students to live at regular pesantren; v) establish a religious 
college with no pesantren features such as state Islamic colleges, IAIN, and ninety-five NU colleges 
and universities at the moment; and vi) establish autonomous pesantren for college students. 
7.4.2 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Traditionalists Approaches for Sustainability
Sociology of knowledge is concerned with the process by which subjective meanings become 
objective facticities. From Berger and Luckmanns model of three ongoing dialectical steps in the 
society: externalization, objectivation and internalization, what the kyai have been doing for their 
pupils in this sense is promoting the third step, internalization. The objectivated social world of the 
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learning-community members attains the character of subjectivity through the process of 
internalization and becomes his/her subjective identity.  Another role of the kyai is providing 
examples that imitate the tradition of the Prophet (Sunna). This process is explained by Bruinessen 
(2008) regarding the pesantren Love and even veneration for the Ulama of the past was and is an 
important part of the pesantren tradition. Where possible, one was expected to follow their 
example, especially in legal thought (p.221). Accordingly, it can be said, rather than the NU 
organisation, the kyais are the real full-time personnel of symbolic universe maintenance for the 
followers. One can argue further that even without the NU, as long as the kyais and their learning 
communities are there, traditionalist Islam will continue, and conversely, if there is no kyai there is 
no NU. Thus, a point can be made as follows. While the NU is capable of mobilizing a large number 
of people as anticipated in the beginning of the research, NU cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
kyai considering the independent role of the kyai. To be effective, the intended mobilization must 
revolve around the Islamic symbolic universe which the kyai are maintaining. Elsewhere, a candid 
response by Islamist intellectual, Adian Husaini, gets to the core of the issue. Responding to my
question about the environmental crisis he said:
Ive been contemplating about the environmental crisis issues for a long time and came to 
the conclusion that Muslims should come up with a society model as a solution to help 
themselves, and work out for the entire Islamic world. Otherwise, who else will help us? 
America? (laughter)
While his statement compels to re-evaluate the presumption that UNCED types of global 
environmental governance are welcomed by the entire world population, his opinion corresponds 
with what I have been contemplating. For the Indonesian Muslims, the call for a radical shift towards 
sustainability will be responded to enthusiastically only if it was brought up by Muslims themselves 
through Muslims own traditional channels and mobilized through Muslims own heart and mind. 
Moreover, characters required for sustainability-literacy (Stibbe, 2009), mainly: simplicity, self-
discipline, reflective heart, and wisdom, are what traditionalist pesantren able to deliver. Literature 
on education and sustainability in intersection with a number of disciplines such as engineering, 
business, agriculture, ecology, public policy, sociology and psychology, demonstrate the difficulty in 
long-term behavioural change regarding sustainability (Savageau, 2013). Savageau, who explores the 
concept of self-audit and self-reflection, argues that real change in behavior must connect with 
individuals in a very personal way: If individuals do not internalize changes in their behavior and are 
not more actively engaged in finding personal means of auditing their behavior and choices, 
sustainability will remain remote and impersonal (p.22). Therefore, the concept of personalized 
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knowledge by a murabbi170, the educator, in Islamic philosophy of education (Kazmi, 1999) is 
pertinent. This concept has been exemplified in this research by the pesantren educators such as the 
traditionalist kyai and nyai, as well as male and female murabbi in the pesantren Hidayatullah and 
an-Nadzir community introduced in the next chapter. The murabbi disseminates knowledge through 
living in it. Murabbi does what parents do but much more explicitly and at a higher level of 
sophistication (Kazmi, 1999). As he/she is doing it, he/she inculcates character into the soul of the 
students. With this in mind, what the traditionalist pesantren system needs is enrichment instead of 
being replaced by something else that engagement with international aid agencies often implies171. 
The demand of secularizing the traditionalist system will only diminish its strength  what 
international bodies aimed to harness in the first place. The enrichment of pesantren will be done 
automatically with the provision of education about sustainability and relocalisation for the murabbi,
as part of the Ulama, kyai, Muslim group leaders and active members mentioned previously. This 
can be conducted either through the NU organization or through direct contacts with individual 
pesantrens.  
7.5 Discussing Sustainability Education
Unlike the worn out, co-opted and compromised connotations of orthodox sustainable 
development (Barry, 2012:83), the protagonists of relocalisation, tellingly claim that it is already 
too late for sustainability within the typical western lifestyle. Thus, the only intelligent course of 
action is to prepare to adapt creatively to global resource shortages, and transitioning into a post-
carbon world with climate uncertainty. Following this train of thought, I found Stibbe (2009) an 
appropriate source of literature for the case being studied. Stibbe presents a collection of writing 
that covers a wide range of skills and attributes needed to respond to the threats of climate change, 
peak oil, resource depletion, economic uncertainty and energy insecurity with creativity, ingenuity 
and new ways of thinking, in order to reinvent both self and society. The book promotes the 
significance of holism, reflexive heart and wisdom, simplicity, unified systemic worldview and non-
materialism that is needed to resuscitate sustainability literacy and to develop skills for the changing 
world. Given these features are among those that have long been the bone of contention between 
Islam and a modern system of thought, and among those that have been pursued in the Muslim 
  
170  
Murabbi is not only knowledgeable and wise but also pious, kind, and considerate; a person who combines a 
life of learning with a life of virtue, and hence a perfect and an ideal person to learn from. Murabbi is based on 
the understanding that one needs more than intellectual ability to comprehend the knowledge in text, but 
rather he needs time to personalize it by living it.
171
E.g. Indeed significant Australian aid funding is directed to improving resources and curricula in Indonesian
Muslim schools (for example, Downer 2007), with the implicit aim of combating the growth of regional Islamist 
terrorism (Nilan, 2009:219).
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reconstruction of knowledge project, Stibbe (2009), rather than the Indonesian national curriculum 
of environmental education, or the UN Education for Sustainable Consumption (ESC) (UNEP, 2014) 
being implemented in Indonesia, is the most suitable reference to appraise the existing 
Muhammadiyah and NU education. 
Table 9 summarizes competencies counted as sustainability-literate skills by a number of 
authors in Stibbe (2009). The Muhammadiyah education system is capable (or has potential) to 
provide a few items, i.e. practical skills (1.b; 12.b; 13.a; and 16.b) and a Shariah economics paradigm 
(12.b).  It fails on all other criterion for the following reasons:
a) It is not possible to induce holism in national curricula under progressive, developmentalist 
and nationalist ideology (1a; 3a; 9a)
b) There is no single norm of justice to refer to in national curricula (2a)
c) It is impossible to incorporate wisdom in a modern-system of thought172 (2b; 8a; 9b; 10a)
d) Modernists inability to profoundly criticize modernity (4a)
e) Muhammadiyah has not invented intentional communities for an alternative society (4b; 5a; 
6a; 16a)
f) Indonesians in general have been merely technological users rather than producers (15a).
  
172  
Philosophy in its original sense is the love of wisdom (philo the Latin of love, and Sophia wisdom). It is a 
thought process being wedded to intellection or the doctrinal aspect of an integral spiritual way, the 
metaphysics, and theosophy. The source of this philosophy is the experience or direct knowledge of the Truth 
that is experience of spiritual nature, the un-mediated or direct access to Reality. On the contrary, the 
currently accepted definition of philosophy in the West as a thought process completely cut off from 
intellection and spiritual experience, an information theory which is almost similar to logical analysis and even 
a mental play, has made it not only no longer philosophy as the love of wisdom but went so far as to deny the 
very category of wisdom as a legitimate form of knowledge.
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Table 9 Sustainability-literacy and Skills for Transitioning Peak Oil and Scarcity
Pointer Requirements
1 Manage complex sustainability problems (Bland Tomkinson) a. Holism first, then 
b. Practical skills
2 Ability to reflect on deeply-held opinions about social justice 
and sustainability (Mychele Goldberg)
a. Sense of justice
b. Reflective heart and Wisdom
3 Ability to view the world relationally (Stephen Sterling) a. Holism
4 Ability to critique the values of an unsustainable society and 
consider alternatives (Jeffery Newman), and envision 
scenarios of a more desirable future (Sue Wayman)
a.  Critical attitudes toward modernity
b. Alternative society 
5 Ability to expose advertising discourse that undermines 
sustainability and resist them (Arran Stibbe); and 
Communication skills for sustainability (John Blewitt)
a. Alternative society
6 Ability to envisage and enable a viable future through 
connected actions
a. Alternative society
7 Ability to experience meaning, purpose, and satisfaction 
through non-material wealth (Paul Maiteny)
a. Mystical life
8 The ability to research and reflect on the roots of emotional 
well-being (Morgan Phillips)
a. Reflective heart & Wisdom
9 The ability to think about the self in interconnection and 
interdependence with the surrounding world (John Danvers)
a. Holism
b. Reflective heart & Wisdom
10 The ability to investigate cultural artifacts from an ecological 
perspective (Greg Garrard), and understanding and respect 
for the cultural aspect of sustainability (Kim Polistina)
a. Reflective heart & Wisdom
11 Awareness of the animate qualities of the earth a. Islamic mysticism
12 Economic awareness based on ecological and ethical values 
(Satish Kumar)
a. Sharia economics 
b. Practical skills in economic activities
13 The art of personal sufficiency (John Naish), and Skills for 
transition to a post-fuel age (Stephen Quilley) 
a. Practical skills
14 Permaculture Design (Patrick Whitefield), and Community 
gardening (Alma Clavin)
a. Practical skills
15 Ability to evaluate technological innovations (Gavin Harper), 
and to design systems, technologies and equipment in an 
appropriate way (Mike Clifford)
a. Technological skills imbued with 
reflective heart and wisdom
16 From my own experience, a  last point:
Entrepreneurial ability to create socially and 
environmentally responsible businesses
a. Alternative society
b. Entrepreneurial skills, with reflective 
heart and wisdom
The traditionalists pesantren, on the other hand, have more potentials than modern schools in their 
ability to nurture holism (1a; 3a; 9a); sense of justice by Islamic norms (2a); reflective heart (2b; 8a; 
9b; 10a); Shariah economics paradigm (12b); mystical life (7a); and Islamic mysticism (11a).  
Correspondingly, with practical skills added, traditionalist pesantren will be able to: manage complex 
sustainability problems (1b.); Permaculture Design (14a); Art of personal sufficiency and skills for 
transition to a post-fuel age (13a); Entrepreneurial skills (16b). With related knowledge added, the 
pesantren students will be able to: view the world relationally (3a); critique the values of an 
unsustainable society and consider alternatives and envision scenarios of a more desirable future 
(4a); think about the self in interconnection and interdependence with the surrounding world (9a). 
Moreover, the existing pesantrens could be transformed into training centers for the nuclei of a 
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relocalisation movement. They are, face-to-face associations of friends who interact with each other 
frequently and over a long period of time (Maser, 1997, Biddle, 1965). For creating a network of 
intentional communities as an alternative society, these nuclei will discover the process, organize 
and make it work. People in the nuclei will consider the steps to be taken, plan the actions and 
reflect upon events to learn from them.
Call for Introspection 
While a systems-thinking argument entails that peoples inability to identify the interconnected 
nature of the crises has been at the heart of the socio-ecological crises facing the world today, to my 
awareness, there has been no systems-thinking research undertaken about the correlation between 
nationalism and sustainability. In the following, I will argue that from a sustainability point of view, 
nationalist sentiments have exacerbated the plight of modern education already presented. 
It should be considered that if individuals are taught to be a member of a country; and as a 
citizen are supposed to defend their country from the looter nations who glare hungrily all the time 
at a countrys wealth; and the collective experiences about those were sedimented in museums and 
history books, how can the aforementioned individuals be expected to see the world as a one world 
family as the environmentalists plead? Amidst the presence of burgeoning cultural icons of 
globalisation such as (in percent market share): KFC (30%), Starbucks (30%), McDonalds (11%), and 
Coca Cola (78%) (Merdeka, 2012; Fast Food Share, 2011; UNEP, 2014)173, Indonesia continuously 
made the observers alarmed by its political leaders call for nationalism. As an Indonesian citizen 
who studied in Indonesian schools, I understand that Indonesian nationalism has always been 
complex, as Chapter 5 described. While the country is far from being a belligerent state, since its 
beginning as a nation-state, Indonesia has had to grapple with several instances of internal 
rebellions that jeopardized the countrys nation-building process. According to Farish A. Noor (2012), 
a senior fellow who has been researching Indonesia for over 10 years, a vast country like Indonesia 
will need some emotive and symbolic force to keep it together. For Noor, in the face of new ethnic 
(read Adat-revival) and religious demands, as long as it is inclusive and not bellicose, nationalism 
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In 2013, Indonesias imports of packaged F&B (food and beverage) products rose to US$6.1 billion, more than 
doubling from US$2.9 billion in 2009. In addition, per capita consumer expenditure on food services (including 
restaurants and cafés) increased by 12% in 2013, considerably outstripping the compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 8% during the period 2007-2013. Indonesians increased spending on packaged food and growing 
preference for dining out at contemporary-styled outlets represents a real opportunity for foreign food 
exporters and the operators of cafés, restaurants and fast-food chains. Packaged food traders may also find 
considerable potential in selling to modern grocery retailers, including hypermarkets and convenience stores. 
(Economist-pick, 2014).
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may well be the glue that keeps the country together174. Yet, in the face of climate change and peak 
oil, the notion of nation-state will gradually lose its significance and become irrelevant.
Transformative Sustainability Learning (TSL) already mentioned (Sipos, 2008) identified a 
major problem in sustainability education, namely, conflict of interests that are bound to arise 
between institutions of higher education and a students local environment. University and 
community, thus, must find or create the necessary common ground to minimize the conflicts by 
creating university-community collaborations. In my view, this problem suggests the need of an 
alternative society where the sustainability-aware individuals can put into actions the ecologically-
sound knowledge and skills, to reverse the trend of unsustainable consumer-capitalist society. That 
is tantamount to the green-intentional community of relocalisation discussed in Chapter 4. These 
alternative societies or intentional communities will become models for the larger Indonesian 
society whereby the dominant paradigm of consumer-capitalism-developmentalism prevails. 
Character-building education such as the National Curriculum of Environmental Education 
(Adiwiyata, 2012) that is being deployed in a society where shopping malls and advertisement-
funded media continue to entice consumerism, is doomed to fail. This situation evokes Orrs 
statement (1991:6) of the power of examples over words and Young (1993) who argues that 
education on sustainability that does not provide direct experiences to students will more likely 
produce short-term changes. Furthermore, there is potential danger in raising environmental 
awareness among young people. Orr (1991:6) identified that for the Western world context,  
Students hear about global responsibility while being educated in institutions that often 
invest their financial weight in the most irresponsible things. The lessons being taught are 
those of hypocrisy and ultimately despair. Students learn, without anyone ever saying it, 
that they are helpless to overcome the frightening gap between ideals and reality. What is 
desperately needed are faculty and administrators who provide role models of integrity, 
care, thoughtfulness, and institutions that are capable of embodying ideals wholly and 
completely in all of their operations.
In Indonesia, on top of the already complex education system where students and teachers have 
been struggling175, previous chapters show that there is very little space for ordinary citizens to 
wrest control over their destiny from the government and corporation-led life spaces to make 
changes. Thus, to give too much information about environmental problems is to give a source of 









the people by encouraging them to change their life ways. His position is understandable for that 
will not be possible to change peoples ways of living without initially correcting the nature of 
economy, the nature of consumption, and the cultural definition of good life in the society at large 
which, in the Third World context especially, are beyond communities control (see discussion in 
sections 4.2.1 and 4.6). The creation of alternative society, with an alternative economy, and 
alternative culture, to the economy and culture of consumer-capitalist contemporary Indonesian 
society at large, is what is needed by the Muslims to bring relocalisation into being.
7.6 Conclusion
The thesis discovered the potential of Muslim groups learning communities, (schools, pesantren, 
pengajian, majlis taklim, halqah, daurah) to be transformed into training centers to mobilize 
ecological actions based upon Islamic values and jurisprudence presented in sections 4.2 and 4.4. 
The available scholarship funding for Muslim religious and educational purposes can be redirected 
towards education for relocalisation projects. First the Ulama, kyai, and the groups active members 
are made knowledgeable through formal education -in the modern-sense of the term- about the 
complex issues in the present-day socio-ecological crisis, which are inextricably linked to Third World 
development on the one hand, and poverty on the other, including learning skills about 
relocalisation actions through training and participatory observation in green intentional 
communities and grass-root initiatives in Western world.  Then they will be able to communicate 
these issues using Muslims own language and sensibility and to call for the Ummah to act upon 
them. Mobilization that revolves around the Islamic symbolic universe which the Ulama and kyais 
are maintaining is bound to be effective.
As the research was seeking suitable methods to disseminate ecological messages and 
sustainability-literacy, it found developmentalism and nationalism components in the national 
curricula problematic. Notably, the two components are among elements that must be adopted by 
the modern schools of Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist pesantren of the NU. Nationalism and 
developmentalism will mutually hamper the development of characters for sustainability-literacy. 
The desire to engage in competition and expansion that the two induced will become an 
insurmountable hindrance to students self-reflection. 
The research found numerous strengths of traditionalist pesantren that need to be 
maintained with much enrichment to be added. The modern schools of Muhammadiyah, on the 
other hand, together with all secular-national schools of Indonesia need to be prepared to 
deconstruct and reconstruct all aspects of teaching and learning, in order to be consistent with the 
reality of depleting natural resources and the deteriorating condition of the earth.
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Finally, in the light of a symbolic universe premise, I would like to summarise the potential of 
Muslim groups in comparison with the state and environmental NGOs, along the lines of the aspects 
of social setting that have been taken in the research analysis. They are: (1) cognitive aspect; (2) 
meaning aspect; (3) emotional aspect; and (4) ranking of potentials. 
Table 10 Comparing the potentials of Muslim groups; the state; and environmental NGOs
1. The State
Cognitive (Worldview) Nationalism
Meaning (Symbolic Universe) Developmentalism 
Emotional (Symbolic Universe) Nationalism
Ranking i) Have normative authority (thus, listened and obeyed by) nationalist 
Indonesians
ii) Due to nationalism, it does not espouse holism
iii) Due to its high needs of conformity with modernity, it can easily be 
exploited by it
iv) While preaching sustainability, it can sit comfortably in a capitalistic-
developmentalist paradigm
v) Hold the highest power in natural resource authority for distribution
2. Environmental NGOs
Cognitive (Worldview) Truth (from a Scientific-Ecological perspective)
Meaning (Symbolic Universe) Eco-centrism or Anthropo-centrism
Emotional (Symbolic Universe) Westernism 
Ranking i) It does not speak in the same thought language as the Muslims
ii) Has normative authority (thus, listened and obeyed by) 
environmentalists and scientists only
iii) Due to its scientific worldview, it espouses holism, hence, global 
humanity
iv) Due to its dependence on funding and need of high conformity to 
modernity, it could be exploited by modernity and the financial providers
v) Have no power in natural resource appropriation
3. Muslim Groups
Cognitive (Worldview) Truth (from Islamic perspective)
Meaning (Symbolic Universe) Theo-centrism 
Emotional (Symbolic Universe) Islam (and the global Ummah)
Ranking i) Have normative authority (hence, listened and obeyed by) Muslims 
world over including lay people (the observant ones in particular)
ii) Due to being theo-centric, espouses holism, hence, global humanity
iii) Due to Islamic symbolic universe, needs to act on Islamic terms to 
implement Islamic laws, values, ethics and norms, and hence, needs self-
governance
iv) Mostly independent from state and corporation (in terms of funding and 
supports)
vi) Less need for conformity to modernity




Discovering Possibilities: Models of Endogenous Relocalisation by Muslim 
Groups
8.1 Introduction
This chapter provides two examples of intentional community models already undertaken 
endogenously by Muslim groups that can be considered in envisioning relocalisation. They are the 
pesantren-network of Hidayatullah, particularly the mother-pesantren at Balikpapan and one at 
Depok, and An-Nadzir community in Gowa, South Sulawesi. In order to provide a wider scope of 
Indonesian Muslims, and to test the efficacy of Islamic symbolic universe with different ethnicities, 
the fieldwork was conducted outside Java where the membership composition of the communities is 
dominated not by Javanese as for the NU and Muhammadiyahs respondents in the previous 
chapter. It is worth noting though, like other Indonesian Muslim groups, both communities were 
founded by the offspring of either Muhammadiyah or NU. However, by subscribing to the ideals of 
the Darul Islam, Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir have not been entangled by the burden of nationalism 
and nation-state system. This has enabled them to gain greater control over their members destiny 
through fenced-pesantren, which is neither desirable to the traditionalist NU for it is against their 
inclusive approach, or to the Muhammadiyah who chose the modern approaches, or, to both 
concerning national-ideological reasons.
Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir exemplified intentional community models by urban and rural 
Muslims respectively. I put the two groups forward to address the following issues from what have 
been discussed in previous chapters:
1. The need of alternative societies where the sustainability-aware individuals can put into 
actions the ecologically-sound knowledge and skills, to reverse the trend of unsustainable 
consumer-capitalist society, discussed in Chapter 7.
2. The need to construct and demonstrate an ideal model that could be duplicated throughout 
the country.
3. The need of self-governance, hence, land allotment and jurisdiction, for the local Muslim 
communities to create intentional communities that are socially and environmentally 
responsible.
4. The need of social capital for effective mobilization to take place. 
In addition, 
5. Because the elites are tied to their fortunes, ideology, loyalty, and intransigence, they are 
unlikely to initiate revolutionary changes that threaten their wealth and power (Somma, 
2009:42). Therefore, radical changes should be sought only from outside the elite circles.
6. Outlined in section 4.6, the Eco-Pesantren programme by the Ministry of Environment 
failed to address the heart of the problems, namely: the nature of economy; the nature of 
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consumption; and the developmentalism paradigm. In addition, there is legitimate reason to 
question the ability of the program to proceed and reach out to 24,000 pesantren all over 
the country, given the meager budget and lack of authority of the Ministry of Environment 
(Nguitragool, 2012:66).
In contrast to green intentional communities in the West, neither the Hidayatullah nor An-Nadzir 
community was designed, based on the ecological utopian principles and techniques embraced by 
bioregionalism, permaculture and ecovillages (Pyhala, 2013) for developing closed-loop, symbiotic, 
self-sustaining human habitats and production systems that do not result in ecological degradation 
and social injustice. Nonetheless, as the community members reduce their dependence on the 
global economy and replace it with household and local economies, they reduce the demand that 
drives current inequities. After all, it should be borne in mind that bioregionalism, permaculture and 
ecovillages seek to enable people to become more self-reliant, and in the process, relieve the social 
injustices and ecological degradation created by the global political economy (Pyhala, 2013).  
This chapter begins with the history behind the formation of the two communities, followed 
by ethnographic accounts that illustrate the meaning of fenced-pesantren for the leaders and the 
recruits. Clash of symbolic universe and the Islamic utopia of the Medina society that plagued the 
state-Muslim relations continued to appear as the main themes. Correspondingly, while 
Hidayatullah resonates a reinterpretation of khilafah, an-Nadzir reflects the notion of walayah176 -
both concerned with the concept of governance in Islam. Further, pertaining relocalisation and 
sustainability agendas, both provide an inspiration from the concept of murabbi that they adopted 
from the traditionalist education system (see section 6.3.3). Additionally, An-Nadzir provides 
notional understanding of Imam Mahdi, the messianic savior that will appear to institute a reign of 
justice. In a broader sense, Hidayatullah was developed upon a combination of the following 
reasons:
a) The search for similarity and like-mindedness outside the Muhammadiyah-NU 
mainstream Islam; 
b) Yearning for close knit ties of village communities, security and camaraderie of a 
large family; 
c) Parents concerns over their childrens encounter with un-Islamic influences;
d) The leaders political instincts to circumvent those hardships through the creation of 
their own space for self-governance, and by doing that, ignoring the state and the 
dominant political-economic order that it encompasses. 
Erich Fromms work on having and being as two fundamental human orientations toward the self 
and the world, and Hannah Arendts vita activa, give explanations for the formation, development 
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See the discussion of Islamic version of deep-ecology in section 4.2.2. 
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and stability of Hidayatullahs community. In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt argues that 
there are three fundamental human activities: labour, work and action. Labour is the activity that is 
linked to the biological process of the human body and the satisfaction of direct physical needs, like 
the provision of food and drink. Work is the activity that creates an artificial world of enduring 
objects, to provide a stable living environment for humans. Action corresponds to the fundamental 
human condition of plurality and is directed at the creation of a public sphere in which people can 
enjoy political freedom (Arendt, 1985, pp.7, 50-54). Arendt contends that while action was of the 
highest significance in the Greek polis, in ranking (followed by work and finally labour), in modern 
times the hierarchy has been completely reversed. Political changes resulting in the systematic loss 
of so-called spaces of political action and the loss of distinction between the private and public 
realms have contributed to this reversal. Nowadays, the value of labour and production of 
consumption goods are consistently overrated, whereas the value of the more meaningful activities 
of acting in the public realm and creating lasting products have almost disappeared (Arendt, 1985, 
pp.294-305). Arendt argues that in our era the goal of human activities (vita activa) is no longer to 
be found in sustaining a public sphere of political action or in creative work, but in routine labour, 
growing economic welfare, abundance and mass consumption. Nowadays, increasing wealth and the 
greatest consumer happiness of the greatest number are the basic aims of social and political life 
(Arendt, 1985, p 133). 
As an esoteric community, An-Nadzir, on the other hand, reveals the mystical quest of 
unitive knowledge and ultimate Self, and hence, of the Absolute Truth, characterized the drives of 
the member recruits (see Section 2.2.2). Both fenced-pesantren communities, nevertheless, made 
another example of Foucaults (in Rabinow, 1991, p.75) argument, that resisting power can be 
undertaken by detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and 
cultural, within which it operates. The two communities also provide examples of the hearts and 
minds model of social movement where people give their sentiments or meanings to the world, for 
which Gamson (Zald, 2004) criticized Zald and McCarthys heavy institutional and organisational 
approaches to social movements. 
Minor findings, but ineluctable in the debates of ecological restoration, are presented in the 
ethnographic description of the Hidayatullah in East Kalimantan and Jakarta. It demonstrates a 
challenge in re-ruralizing the urbanites and the dilemma if they are to place them into immediate 
contact with wilderness, as they have long lost contact with indigenous knowledge and practices to
deal with nature. This is especially challenging in the tropics, where ecological restorations entail 
harmful animals within restored ecosystems. The fieldwork at an-Nadzir as a rural community 
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demonstrates everday routines and practical knowledge that needed to be confronted pragmatically 
in rural society. 
No doubt, Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir are merely examples of limitless variants of Islamic 
communities, but each provides inspiration to envision relocalisation by Indonesian observant 
Muslims as able to transition after peak oil and climate change. As a Muslim majority country, the 
picture of Indonesia will be quite different if every Muslim group, invariably, created intentional 
communities like the Hidayatullah ones, for their urbanite members, to be promoted as models for 
developing saner ways of living according to Islamic ecological principles.  Similarly, if all traditional 
kyai and their staffs possess the ecologically-sound knowledge and skills of the an-Nadzir leaders to 
transition the observant rural Muslims into sustainable agriculture and production, the picture of 
Indonesian villages will be less gloomy. In these portrayals, the existing modus Vivendi created since 
the Dutch colonial times that wants Islamic organisations to refrain from any political activity and to 
stick to innocuous and purely religious pursuits, is reversed toward the Islamic ethos where the 
sacred and the secular are inseparable.
8.2 Pesantren Network of Hidayatullah
The pesantren Hidayatullah learning community was founded by Abdullah Said in 1973.  Hidayatullah 
has five levels of leadership with several foundations (yayasan) attached to each level: nation, 
province, district, country and village. Each is responsible for managing the organisations affairs at 
that particular level. Once a year a national conference is held, and others might be held as 
necessary. In 2013 Hidayatullah ran in total about 297 schools in 33 provinces177 from kindergarten 
to high school, five colleges, and numerous (unrecorded) economic institutions (for example, 22 in 
East Java). Economic institutions are managed by the yayasan (foundations). Since 2000, 
Hidayatullah transformed its Indonesian legal status from Orsos (social institution) to Ormas (mass 
organisation) which implies a more system-oriented, in lieu of charismatic leader-oriented, 
management of the organisation.  In an official statement, the organisation claimed to have not 
been linked with Darul Islam, both organisationally and in its methods (reiterated in the interviews
with Abdurrahman Muhammad, the Hidayatullah chairman in 2000-2005). Although Hidayatullah is 
not officially associated with Darul Islam, I concluded nevertheless, that they are tied inspirationally 
and emotionally as the story of the founding father below suggests. Moreover, Aziz Kahar, a son of 
Kahar Muzakkar (Qahhar Mudzakkar), the Darul Islam leader in South Sulawesi, was once one of the 
directors of Hidayatullah pesantren in Jakarta and in Makassar (Bakti, 2005:138). 
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Until the end of 2012 (when the fieldwork was undertaken), Indonesia had 33 provinces.
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What follows is the history of Hidayatullahs formation. The description of Abdullah Said and 
other pioneers of the pesantren is taken from his biography, Mencetak Kader by Manshur Salbu 
(2009). Abdullah Said was born in 1945; the year Indonesia proclaimed its Independence, in a 
remote village in Sinjai, South Sulawesi. He is a Bugis ethnic. His parents named him Muhsin Kahar. 
Later in his life he needed to change that name, and he then became Abdullah Said. He came from a 
religious family, his father Kyai Abdul Kahar Syuaib was a religious leader in the village, and his 
grandfather was known by the villagers as orang tua yang rajin berdzikir (old man who chants the 
dzikir178): when he was tilling the ground or cutting grass for livestock, his humming dzikir could be 
heard from afar (p.7), he wrote. The village where he spent his childhood had lasting marks on 
Saids life. He recalled that the habits of making daily prayers in jamaah (congregation) in the 
mosque and forming a close relationship with ulama, the way his father raised him, were influential 
in his later life. He retained a number of affecting memories about the remoteness of the village that 
were filled with vibrant religious rural community lives. In his portrayal, Sinjai was a green and fertile 
area located in the highland, from where the view of the Gulf of Bone and the surrounding nine 
islands was lovely. In his day, there were no motor vehicles, so people went to Sinjai town on foot, 
horse or bike. His grandfather was also known as a man who loved gardening. There were many 
kinds of fruit trees in his garden, and if a villager stole the fruits, Said remembered, his grandpa 
simply laughed and said thats good he came to choose what he liked, if Im the one who gave [it] 
to him he may not like what I gave.  Besides his memory of the beautiful scenery, he also could not 
forget the taste and sweetness of pao apang, a sort of mango that can be found only in that area, 
and the delicious penjang, white thread anchovy fish that appear only once a year in the sea, 
wrapped in banana leaf and roasted. There lived in that village a number of the activists of the Darul 
Islam movement, then in rebellion, led by the famous Abdul Kahar Muzakkar (note the name, Kahar 
which they share).
In 1958, after he completed primary school, he continued to a school for Islamic teachers in 
Makassar, a capital of South Sulawesi, about 200 km away from his village. There he felt for the first 
time alienation and the plight of city lives. He recalled the horror and disgust he felt seeing people in 
the city getting together in lontang (pubs) widespread in the city, drinking ballo (alcohol drink made 
of fermented rice) and eating baluta (food made of animal blood)  both are forbidden in Islam. He 
often saw them fighting, hitting each other for trivial matters. He felt homesick for his village and the 
religious atmosphere it had. Said had displayed political talent since he was quite young. At that 
secondary school, he started being an activist of Indonesian Muslim Student (PII), one of the Muslim 
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Invoke the divine names of Allah.
221
organisations who opposed strongly the reigning communist party (PKI) during Sukarnos regime. He 
admitted that PII laid the foundation for him to be militant and skillful in organisation, and where 
he came to know numerous local and national Muslim activists.  Afterward, he continued his tertiary 
education in the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) in Makassar, but quit in the third semester. He thought 
he would have learnt more from a direct relationship with the Ulama, and felt he had wasted his 
youth in IAIN and would rather do organisation. Since then, he has been an activist in a number of 
organisations, including Muhammadiyah, where he learnt the skills of regenerating the cadre. When 
a new Islamic party, Parmusi was established in 1968, Said joined it. Parmusi aimed to embody 
Masyumi that Sukarno had banned and put many of its activists in jail. He hoped that in the new 
regime of Suharto, Islamic politics should have a chance. But after a while he realized that Suharto 
was no different to Sukarno, and came to a conclusion that the ideals of Islam can never succeed if 
they are pursued through national schemes.  Henceforth, he dreamt of a fenced pesantren learning 
community, where the cadre or nuclei of Muslim groups will be well-taken care of as well. He looked 
in retrospect, and was touched by all those organisations of whom he said, with a mere trifle of 
cadre management, had produced uncompromising activists to save Islam from those who wanted 
to dim its light (Salbu, 2009:27). The community he envisioned had to be self-reliant with self-
production of food, in which Shariah laws were enacted and where every issue will be resolved by 
the guidance of the Sunna. In such a place the learning process occurred without being obstructed 
by the fuss of worldly matters and burdened by financial needs. 
A story of such a place in Libya from Kyai Mas Mansyur from Surabaya who once visited 
when he was studying in the University of al-Azhar, Cairo, Egypt, was an inspiration to Said. The 
place in Libya was called Syanggit, led by Syaikh Sidi Abdullah. It had its own date and wheat farms, 
cattle, sheep, horses and camels, managed by the Syaikh and his family. They looked after 5,000 
students who stayed in a dormitory with 100 bedrooms. The students woke up at daybreak, made 
the fajr prayer in congregation led by the Syaikh, and prepared for the classroom learning that began 
at 7 a.m. They did many interesting learning activities, including horse riding, swimming, and 
different kinds of games. They studied various Islamic disciplines. The only thing he found strange 
about that place was that everybody there was male, that must look like a male village, he 
commented.  Said was determined to make his dream come true. He learnt that the idea of fenced-
pesantren was once proposed to the Muhammadiyah congress by Kyai Mas Mansyur in 1941, but 
was rejected. The organisation chose to establish a university, instead. 
Said began the journey with creating learning circles in which he became the preacher. His 
eloquence and his wide reading made him attractive to a wide range of audiences. But unlike the 
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Traditionalist kyai, Said aimed to produce from his learning community the cadres of his movement. 
This evokes what Bennett (2005:22) distinguishes between neo-traditionalist and Modernist: the 
modernist (like Muhammadiyah) tended to concentrate on education, whereas, the neo-
traditionalists (like Said) founded movements and reached popular audiences. In 1969 Said was 
wanted by the police after launching actions against gambling that was rampant in South Sulawesi 
at that time and even endorsed by the government as lotteries. 
Walking 40 km on foot, aided by his companion, he fled Sulawesi in a ship that was about to 
depart without knowing where to go. Being disguised as a livestock keeper on the ship, he managed 
to sail safely and landed in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan. His South Sulawesi background, his Kahar 
name, his courageous trait in contrast with Javanese deference, his ideology, and the type of his 
companions, altogether could have made the Indonesian government associate him with the Darul 
Islam rebellion led by Kahar Muzakkar as will be seen later. Thenceforth, he decided to change his 
name to Abdullah Said, and made a solemn oath to dedicate his life to Islam and nothing else. He 
recalled a dream he had before that happened. He heard a voice reciting a verse of the Quran when 
God checked the attempt to kill prophet Yusuf (Joseph). He interpreted it as Gods blessing to let him 
be alive to keep on endeavoring for Islam. He continued spawning cadres in the new place and 
attracted numerous like-minded friends from different places in Indonesia, male and female. They 
then became the pioneers of Hidayatullah including four female cadres he called the Big Four 
(using precisely these English words). One of them, Aida Chered, became his wife in the future, and a 
respondent in this research. The first Hidayatullah pesantren was held in a house of a local 
businessman who supported his movement. As they grew bigger, they moved to two different places 
before they finally settled in Gunung Tembak, the land they obtained from the mayor of Balikpapan, 
also his supporter. It was the location of the fieldwork for this research.
The construction of the campus in this new place was fraught with the physical struggle of 
the pioneers life. Chopping out paths through thick bush, and building a mosque and homes from 
scratch with constant threats from poisonous snakes and centipedes were the everyday routine. 
There was not a big enough supply of food, so sometimes they collected and cooked whatever 
looked edible from the bush and swamp. Everyone developed the habits of practicing the fast of 
prophet Daud (David) - meaning fast one day and not the next, the effects of which were felt by 
them as spiritually rewarding and clearing the mind and heart. Said raised the spirits of the cadres by 
bringing to their mind that they were working to get Gods blessing and to be able to be thankful and 
satisfied with those blessings (known in Islam as rida).  They filled their days and nights after work 
time with prayer, Quran reading and dzikir. In 1976 the work was completed.
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Saids story compels transformative understanding and hermeneutically-informed social 
theories in place of a rationalist view in measuring his worldview and world of meaning. Not only did 
Said display characteristics of the warrior personality character to whom politics is the main 
concern, but also the role of Islamic symbolic universe as a source of ideas and meaning for him. 
8.2.1 The Khilafah Reinterpreted
Pringle (2011) commented that the mother pesantren in Balikpapan turned out to be a remarkably 
successful institution. Campus for the Hidayatullah is an enclave composed of schools, mosque, 
housing complex and student dormitory. The first one in Balikpapan has been extended to include a 
reforested wood, community garden, a large pond, self-managed water facility and pasar umi 
(moms market) selling household groceries. Campus-1 is located in Gunung Tembak, East 
Balikpapan, with an area of 200 hectares and a little more than a fifteen hundred inhabitants. When 
I visited on this research, Campus-2, within sight from the gate of campus-1, was under construction. 
Balikpapan is a seaport city on the east coast island of Kalimantan (Borneo). It is a resource-rich 
region known for timber and petroleum export products, and famous as one of Indonesias oil 
cities. Before the oil boom of the early 1900s, Balikpapan was an isolated Bugis ethnic fishing 
village.
The Hidayatullah community in Balikpapan attracts people to join their activities although 
they do not necessarily become active members or cadre who are ready to be assigned to assume 
tasks in other branches. I came to know a lady, Rahima, (name has been changed), who, together 
with her husband, joined Hidayatullahs activities for a number of years. Rahimas husband was a 
professional in an oil company in Balikpapan, and he had recently passed away when she was being 
interviewed.
I decided to live inside the Hidayatullahs campus in order to give my two sons a good 
Islamic neighborhood and to have a village for myself to settle down in the rest of my life. 
Its really hard to raise children in the cities as you know the influences are so bad. My big 
son has been studying in another pesantren outside Balikpapan and my late husband wanted 
our little son to be a hafiz (a person who memorizes the Quran completely), he seems able 
to do so, so we put him here 
While all properties in the campus-1 are owned by the organisation, the campus-2 that was under 
construction is intended to be purchased by the members with a condition that it cannot be 
transferred to anyone without prior consent of the Hidayatullah. The condition was made in order to 
keep the campus inhabited by the members only. The price of the land was quite low. Rahima 
bought a plot of land, more or less 300m2, and built a house with a vegetable garden on the back. 
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Fieldwork was also conducted in Depok campus near Jakarta. It was built in 1991. Here the 
organisation was not able to obtain a larger plot of land than the existing three hectares, therefore 
not every member was given a chance to live inside the enclave. There are some individuals who can 
afford to buy a piece of land adjacent to it and it is intended that the complex will expand gradually. 
It took a lot of trouble with the traffic and tricky roads to get to the location which was in the 
farthest outskirts of Jakarta city. Shodiq, a member, has been living in the complex for fifteen years. 
He came from a nominal Muslim farmer family background in Central Java. Both Shodiq and his wife 
work fulltime to serve the schools and students dormitory and receive in-kind remuneration instead 
of salary. 
We live with a very small economy. We have good supposition of God though, that His 
hand will always be extended to us whenever we need help. As you see we dont live like 
people out there, we dont have to have a TV and the luxury stuff like them. We feel secured 
because we know that our children will be taken care of, in our network we have schools 
from kindergarten to university. For anyone who has tasted the life of being anonymous out 
there they will agree that it is a lot easier to manage your family if you live in a community 
where everyone helps and exhorts one another like us here  
And, Ikhwan:
The feeling of being in a large family is wonderful here, considering were not related 
familial-wise. I got an example, my friends will give you more. My wife was advised by the 
doctor to give birth through caesarian, I was so shocked, how could I afford the surgery? 
(titter). But thats done at the end, paid jointly by everyone. So, theres no shortage in here, 
insyaAllah
Because we perform prayer in congregation, the sense of togetherness is maintained. If we 
have a problem, we share with one another
Because we are like-minded, we can let our children play and make friends freely without 
being worried
One of  Hidayatullahs values is insistence on the five times a day prayer being conducted in 
congregation (jamaah) in its mosques for the males who at the time of prayer happen to be around 
the campus. They believe it to be the most effective method to maintain social capital among them. 
Male and female focus group discussions gave identical answers to Shodiq and Ikhwans reasoning 
for living in the Hidayatullah communities. It is interesting to note that among members living in the 
Depok campus were men who worked in government offices and their wives served the Hidayatullah 
schools. 
Clearly all the people of Hidayatullah placed community-living at the highest importance. 
They see small-scale communities like the ones they have established and networked as a 
manifestation of the khilafah. Syaikhul in Jakarta head office said:
225
We are not the ones who feel frustrated because khilafah Islamiyah is not there, we still 
can have it by ourselves, in a small scale
The members can make a living outside the Hidayatullah, but when they are going home 
they are going to the community
And, Suharsono in Jakarta head office:
What we are doing is in accordance with the Hadith saying that every collectivity must have 
a leader, When three men travel together, they should make one of them a leader
Hidayatullah states explicitly that rebuilding Islamic civilization is its vision. In its notary act of 
establishment, the organisation is officially defined as a mass organisation and mentioned as an 
Islamic movement. Further, it is meant to be a medium of the holy struggle (jihad) and taking jihad
as an injunction for all Muslims on board, individually (infiradi) and collectively (jamai). The 
Hidayatullah members families were proud to be families of mujahid (those who engaged in jihad). 
Slogans such as Indahnya menjadi keluarga mujahid (how beautiful it is to be a mujahid family) are 
ordinary in this community. The alumni of Hidayatullah rapidly produced a network. While initially 
the members were mainly Bugis ethnic diaspora, over the years they have become increasingly 
diverse. The network is managed in a system of organisation with clearly defined criteria of zones, 
regions and areas for its branches. The male members in a focus group recalled the vision of 
Abdullah Said for a model of Islamic society in Indonesia.
He said we wanted to make a place so that when people come to visit and observe, they 
can tell what Islam is like, that Islam is beautiful  sounds like the title of that Trans TV 
program Islam is beautiful by Ustadz Maulana
Zainuddin Musaddad, the head of pesantren, snapped: beautiful in story! and the rest of them 
laughed, 
Yes, thats how the Muslims attitudes are today, they only tell about Islam, that Islam is 
beautiful - but only in story, No-Action-Talk-Only
They just articulated bitter feelings they have experienced through enduring attempts to discourage 
Muslim organisations from politics and to stick to purely religious pursuits.  Due to perceived ties 
with the Darul Islam rebellion, the organisation continues to be counted as a potential threat. Sidney 
Jones (2003), an American expert on terrorism in the ICG (International Crisis Group), and Solahudin 
(2013), identified Darul Islam as the origin of the Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist underground network. 
According to John T. Sidel (2007), in order to appreciate the broader context of Islamist activities and 
influence in Southeast Asia, it is essential to understand the ways in which European and American 
colonial rule created lasting obstacles to the promotion of Islamist politics in Southeast Asia. He 
argues that coverage of terrorist events in South East Asia focuses on description, rather than 
explanation, events, rather than causes. Furthermore, scholarship on Southeast Asian terrorism 
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relies too much on official sources from the security services, which could have a professional 
interest in exaggerating the danger. Also, several individuals in Southeast Asian security apparatuses 
have personal and ideological reasons for not telling the truth. Perhaps, Hidayatullah will be seen in 
a different light if Kahar Muzakar finally has the status conferred of a national hero instead of a 
rebel, a perspective being proposed by Muhammadiyah to the Senate. While the organisation 
continuously received a defamatory label associated with militant Islam, it also often received 
prestigious official visits, such as former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President Habibie, 
and Megawatis vice president Hamzah Haz. In 1984 the mother pesantren in Balikpapan received 
the Kalpataru prize for environmental conservation. 
I found two social phenomena in the Hidayatullah community in Balikpapan that made it 
seem like an appropriate medium for change. One is an image of a vision of Erich Fromms 
community of being as opposed to community of having in the debates over sustainable lifestyle 
(de Geus, 2009:91)179 displaying a balanced configuration of Arendts vita-activa. The other is the 
fact that they have been living, indeed, in the imagined Darul Islam which now has been reified. 
Due to the fact that they are in a position of having to provide nearly everything by themselves with 
very limited funding, I observed everyone, men and women including the youth, always engaged in 
providing various kinds of public services to the community such as cleaning, gardening, taking part 
in the builders work, cutting wood for constructing, maintenance and so forth, besides managing 
schools and everyday needs of the students living in dormitory while not forgetting to conduct 
regular halaqah (learning circles) in which some of the leaders were the murabbi. A sense of 
connection with the rest of Hidayatullah members in different places seemed to have been well 
maintained by regular meetings held regionally or nationally ranging from every three months, to 
yearly, then to five-yearly, depending on the scope of the assembly. Under its womens division, 
Mushida (Muslimah Hidayatullah), the women enjoyed equal opportunities for being active in public 
life as well as to get connected through the equally regular womens meetings. 
Besides being a school provider, Hidayatullah has been active in humanitarian works as well. 
In disaster relief activities they engage with other Muslim groups, national and international. There 
are two sources of funding stated by the leaders: economic activities and zakat. Baitul Maal 
  
179  
..in a less high level consumption society the overall emphasis will not be on the outward characteristics of 
status and success, but on the inward aspect of human well-being. One can think of relaxation, balance, a 
focus on and attention for our fellow-beings (human and non-human), the enjoyment of pleasant and 
meaningful work, contributing to the community, but also the importance of the spiritual, just to be and exist 
in a dignified, relaxed and elegant way, instead of constantly being eager to accumulate possessions of 
whatever kind" (de Geus, 2009:91).
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Hidayatullah180 is the financial institution they founded to manage their funds. Economic activities of 
the organisation include charitable business such as schools, and profit making business such as 
palm oil plantation and many small-scale entrepreneurial undertakings. In the focus group discussion 
with the male leaders in Balikpapan the head, Zainudin Musaddad claimed:
People who often associated us with Wahabism and terrorism must have thought that 
Hidayatullah has been funded by the Saudi Arabian emir181- no, we arent, we would love to 
have one if they are interested in our movement so that we can do more things, maybe from 
the publication of your thesis someone who reads will be interested to help us financially 
(laughter). Anyway, but we believe there must be a blessing in disguise that none of the 
Middle-Easterners have helped us so far - of course we received a dates-fruit parcel every 
Ramadhan (laughter)  otherwise, we would have been caught by those who accused us 
over and over that we are terrorist camps, such as Sidney Jones. Ill tell you what, have you 
seen the map of Indonesia downstairs with networking lines linking all our branches across 
the archipelago? That one was reported by Sidney Jones as a network of terrorist cells 
(laughter)
As the discussion continued, Zainuddin enumerated three challenges of Hidayatullah into the future. 
Here are his actual words: 
One is human resource. We cant possibly order what types of people are eligible to our 
group. So we just have to accept whoever comes. Thats a real challenge. For instance, there 
was a person very capable in worldly matters but the quality of his Islamic capacity was low, 
he might be a good engineer but didnt keep his five-times daily prayers and was not able to 
wake up to join our fajr prayer congregation in the daybreak,
Two, we dont have large funding, only very limited. We havent been able to make large 
corporations support our activities, thats why we cant invite great people to join and help. 
But this weakness can also be seen as great opportunities for our people to maximize 
whatever capacity they have to help the community. And usually, people who came here 
because of the calling in their hearts turned out to be amazing far beyond people who work 
for money,
Three is the external factor. There are always people who think of our movement negatively. 
They continually draw us into the political sphere, label us extremists, investigate us secretly 
under the guise of research, and so on. Well, even though we should not take those too 
seriously but honestly they caused psychological burdens too sometimes. So, I would admit 
the three are our weaknesses. Of course you can find hundreds from your own investigation 
(laughter). I have to claim though, that we here are happy people, truly happy. I often 
compare with friends and relatives who look so glamorous but on a deeper look I pitied 
them
And the female group answered:
Transforming culture is the greatest challenge for women as we are working in grass-root 





Prince, used in a variety of places in the Arab world.
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and then about raising children and code of conduct and Islamic manner, are truly 
challenging 
8.2.2 The Pesantren-inspired Reformists
While it can be said that NU, Muhammadiyah and Hidayatullah have founded and maintained a 
substantial network of learning communities, it is obvious that Hidayatullah is distinct from the two 
giants. What singles out Hidayatullah from NU and Muhammadiyah is in its combining Traditionalist 
and Reformist approaches. From the Traditionalist, it adopted two features: one, the concept of 
murabbi as personalization of education and two, making pesantren learning institutions the centre 
of their social movement (the anchor of Islamic society  in the language of the leaders in focus 
group discussion). From Reformist, Hidayatullah adopted modern school approaches. So, the 
combination was: make the pesantren community members dwell together in a defined location as 
if it were fenced and then network them. The fact that it adopted the highly exoteric-oriented 
method of Islam and has less attraction to Sufism ascribes to its Reformist origin. This has continued 
to attract the equally warrior individuals as new members. In a notary-stipulated document about 
the decisions made by the Hidayatullah national convention in December 2010, the organisation 
claimed to follow as a model of its struggle the periodization of the advent of Quranic revelations182. 
The organisation believes that a struggle must necessarily be kaffah, further defined as holistic and 
integrated. That is, to develop a society they must begin with developing individuals, then, family, 
and that must be in all aspects: moral, cultural, social, economic, politic, security, and law. 
Obedience to Allah and the Prophet is defined as the key if the movement is to succeed. In brief, 
Hidayatullah aims to rebuild Islamic civilization. 
Even though they, too, had to contend with growing problems in the society at large, my 
observation of the two communities in Balikpapan and Depok, Jakarta, suggests that the institution 
was remarkably well and alive. In general, the communities have greater control of their own destiny 
compared to the larger society of Indonesia. In that respect, it is worth presenting that in the focus 
group discussion with the male leaders in Jakarta, a flippant, joking answer to my question regarding 
what their opinion about the multi-dimensional crisis in Indonesia was:  Thats true, but thats 
Indonesia, our neighbor (laughter). As they created their own space for self-governance they felt 
they did not need to concern themselves too much with the state and the dominant political-
economic order that encompasses it.
  
182
Meccan surah revealed before Hijrah, Madinah surah after Hijrah. Hijrah is the migration of Prophet
Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina. Meccan surah deals with spirituality, Medina with social 
issues including the laws of Islam (Shariah). 
229
8.2.3 Cognitive Warfare
In the focus group discussion with leaders in Balikpapan, crisis of conscience and cognitive 
dissonance was resolutely agreed by everyone to be the reason why they were there.
The more we learned in college the more we felt uneasy, everything seemed upside down, 
we couldnt find any relevance to what we had studied with what we found in real life, it was 
bitter to realize that our years in school were totally useless. By the way, have you heard 
that ripping up our school and college certificates was the initiation ritual for early members 
of Hidayatullah like us (laughter)? 
Please highlight that, bertentangan dengan kata hati, (dissonance) by being with the 
mainstream out there, was the reason for all of us to get together here
Their statements strike a number of foci of the research. Firstly, it recalls Trainers (2012) critical 
views of education under consumer capitalism in which schools and universities, while teaching 
things that are of no apparent relevance to students (p.3) and legitimise social position and 
inequality (p.1), among other things:
Help to produce enthusiastic consumers, people who are keen to get ahead, succeed and get
rich, who identify modernity and progress with affluence and see Western ways as the goal
for the Third World, and who accept the market system and think technical wizardry will
solve all problems. Just as they have passively consumed the activities, work and decisions
presented by their teachers, so they passively consume the products, services and decisions
presented to them by government, corporations, and professionals (Trainer, 2012:1)
Secondly, as it might have been clear this far, all conflicts between Islam and secularism in Indonesia 
take place primarily in the cognitive arena. This situation resonates, once again, Jovchelovitchs 
(2001) knowledge in context and Hutchins (1995) view of cognition, according to which culture, 
context and history are fundamental aspects of human cognition. In this relation, Sidels (2007) 
argument is appropriate. For him, the incorporation of Southeast Asia into the world capitalist 
economy under conditions of colonial rule established both the enduring subordination of Muslims 
to non-Muslims not only in the market, but also education: 
the construction of modern colonial states in the region established the enduring patterns of 
subordination of Islamic traditions of learning and socialization (and thus of acquiring 
cultural and social capital) to those pioneered in the Christian West and reconfigured as 
secular (Sidel. 2007:11)
Subsequently, 
These legacies prefigured the notably profaneindeed, at times obsceneforms of 
machine politics, money politics, and oligarchic rule so prevalent today throughout much of
Southeast Asia. (p.11)
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The leaders statement just evoked what Abdelwahab Elmessiri (Farouk-Alli, 2006:292) called 
comprehensive secularism as the identity of Western modernity. For Elmessiri, comprehensive 
secularism does not merely aim at the separation of Church and state and some aspects of public 
life, but it aims at the separation of all values  religious, moral, or human  not only from the state 
but also from public and private life and from the world at large. A female respondent, after a long 
informal chat with me about the barrage of un-Islamic influences in larger society, ranging from 
consumerism that penetrates into Muslim families to the influence of liberal thoughts that often 
stirred up such emotional arguments between Muslim leaders, said:
You seem to understand us, so you yourself must be facing lots of hardship to be without a 
community like us
She provides further insight into what has been discussed in the previous chapter that the meaning 
of pesantren is much more than an Islamic boarding school. Even if one part of the Hidayatullah 
leaders motives to build a pesantren community was redressing political grievances, there is more 
to it than ideological reaction to un-Islamic economics and political dominance. The lady indicated 
the need of moral, cognitive and interpretive unity under an Islamic symbolic universe that has been 
debated by Muslims interested in the reconstruction of knowledge. 
Relatedly, the pesantren Hidayatullahs code of conduct places a rigid restriction on the use 
of media in order to develop cautious attitudes towards alien ideas.
They need to be made aware of, and trained to restrain, so that later in the rest of their life 
they will be cautious of ideas alien to Islam
During my visit I was given accommodation in the female block of campus-1. I was staying in the 
house of a lecturer, Abdul Gofar, whose wife, Yati, was in charge of managing the female student 
dormitory. Yati seemed to be one of the ladies in the communities from whom students seek help in 
their everyday life affairs.  Upon my request, every night during my stay a female student 
accompanied me. Sometimes a number of them came for a chat in my bedroom. There I had the 
opportunities to be in discussion with them and hearing their honest concerns about studying at the 
pesantren.  Obviously, the institute lacked a variety of subjects for students interests. The 
Hidayatullah campus in Balikpapan only focusses on the study of Shariah law; the one in Surabaya on 
Education, and in Depok, Shariah Economics. As an example, a female student from Sulawesi whose 
parents were Hidayatullah leaders, complained:
Actually Im interested in Psychology so much but we dont have that here, so I have no 
choice but to study Shariah
231
When I raised the issue in the Focus Group Discussion with male members, the head, Musaddad 
responded,
Thats true. We havent yet had the ability to establish a good university with a range of 
subjects while we continued to be Islamic at the same time - in a sense, of truly Islamic 
sciences, or the sciences that are Islamic - Im sure you know what I mean. Well, what about 
you joining us and we build a high quality Islamic university together?
Hidayatullah funds its students to study in universities in the Middle East such as Medina. This way, 
the organisation has been connected to the world of Islam through scholarly engagement. I was 
interviewing Abdul Gofar, a lecturer of Shariah about whether they were studying the environmental 
fiqh, the Shariah on environment. Gofar answered:
No, its been long forgotten. Im pretty sure no one has been studying that knowledge in 
the entire Indonesia. I heard though, there are one or two scholars researching it in Yemen. 
Ill find out for you if you are interested to get in touch with them. Do you mind briefing me 
with the most salient issues on the environmental studies so that I can start thinking about 
the pertinent law in Shariah?
In the material presented above it can be seen that the Shariah approach, rather than the deep 
green version, might be more appealing to the Islamists or jihadists (formerly, reformists) towards 
Islamic environmental discourses. 
8.2.4 Globalism under a Sacred Canopy
One of the shortcomings of what ecological utopianism attempts to achieve identified in the 
literature is to assume an extreme degree of isolation (de Geus, 2009). Aldous Huxley, Thomas More 
and William Morris situate their utopias on a remote island; Murray Bookchin and B.F. Skinner in an 
isolated environment; and Ernest Callenbach in a completely secluded nation. For these thinkers, 
contact with outsiders is considered threatening, because bad influences, disruptive ideas or 
behaviour patterns introduced from outside could directly endanger the extremely delicate balance 
of their ideal societies. That particular principle of ecological utopia does not sound congruent with 
the global aspiration of Islam. An insight into Muslims position on this issue is required to envisage a 
global network of relocalisation by local Muslim communities. 
With a symbolic universe framework the relation between Islam and Indonesians as non-
Arab Muslims is explainable. The Nahdliyin adopted the concept of wasila (Bruinessen, 1994) or to 
draw spiritually near to the Prophet. Interviews with Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir reveal another 
spiritual concept. Three male leaders on separate occasions mentioned in the middle of the talks, 
more or less:
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We must distinguish between Muhammad as the son of Abdullah (the father of Prophet 
Muhammad) and Muhammad as the last Prophet. Being the son of Abdullah he is an Arab, 
but being the last Prophet he is transcendent 
The same statements were made by leaders of an-Nadzir (see the next section).  Thereby, it can be 
said, in comparison with the Arabs, the Indonesian observant Muslims have adopted and developed 
a more sublime meaning of Prophet Muhammad and of being Muslims, which might have not been 
readily the case among the Arabs, as Gardet (1961:147) said: Even today it is still true to say that, to 
an Arab, Muslim means totally Arab. And Nasr (2001a: 133) stated: 
For a simple Arab Muslim in the street, any Muslim who knows a few verses of the Quran 
and can perform his prayers is considered to be an Arab, for in his mind to be Arab and to 
be Muslim are the same.
In addition, almost all respondents from Hidayatullah both female and male answered confidently 
(one person said and others agreed), more or less, with the following statement to my question 
whether they wanted their children to continue in the same group as the parents: 
Islam is universal and not for any ethnicity exclusively, so we dont mind if our children 
want to go anywhere and join any Muslim groups there
This suggests Putnams (2000) concept of social capital, that for the Muslims living in a community, 
the Ummah, global Muslim community is a primary concern and their ethnic identity is subsumed 
within it. Putnam discusses relations between social connectedness and civic engagement with all
forms of social capital. According to him, members of associations are much more likely than non-
members to participate in politics, to spend time with neighbors, to express social trust and so on.  
However, as Zald and McCarthy (1994) argue, tension between competition and cooperation is 
always present in any Social Movement Industry (SMI). SMI refers to a congeries of social movement 
organizations that pursue common goals. From this perspective, diverse Muslim groups compose an 
SMI.  Zald and McCarthy (1994) argue that effects from external influences such as social control will 
affect interactions within a SMI. Therefore, social control by the Indonesian government affects 
interactions between Muslim groups in Indonesia. It will be clear by the following illustration. To get 
an insight into relationships between Muslim groups, I inquired what the Hidayatullah members 
perceived about their relationships with Muhammadiyah and NU.  Nearly all male leaders answered 
that the relationships with NU and Muhammadiyah, on the level of ukhuwwah Islamiyah
(brotherhood among Muslims), on the grass-root levels especially, have always been good and in 
harmony, while on the top-national level leadership their answers suggested that it had not always 
been the case given the NU overt anti-politics stance (see section 6.3.1), and the liberal Islam 
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movement183 in Indonesia, which took a very critical stance against the Islamists (Ali, 2005). In this 
respect, Artawijaya (2012), author of the book, Indonesia Tanpa Liberal, contends, Liberal NGOs in 
Indonesia often collaborated with the West to discredit Islam. When the UN human rights
commission claimed that Indonesia is an intolerant society, they were given data by Indonesian 
NGOs184. To conclude the interview, I asked the leaders in the Focus Group Discussion about their 
level of confidence in continuing their movement into the future. 
Of course we are confident to continue. What would be the reason for not being confident 
if you are advancing good causes and the truth? The West itself, who advocates falsehood, is 
so confident (laughter) 
8.2.5 The Challenges of Greening the Urbanites
Drawing from this research, I wish to contribute to a debate on the challenges of greening the 
urbanites. Within this conversation, several scholars have explicitly and convincingly argued that 
practical skills must be developed in a short time in order to deal with the on-the-ground challenges 
of ecological restoration and nurturing behavioural changes that are long-lasting. A minor finding 
that came accidently during my stay in the Hidayatullah pesantren in Balikpapan suggests particular 
challenges in the tropics besides a need of skills such as environmental planning concerning the use 
of land and design of the environment. A visit to the pesantren in Depok strongly indicates the need 
of practical skills of ecological management and restoration for the murabbis educator, who 
disseminates knowledge through living it. It calls for further research on appropriate methods of 
educating sustainability for pesantren.
Yasin, 5 years old, a son of Gofar, in whose house I was staying was stung by forest bees 
when he was playing with the other children. As has been described earlier, the Hidayatullah 
campus-1 turned out to be a housing complex surrounded by a small forest replanted by them with 
seedlings obtained from the local government. Possibly, Yasin and his friends had done something 
that unintentionally caused the hive dangling in a big tree to fall out. The Borneo forest beehive was 
as big as a soccer ball and the bee was human thumb size. The poison could be very harmful. Even 
after Yasin had been treated with traditional herbal ointment and the bee stings were taken out, still 
I could hear Yasin crying out all night long. The female student sleeping in my bedroom told me
earlier that she once found a snake in the bathroom in that bedroom and another time in the 
kitchen. In addition, even though mosquitoes are a prevalent problem everywhere in the tropics, I 
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found the ones in the Hidayatullah complex in Balikpapan were a lot more prevalent than, for 
instance, in Surabaya where I was from. The challenge of re-ruralizing urban societies when one 
considers the apprehension of food crisis in Indonesia on the heel of massive urbanization, was 
present in the Hidayatullah community in Depok, Jakarta. They seemed to have been made a target 
in pilot projects by university students and the government, whereby they received seeds of food 
crops, chickens and fresh water fish. Unfortunately, the project did not work, We dont have those 
farming skills anymore, said Shodiq and Suharsono. This lack of ecological skills pose another 
challenge that must be considered in addition to two pre-requirements namely: i) land allotment 
and ii) self-governance, needed for creating a green intentional community movement by 
Indonesian Muslim groups. Unlike environmental activists who normally have interests and skills in 
ecological issues already, which were the reasons why they joined the environmental movement in 
the first place, such interests and skills might not be readily available among the activists of Muslim 
groups. 
Happiness is another important theme that emerged from the fieldwork. It calls for further 
study to be addressed to the question of how individuals can live comfortably and well within the 
limited ecological boundaries of the earth.  In this sense, the fenced-pesantren communities make a 
striking contrast with respondent Sumiyati (name has been changed), a villager that I met 
accidentally in a friends home during the fieldwork. Sumiyati represents the Indonesian non-elite 
society at large, hence, the majority population. She said: 
People in my village are now happy to buy motorbikes from China, they are very cheap! We 
can afford them by installment with almost no down payment. Its time to get rid of our 
bicycles now
Ill tell you what. Even in my village there is Superindo now (the name of a huge 
supermarket chain). People can find everything they like as long as they have money 
(laughter) - thats why people seek pesugihan (the sorcerer) again these days, they need 
their help to bring fortune
This simple illustration, at least, suggests there are different kinds of happiness. Happiness is surely 
one of the most contested concepts. Different ideology promotes different measurements of 
happiness as shown by different levels of happiness a country like Indonesia can get from different 
polls185. The fact that the poor are able to enjoy their condition and be happy is no doubt, pleasing. 
But since it is necessary to discuss happiness intellectually, it is found that Sumiyatis happiness is 
the one that stimulated frantic urbanization, traffic jammed with motorbikes then, the need of more 
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Happiness index of Indonesia ranges between 76 out of 156 countries (Helliwell, 2013) to the top level of 
another survey in 2012 with 51% of people claiming to be very happy.
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roads to be constructed and, therefore, more land to be converted which entails more deprivation 
and marginalization of the poor, and so forth. It is a vicious circle of developmentalism. As soon as 
the poor have the means, they will become another quick spender, and as soon as they have the 
opportunity of power, they could become another corrupt officer. The outright opposite was 
provided by people who chose deliberately to join and to live within the fenced pesantren. The 
insights of Arendts (1998) vita-activa and Fromms (1979) community of being versus community of 
having are able to explain happiness of the people who chose to live voluntarily in places such as 
the fenced-pesantren of Hidayatullah. 
8.3 Community of An-Nadzir, Gowa, South Sulawesi
An-Nadzir community members settled in Kampung Mawang village, Gowa, 25 km toward south 
from Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi. The community was founded in 1998 in Jakarta by Kyai 
Syamsuri Abdul Majid who came from Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan. There were about a thousand 
people living there. I was particularly interested in this group because of their ecologically-sound 
farming practice, which supports the community. The two current leaders at the time of my visit, 
Daeng Rangka and Lukman Asli Bakti were among Syamsuris first disciples when he was spreading 
his teaching around Sulawesi. He attracted a large number of followers; all of whom held Syamsuri in 
high respect as the most learned ulama and a holy man associated with Qahhar Mudzakkar (often 
spelled as Kahar Muzakkar), the leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi. A brief 
overview of Qahhar Mudzakkar is appropriate at this point. The following is summarized from Andi 
F. Baktis (2005) Collective Memories of the Qahhars Movement.  
8.3.1 Qahhars Movement
Qahhar was born in Luwu, South Sulawesi in 1920.  When he was growing up his parents sent him to 
study at a Muhammadiyah school in Java and there he was first involved in the Indonesian 
Independence Struggle against the Dutch. Despite his accomplishments, he was passed over for 
leadership by the then President Sukarno, and other high-ranking officials. With the support of loyal 
followers he established his own command and proclaimed a guerilla war against the Republic in 
1950. Afterward, he joined the Darul Islam movement founded by S.M. Kartosuwiryo in West Java. 
In 1953 he formally announced the integration of Sulawesi into this Islamic state. As the Darul Islam 
weakened in Java, in 1957, he declared the outright independence of Sulawesi. In 1962, he 
proclaimed the independent East Indonesia RPII, Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia (Islamic 
Federated Republic of Indonesia), with a centre in Sulawesi and himself as khalifah (caliph). In 
1963, acting on the advice of his foreign ministers, he decided to sever all political links with 
Javanese Indonesia as the only means of saving Sulawesi from Javanese domination.  In 1965, the 
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Indonesian army in Jakarta declared it had killed Qahhar. Because no one saw the corpse, the claim 
had been refuted by his followers, and generated rumors suffused with both political and mystical 
speculations. Some believe that his death was faked and he merely disappeared for political reasons, 
and others believe that he ascended to Heaven temporarily, awaiting the time when it is necessary 
to come back, a tomanurung in the local myth, which found correspondence with the Imam Mahdi 
in Islam. The latter groups belief was buttressed by a speech he purportedly made shortly before he 
left: Ill go away from you all for some time, dont ever try to look for me, because you simply cant. 
But if I want to, I can easily find you (Bakti, 2005:127). The afore-mentioned Kyai Syamsuri who 
came from Kalimantan and propagated ideas central to Qahhars presentations was then believed to 
be Qahhar himself, but replacing his old strategy with a new one.  
Bakti argues that memories of Qahhar framed by quasi-spiritual contact shape the 
movements collective memory and are central to how the movement sustains its cohesiveness long 
after the alleged-death of its leader. The ideas are perpetuated and broadened through cell-based 
organisations and play a role in the contemporary regional movement in South Sulawesi. The core 
group includes a number of members of NGOs who are involved in a varied field of activities 
ranging from cooperatives, legal practice and farming, to youth training and professionals employed 
in Sulawesi as teachers, lecturers, lawyers, consultants and engineers. They were fully aware of the 
consequences of being loyalists, such as being identified, captured, detained, tortured, and killed. 
When Suhartos centralized regime ended and the periphery regions sought decentralization, 
Qahhar became the symbol of independence from Javanese hegemony and Jakartas alleged role as 
colonizer. Slogans such as Javanese colonialism, Majapahitism, and Javanese syncretism and 
communism are heard regularly in the core groups meetings, which according to Bakti, aim to 
construct memories of the ties between the original Qahhars movement and the contemporary 
situation. 
Members of the movement identified themselves as having been colonized by the Javanese 
who are literally depicted as foreigners. Some staff of the contemporary movement said, 
its not the Javanese that we dont like, but their exploitative domination, their colonization 
and their openness to communism, and Some of us, including Qahhar, are married to 
Javanese because we love them, but we dont like their corrupted values (Bakti, 2005:132). 
The members also reject national transmigration policy that is seen as simply a means to spread 
Javanese domination over the outer-islands and infuse all the nations peoples with Javanese values. 
They also view the national family-planning (KB) program as a means to control the growth of non-
Javanese. As for an economic policy, they believe local natural resources have been taken away from 
them so as to feed and enrich the Javanese. They believe that Javanese values have become strong 
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and predominant in the national framework, largely because of the constant support of the military 
and central bureaucracy, both of which are regarded as being Javanese-dominated.
Scholars Commentaries on Messianism
Referring to Nasr (1994:302-3), Qahhars movement can be seen as an example of Messianism186. 
According to Nasr, Messianism has always been present in Islam and has manifested itself whenever 
the Islamic community has felt an immense danger to its world of value and meaning. 
It was one of the appearances of a charismatic figure claiming to be the Mahdi or his 
representative in direct contact with God and his Agents in the Universe and representing a 
divine intervention in history with eschatological overtone (p.303). 
Qahhars movement also demonstrates what Jenkins (2012) argued about disenchantment and re-
enchantment in section 2.3. According to Jenkins, although modernization seems to have made the 
world homogenous to a certain degree, the world remains as divided by heterogeneity of culture as 
ever. Jenkins claims further that spirituality, among other things, is the origin of re-enchantment.
8.3.2 Decentralising South Sulawesi
In the midst of the decentralization that took place after Suhartos New Order ended, the tacit 
ideological perpetuation of Qahhars movement by the core members through myth and personal 
recollection has taken institutionalized forms. Two of them are Komite Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam 
Organizing Committee for the Preparation for the Application of Islamic Law (KPPSI) founded by 
Qahhars son, Abdul Aziz in 2000; and Pusat Amanat Referendum Rakyat Sulawesi (PARAS)  Centre 
for Trusteeship of the Sulawesi Peoples Referendum, also founded in 2000.  The main purpose of 
KPPSI is to promote the implementation of Islamic law, Shariah, in South Sulawesi, and the PARAS 
focuses on gaining popular support for a referendum, asking whether to remain within the unitary 
state of republican Indonesia or to work towards independence. 
Many have written on KPPSI and its agenda to implement Shariah law  both from positive 
and negative outlooks (Feener, 2013; Nordholt, 2007; Jonsson, 2006; Hooker, 2008). Hooker puts 
forward a thesis that there is a Shariah that has been formulated to meet the needs of Islam in 
Indonesia on its own terms. He examined four regional Shariah codes including the one by KPPSI 
who has been attempting to pursue decentralization and getting some form of autonomy for South 
Sulawesi. For Hooker, the two most interesting features of the South Sulawesi draft are its 
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Messianism is the belief in a messiah, a savior or redeemer. Many religions have a messiah concept including 
the Jewish Messiah, the Christian Christ, the Muslim Imam Mahdi, the Buddhist Maitreya, the Hindu Kalki, and 
the Zoroastrian Saoshyant. The concept goes hand in hand with the idea of corruption of the time and that 
divine intervention is needed through a specially selected and supported human. (Nasr, 2004).
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correctness as a formal document and its stated intention to shift the economy and trade of the area 
from a secular to Sharia basis. The elucidation of the code points out that the traditional inhabitants 
of the province, the Bugis, Makasarese, and Mandarese, have long been known as devout Muslims. 
They argue that South Sulawesi merits the honor of being called the Verandah of Medina just as 
Aceh is called the Verandah of Mecca.  The contemporary argument for the code starts with the 
failure of present law to bring peace, justice and prosperity to the region (p.261) and that Sharia 
would provide a solution to these ongoing problems of mismanagement.  Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the 
elucidation sum up the positions that are important to my research:
It is essential that the government respond positively to these very strong aspirations of the 
community of South Sulawesi, because they are an endeavour to maintain and protect the 
Unitary State of the Republic Indonesia [NKRI, my note], and because these aspirations are 
carried out in a peaceful and constitutional manner. If the government does not respond 
positively, the voices of aspirations of those who wish to separate themselves will become 
stronger, growing like a snow ball, and eventually it will not be easy to overcome them. 
The granting of Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic Syariah is a perfect 
solution because it is cohesive for the nation as well as being an endeavour to broaden the 
participation of the community of South Sulawesi in building a special nation in South 
Sulawesi (Hooker, 2008:261-262)
While wrestling with local South Sulawesi issues, KPPSI is not isolated from being connected to the 
Muslim world at large. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, that has been active in seeking to build relationships 
with all local groups, has become a key channel to joining the transnational movement. In addition, 
the chairman of Wahdah Islamiyah (WI), another South Sulawesi-based Muslim group that has been 
connected to the transnational movement through scholarly exchanges, was among the founders of 
KPPSI (Jurdi, 2012:8).
8.3.3 An-Nadzir: the Esoteric Community
An-Nadzir community is one of Qahhars movements. The community leader, Daeng Rangka, once a 
Muhammadiyah cadre, is an indigenous Gowan ethnic. He is known to be a descendent of Syekh 
Yusuf, a ruler of Gowa in the mid 17th century who struggled against the Dutch trade monopoly. 
Yusuf was captured and banished to Ceylon, and then to Cape Town in South Africa till the end of his 
life. Yusuf is regarded as the introducer of Islamic faith by the South African locals. Interestingly, 
besides a grave in Cape Town, there is also the grave of Syekh Yusuf in Gowa, another one on Putera 
Island, and one more on Maluku Island, which are treated by the locals with great esteem. They 
could have been memorial graves built by his students.
The largest proportion of members of an-Nadzir community came from South Sulawesi 
although there were also some from Sumatera, Kalimantan and Papua. The community is an 
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example of a small-scale rural farming community with simple community organisation. Rangka is an 
example of an ideal leader in the relocalisation of rural community envisaged in this thesis, aimed at 
rebuilding self-sufficient sustainable communities with local governance. As a teacher with expertise 
in organic farming in a local government-owned agriculture academy, STTP, Rangka was leading his 
community into integrated farming practices. They were utilizing the seemingly abandoned land of 
STTP. In fact, the STTP gate turned out to be the entrance to get into an-Nadzir community. To me, 
Rangka seemed to be a hands-on leader who managed to run the everyday small scale economic 
activities: tilling the 18 hectares of rice-field and orchard, goat and cattle husbandry, fish breeding in 
the eight hectare Mawang lake, and running a rice-mill, photocopy service, drinking water filling 
plant, cellular phone top-up, and a motorbike garage. Rangka is, therefore, a murabbi. 
He was a charismatic leader. Once a visitor was accepted and welcomed by him the whole 
community including the non an-Nadzir people living outside the gate were welcoming without 
barrier. To my surprise, Rangka, who was discussed in the internet forum as a crank Muslim, even 
once accused of being a terrorist camp leader, appeared to have maintained good relations with 
the villagers as well as with local government officers. While I was staying in the community, the 
STTP officers held their annual meeting in an-Nadzirs hut standing on the lake of Mawang. The 
accommodation that Rangka arranged for me was the house of his niece, Marwah, right off the STTP 
gate. Marwahs husband was Javanese. He was in the army doing military service in Java. I was 
treated very kindly by everyone, both inside and outside the STTP gate. When I was invited by 
Rangkas wife for tea with the other women in the community, I was even welcomed to move to 
their house.
The term Muhammads nation that I coined was exteriorized in an-Nadzir male members 
who aimed to mimic the Prophets appearance.  All an-Nadzir men were bearded with shoulder-
length long hair.  During prayer time the men wore black robes with turbans. They often got their 
hair henna-dyed. Those symbols were not of little importance to them. Rangka explained:
The Prophets hair was long to shoulder, so why not the Muslim mens? Men must appear as 
men, having beard and mustache, the Muhammads way is the salvation, laqod kana lakum 
fi Rasu-lullahi uswatun hasanah, liman kana yarjullaha wal yaumal-akhira wadzaka-rallaha 
katsira187. Muhammad is the image of God, he doesnt say anything but the sayings of God, 
he moves not but the movements of God, so we are here attempting to be the image of 
Muhammad. Please note, by that we are not saying that there is no salvation outside 
  
187  
Quran 33: 21: There is indeed a good model for you in the Messenger of Allah (Muhammad) - for the one who 
has hope in Allah and the Last Day, and remembers Allah profusely.
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Muhammads as you know the Quran also tells us188, but the question is where are their holy 
books now? Have they got them well preserved?
An-Nadzir protested against the existing governments education system, which according to them 
produced nothing but corrupt individuals in the government and private sectors. Because the 
community was composed of relatively young people, they had not developed a through alternative 
education for those aged over 13 years like the ones in the Hidayatullah. 
Being a Muslim myself, I found the sound of their azan maghrib in the sunset -a melodious 
call to prayer- from their small mosque was really tranquilizing. Each evening at the maghrib time 
the male members performed the prayer in jamaah (congregation) followed by discussions, 
formally or informally. Obviously, Rangka and Lukman were highly esoteric personalities and an-
Nadzir appealed to equally esoteric individuals. They sought the return of Islam to the unified 
systemic worldview, or unitary perspective of Islam, Tawhid, in which God is understood as the 
Ultimate Reality (al-Haq) - the one they felt has been partly forgotten or only literally and 
superficially understood by the majority of Muslims today. Rangka argues:  
If your teacher (Mursyid) didnt know Allah, leave them, theyre dead-end tunnels, its fairy 
tales that theyre telling you. The first step for Muslims to do is to know Allah, once you 
know Him youll have nothing to be afraid of except Him. Otherwise, as you see today, 
Muslims are such cowardly creatures. We, an-Nadzir people, know Him, and I myself have 
experienced the union with Him 
Theo-centric Deep-Ecology
On the issue of world crisis, I was surprised to know Rangka, Lukman and Epong were fully aware of 
the environmental conditions, and that the earth is endangered and in disequilibrium. They are 
internet-literate and aware of the most current world issues. According to Lukman, the name an-
Nadzir means an admonisher, 
What we are doing here is to remind ourselves, the an-Nadzir people, as well as all 
Muslims, the Ummah outside our gate. We, who gather here, are the people who fear and 
are shy of Allah. You will find nothing that we are doing but the formulation of what was 
prescribed by the Prophet and has been corrupted as time went by, so here we are to 
remind of that 
He enunciated an apprehension of rampant injustice and the question of the end of history:
The Prophet said that Allah will defer the Hour, the end of history, when there is a man 




Expressed in several verses, like the famous Q:35:24: There never was a community without a prophet having 
lived among them.
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The man that Lukman was referring was Imam Mahdi189, the savior in Islamic tradition. An-Nadzir 
community believes that they are preparing the 313 men who would be assisting Mahdi, the Bani 
Tamim190. Lukman continued:
We dont know if we have qualified people for the Bani Tamim here, all we do is keep on
trying to do good and resuscitate Islam as it was originally brought up by the Prophet
On that, Rangka said on another occasion:
Ali Ibn Abi Talib191 has prophesized that one day the Arab will be astonished to watch, when 
the Quran is coming back but not through the hands of the Arab, rather people who do not 
speak the language of it192
And Epong, his assistant, a hafiz193 and University of al-Azhar Cairo graduate, added to what Rangka 
said:
Thats true, those people, the Bani Tamim, are not Arabs. Look at Quran Surah al-
Jumuah:3 
The notions they were speculating on juxtapose globalism under a sacred canopy already discussed 
(see section 7.2.4) with a kind of localism under a global sacred canopy, which has been possible 
only by the non-organisational structure of Islam. Further, Rangka described the metaphysical 
relations of Bani Tamim and nature. His description articulates the concept of walayah, with regard 
to humans guardianship of the earth discussed in section 4.2.2 about the Islamic version of deep-
ecology:
Wherever there is one of the Bani Tamim living you can tell from how nature looks so 
happy and alive194. Muslims have forgotten that humans are the khalifah (vicegerent) as well 
as the abd (servant) of Allah. What is the khalifah supposed to do? Three, firstly, managing 
the earth, and then being the leader, and then fulfilling and upholding that trust (amanah)
through enacting the divine laws. As the Muslims forgot those tasks, and dont understand 
anymore the meaning of Laa ilaha illalLah195, they became timid, as you can see everywhere. 
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When injustice is rampant Imam al-Mahdi, as portrayed by a Hadith, is a man who abides to the Islamic Law 
and will uphold justice on earth. 
190
They meant Bani Tamim as the assistance of Imam Mahdi.
191
Ali Ibn Abi Talib is the closet person to the Prophet.
192
The Quran is preserved in its original language, Arabic. Although translation into other languages is allowed the 
recitation of the Quran, such as in Muslims everyday prayer, is only done in its original language. It is believed 
to be this way to preserve the authenticity of the original text.
193  
Hafiz is a person who has completely memorized the Quran.
194
See the Islamic version of deep-ecology in section 4.2.2.
195  No God but God. The most important creed of Islam.
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Only tears have made them terrified and paralyzed, isnt that a sign that they dont know 
Allah anymore?  
As a grass-roots thinker, Rangka has enunciated the major source of cognitive dissonance among 
Muslims about different concepts of reality already given in Chapter 2. The main idea of the 
humanism of the Renaissance in which humans are the centre of all things -thus, everything revolves 
around humans- is the antithesis of the concept of human in Islam. As the Muslims adopt humanism 
through the modern system of thought, they are placed in great inconsistency with what they 
believe. Festinger (1957) contends that an individual strives toward consistency within himself, the 
kind of consistency between what a person knows or believes and what he/she does. According to 
him, cognitive dissonance leads to activity oriented towards dissonance reduction just as hunger 
leads to activity oriented toward hunger reduction. The activity of dissonance reduction aims to 
achieve consonance, or active avoidance of situations and information which would likely increase 
the dissonance. Such a cognitive dissonance that accompanied a clash of symbolic universe can be 
propounded as another explanation behind the de-secularization waves in the Muslim world. I asked 
Rangka his opinion of the future of Indonesia. He answered with full confidence:
Indonesia is going to be with the khilafah Islamiyah which will be coming soon.
I asked further how that would be possible given the present nation-State structure of the country. 
(Laughter) Nothing is impossible if Allah so wills. Look, I can tell from your features that you 
are an Arab descendent, and your husband is not, how did that happen? 
I inquired further if he meant a revolution would need to take place for a khilafah Islamiyah to be 
established.
No, no revolution, everything will be handed over just like that when the time comes. It is a 
matter of Gods will
8.3.4 An-Nadzirs Contribution to Deep VS. Social Ecology Debates
As the world becomes a more dangerous place to live there is every reason to expect such forms of 
Mahdiism in the Islamic world will continue. An-Nadzir also exemplifies the Islamic version of deep-
ecology; theirs is neither characterized by eco-centrism nor anthopo-centrism, but a theo-centric 
one.  Considering the unpardonable sin of divinizing other than God (Shirk) in Islamic faith -which 
has been alluded to by Manzoor in section 4.2.2- the theo-centric deep ecology is the most 
appropriate school for the Muslims, although limited to the esoteric-inclined individuals196. Unlike 
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The term deep ecology signifies its advocates deeply felt spiritual connections to the earths living systems. 
The experiences are the ground of their intuitive, affective perception of the sacredness and interconnection 
243
the eco-centric deep-ecologist, an-Nadzir is not politically and historically-naïve. Their insistence on 
Shariah laws has in fact made them a striking contrast to deep-ecologists in the literature, who are 
known as largely evading confrontation with the problems posed by huge power as well as the issues 
of poverty and inequality (Pepper, 1996:29). This characteristic has made the critics disparaging -
that deep-green in reality is shallow (Bradford, 1989). The An-Nadzir counterpart, KPPSI, seems to 
know enough realpolitik to get into the battle of pursuing Islamic laws. Furthermore, the following 
accounts are worth noting.
Despite the anti-Javanese sentiments that prevail in South Sulawesi, by placing God at the 
center of allegiance instead of nature, or human, the Qahhars movement in general has been saved 
from the risk of slipping into the blut und boden of Nazism. This, is especially significant if we 
consider the bloody ethnic conflict that happened in Indonesia such as the massacre of immigrant 
Maduras by indigenous Dayaks in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, in 2001. The ethnic cleansing was 
associated with long-held economic and social grievances of the Dayaks, competition over local 
resources and new opportunities for political mobilization along ethnic lines (Combs, 2009). 
Bookchin (1990) reminds us that the deep-ecologys obsession with community and oneness with 
nature too could go very wrong. With only minor ideological tilt, Bookchin argues, allegiance to 
nature [as well as to human, or patria in tribalism and nationalism] can enable massacres such as
those of the Nazis197. For Indonesia in particular, this situation is reminiscent of the pitfall of adat-
revival which was often supported by international organisations for being a secular complement 
to Islam-revival as already presented in section 5.6.
8.4 Murabbi and Alternative Society for Relevantizing Sustainability Education
Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir provide examples of possible models of alternative society for the 
Indonesian Muslims. I found the significance of murabbi (pesantren educator) and personalized 
knowledge in their models. Mentioned previously (See section 7.4.2), a murabbi is a person who 
combines a life of learning with a life of virtue, and hence a perfect and an ideal person to learn 
from (Kazmi, 1999). According to this view, the necessary prerequisite for education is an encounter 
of a personal kind between two beings. The two beings can be two human beings, or God and a 
     
of all life. Deep ecology has been criticized for being intellectually incoherent, ignorant of socio-economic 
factors in environmental problems, and given to mysticism and misanthropy.  Social-ecologists criticize deep 
ecologists overemphasis on cultural factors (worldview, religion, philosophy) in diagnosing the roots of, and 
solutions to, environmental problems, for it has minimized their understanding of the roles played by political, 
and economic factors inherent in global capitalism. For a more detailed account and criticism of deep ecology, 
see Taylor and Zimmerman (2005).
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For further intellectual analysis, I suggest looking at the debates about relations between Heideggers thought; 
his deep ecology; his own version of National Socialism; and his involvement in Nazism (E.g. Zimmerman, 1993; 
Bruggemeier et al, 2005; Sluga, 1993).
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human being198. Thus, education is the result of a personal encounter between a teacher and 
student. In response to the question: Why should the truth of the knowledge matter? A murabbi
gives the answer with his/her life. If his/her life has acquired a quality that is worth emulating, then 
the truth that has shaped his/her life is worth consenting to. In Islamic tradition, the person who 
best embodies the qualities of a murabbi is the Prophet Muhammad. This premise provides another 
explanation of the role of Sunna (tradition of the Prophet) for the Muslims that have been discussed 
in detail from Chapter 2 onward.  
For a murabbi the only way to understand knowledge is to live it, and to test its validity is to 
see what difference it makes to his/her life as a Muslim. What a murabbi then teaches is not an 
impersonal body of theoretical knowledge that he/she has mastered and accepted its truth based on 
the objective principle of verification but rather teaches knowledge that he/she has lived and having 
lived found it to be true or false (p.218). Kazmi highlights that education, in this view, is about 
helping students to create a configuration of meaning that tells them what is and what is not 
important:
This structure does not only tell them what is true or false, or that stealing is wrong and one 
should avoid bad company. This structure gives them something more fundamental than any 
moral code or ethical principle. For even though a child may know right from wrong and true 
from false but if he/she has not learnt that it is important to always speak the truth and to 
do what is right, he/she may not act according to those norms. The knowledge of norms 
alone is not sufficient to make me act according to them; I need to be impressed that 
following these norms is important, that it matters to live by them. If my father demands 
that I should always speak the truth but hardly ever speaks the truth himself, would telling 
of the truth impress me? (Kazmi, 1999:217)
Personal encounter is the matrix that allows all other modes of communication to be effective. 
Further, seeing, watching, doing and thinking constitutes an education: I have to observe several 
judgments being made in understanding football before I get the hang of them. It is seeing, 
watching, doing and thinking simultaneously that helps me to get the inside view of the game or, as 
they say, get a handle on it (Kazmi, 1999:215). The notion of personal knowledge that is 
particularistic and not generalizable in the concept of murabbi is in correspondence with my 
argument that there is hardly universal rationality where there are different symbolic universes. 
Furthermore, for the murabbi, there is almost no distance between knowledge and practice, 
between theory and praxis, between knowing and acting. Taking those together, I put forward a 
proposition that a more effective sustainability education can be provided by the murabbi. 
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As God teaches Adam (human) the names of everything (Q:2:30-9) already discussed in section 2.2.3.
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8.5 Is National or Trans-national Islam better?
While Islam as a religion has always been transnational, the contemporary word transnational 
Islam can mean many things. It can mean atrocious terrorist groups, or radical Islam and the two 
books by NU and Muhammadiyah leaders (Wahid, 2009; Rahmad, 2012) seemed to refer to it in this 
sense (see section 6.4). Mandaville (2009) includes Sufi brotherhoods, Islamist parties and groups, 
renewal/pietistic movements, charitable organisations and dawa organizations as transnational. 
The primary conduits for cross-border transmission include scholarly engagement and studying 
abroad, labor migration, new media, and ritual obligation such as pilgrimage (Mandaville, 2009:2). 
Envisioning a global network of relocalisation by Muslim groups needs Muslim groups that espouse 
transnational relations with other groups. With these criteria, Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir by my 
evaluation are more attuned to the global relocalisation movement requirements. Whether 
Muhammadiyah and NU really do not fit with global dimension of Islam remains subject to further 
research. The following fieldwork findings showed a striking contrast to a loathing of particular 
trans-national Islamic groupsoutlined in the two leaders books. Two Nahdliyyin kyai in East Java 
gave positive appreciations, with answers such as: 
O yes, I know, Hizbut Tahrir and the like, they seem successful in recruiting students from 
one campus to another. But of course the government doesnt like them, thats why they 
were slandered and repressed 
And, 
I supported Jamaah Tabligh. The Nahdliyin needs to be resurrected with that kind of 
puritanical message, to keep their daily prayer, and the rich Muslims need to be reminded of 
their obligation to pay zakat. The rich have to be reminded that by paying his zakat does not 
mean he becomes a generous man, it was just his obligation. So, if you just pay the due 
amount of your zakat actually you are still stingy, only your duty was fulfilled   
The NU and Muhammadiyah sympathizers working as professionals outside the organisations gave 
resolutely positive views of Global Islam, and a Muhammadiyah senior leader in Jakarta said: Even 
Muhammadiyah is no longer confined to Indonesia. We are beginning to have branches in the US, 
Australia, and so on... soon well be global. 
I came to realize that nationalism and religious exclusivism are part of the same thing in the 
end. I reflected that humankind is very prone to fall into both. It is probably because humankind 
cannot stand too many realities. Whole earth, one world family vision of the environmentalist can 
be honestly advocated only by the ones who have reached the Ultimate Self, to whom there are no 
more illusions of nation-states barriers and self-interests199. He/she is the universal person in the 
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Considering, (i) certain deep ecologists (see section 4.4.3) turned out to be racists, believing that Third World 
peoples should be permitted to starve to death and that desperate Indian immigrants from Latin America 
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true sense of the term, and can act beyond a symbolic universes confines. I was personally 
enlightened on this particular issue during the research. I also came to see the correspondence in it 
with the concept of the unity of the Islamic world. Also, the reasoning behind the concept of dividing 
the world politics into three by the great Ulama in the past, namely: (i) dar al-Islam, the abode of 
Islam or where Islam rules as a majority religion, that is where the Islamic Sacred Law or Shariah 
governs human life; (ii) dar al-sulh, the abode of peace where Muslims live as the minority but 
where they are at peace and can practice their religion freely; and finally (iii) dar al-harb, the abode 
of conflict or war, where Muslims are not only in minority but where they are in a state of conflict 
with and struggle against the external social and political environment in order to be able to practice 
their religion. The Quran and the early Ulama seemed to be aware of humans limitations 
aforementioned. If only the concept of dar al-Islam were applied, one can easily imagine a global 
Islamic environmental movement within the dar al-Islam, as a result of which the world will have to 
deal with far less of nation-states interests during world climate diplomacy, for instance. As 
mentioned previously (see section 1.1) the real challenge for a global environmental diplomacy is to 
overcome the legitimacy of an individual nation states interest. Respect for national sovereignty 
requires agreement from many governments and no government can be forced to agree or to be 
obligated without its consent (Speth, 2002), hence, countries continued to defend their sovereignty 
against undue encroachment (Park et al, 2008:3). Treaties would be much easier to attain within 
dar al-Islam.
8.6 Conclusion
My vision of a post-Carbon world is in line with Trainers Simpler Way. The fenced-pesantren
learning communities, therefore, can be envisioned as alternative societies to transition from peak 
oil and climate change for Indonesian urban and rural observant Muslims. Their strengths include 
the availability (abundance) of: social capital, self-discipline, solidarity, faith energies, resilience-by 
virtue of Islamic faith in Qada and Qadar (the supremacy of Gods will), an Islamic economic and 
Islamic business ethos as an alternative to capitalist or socialist paradigms. While the survivalists 
motivations might not suit well the belief in Qada and Qadar, a transition movement can be 
presented in the Muslim context as a kind of responsibility to God following what Prophet 
Muhammad says, Every one of you is a guardian, and responsible for what is in his custody 
(Hadith). The fenced-pesantren models can possibly be networked into global ecological mobilization 
     
should be excluded by the border cops from the United States lest they burden "our" ecological resources 
(Bookchin, 1987); and (ii) certain deep-ecologists connections with Nazi ideals of land and identity 
(Zimmerman, 1993; Bruggemeier et al, 2005; Sluga, 1993); and (iii) the UNFCC did not provide room for non-
state movement such as by the Ummah (see section 4.6) which in my eyes, is another manifestation of the 
Wests hidden power trips (Zimmerman, 1989)     
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with the rest of the Muslim world for the concept of Ummah provides a substratum and 
infrastructure to link and interconnect Muslim groups on a global scale. Nonetheless, while they 
have a wide range of capabilities to overcome a number of weaknesses of the ecotopian intentional 
communities in the literature, in their present-day conditions, Muslims lack information about the 
latest socio-ecological conditions of the planet and its people, and lack pragmatic knowledge and 
skills to confront the problems in a carbon-constrained world. I identified that what is needed 
includes:
- Alternative energy and creation of an energy-descent plan
- Sustainable agriculture
- Fresh water crisis and wastewater treatment
- Rubbish treatment
- Ecological buildings
- Environmental planning 
- Ecosystem restorations
- Production of consumables toward self-sufficiency within the community, e.g. processed 
foods (cooking oils, sauces, flours, etc), toiletries (soap, tooth paste, body lotions), drinking 
water (Jackson and Svensson, 2002; Bang, 2005; Dawson, 2006; Lockyer and Veteto, 2013)
Once they are able to produce socially and ecologically responsible products and services based 
upon Islamic economics and business ethics, the community members should seek to expand their





[God] Show me things as they are. You make things appear beautiful when in reality they are ugly; 
You make things appear ugly when in reality they are beautiful.  Show us therefore each thing as it is,
lest we fall into a snare and be ever errant.
(Jalal Ad-Din Muhammad Rumi (1207-1273))
The scale of this research required an iterative process of interpretation to collect divergent 
information and comprehend the subtlety of meaning from events and phenomena through analysis 
of prolonged, complex processes of social interaction involving history, local cultures, religious 
doctrines and practices, languages, and actions. Being constantly guided by the overarching research 
problems, issues, background, agendas and pragmatic objectives to find solutions, the process of 
interpretation led me to move inductively from vague ideas and the seemingly unstructured pattern 
of data into themes. On many occasions, repeating the process of collecting new data was needed, 
then interpreting and focusing the data into the aspects of social settings to consider either new 
themes, or new insights to substantiate or disprove the previously identified themes. It is worth 
noting that as qualitative research, this research is highly cyclical.
A detailed and close examination has revealed the fact that Indonesia has been forced into a 
global economic order and developmentalism within which the participation of Muslim groups has 
been insignificant or even minuscule, and where Islamic values and philosophies hardly play a role at 
all. This fact must be taken into account in the study of religion and ecology in answer to common 
questions: why the non-Western religious societies do not reveal any less destructive trends and are 
not less industrial-attracted than the West? (Radcliffe, 2000:93-4), or, if lives on earth are severely 
endangered, why they [religions] have been so late to participate in solutions to ecological 
challenges? (Grim and Tucker, 2014: 13). 
In general, the research findings confirm what was also noted by Foltz et al (2003:xxxiv) that
discourses on environmental issues amongst Muslims with strong Islamic sensibility (a mark of the 
Muhammads nation in the thesis) are characterised by a point of view that environmental 
degradation is merely a symptom of the broader and more alarming calamity. Their concerns are not 
just with this world but also the next, that human societies are not living in accordance with Gods 
will. Fieldwork and literature show that when they came to talk about environmental crisis, they 
were more immediately concerned with the issues of social justice and human relationship with God 
rather than about the condition of the environment scientifically. This fact, as conversations with 
leaders of Muslim organisations show, further reinforces the importance of the Islamic symbolic 
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universe in conveying environmental messages effectively to the Muslim audiences. The thesis 
demonstrates the normative, cognitive and affective components of a symbolic universe. Therefore, 
the calls for radical shift towards sustainability will receive an enthusiastic response only if brought 
up by the Muslims themselves through the Muslims own traditional channels, and mobilised 
through the Muslims own hearts and minds. In a larger argument, I came to conclude that no 
aspects of Muslim problems could hope to be changed satisfactorily unless solutions are consistent 
with Islamic tradition.  
Despite these facts, however, the potential of varied Indonesian Muslims groups in 
advancing environmental actions has never been studied academically in depth; the potential of an 
Islamic symbolic universe in mobilising global environmental actions has not been recognised 
adequately by the sociologists; and the potential of Muslim learning traditions in nurturing 
sustainability education has not been taken into account in environmental studies. This is especially 
surprising given the heated debates on the presumed role of Islamic education in the spread of 
Muslim militancy. In addition, there has been no study of relocalisation as a radical environmental 
movement undertaken in Indonesia, much less an endogenous relocalisation in the Muslim world. 
Besides, to my awareness, there has been no non-positivist, qualitative research that examines the 
desirability of Eurocentric development models to the non-elite Muslim population  the very 
people who have been subject to development and Western Enlightenment projects. All these may 
suggest, on the one hand, the accounts of Islam-o-phobia, and on the other, Foucaults 
discourse/power where discourse is conceptualised as the nexus of powerknowledge (Foucault, 
1977) and where certain values and scientific models are taken for granted as true. Thereby, 
contemporary discourse in Indonesian politics and the environmental movement is dominated by 
the nationalist and westernists views, reflecting the positions of the Right (the World Economic 
Forum camp - neoliberal capitalists), and the Left (the World Social Forum camp - socialists). In 
contrast to those, this thesis shows that a global network of relocalisation by local Muslim 
communities is possible and doable and should be pursued in the face of climate change and the 
end of oil. 
A pragmatic research paradigm, by Creswells (1998) definition, is the primal driver of this 
thesis. Pragmatic research seeks solutions and what works. Thereby, alongside an assumption that 
happiness is what every human strives for, a pragmatic paradigm liberates me in analysing the 
conditions of the Muslim communities being studied and their community development from two 
academic shackles identified by postmodernism, namely, (i) the power of truth that has been 
shaped and created by dominant discourse on modernity, progress, and development, and (ii) the 
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Western hegemony of meaning in words such as: savage, pre-modern, under-developed. It needs 
highlighting that what works in this thesis has been considered from both human and 
environmental perspectives. Eventually, a pragmatic paradigm liberates me from the dualistic vision 
of reality that is manifested in binaries which structure the following texts: good-bad, civilized-
savage; modern-pre-modern; developed-underdeveloped. A liberation from the dualistic vision of 
reality is identified by Al-Attas (1978) in the reconstruction of knowledge debates (see section 
2.4.1) as a pre-requisite for Islamisation of social science to occur. Dualistic vision of reality does 
not conform to the unitary perspective of Islam where all aspects of life and all degrees of cosmic 
manifestation are governed by a single principle and are unified by a common center, thus, there is 
nothing outside the power of God (Nasr, 2001b). In  more esoteric terms, there is nothing outside 
His Being, for there cannot be two orders of reality (Nasr, 2001b). 
Working toward pragmatic objectives this research and its analysis are concerned with both 
people as individuals, and institutions as the doers of social movements. Thus, it engages heavily 
with the knowledge-meaning-action trilogy, and hence, cannot ignore the social and historical 
context of human thought. Therefore, while pragmatism, as aforementioned, liberated me from the 
dualistic vision of reality in the philosophical sense of the term, studying the world of meaning of 
Indonesian Muslims and gaining an understanding of their actions necessitated me to consider 
reality in the sociological sense of the term as being socially-constructed. The latter has placed this 
thesis in a sociology of knowledge framework where binaries that structure texts re-appear after 
they disappear within my pragmatic mode of thought. Thus, Orient-Occident, Muslim-non-Muslim, 
Nation A-Nation B are inevitable. They are sociological realities that must be dealt with by the 
thesis even though I have adopted a unitary perspective of Islam where everything is governed by a 
single principle and unified by a common center. Accordingly, given that grouping and creating 
multiplicity are intrinsic to the sociological nature of human being, with Berger and Luckmanns 
symbolic universe premise I draw a bold demarcation line between Muslims -the Muhammads 
nation in particular- and the rest of Indonesian society. Thereby, a dualism of Muhammads 
Nation-Other Nations emerged. With this, I aimed to work out the realistic and doable, rather than 
the normative and awu-awu solutions. In this sense, a symbolic universe signifies a center of 
allegiance, the objective, and the world of meaning for individuals or collectively it is such a centre to 
their actions. Henceforth, five major themes and a number of subthemes emerged. They are: (i) 
clash of symbolic universes that predominate in relations between Muslims and the state and 
Muslims and modernity; (ii) mistrust of the West that I argue can be ascribed to the colonial legacy; 
(iii) Islam as a social movement rather than merely faith (iv) different kinds of Happiness; and (v) 
possible models of endogenous Islamic relocalisation. Eventually, if grouping and creating 
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multiplicity are intrinsic to the sociological nature of human beings, the question of the extent to 
which the whole earth-one world family vision of the environmentalist is possible should, 
therefore, be addressed to the question of how interactions between one nation and another have 
been made thus far. 
Throughout the thesis I gave phenomenological perspectives. From my practising Muslim 
background I introduced spiritual experience and spiritual meaning into a symbolic universe premise 
in order to modify Berger and Luckmanns model of sociology of knowledge and Bergers sociology 
of religion to explain Muslims decisions to act voluntarily more effectively,. From my social activist 
background, my awareness of political power as enablement and constraint of social change 
directed me towards a relocalisation paradigm with self-governance. It is worth noting that a 
practitioner point of view is actor-oriented. Thus, it gives emphasis to the determinative factors of 
the actors decision to act. This background serves to explain why I needed to consider both social 
and individual determinative factors in human thought. These are the reasons why I could never 
ignore the influences of human personality-characters from the insights of the Traditional Science of 
Man (Nasr, 1989) to explain differences of approach that contribute to duality of the Reformist-
Traditionalist in the world of Islam as well as the Warrior-Sage in environmental literature on Third 
World issues. As for endogenous relocalisation, Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir communities appear to 
represent the Warrior and Sage expressions respectively. This finding suggests that both characters 
offer relocalisation solutions that may attract like-minded individuals. 
While Berger and Luckmann (1991), who make culture, rather than struggles for economic 
gain and power central to social analysis, are able to explain the enduring contentions between 
Indonesian Muslims and secular-nationalists, and between Muslims thoughts and modern-Western 
thoughts, Foucault (1972, 1980) and symbolic interactionists emphasis on process are helpful to 
explain the modernist Muslims in particular. As it has been clear, modernist Muslims have been at 
the forefront of modernising Islam, and hence, are subject to Western hegemony and Foucauldian 
power-knowledge relationships. Herein, everything that may appear as counterintuitive throughout 
the whole thesis, is explained. Foucault uses the power-knowledge term to signify that power is 
constituted through an accepted form of knowledge, scientific understanding, and truth (1998). He 
argues that through the education system, the media, and the flux of political and economic 
ideologies, general politics and a regime of truth are constantly reinforced and redefined. In this 
sense, the battle of truth is the battle of the rules according to which the true and false are 
separated and specific effects of power are attached to the true. Also, a battle of truth is a battle 
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concerning the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays (Foucault, in Rabinow, 
1991:175). 
As for the modernist Muslim, once he/she steps outside the boundary of an Islamic symbolic 
universe into the modern system of thought, he/she has to struggle with the forces of the modern-
Western symbolic universe. Therefore, he/she either finds the need to stand as corrective of the 
Muslims themselves (tends to criticize and is often unable to accept the ground realities of Muslims 
nor to appreciate their good merits), or is pulled completely by the gravity of the modern-Western 
symbolic universe alongside progressive Indonesians. The case of Tibis emphatic and wholehearted 
endorsement of modernity as described in Farouk-Alli (2006:288-9) is a categorical example. The 
situation has made the modernists unable to delegitimise modernity in order to open up a new 
intellectual space. As a consequence, instead of engaging in dialogues with the world outside Islam, 
Indonesian liberals such as JIL, for instance, have spent most of their energies in endless squabbles 
with conservative majority Muslims (see Republika, 2013; Indonesia Tanpa JIL, 2013). To reiterate 
(see section 8.2.5), JIL is a loose network of intellectuals disseminating critical and liberal 
interpretations of Islam. The network was developed in the early 2000s by young modernised-
progressive scholars with modernist and traditionalist backgrounds who received scholarships to 
pursue degrees in Western universities. JIL has become emblematic to many conservatives of what is 
believed to be attempts by the West to undermine Islam through an outspoken advocacy of SEPILIS 
(stands for SECULARISM, in a sense of restricting Islam within the limits of individual-God relations; 
PLURALISM, or denying religious truth, hence, relativism; and LIBERALISM, in a sense of judging 
religion by the use of freedom of thinking and relegating revelations). In 2004, the NU decided to 
clear their organisations from JIL influences (NU, 2004; JIL, 2004) and in 2005, the Indonesian Ulama 
Council (MUI) declared SEPILIS as haram (unlawful) (See Voragen, 2007). The JIL protagonists 
contend with the question of how to achieve civility and inclusive citizenship in deeply plural 
societies in which this nowadays becomes a universal issue (see Hefner, 2001:4). Elsewhere, more 
recently, Umar (2014) analyses the political and discursive construction of such moderate Islam 
discourse in contemporary Indonesia in its relation with Indonesias Foreign Policy and the US-led 
Global War on Terrorism that made Southeast Asia the second front of the war. Based on Rabasa et 
al (2007) and Mamdani (2001), Umar contextualises JIL within the US political project that has 
divided the world into Good Muslims and Bad Muslims. He argues, The US government had 
been involved in building a moderate Muslim network through building a civil society network, 
giving some grants through donor organisations, and Public Diplomacy (Rabasa et al, 2007) (Umar, 
2014:20). Thus, Umar argues that JIL is an example in Indonesia in which US government did not 
directly assist the network, however; there were many donor organisations involved in 
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disseminating a moderate Islamic platform to Indonesias civil society institutions (Umar, 2014:21). 
This situation evokes, once again, Foucault who sees power as diffused rather than concentrated, 
embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely coercive, and 
constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them (Gaventa, 2003:1). 
The traditionalist kyais and their disciples, on the other hand, have survived the challenge of 
modernity not by confronting it but by remaining within the Islamic symbolic universe. That makes 
them relatively more relaxed than the Modernist or Reformist in facing the world. They are also the 
place to return to for urban Muslims seeking sound knowledge of Islam and to re-enchant the 
world. This also evokes Alatass (1995:90-1) critique of the captive mind and the claim of 
universality of sciences made by practitioners of social sciences by ignoring the differences in inter-
subjective meanings between Western and non-Western settings and persists in using Western 
categories, even in cases where they may not be relevant. From the outline of the development of 
Indonesia, there is empirical evidence that the traditionalists enjoy sufficient intellectual freedom to 
survive the challenges of modernity to this day and into the future, with limited government 
support. Further, in consideration of what constitutes well-being, physical, mental, social and 
spiritual, the traditionalists possess, probably, less of the first, but obviously are affluent in the last 
three. While they might have less wealth, the case study communities have ample convivial 
company; time and opportunity for praying and contemplation; opportunity to fulfill social 
obligations; intellectual stimulus (certainly, from an Islamic symbolic universe) to reflect on history 
and mythology and speculate on metaphysics; to compose poetry and rhetoric.
On the other hand, because of the same reasons, the traditionalists, even those who are 
interested in politics, largely do not appear to be keen to challenge radically the established 
capitalist order, which the state is viewed as a supporter of, as is the case of, for example, Hizbut 
Tahrir (a characteristicly Warrior group see section 4.2.1). Here is the potential pitfall for the 
traditionalists as the case of the NU has shown. In the name of peace, understood as the absence of 
conflicts, the traditionalist might be used to make people accept the stability provided by unjust 
rule, and in the name of social responsibility they can possibly be manipulated to use religion in 
defense of nationalism. Therefore, unless called for by Islamic tradition (the Quran, Sunna, practices 
and exegesis of the righteous predecessors (salaf as-salih)), they are not likely to make radical 
changes needed in the transition that climate change and peak oil require, whereas the modernists 
and reformists like Muhammadiyah, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, KPPSI, PKS, Hidayatullah, DDI and 
others are more prepared for radical changes once made aware of the problems from the channel of 
modern rational thinking. The latter also have potential to support the endorsement of Shariah law, 
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even pursuing the night watchman state or a minimal State (Nozick, 2013) -that I believe- would 
serve best the conditions of a post-oil world, for it gives a chance for equality of resource 
distribution, and a life of creativity that liberates people to freely choose their own social 
arrangements.
Lastly, the fenced pesantren communities such as Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir, provide more 
straightforward examples of Foucaults argument that to challenge power is not a matter of seeking 
some absolute truth but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, 
economic, and cultural, within which it operates (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1991:75). Hidayatullah and 
an-Nadzirs creative interpretations of khilafah and walayah are what Manzoor (1988) hoped to 
happen before Shariah is implementable under the modern day conditions of Muslim society. 
Hidayatullah has explicitly interpreted the governance of their intentional fenced-pesantren
community as a khilafah on a small scale, a community scale, where they can implement Islamic 
laws, values, ethics, norms and ethos holistically (kaffah). While An-Nadzir did not state explicitly as 
Hidayatullah, from their own description of their communitys agenda, I came to view this esoteric 
community as an expression of the esoteric concept of guardianship (walayah). The two can be 
taken as exemplary pragmatic actions drawn upon calculation of the most possible and doable 
endeavors they can take within the constraints of a nation-state, to implement what they believe.
Unfortunately, the very word, pragmatic nowadays is a derogatory term used to discourage 
Muslims from any attempts to put the Shariah law into practice (Doran, 2002). This point of view 
might be associated with what has been largely considered as the dark effects of modernization. 
Philosopher Charles Taylor included instrumental reason as one of three malaises of modernity 
besides individualism and loss of freedom. For Taylor, instrumental reason is a kind of rationality 
that we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end. In this 
scheme of things maximum efficiency and the best costoutput ratio is the measure of success
(Farouk-Alli, 2006:294). Thus, instrumental reason can be easily attributed to Muslims pragmatism, 
and often used to imply an association with terrorism. This research, conversely, demonstrates that 
pragmatism can be harnessed positively to create endogenous self-help solutions for Muslims 
problems. Thereby, a network of endogenous relocalisation by local Muslim communities is
envisioned as possible and doable in this thesis. It will be a network of diverse green intentional 
communities, where Muslims from diverse interpretations of Islam can implement what they 
believe, and where their young people can exercise their visions of Islamic societies. I believe it is
the only way ahead for the existing groups to adopt. This scheme serves as reinterpretation of 
khilafah to map out a path from the present impasse. It also serves to anticipate undesirable future 
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possibilities in the face of peak oil, climate change and scarcity - reminiscent of the act of digging a 
trench that Prophet Muhammad gave as an example of preparedness to minimise casualties in 
anticipating the Battle of Khandaq (see Sardar, 2006). In such a constellation, each community will 
strive for its own betterment in a circumstance that the Muslims understand as fastabiqul khairat 
race in good deeds (Quran 2:148).
While the thesis highlights the strength and fortitude of the poor in the face of misery in 
their life, it has been spelled out that the thesis neither advocates for the spiritual sentimentality of 
the New Age in foregrounding happiness, nor the communists principle of equality. Rather, it aims 
to promote the implementation of Shariah law as the effective path for committed Muslims to 
justice, happiness and well-being. In this respect, it is appropriate to mention Llewellyn in Foltz 
(2003) who writes in detail about Shariah environmental law including: its legal and ethical 
philosophy; source and methods of jurisprudence; its ultimate objectives (maqasid); its principles for 
weighing benefits and detriments; its laws of property; its allocation and accountability in the use of 
renewable and nonrenewable resources; environmental planning which includes its legal instrument 
for protected areas (harim) and inviolate zones (hima), and other legal instruments such as waqf
(charitable foundations and endowments); iqta (grants of unowned lands); ijara (lease of state-
owned lands); and ikhtikar (designation of lands for special purposes). 
Obviously, the environmental Shariah has lagged far behind in contributing solutions to the 
Muslim world problems today, for virtually all legislation in Muslim countries is borrowed from the 
industrialised West (Llewelyn, 2003). The office of Muhtasib, jurists, who had to be thoroughly 
familiar with the rulings of Islamic law with jurisdiction over many of the responsibilities of
environmental protection and conservation, has long disappeared (Llewellyn, 2003:221). It is also 
the responsibility of the Muhtasib to draw up Sharia based policies (Al-Siyasat al-Sharia) that are 
fundamental to environmental policy and legislation such as, in the present-day context: population 
control, development and lifestyle, animal rights, or international cooperation and conflicts 
(Llewelyn, 2003:222). Llewelyns description of environmental Shariah supports my critique of the 
religious environmental movement in Indonesia as outlined in section 4.6: How would the Muslim 
organisations be effective in propagating Islamic ecological values if they have no jurisdictions? This 
argument substantiates the self-governance feature of relocalisation models that I put forward in 
the thesis. Further, my position, in fact, echoes Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 CE) who declared that 
government is one of the most important requirements of Islam, for the fundamental obligation to 
command the right and forbid the wrong cannot be discharged without power and authority 
(Rosenthal, 1958) (See amar maruf and nahi munkar in Chapter 6). Therefore, if only the existing 
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Muslim groups can act as pressure groups to appropriate land and resource distribution from the 
government for Muslim communities, they will have opportunities to implement, not only Shariah 
economics but also Shariah environmental law. 
Llewelyn is also aware of a common disparagement of the very word Shariah law in the 
context of Western civilisation (2003:186), as it conjures unreasonable restrictions and harsh 
punishments. Furthermore, the greatest challenge to establishing Shariah environmental law in a 
contemporary Muslim world, according to Llewelyn, is the wide gap that separates the 
environmentalists and scientists from Islamic law. According to him, the origin of this gap is the 
progressive marginalisation of the fuqaha that has taken place throughout the Muslim world over 
the past century or so (Llewelyn, 2003:236). Interestingly, Llewellyn echoes precisely the 
statements of respondent Kyai Munhanif from pesantren An-Nur Fatmah, and evokes what 
respondent Abdul Gofar from Hidayatullah Balikpapan said about that matter. Llewellyn argues that 
the gap between the Islamic Shariah environmental law and the environmentalists must be bridged 
through the creation of a network of people concerned about environmental law in Islam, including 
fuqaha and ulama as well as environmental activists, lawyers, economists, social scientists, 
educators and others (p.236-240). They should initiate the compilation of sources and references to 
environmental laws. He highlights the flexibility of Shariah to different places and times. For that, 
training materials on environmental issues should be designed for fuqaha and ulama. Only then can 
ijtihad occur (both Sardar and myself assert the need to reopen the gate of ijtihad). According to 
Llewelyn (2003), ijtihad cannot occur through hypothetical discussion; it requires real problems for 
which solutions are proposed, tested, and as they succeed or fail, progressively refined (p.238). His 
proposition, in fact, corresponds closely with what I envision to occur on a global world-level if it is 
organised by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as chairman of the NU, Kyai Said Aqil 
Siradj, suggested (see 5.7). 
Cognitive transformation must begin with the present conditions. The outcome of rational 
reform imbued with a developmentalism paradigm brought about by the state and modernist 
Muslims such as are teaching in Muhammadiyahs schools, contributed to the weakening of the 
reflexive hearts ability to think about the self in interconnection with the surrounding world, and 
to recognise the animate qualities of the earth. For that reason, to the already modernised Muslims, 
Shariah approaches are more conceivable than metaphysical approaches. On the other hand, while 
the traditionalist pesantren might not be as suitable for modern-day life-skills requirements, their 
education system possesses features to nurture intuitive sustainability-literacy. Moreover, by not 
denying different orders of reality, and not excluding all other possibilities of knowing, their 
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education system prepares the students to be aware of the sacred and metaphysical foundations of 
knowledge, hence, to have potential to contribute to Muslims reconstruction of knowledge 
project(s). Ultimately, reconstruction should be able to create intellectual space for pious Muslims to 
view the world in correspondence with their beliefs, where they can:
1) Learn that humans are not independent and separated individuals 
2) Look at the phenomena of nature as the portents or signs (ayat) of God
3) View divine law as different from convenient agreement between humans
4) Look at the Universe not as a single level of reality  the spatio-temporal complex of matter 
and energy -  but as having higher levels of reality
5) Look at humans as theomorphic beings
6) Understand that knowledge extends in hierarchy from an empirical and rational mode of 
knowing to the highest form of knowledge, which is, al-marifah (unitive knowledge) 
7) Study philosophy that is wedded to spiritual experiences, not a philosophy that is 
synonymous with  logic, nor a mental play or discipline that does not transform ones being 
spiritually, which - from an Islamic point of view - is meaningless and dangerous
However, the research shows that the grass-root thinkers such as traditionalist kyai, the 
Hidayatullah and an-Nadzirs leaders did not seem to have contributed to the debates on 
reconstruction of knowledge so far. They are, nonetheless, more prepared to take the tasks of 
murabbi to relevantise sustainability education for the Muslim society at large. For that, they 
themselves need sustainability education initially. Besides the information technique of education to 
bring about cognizance of the complex socio-ecological crisis at hand, they themselves need 
personal encounters with teachers to obtain the inside view of the relocalisation game. They need 
to observe how the undertakings have been done and how judgments around sustainability are 
being made by the actors. For that purpose, they need to visit and do participatory observations in 
green-intentional communities already established in the Western world; for example, such as GEN 
and Findhorns ecovillages, and the many grass-root relocalisations initiatives that I found in New 
Zealand such as Lincoln Envirotown Trust, St Albans Transition Town, Lyttelton sustainable 
community, Nelson Transition, Dunedin Transition, Biological Husbandry Unit of Lincoln University, 
Succession Training by John King and Telford Organic Training, and so forth.  
These green alternative communities are not available in Indonesia. Beforehand, preparatory classes 
on relocalisation would be necessary in Indonesia for the participants. Considering the JIL cases 
previously mentioned, two significant issues emerge. The countries where the education funding is 
from is going to be a matter of careful consideration by the Muslim audiences or recipients of the 
programme, and the institution that organises the funding in Indonesia must necessarily have no 
linkages with SEPILIS movements. Nowadays, with many pesantren running English language 
teaching intensively, their youths and young adults will be ready to participate in an overseas 
programme for relocalisation. As they are seeing, watching, doing, and thinking about relocalisation 
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they will become familiar with it.  Only then, will they be able to translate the notion of sustainability 
into the Muslims own worldview and disseminate the ideals of relocalisation in Muslims own faith-
language and sensibility. Thereby, a sweeping relocalisation movement within the Indonesian 
Muslim societies toward less-unsustainable ways of living can be envisaged. Given the envisaged 
programme is purely pragmatic and far from advocating SEPILIS as the thesis stated explicitly, no 
chance of resistance can be expected from the traditionalist and revivalist (or Islamist) groups 
leaders to the new ideas that the participants will bring home. Once the traditionalist leaders
including the kyais in Bahtsul Masail of the NU (discussion group on the fuqaha) are made aware of 
the magnitude and enormity of the problems on a global scale, they will be called to implement 
Islam. By implementing Islam as a religion of law in its true place, the organization will perform 
much more impactful services to society than they have been doing so far when they merely 
ameliorate the victims of environmental disasters. 
Considering the independent roles of the kyais that almost no central leadership of the NU or 
the government can control (besides, note unlike Muhammadiyah, NU is merely an association of 
kyai), no serious challenge of resistance to the programme should be expected even in view of the 
NUs avoidance of conflict with the government. For the NU constituents and traditionalists in 
general, the kyais are the real full-time personnel of symbolic universe maintenance for the 
followers. Therefore, mobilization that revolves around the Islamic symbolic universe which the 
kyais are maintaining is bound to be effective.  The revivalists (or reformists, or Islamists), who have 
a tendency to get into politics and being more Sharia-minded, are apt to grasp an understanding of 
the crisis through interactional processes they have with the West (see discussion in section 6.3.5). 
Participatory observations in green intentional communities and grass-root initiatives in the Western 
world will create concrete and convincing evidences of the growing concern about peak oil and 
climate change as seeing is believing. By the same token, a genuine peace making between Islam 
and the West can be imagined, given that the most important experience of others takes place in 
the face-to-face situation (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:43). Berger and Luckmanns process of the 
social construction of what people in collectivity conceive as reality, and hence, of knowledge that 
guides their conduct, is able to explain the development of Islam-o-phobia in the West. Under this 
light, it is worth noting that in the history of the West, Islam was the only other known (unlike the 
history of the Orient), and in Greco-Roman civilisation, people other than themselves are 
barbarian200 (Nasr, 2001a). By a similar process, the thesis shows that the sins of colonialism and 
the Wests continuing domination of the Muslim world have stigmatised all Westerners as being 
  
200
The very word barbarian means simply people other than themselves.
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immoral in the eyes of Muslims in general. The same process also devastated Muslim-Christians 
relations. If this long-held and institutionalised hatred between the West and Islam and vice-versa is 
ever to be overcome, I believe that it can be done only by relocalisationists for they are the ones 
who, as never in history, are aware of the vast interconnected network of earth ecology and thus, 
realise the need to cooperate with one another in the face of looming scarcity and the threat of 
calamity. 
Finally, I found the interpretive theoretical framework with a constructivist-interpretivist 
approach was effective in accessing the world of meaning of the people being studied. It provided 
me with a much deeper understanding of the complex reality of the Indonesian Muslim relations 
with the state, the West, and modernity. A difficulty in undertaking inquiry within the limited time of 
a PhD process was felt when a number of new potentials emerged as the research was carried out, 
for example, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in Chapter 6, and KPPSI in Chapter 8. Similarly, the emergent 
insight regarding transnational Muslim groups in Chapter 8 would benefit from future research into 
these findings regarding their potential in the advancement of relocaliation. Given that more than 
half of the world population lives in urban areas now, further research should focus on the everyday 
lives of urban Muslim communities, interviewing and observing members as well. Finally, it is worth 
noting, despite the potential of the Muslim groups in mobilising the Ummah, the thesis 
demonstrates that Islamic belief has the potential of supporting a fatalistic view of the problems if 
they are perceived as insurmountable by Muslims. In that situation, the Muslim people can 
carefreely do nothing, enjoy life, and fall into a situation that Emhas remark captures best:  wis ayo 





Abd Allah Slave of Allah. The Islamic concept of human. 
Adat an Indonesian word of Arabic origin, meaning the customary law of local 
ethnic groups, usually but not always distinct from Islamic law. The Dutch 
made adat law part of Dutch East Indies law, in part as a strategy to isolate 
and control Islam, and it still has legal standing in Indonesia today 
Agama (Ind) religion
Ahl (Arabic) people, or, family, or, community
Ahlu-sunnah
wal-jamaah People of the sunnah of the Prophet 
Aisyiyah The female wing of Muhammadiyah
Akhlaq (Arabic) Ethics
Al-Haq (Arabic) the Reality, the Ultimate Reality, the Truth, the Absolute. One of the 
names of God in the Quran
Awu-awu Eastern Javanese slang, means, bullshit, nonsense talk in attempt to please 
or deceive
Ayat, ayah (Arabic) signs, indicators, evidences (of God). In the context of the Quran, 
ayah is used to mean verse, each statement or paragraph marked by a 
number
Ayat al-takwini Ontological signs or ontological Quran, signs in creation. Also known as 
cosmic Quran
Ayat al-tadwini Written signs, or written or composed Quran
Ayat kawniah (Ind) ayat al-takwini
Ayat dauniah (Ind) for ayat al-tadwini
Azas Tunggal (Ind) Sole basis
Azas Tunggal Pancasila The obligation for associations to declare that Pancasila is their only basic
principle
Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana National Board for Disaster Management
Bahasa Indonesia the Indonesian national language
Bahtsul Masail Discussion forum of the fuqaha (experts in Islamic law). From two Arabic 
words, bahtsu, deliberation, and masail, issue. 
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Bismillah (Arabic) in the name of God (an invocation used by Muslims at the beginning 
of an undertaking)
BNPB Badan Nasional Pnanggulangan Bencana (National Board for Disaster 
Management)
Budaya (Ind) Culture
Budi Utomo an early, quasi-nationalist association established in 1908 to encourage 
awareness of Javanese culture, soon overshadowed by less genteel 
nationalist organizations
Constructivist is the recognition that reality is a product of human intelligence interacting 
with experience in the real world. It is recognition of inclusion of human 
mental activity in the process of knowing reality. As it accepts reality as a 
construct of human mind, it therefore perceives reality as subjective.
The main distinction between constructivism and positivism relates to the 
fact that while positivism argues that knowledge is generated in a scientific 
method, constructivism maintains that knowledge is constructed by 
scientists and it opposes the idea that there is a single methodology to 
generate knowledge.
Constructivist research (1) positions researchers within the context; (2) collects 
participant-generatedmeanings;(3) focuses on a single concept or phenomenon; (4) brings 
personal values into the study; (5) studies the context or setting of participants;(6) validates 
the accuracy of findings ; (7) interprets the data ; (8) creates an agenda for change or 
reform; (9) involves researcher in collaborating with participants
Darul Islam (1948-1962) an Islamic insurgency centered in West Java with chapters in Sulawesi, Aceh 
and elsewhere
Daurah (Arabic) intellectual training and Islamic workshop
Dawah (Arabic) the preaching of Islam
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Mission Council) 
Founded by former Masyumi leaders after Suharto shut them out of politics, 
to disseminate Islamic teachings and prosetylize among non-observant 
Muslims
Deep Ecology a school of ecological philosophy. The distinguishing and original 
characteristics of this school were its recognition of the inherent worth of all 
living beings regardless of their instrumental utility to human needs, and the 
use of this view in shaping environmental policies. The word deep in part 
referred to the level of questioning of humans purposes and values when 
arguing in environmental conflicts. Deep ecology involves deep questioning 
right down to fundamental root causes. This school arose from the 
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contemporary planetary crisis and human dilemma which have prompted 
people to question the validity of the conception of nature held in modern 
science. Deep ecology also has given rise to the proliferation of earth and 
nature-based spirituality (Taylor, B. 2001). The term deep ecology was 
introduced by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in 1972 in Bucharest at the 
Third World Future Research Conference. Unfortunately, due in part to its 
eco-centrism, some vociferous environmentalists who claim to support the 
movement have said and written things that are misanthropic in tone, and 
made this school appear to some as anti-human
Dhikr (Arabic) remembrance, invoking the divine names of God
Dinul Islam (Ind) Indonesian word of Arabic al-din al-Islam, religion of Islam
Dzikir See Dhikr
Eco pesantren an Indonesian government program, launched in 2009, that aimed at 
transforming existing pesantrens into environmental friendly institutions
Ecosocialism a vision of a transformed society in harmony with nature, and the 
development of practices that can attain it. It is directed toward alternatives 
to all socially and ecologically destructive systems, such as patriarchy, 
racism, homophobia and the fossil-fuel based economy. It is based on a 
perspective that regards other species and natural ecosystems as valuable in 
themselves and as partners in a common destiny. Ecosocialism shares with 
traditional socialism a passion for justice. It shares the conviction that 
capitalism has been a deadly detour for humanity. Capitalism is understood 
as a class society based on infinite expansion, through the exploitation of 
labor and the ransacking of nature
Ecotopia an ecologically ideal region or form of society, generally viewed as imaginary
Environmental justice the movement's response to environmental racism. Environmental racism is 
the disproportionate impact of environmental hazards on people of color. 
The environmental justice movement is not seeking to simply redistribute 
environmental harms, but to abolish them.
Environmental racism See environmental justice 
ESC Education for Sustainable Consumption, United Nations Environment 
Programme
Fana (Arabic) annihilation
Fatah formerly the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. It is a secular
Palestinian political party and the largest faction of the confederated multi-
party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Fatayat association of NU girls and young women
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Fatwa (Arabic) Religious legal opinion
FGD Focus Group Discussion
Fiqh (Arabic) Islamic jurisprudence 
Fitrah (Arabic) original nature
Fitnah (Arabic) the spread of falsehood that causes a rift between Muslims
Fuqaha (Arabic) plural of faqih, an expert in Islamic law
Ghaflah (Arabic) forgetfulness, oblivion
Ghibah (Arabic) Gossip
Guided Democracy Period between 1959 and 1965 in Indonesia (during Sukarnos regime)
Hadith (Arabic) tradition about the word and deed of Prophet Muhammad
Hafiz (Arabic) someone who has completely memorized the Quran
Hajj an annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, and a mandatory religious duty for 
Muslims that must be carried out at least once in their lifetime by all 
adult Muslims who are physically and financially capable of undertaking the 
journey, and can support their family during their abscence
Halal (Arabic) lawful
Halqah (Arabic) study circle
Hamas is an acronym of arakat al-Muqwamah al-Islmiyyah Islamic Resistance 
Movement) is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist organization. It has 
a social service wing, Dawah, and a military wing
Harakat al-jawhari (Arabic) substantial motion, trans-substantial motion
Haram (Arabic) forbidden, illicit, not lawful
Hermeneutics art or science of understanding. Hermeneutical means the process of 
bringing to understanding
Hizbut Tahrir (Party of Liberation) an international organization founded in Jerusalem in 
1953, with a branch in Indonesia since 1983 (see HTI), advocating a pan-
Islamic agenda and restoration of the Caliphate, endorses resort to violence 
by others but is non-violent itself
HTI Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
Hudhuri (Arabic) direct, by presence, without intermediary
Husuli (Arabic) acquired, by thought, conceptual
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IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Islamic Institute), part of the state Islamic 
university system
Ibadah (Arabic) worship, ritual observance
Ijmali name of a group of Muslim intellectuals interested in reconstruction of 
knowledge, based in the United Kingdom but also operating in the United 
States, Europe, and Malaysia, with Ziaudin Sardar as one of the founders
Ijtihad Independent judgment based on Islamic scripture, used to reinterpret 
Islamic law in the light of contemporary circumstances
Ikhwan al-Muslimin Muslim Brotherhood
ilm al-hudhuri (Arabic) direct knowledge, knowledge by presence, intuitive knowledge
ilm al-husuli (Arabic) conceptual knowledge
Imam Muslim religious leader
Imam Mahdi In Islam, the rightly guided one, a messianic figure who will appear to restore 
correct religion
IMF International Monetary Fund, an international organization that was 
initiated in the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944
Inclusive democracy a form of social organisation which re-integrates society with economy, 
polity and nature. This is the project for direct political democracy, economic 
democracy (beyond the confines of the market economy and state 
planning), as well as democracy in the social realm and ecological 
democracy. 
Infaq (Arabic) Voluntary gift, charity
Interpretivist Interpretivism, also known as interpretivist, involves researchers who 
interpret elements of the study, thus interpretivism integrates human 
interest into a study. Accordingly, interpretive researchers assume that 
access to reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social 
constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, and 
instruments (Myers, 2013:39). Development of interpretivist philosophy is 
based on the critique of positivism in social sciences. Interpretivism is 
associated with the philosophical position of idealism, and is used to group 
together diverse approaches, including social constructionism, 
phenomenology and hermeneutics; approaches that reject the objectivist 
view that meaning resides within the world independently of consciousness 
(Collins, 2010, p.38). Moreover, interpretivism studies usually focus on 
meaning and may employ multiple methods in order to reflect different 
aspects of the issue. 
In general, an interpretivist approach is based on 1. Relativist ontology, in 
which reality is perceived intersubjectively based on meanings and 
understandings on social and experiential levels; and 2. Transactional or 
subjectivist epistemology, in which approach people cannot be separated 
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from their knowledge, therefore there is a clear link between the researcher 
and research subject. 
The contrasts between interpretivism and positivism approaches can be 
summarised as follows: 
Interpretivism assumes the nature of reality as multiple and socially 
contructed; rather than single, tangible and objective
Interpretivism assumes the goal of a research is understanding, with weak 
prediction; rather than explanation, with strong prediction
Interpretivism assumes the focus of interest is what specific, unique and 
deviant; rather than what is general, average and representative
Interpretivism assumes that the knowledge generated is meanings-relative 
(time, context, culture, value, bound); rather than laws-absolute (time, 
context and value-free)
Interpretivism assumes the Subject-Researcher relationship as interactive, 
cooperative, participative; rather than rigid separation
Interpretivism assumes the desired information is what some people think and 
do, what kind of problems they are confronted with, and how they deal with them; rather 
than how many people think and do a specific thing, or have a specific problem
Insan (Arabic) human 
Insan Kamil (Arabic) the perfect man
Irfan (Arabic) mysticism, esotericism
Jakarta Charter Alternative to Pancasila from which it differs by its mentioning of the 
obligation of Muslims to follow Islamic law
Jamaah (Arabic) Community
Jamaa Tabligh See Tablighi Jumaat
Jamai (Arabic) collective
Jihad (Arabic) holy struggle
JIL Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network)
Kaffah (Arabic) holistic
Kampung (Javanese) neighborhood 
Khalifat Allah (Arabic) vicegerent of God
Khilafah (Arabic) caliphate, the first system of governance established in Islam.  It is 
believed to be the perfect way of ruling the Islamic Ummah. It is worth 
noting that khilafah was not intended to be a religious authority, as Islam 
emphasizes the direct link between man and God (ittisal)
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KPPSI Komite Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam (Organizing Committee for the Preparation 
for the Application of Islamic Law) founded in 2000
Kyai, kiai (Javanese) term for a cleric or scholar (Ulama), including the head of a 
pesantren
Kitab kuning Literally, yellow books, a defined corpus of scripture and commentary 
chanted and studied in Traditionalist pesantren. The name derives from the 
fact that the old books were often printed on yellow-tinted paper
Limits to growth refers to a debate that, given economic and population growth rise 
exponentially whereas resource supplies are finite, the growth directly 
causes environmental decline and could not be sustained forever
MACCA the Muslim Associations for Climate Change Action
Mad(h)hab (Arabic) School (of thought) of Islamic jurisprudence
Madrasah Islamic day school
Majapahit The last great Hindu-Buddhist state in Indonesia, 13th to 16th centuries, based 
in East Java but with vague territorial claims extending elsewhere in the 
archipelago, including the areas now part of Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, 
Thailand, the Philippines
Majelis taklim Islamic study group
Manaqib (Arabic) Narrative in praise of important religious figures, celebrating their 
lives, merits and miracles
Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council) 
Japanese-sponsored Islamic umbrella organization created in 1943. It 
became a political party after independence and was banned by Sukarno in 
1960
Madina, or, Medina, 
society and constitution  a reference to the system of government said to have been established by 
the Prophet Muhammad after his flight to Medina. The charter has been 
cited as proving that Islam is compatible with pluralism
Marifah, 
Marifat-Allah (Arabic) Unitive knowledge, union with God
(neo) Marxist ecologist those who aims to revise Marxism to make it bring about environmental 
vision. Their ideas of conflict sociology were applied to 
capital/state/labor/environmental conflicts instead of only 
labor/capital/state conflicts over production. Neo-marxist ecologist generally 
do not take the trouble to prove the orthodox theory wrong. However, they 
accept, prima facie, that the ecologists are right, i.e. that ultimate limits to 
growth imply immediate and significant, rather than distant, impediments to 
human development even under socialism.  
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Minangkabau an ethnic group indigenous to the Minangkabau Highlands of West 
Sumatera, Indonesia
Minarchism a right-libertarian political philosophy which advocates for a minimal state
Minimal state used to describe a limited, functional government that ensures an ideal free 
society
MRI Mahad Rabitah al-Islamiyah. Association of pesantren education under NU, 
Nahdlatul Ulama
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama), established by the 
government to explain government policy
Murabbi a concept in Islamic pedagogy that refers to a person who possesses the 
knowledge, then he or she processes and interprets the information 
gathered from the surrounding world through their action. Murabbi is not 
only knowledgeable and wise but also pious, kind, and considerate, a person 
who combines a life of learning with a life of virtue, and hence a perfect and 
an ideal person to learn from. Murabbi is based on the understanding that 
one needs more than intellectual ability to comprehend the knowledge in 
text, but rather one needs time to personalise it by living it.
Mushalla Small prayer house or room
Muslimat NU Womens branch of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
Mursyid (Arabic) master, in Sufi order
Nafs (Arabic) soul
Neo-Hobbesian generally refers to a belief that the only way to secure civil society is through 
universal submission to the absolute authority of a sovereign.
Neo-Malthusian generally refers to people with the same basic concerns as Malthus, who 
advocate population control programs, to ensure resources for current and 
future populations
New Age a broad movement characterized by alternative approaches to traditional 
Western culture, with an interest in spirituality, mysticism, holism, and 
environmentalism
New Order The period between 1965 and 1998, Suhartos regime
Night Watchman State a model of minimal state. A form of government where the government's 
responsibilities are so minimal that they cannot be reduced much further 
without becoming a form of anarchy 
NKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia - Indonesian national unity




Orientalist study of the Orient, especially by Westerners
Pagar (Ind) fence
PARAS Pusat Amanat Referendum Rakyat Sulawesi (Centre for Trusteeship of the 
Sulawesi Peoples Referendum), founded in 2000.
Pancasila The five principles of Indonesias national philosophy, in the preamble of its 
constitution
Peak Oil the hypothetical point in time when the global production of oil reaches its 
maximum rate, after which production will gradually decline
Pengajian (Ind) 1) Quran recitation, 2) Islamic study group, religious lecture
PII Partai Islam Indonesia (Isamic party of Indonesia)
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party), political party related 
to the Nahdlatul Ulama. Founded July 1998
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia), banned in 1965
PKS Prosperous Welfare Party, inspired by Muslim Brotherhood ideology
Planas PRB Indonesian National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction
Pondok (Ind.) term used interchangeably with pesantren, or pondok pesantren
Post-modernist refers to a person who engages in various movements or ideas that emerge 
as reactions to modernism
Pragmatist a person who has commitment to useful knowledge and always focuses on 
practice rather than merely metaphysical truths
Priyayi Javanese elite
Qada (Arabic) divine decree, pre-ordination
Qadar (Arabic) destiny, predestination
Qiyamah (Arabic) Islamic eschatology of the end of the world, the final assessment of 
humanity by Allah, consisting of the annihilation of all life, resurrection and 
judgement
Quran The central religious text of Islam which Muslims believe is the verbatim 
words of God
Rasul (Arabic) the Prophet
Ratu adil The just king, or, queen of Javanese mythology
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Redemptionist a person whose social and environmental action was driven by psychological 
dissonance between a sense of their own values and ethical standards and 
the behaviour that people are forced to adopt through participation in 
consumer-capitalist society
Religious ecologist a person whose studies of ecology aims to retrieve, re-examine and 
reconstruct human-earth relations that are present in all world religions 
Relocalisation a radical green political movement through the creation of, or transforming 
the existing communities into, less-unsustainable communities which are 
largely self-sufficient, with self-local governance
Riba (Arabic) usury
Rida (Arabic) the fact of being pleased or contented, a stage in Sufism 
Sadaqa, shodaqoh (Arabic) Voluntary charity, alm
Sage a profoundly wise person
Salah (Arabic) prayer, especially formally ordained and ritual prayers
Santri (Javanese) Literally a religious student, but used by Clifford Geertz in his 
typology to designate a class of strictly observant Muslims, including 
merchants, landowners and clerics, both Traditionalists and Reformists
Scientia sacra Seyyed Hossein Nasrs works refer to none other than the ultimate science 
of the Real. It is knowledge that lies at the heart of every revelation and is 
the center of that circle which encompasses and defines tradition (Nasr, 
1989:130). The source of this knowledge is Revelation and Intellection 
(Intellectual intuition which involves the illumination of the heart and mind 
and the presence of knowledge of immediate and direct nature which is 
tasted and experience (see al-ilm al-huduri))
SEPILIS Or SIPILIS. An abbreviation, stands for SECULARISM, in a sense of restricting 
Islam within the limits of individual-God relations; PLURALISM, in a sense of 
denying religious truth, hence, relativism; and LIBERALISM, in a sense of 
judging religion by the use of freedom of thinking and relegating revelations
Shallow ecology/ the contrast of deep ecology, characterized by its short-term approaches to
Shallow green environmental issues. The shallow approach stops before the ultimate level 
of fundamental change, often promoting technological fixes (e.g. recycling, 
increased automotive efficiency, export-driven monocultural organic 
agriculture) based on the same consumption-oriented values and methods 
of the industrial economy
Shariah (Arabic) divine law; lit.the clear, well-troden path to water. The word used to 
refer to Islamic law
Shia one of two major denominations of Islam. Sunni-Shia split lies in the schism 
that occurred when the Prophet (peace be upon him) died, leading to 
disputes over succession to the Prophet as a caliph of the Islamic community 
that spread across various part of the world. Shia are the ones who believe 
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that leadership should stay with the family of the Prophet, and therefore the 
Shia is the partisan of Ali (a cousin of the Prophet), whereas the Sunni 
accepted leadership of the companion of the Prophet. Therefore, Sunni-Shia 
conflict reflects modern power struggle, not theological schism 
Shirk (Arabic) ascribing partners to God
Shodaqoh a form of Islamic charity
STTP Sekolah Tinggi Penyuluhan Pertanian (Agriculture Instructor College)
Sunna(h) Words and deeds of the Prophet
Sunni one of two major denominations of Islam. The word "Sunni" in Arabic comes 
from a word meaning "one who follows the Sunna (traditions of the 
Prophet). For more detail, see Shia
Surah Chapter of the Quran
Surau (Ind.) small mosque
Survivalists a person whose social and environmental action was driven by the perceived 
need to prepare for the conditions of scarcity, which they anticipate will 
result from peak oil, climate change and looming ecological collapse.
Syeikh/sheikh a leader in a Muslim community or organization
Tablighi Jumaat A puritan fundamentalist group with Sufi roots founded in India in 1927, 
active recently in Indonesia and in many other Muslim countries
Tahlil Repeated chanting of the confession of faith
Takdir (Arabic, Indonesian, Javanese) predestination, fate
Takdzim (Arabic) Respect
Taqlid (Arabic) to follow, imitate
Tasawuf (Arabic) Islamic mysticism (Sufism)
Tawasul see Wasila
Tawhid (Arabic) absolute unity of God. The fundamental principle and forte of the 
Islamic tradition. It includes the idea of the unicity of the Godhead as well as 
the principal unity of all Being in both its transcendental and immanent 
modalities
Tarekat Javanese, Thariqah. It can mean sufi order, or simply, tasawuf
Thariqah (Arabic) Sufi order or brotherhood; lit. narrow path
Tradisi (Ind) Tradition
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Transcendent beyond or above the range of normal or physical human experience
Transition in the context of peak oil and climate change that demands emission 
reduction, transition refers to the process needed to change present ways of 
living to less carbon-intensive lives
Transition town a movement that seeks to address concerns about the impending impacts of 
the combined threats of oil depletion and climate change on the economies 
and well-being of communities. It is founded on four key assumptions: (1) 
that life with dramatically lower energy consumption is inevitable, and that 
its better to plan for it than to be taken by surprise; (2) that our settlements 
and communities presently lack the resilience to enable them to weather the 
severe energy shocks that will accompany peak oil; (3) that we have to act
collectively, and that we have to act now; (4) that by unleashing the 
collective genius of those around us to collectively and proactively design 
our energy descent, we can build ways of living that are more connected, 
more enriching and that recognize the biological limits of our planet.
Transformative a series of learning objectives corresponding to cognitive (head),
Sustainability Learning  psychomotor (hands) and affective (heart) domains of learning that facilitate 
personal experience for participants resulting in profound changes in 
knowledge, skills and attitudes related to enhancing ecological, social and 
economic justice
Ulama (Arabic) Religious scholar, see also kyai
Ummah (Arabic) Global Muslim community
UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
Wahabi The form of Islam that is puritanical and favoring a literal interpretation of 
scripture and early tradition. It is the state religion of Saudi Arabia
Wahyu (from Arabic wahy) revelation
Wakaf (Arabic) An Islamic endowment
Wali (Arabic) The trusted, Saint
Wali songo (Javanese) the Nine Wali. Nine saints, teachers and holy men, who 
established Islam on Java and are still revered today
Warrior a person who shows or has shown great vigor, courage, or aggressiveness, as 
in politics or athletics
Wasila Islamic understanding of intercession, to draw near spiritually to what one 
seeks after
Wirid Litany




Appendix-2: Indonesias Oil and Gas situation
Figure-1
Indonesias increasing oil consumption vs. decreasing oil supply
274
Figure-2
Indonesias Oil Reserves Decline
Source: Presentation of BP Migas, Lembang, January 30 2009. 
Oil resource in Indonesia is approximately around 7 924 Mtoe and proven up only for 23 year, natural gas 8
410 Mtoe, proven up 50 year and coal 94 844 Mtoe, proven up 80 year based on current production level
in 2012. Compare with worlds resources of fossil fuel, Indonesia position is categorised as non---rich fossil fuel
country. Proven oil reserve Indonesia is 0.2% of total world under Vietnam and India countries (BP Statistical
Review 2013). Proven gas reserve is rank no 14 in the world and proven coal reserve is 18 positions in the
world. Total coal reserves in Indonesia were more than 161 billion ton in 2012. Indonesia has various range of
coal quality, from low rank, lignite, to high rank bituminous. Thermal coal makes up 6.7% of the total coal
reserves and low rank coal share was 35.7% in 2012. Most of coal reserves in Indonesia are located in
Kalimantan and Sumatera. More than 98% of coal reserves are located in those locations.
Total primary energy demand (excluded traditional biomass in household) is estimated to have increased by
1.1% in 2012 from 212.2 Million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2011. Oil still dominates the primary energy
mix. Oils share was accounted for 48% of the overall primary energy demand, whereas coal and gas was
accounted for 27% and 20% respectively in 2012. The share of renewable energy in primary energy demand
(excluded traditional biomass in household) reached 5% in 2012 from 3% in 2011.
INDONESIA ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 
(page-6)
PUSAT DATA DAN TEKNOLOGI INFORMASI ENERGI DAN SUMBER DAYA MINERAL 
KEMENTRIAN ENERGI DAN SUMBER DAYA MINERAL
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Appendix-3: Deforestation, Natural and Man-made Disaster Statistics in Indonesia
Table-1
Indonesias Deforestation Rate
(Compiled from Mongabay 2005 and Department of Forestry Indonesia 2010).
Year 1960 1982 1995 2005 2010
% forest cover to countrys 
land area
82% 68% 53% 49% 37%
1976-to date
Figure-3
Indonesia Disaster Statistic Occurrence and Death Toll (1815-2012)




Proportion of Disaster Occurrence per Category (1815-2012)






Appendix-4: Brief summary of Earth Summits
The Kyoto Protocol (named after the Japanese city where it was concluded in 1997), is an 
international agreement to address global warming and delay climate change. It aims to reduce the 
total greenhouse gas emissions of developed countries (and countries with economies in transition) 
to 5 per cent below the level they were in 1990. Different countries have different targets they have 
to achieve. According to the UNFCC website, the Protocol "recognises that developed countries are 
principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of 
more than 150 years of industrial activity, and places a heavier burden on developed nations under 
the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. The United States (under former 
President George Bush) and Australia (initially, under former Prime Minister John Howard) did not 
ratify the Kyoto treaty. According to Stern (2006), their decision was based on the lack of 
quantitative emission commitments for emerging economies. Australia, under former Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd, has since ratified the treaty, which took effect in March 2008.
In 2007, the climate conference was held in Bali, Indonesia. The conference aimed to draw a Bali 
roadmap that initiated a two year process of negotiations designed to agree on a new set of 
emissions target to replace those of the Kyoto Protocol. The UN conference in Bali too was 
composed of deadlocks. The EU had pressed for a commitment that industrialised nations should 
commit to cuts of 25-40% by 2020, a bid that was implacably opposed by a bloc containing the US, 
Canada and Japan. It saw tempers rising to boiling point and a number of emotional moments when 
the UN's top climate official Yvo de Boer was in tears after being accused by China of procedural 
irregularities, a direct intervention of the UN Secretary-General and the Indonesian President to 
appeal to the countries to make a final deal, a seemingly recalcitrant United States holding the entire 
meeting to ransom. But as this global warming is an issue which affects the whole humanity, whole 
planet earth, we must have co-ordinated and concerted efforts to address this issue," Mr Ban Ki-
moon of the UN said. While delegates were anxious to make a deal and catch aeroplanes home, the 
US delegation announced it could not support the amended text. A chorus of boos rang out. And a 
member of Papua New Guinea's delegation told the US: "If you're not willing to lead, please get out 
of the way." Shortly after, the US delegation announced it would support the revised text after all.
The document coming out of the meeting, the "Bali roadmap", contained text on emissions cuts, the 
transfer of clean technology to developing countries, halting deforestation and helping poorer 
nations protect their economies and societies against impacts of climate change such as rising sea 
levels and falling crop yields.
The roadmap set the parameters and aims for a further set of negotiations to be finalised by the 
2009 UN climate conference to be held in Denmark. The final text does not mention specific 
emissions targets, but does acknowledge that "deep cuts in global emissions will be required to 
achieve the ultimate objective" of avoiding dangerous climate change. It also says that a delay in 
reducing emissions will make severe climate impacts more likely. Delegates agreed on a framework 
that could allow richer nations and companies to earn "carbon credits" by paying for forest 
protection in developing countries. "We need to find a new mechanism that values standing 
forests," said Andrew Mitchell, executive director of the Global Canopy Programme, an alliance of 
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research institutions. "Ultimately, if this does its job, [deforestation] goes down to nothing."  Mr 
Mitchell said the only feasible source of sufficient funds was a global carbon market. Environmental 
groups and some delegates have criticised the draft as being weak and a missed opportunity. "This 
deal is very disappointing," said Tony Juniper of Friends of the Earth. "We said we needed a 
roadmap, but this conference has failed to give us a clear destination."
Following the Bali roadmap, the summit in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009 that aimed to address the 
defining challenge of our times also documented more failure than success. 







Appendix-5: Syiir Tanpo Waton*
In Arabic:
I seek forgiveness from Allah, the Lord of all creatures
I seek forgiveness from Allah, for all my transgressions
O Lord, grant me beneficial knowledge (ilm nafi)
And guide me to perform good deeds
O the Prophet of Allah, peace be upon you
O you who have high dignity and elevated degree
O you the leader whose love embraces the neighbor  
O the beloved of God, the most generous one.
In Javanese:
I begin this reciting
with Allahs name in praising
which has given us bless and gratification
day and night without any consideration
day and night without any consideration
o all my fellow, men and women also
do not learn a mere Sharia so-so
in where you only fluent in speak, read and write
but in the end all you have is a mere regret
but in the end all you have is a mere regret
many whom memorized Quran and Hadith
but liking to consider else as infidel filth
their own infidelity often out of concern
that their heart and mind still filled with stain
that their heart and mind still filled with stain
easily seduced by lustful egoism
in the sparkling and glittering of worldly hedonism
full of envious jealousy of others richness
that is why their heart full of stigma and darkness
that is why their heart full of stigma and darkness
o my brother please do not lose this reminder
the obligatory to learn with all its order
for thickening our faith and Tawhid
as the best provisions in pronouncing the death creed
as the best provisions in pronouncing the death creed
the most pious people is the most kindhearted
because their knowledge is well-established
doing the Thariqah until revealed the Marifah
and finally arriving at the absorbing Haqiqah
201
and finally arriving at the absorbing Haqiqah
The Timeless Quran is a noble revelation
  
201
Shariah, Thariqah, Haqiqah is known as the three hierarchical paths that one takes to reach the Ultimate 
Reality
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though unwritten but readable in pronunciation
that is the teaching of clear-sighted teacher
and have this implanted inside your chest deeper and deeper
and have this implanted inside your chest deeper and deeper
after it embedded in your minds and hearts
it will obsess your bodies and innards
The Miracle of The Prophet (Quran) become a guidance
as a entering doorway of the faith radiance
as a entering doorway of the faith radiance
In Allah The Most Exalted
we must day and night approached and asked
with all of our tiraka
202
and effort
and not to forget zikr and suluq
203
and not to forget zikr and so suluq
our life will be tranquil and peaceful
which is a sign of our beliefs and faithful
forbearing the unbearable incidence
with a consciousness of Allahs providence
with a consciousness of Allahs providence
with friends, brothers and neighbours fellow
live harmoniously without fuss and row
this is the Sunna of The Noble Prophet
Prophet Muhammad our adviser and leader
Prophet Muhammad our adviser and leader
lets do this with all our ability
Allah that will raise our degree and nobility
even though considered physically low and humble
but spiritually we will be seen as high and noble
but spiritually we will be seen as high and noble
and when finally come the time to die
our spirits and souls will not lost and stray
Allah will laud us to His paradise
and our corpse will remain intact and our shroud will stay flawless
and our corpse will remain intact and our shroud will stay flawless
The second paragraphs in Arabic repeated
***
* Translated by Reapmeaning (2014)
The author of the hymn is not known. While people believe Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) composed it, 
others claim Gus Nizam from Pesantren Darul Safa Wal Wafa, Sidoarjo, East Java, is the author. The hymn was 
made popular right after Gus Dur passed away, so there was no way to confirm whether he was the true 
author. Gus Nizam was reported to have made statement that he had no problem if the hymn he composed is 
being popularized under the name of Gus Dur.
  
202
Javanese of pracitising Thariqah
203
Journey of the mystics in Sufism
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Appendix-6 Photos
Fig 6.1 Pesantren Riyadhul Jannah, Pacet, Mojokerto, East Java
 
Fig 6.2 Pesantren An-Nur Fatmah, Trawas, Mojokerto, East Java
 
Kyai Munhanif, Ibu Nyai (his wife) and myself    In-depth interview with Kyai Munhanif
Fishpond for Agribusiness class. Riyadhul 
Jannah has organic farm as well
Fenceless-pesantren.
The village behind Riyadhul Jannah
Practical entrepreneurship class. Riyadhul 





6.3 A picture of the Traditionalists families living in Surabaya city: 
 
 Attending Thariqah Naqshabandiyah gathering at Masjid Akbar (12/28/2012)
6.4 Urban santri education: At-Taqwa Primary School, in Surabaya city
 
A classroom at an-Nur Fatmah. All 
of them came from poor families. 
Not only do I have to teach them, 
but also feed them (Munhanif)
A villager of Trawas and the 
firewood from nearby forest
Islamic education in Indonesia is now 
so well institutionalized that, in 
contrast to the pattern of the 1950s 
and 1960s, all Muslim citizens receive 
basic (and state-mandated) training in 




Young urban observant Muslims. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Indonesian authorities lifted the ban on 
wearing the veil in public schools. The veil was promoted in particular by dawah (preaching of Islam) activists 
belonging to the groups known as Usroh and Tarbiyah who were inspired by Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwan al-Muslimin) (Hefner, 2013)




List of education services. 
From pre-school to a college
The 3 hectares enclave
The fenced-enclave becomes a safe 
playground for children





6.6 Campus of Pesantren Hidayatullah Balikpapan, East Kalimantan
 
Hidayatullah is a community of students (female 
leader, Reni). At university she was interested in 
Usroh and Tarbiyah, then, joined Hidayatullah.
In-depth interview with Suharsono
The headquarter in Balikpapan Network of pesantren across the archipelago




Female pengajian when I was asked to 
explain about my research
Female murabbi, Mulkiyah, and 
Hidayatullahs vision of education: creating 
Quranic generations
Girl classroom Sewing classroom





Reading the Quran Female laundry area
New female student dormitory.
As more space and facility improvement 
needed, permanent building appeared
In contrast,






Living in natureFood stalls 
Having break
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We are preparing our children in four skills: reading-writing, number, farming and trading -besides 
knowledge of Islam (Rangka)
STTP gate Explaining the research at An-Nadzir 
function hut.
In depth interview with Rangka and Epong Members Housing, made of natural 
material and roofing
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Organic farming   
Economic activities
Abah [father, referred to Rangka] tells us if the buyer bargain too hard that means they dont have 
enough money, so we just have to give it away with whatever price they like (respondent Hasbi)
Casual clothes for working time, 
Abdullah Rifai is a Papuan ethnic
Robe and turban for evening time. After 
in-depth interview with Lukman Bakti
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